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ABSTRACT 
 
 
New exciting literature that points to the significance of considering intersubjective 
processes in therapeutic work with people diagnosed with psychosis has been recently 
developed in the realms of phenomenological psychology and psychiatry. However, 
the research literature reveals an emphasis towards the exploration of clients’ 
processes and an underestimated inclination towards the in-depth exploration of 
therapists’ experiences that work from an intersubjective/interrelational perspective 
with this client group. Given this particular limitation, we therefore need a more 
detailed exploration of what this work is like, and how therapists make sense of this 
work considering this intersubjective turn. This project has therefore attempted to 
shed light on the intersubjective processes of psychotherapy for psychosis from the 
therapists’ point of view while emphasising how the therapeutic praxis can be 
grounded upon firm existential-phenomenological principles. The study explored the 
subjective experiences of six counselling psychologists and/or therapists who 
identified themselves as working intersubjectively with psychosis. After careful 
consideration, Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) was employed as the 
most suitable methodology in order to explore the interviews and to gain insight into 
participants’ lived experiences of their relationships with clients. The analysis of data 
revealed four key themes: the primacy of sense-making, a relational approach to 
therapy, therapists’ processes in the rupture of relatedness and the lived experience of 
being-with. Despite the congruence with the limited literature on therapists’ lived 
experiences of their intersubjective work with psychosis, the results of this study also 
shed light on some neglected areas of consideration with regards to the therapeutic 
process, while encouraging the consideration of existential/phenomenological 
contributions towards both the understanding and clinical praxis of the psychotherapy 
for psychosis. This piece of work consists therefore of a significant contribution to the 
limited literature on phenomenological and intersubjective work with psychosis and is 
an essential addition to counselling psychology literature. 
 
Keywords: Psychosis, Intersubjectivity, Counselling Psychology, Psychotherapy 
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TERMINOLOGY 	
 
It should be noted that all terminology employed will be as thoroughly defined as 
possible and presented within the epistemological and ontological frameworks within 
which the study was conducted. I am aware that some readers may not feel 
comfortable with the employment of the term ‘psychosis’ and the phrases 
individual(s) diagnosed with psychosis or person(s) with psychosis will be employed 
in this research paper in an effort to avoid using terms like psychotic or schizophrenic 
which are considered to stigmatise individuals (e.g. Haghighat, 2008; Dinos et. al, 
2004; Keusch, Wilentz, & Kleinman, 2006). Words or phrases within single quotation 
marks that are presented throughout the research will be employed to indicate 
constructed ideas, notions and concepts, or conditions that have been considered 
according to their context of interest (e.g. medical and psychiatric settings), with the 
intention of bringing taken for granted concepts into an open enquiry for the reader. 
Moreover, it should be noted that when I am referring to discourse/s, I refer to 
patterns or regularities routed in language or written form, therefore, the ways in 
which we think about particular phenomena (e.g. Bakhtin, 1981).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
					 10 
“Εάν µη έλπηται 
ανέλπιστον ουκ εξευρήσει, 
ανεξερεύνητον εόν και άπορον”  
                                                                
 (Ηράκλειτος)  
 
  
 “If you don't bear hope 
you will not discover the unforeseen 
by rendering it unexplored and beyond reach” 
                  
 (Heraclitus)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
					 11 
PREFACE 	
NOTE ON WRITING STYLE 
 
This research project has been written with a view to submitting to a British 
Psychological Society Journal. It has therefore been written according to the British 
Psychological Society’s style guidelines and has followed the American 
Psychological Association’s referencing and citation style (American Psychological 
Association, 2010). In constructivist research methodologies where a subjective and 
interactive researcher role predominates, the language employed to present the 
research processes and results describes the rhetoric structure, which flows closely 
from one’s epistemological and axiological stance (Ponterotto, 2005). It is therefore 
important to elucidate that the current project, which was conducted from an 
existential-phenomenological perspective, was written in the first and not the third 
person narrative for very specific reasons which lie at the core of phenomenology 
(e.g., Finlay, 2011). Such an approach is in line with seminal phenomenological 
approaches such as that of Husserl (1925/1977) who opened up the way to 
phenomenology as the reflective study of structures of consciousness as experienced 
from a first-person perspective. As the narrator in this research project, I was 
justifiable as an active agent in establishing with all co-researchers the dependable 
research findings by reflecting together about shared meanings, as human beings 
interested in the explored phenomenon of working at a relational depth with people 
that had been given a diagnosis of psychosis. It would have therefore been 
incongruent to engage in a de-personalised third person narrative and instead, written 
in first person narrative, this thesis reflects a more authentic outcome, congruent with 
the chosen epistemological and ontological position, which will be unpacked in the 
introduction.   
 
 
 
					 12 
INTRODUCING THE AUTHOR  
 
This section aims at introducing the reader to my personal journey in the 
training of counselling psychology and existential psychotherapy and my work 
experience in psychiatric settings in order to explain how my personal and research 
interest in the field of psychosis has progressively formed itself and led to the 
development of the current project. Moreover, this section is vital in the sense that 
from a qualitative and more particularly a phenomenological research vantage point, 
the position from which one speaks should be as thoroughly reflected as possible in 
order to acknowledge pre-conceptions and how previous lived experiences can 
influence the research process overall.  
 
Before I commenced postgraduate studies in counselling psychology (CoP), I 
completed undergraduate studies in social sciences and psychology. My 
undergraduate years required a great level of involvement with the empirical and 
scientific principles of the psychological-scientific model, which emphasises the 
objective and the measurable. My involvement with this logical-empiricist 
perspective gave me the opportunity to appreciate the scientific demand for rigorous 
empirical enquiry focusing on traditional psychology, but likewise, I felt that the 
empirical methodologies for understanding and exploring the human experience were 
narrow and monodimensional. It therefore felt necessary to choose a postgraduate 
training within applied psychology that would endorse a more pluralistic attitude with 
recognition and validation of multiple perspectives in theory and practice, whilst also 
integrating psychotherapeutic training. The consideration of selecting pure 
psychotherapeutic training did not appeal to me at the time, as I was deeply interested 
in exploring qualitative and phenomenological research methods from a psychological 
platform. CoP seemed able to combine psychology and psychotherapy in a tantalising 
fashion. Its pluralistic, anti-dogmatic standpoint and commitment towards the 
subjective experience and the possibility for its significant contribution to the 
understanding of human existence attracted me greatly. My decision to train as a 
counselling psychologist (CoPt), particularly within the existential-phenomenological 
paradigm, therefore gradually became clear.  
 
					 13 
 In the process of reflecting about how past experiences have contributed to the 
formation of my decision to choose the existential-phenomenological school of 
thought, it was impossible to ignore memories of my early schooldays. The high 
school curriculum back in Cyprus (where I come from) included weekly readings, 
comprehension and analyses of ancient Greek tragedies by writers such as Aeschylus, 
Sophocles, and Euripides. Their narratives of great suffering and transience and their 
imperative of growth through suffering were early intimations of existential attitudes 
and dilemmas since their central concerns were problems related to human existence. 
These tragedians advocate saying yes to life even in its strangest and most painful 
experiences. Although I was unacquainted with existentialism back in those days, the 
explicit exposure to existential works in adulthood rekindled a nameless passion and 
framed pre-existing knowledge. Poring over existential philosophy books in early 
adulthood gradually became my new retreat. My passion for world literature and 
cinema were a crucial factor in the development of my philosophical background. 
Favourite film directors such as Ingmar Bergman, François Truffaut, Jean-Luc 
Godard, Michelangelo Antonioni, Akira Kurosawa, Andrei Tarkovsky, Krzysztof 
Kieslowski and many more certainly demonstrate the richness of an existentialist 
interrogation of meaning and purposefulness of action in the world, and contemporary 
cinema continues to prove a fertile area for philosophical enquiry. In addition, writers 
such as Albert Camus, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Franz Kafka, Samuel Beckett, William 
Shakespeare, Hermann Hesse, Oscar Wilde, Haruki Murakami, Leo Tolstoy, George 
Orwell and Simone de Beauvoir whose works accompanied my early adult years, 
demonstrate philosophical concern in the actions and choices of their characters, and 
through the medium of art exemplify their understanding of existentialist philosophy. 
The existential-phenomenological approach to CoP and its devotion to 
phenomenological models of research and practice and its interest in consciousness, 
subjective experience and inter-relationship appeared therefore greatly alluring and 
aligned with my personal interest in existential philosophy.  
 
 The same month I commenced my postgraduate training in existential CoP 
and psychotherapy I also started working on an acute psychiatric unit in the National 
Health Service (NHS) as a mental healthcare worker, a position I held for a 
continuous period of three years. My decision to apply for this particular post was 
					 14 
mainly guided by my curiosity to witness how people who experience severe distress 
are treated and understood in psychiatric settings, and also to explore the severity and 
manifestations of human distress. However, later reflections resulting from my 
clinical work with psychosis provided me with the opportunity to consider how this 
decision was also influenced by a deeper need to explore my own depths of anxiety 
and anguish. My main responsibilities involved the development and maintenance of 
therapeutic relationships with in-patients as part of the on-going assessment and care 
delivery process, and ensure relevant information was reported to the rest of the team. 
Other responsibilities involved contribution and participation in the assessment, 
planning, implementing and evaluating of care and ‘treatment’ in the ward 
environment and assisting in the delivery of therapeutic programmes.  
 
The concurrency of my exposure to theoretical material and discourses on 
critical approaches to psychiatry and ‘psychopathology’ from a philosophical and 
existential-phenomenological vantage point (e.g., Du Plock, 1995; Foucault, 1988; 
Gallagher, 2004; Laing, 1965, 1967; Sass, 2000; Sass & Parnas, 2006; Stanghellini, 
2004; Szasz, 1979) throughout my CoP training, and my lived experiences on the 
psychiatric ward, gradually formed a tension within, which took me a while to contain 
and make sense of.  However, my efforts to contain and make sense of the 
effervescing tensions among the two dynamic platforms and the discourses to which I 
was exposed (mainstream psychiatric versus the existential-phenomenological) 
gradually shaped my research question. I felt deeply challenged in my efforts to 
embrace an attitude to psychopathology that could still allow me the appropriate 
space to reflect the basic humanistic value of my personal philosophical position by 
emphasising clients’ lived experiences. The philosophical backbone of my CoP 
training that was informed by the phenomenological tradition was aligned with this 
view, by emphasising ‘well-being’ instead of notions of pathology (Strawbridge & 
Woolfe, 2003). As Woolfe (1990) has emphasised, CoP places a great emphasis on 
the phenomenological: “(…) one of the primary contributions which CoP has to offer 
psychologists is the value it places on the subjective experience of its clients. The 
sharing of this inner reality helps to cement the relationship between client and helper 
and acknowledges the importance of each individual’s construal of life experiences” 
(p. 532). 
					 15 
The psychiatric environment on the ward where I was employed had the 
typical approach of classifying clients into ‘disorders’ and embracing the symptom-
and-diagnosis-focused approach epitomised by the American Psychiatric 
Association’s (2013) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). 
This is a medical model approach to human distress, which embodies the fundamental 
assumptions of positivist-empiricist science such that human distress can be 
justifiably and precisely categorised (Boyle, 1999), which has been significantly 
critiqued (e.g., Bentall, 2003; Boyle, 2002; Bracken et al., 2012; Fee, 2000; 
Johnstone, 2008). My passionate engagement with clients and colleagues on the ward 
gradually generated several questions and reflections: What could I possibly offer as a 
trainee CoPt within an inpatient psychiatric setting? What could I possibly offer as a 
chartered CoPt in the near future to people whom I felt were trapped and re-
traumatised in inpatient psychiatric services? But most of all, what was it like to form 
close relationships with individuals who had been diagnosed with psychosis, where 
this possibility of the formation of relationships felt to me sabotaged by the 
exaggerated and oversimplified conception that it remains tremendously challenging 
if not impossible?    
 
My basic responsibilities on the ward provided me with a great opportunity to 
spend a considerable amount of time with clients and establish close relationships 
with many of them, which was significant for my curiosity to explore and make sense 
of severe distress and particularly the manifestation of psychosis and its 
meaningfulness. The ward manager, who had witnessed my passion in working 
attentively with clients, soon invited me to take over more responsibilities while 
supporting me in receiving further training related to multifaceted issues in working 
with psychosis. My intense involvement on the ward provided me the opportunity to 
approach mental health and wellbeing in a holistic fashion. My responsibilities 
provided the opportunity to explore what clients were going through, how psychosis 
subjectively emerged for people in heterogeneous ways, how they experienced 
themselves and others around them, how they experienced me in trying to make sense 
of their own experiences but also how their milieu experienced them and responded to 
their difficulties. It is therefore without doubt that my research project was gradually 
inspired within these subjective and intersubjective dynamics.   
					 16 
INTRODUCING THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
 This research project investigates the experiences of CoPts’ and 
psychotherapists, who identified themselves as coming from a relational-
intersubjective standpoint, working with individuals who have been diagnosed with 
psychosis. The scarce literature on the experiences of CoPts working with this 
client group, and also my awareness as a trainee CoPt of a growing body of 
negative literature about psychologists, psychiatrists and psychotherapists’ difficulty 
in working with this client group (e.g., Hinshelwood, 2004; Jackson, 2001; 
Midence, 2000; Dennis, 2000) have also been a significant influence on the 
development of this project. My review of the UK CoP literature revealed that there 
were only a few articles and doctoral theses written by/for CoPts on working with 
individuals diagnosed with psychosis and very limited literature within the CoP field 
on working with this particular group. Frequent and systematic searches within a 
range of psychology databases confirmed this to be the case (e.g. psychINFO). My 
preliminary objective was to exclusively explore the experience of CoPts working 
therapeutically with individuals diagnosed with psychosis. Prior to arriving at the 
final phase of giving shape to my main research question and deciding upon my 
participants, my initial idea went through a series of revisions. The potential 
difficulties in recruiting CoPts who meet the inclusion criteria due to expected 
shortage (e.g., Larsson, Loewenthal, & Brooks, 2012) were confirmed after the first 
stages of identification, targeting and enlistment of possible participants. The 
response rate was significantly low from the very beginning of the recruitment 
process until its completion. After careful revisions, I finally decided also to include 
psychotherapists from different modalities who identified themselves as working from 
a relational/intersubjective vantage point. It is significant to clarify that in the process 
of revising my inclusion criteria I considered the ‘relational’ approach of practitioners 
as a more significant factor in working intersubjectively, as opposed to imposable 
therapeutic techniques (e.g., Geekie & Read, 2009). By including a gamut of 
background training and therapeutic orientations, I assumed a more comprehensive 
understanding of the explored phenomenon and an association with the existing 
literature, to facilitate applicability and dissemination.  
 
					 17 
SITUATING THE AUTHOR WITHIN THE PROJECT  
 
The origins of the project’s early inspirations are considered as an inextricable 
section of the personal reflexivity dimension, an intentional position that will be 
employed throughout the project. It should be noted here that incorporating a self-
reflexive position throughout the research process has been a significantly fertile yet 
challenging task. As has been argued by Kidder and Fine (1997), subjectivities must 
be “(…) acknowledged, studied, interrogated and written about” (p.40). Finlay (2002) 
suggested that such an attitude helps the researcher to transform subjectivity in 
research from a potential problem to an opportunity. Gadamer (1960/1996) has also 
emphasised that in the process of exploring and trying to understand phenomena in 
qualitative research, the process of self-understanding remains significant since we 
are always speaking and exploring from a position contingent on our personal history. 
Even though a Gadamerian hermeneutic approach has informed the research process 
of this project as I have been thoughtful of my own lived experiences and personal 
history related to the explored phenomena, this was accompanied by the appropriate 
bracketing which will be discussed later.  
 
My working background and experiences in psychiatric settings have 
significantly influenced and set the basis for this research project, hence 
encompassing a biographical influence (e.g., Harper, 1999) in the formation of my 
research proposal in the early days. It should therefore be clarified that the following 
remarks are reflections of my own intersubjective experiences and therefore 
idiosyncratic in nature. Moreover, the context of CoP training itself has also been a 
significant factor which provided the appropriate atmosphere, conducive to critical 
research. As has already been stressed, the philosophy of my training was based on 
existential-phenomenological philosophy and it provided me with the opportunity to 
appreciate and identify with existential-phenomenological (e.g. Deurzen-Smith, 
1997), post-existential and postmodern approaches to counselling and psychotherapy 
(e.g., Loewenthal, 2011), a focus on intersubjective approaches to psychology and 
psychotherapy (e.g., Frie, 2003; Frie, 1997) and critical approaches to 
psychopathology and psychiatry (e.g., Sass, 1994; Thomas & Bracken, 2004).        
 
					 18 
The mental health trust I have worked for has in recent years introduced the 
provision of talking therapies for clients receiving treatment within inpatient settings, 
including family therapy, individual cognitive-behavioural therapy, psychosocial 
interventions and weekly group therapy adjusted for psychosis. The introduction of 
these services was part of the latest developments within the UK mental health sector, 
which has begun to consider recovery and living well in the presence or absence of 
one’s ‘symptoms’ as the optimum outcome for people, rather than understanding 
stabilisation (National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2009). Additionally, recovery 
is progressively conceptualised on an international level as not simply the reduction 
and treatment of manifested ‘symptoms’ or achievement of psychological milestones. 
It is also seen as encompassing positive transformations in how people reflect on and 
experience themselves as individual human beings in the world, changes that may 
occur irrespective of whether they experience other improvements in symptoms or 
function (Silverstein & Bellack, 2008).  
 
Although this has been a noteworthy shift and albeit the aforesaid provision of 
services can be integrated into the clients’ treatment plan on a voluntary level, clinical 
interventions involving the administration of psychotropic medication still dominate 
the treatment of severe human distress. More specifically I observed that the enforced 
administration of psychotropic medication for individuals sectioned under the Mental 
Health Act (Department of Constitutional Affairs, 2007) restricted their volition on 
many different levels. When clients were not compliant with their medication they 
were explicitly considered incompetent in making decisions regarding their own 
treatment. I have often questioned the value of encouraging the client towards a 
relational and intersubjective option (talking therapies) when they seemed objectified 
into a complex ‘accumulation’ of symptoms. How can a person assume a purposive 
striving towards a talking therapy when she is simultaneously considered incompetent 
in making decisions for her treatment in the often-presented case of refusing 
medication? How can we consider the manifested avolition in hospitalised people as 
independent from the rationale of their hospitalisation? I witnessed various implicit 
and explicit conflicting demands placed upon clients during their hospitalisation (e.g. 
freedom to choose a form of talking therapy versus the enforced psychotropic 
medication), which often brought to mind the concept of the Bateson’s double bind 
					 19 
which has been hugely neglected in the literature and deals with the conceptualisation 
and understanding of psychotic experiences. Bateson (1972) suggested that these 
conflicting demands might lead a person to further confusion in their thinking 
processes and may appear incapable of confronting it at length. In view of Bateson’s 
double bind hypothesis, the solution for the client is then to create an escape from the 
conflicting logical demands of the double bind, in the subjective world of a delusional 
system.  
 
 
EXPLANATION OF MAIN CONCEPTS   
 
It is essential to briefly introduce the reader to the concepts of both psychosis 
and intersubjectivity, which constitute the principal exploratory emphases within this 
research attempt. Psychosis in the mainstream psychiatric/psychological literature and 
diagnostic manuals is a broad term described as a bundle of clinical symptoms 
presented accordingly in several diagnostic categories (e.g. schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, delusional disorder, etc.), which include 
hallucinations, delusions, thought disorders, disorganized or anomalous speech, 
flat/inappropriate affect, avolition, apathy, disorganized behaviour, catatonic motor 
behaviour, depersonalization and derealization (Ban-Thomas, 2001). This project 
does not comprehend these experiences as pathological states or symptoms of a single 
form of acute distress but instead considers them as meaningful and context-sensitive 
experiences. By employing an E-P approach, this project understands the 
phenomenon of psychosis as a meaningful alteration of intentionality and self-
experience, and also as a transformation of Other-experience and disembodiment. The 
literature review is not particularly interested in exploring the causations/aetiology of 
the manifold phenomena of psychosis but instead is interested in making sense of 
their meaning by approaching them as a way of being-in-the-world. Additionally, 
from a phenomenological perspective, psychosis is not conceived as a pathological 
condition which happens within the person but one that occurs between the person 
and the world.   
 
					 20 
Intersubjectivity cannot be exhaustively defined within a single paragraph or 
chapter, as it is an extremely complicated concept that can be approached from 
several philosophical, sociological, and psychological perspectives, even from within 
a single epistemological framework. Furthermore, although various E-P thinkers have 
directly or indirectly addressed the problem of intersubjectivity, in subsequent 
sections I will be emphasising those whose contributions are considered more in line 
with this project’s epistemological position and pertinent to the understanding of 
psychosis and its psychotherapy (Binswanger, Merleau-Ponty, Buber, Scheler) while 
critically reviewing others (Sartre, Heidegger, Husserl). A particular emphasis will be 
placed upon Buber’s dialogical philosophy and how his analysis of the ontology of the 
between (Buber, 1921/1996) can contribute towards a clinical understanding of an I-
Thou intersubjectivity in therapeutic work with psychosis. Intersubjectivity in this 
sense emphasises the significance of reciprocal relatedness and the emergence and 
unfolding of selfhood as contingent upon dialogue, which is situated between 
separateness and relatedness in the therapeutic process. Even though one can often 
locate references in the psychological and psychotherapeutic literature conflating 
empathy with intersubjectivity, it is important to remark that the two are not 
indistinguishable concepts. Zahavi (2001) distinguished between intersubjectivity and 
empathy and emphasised that intersubjectivity does not exclusively concern concrete 
face-to-face interactions or the thematic interchange between two persons, where one 
is trying to comprehend the emotions or experiences of the other. Intersubjectivity is 
therefore not only to be understood in its ontic but in its ontological and 
transcendental forms and involves the multifaceted interactions between subjectivity 
and the world. In other words, it is interested in the intersections of self, others and 
the world. In a subsequent section, I will explain in more detail how this project 
mainly emphasises the form of intersubjectivity which endorses the second-person 
perspective.  
 
 
 
 
					 21 
SYNOPSIS  
 
A substantial amount of psychological and psychotherapeutic literature 
emerging from a plethora of theoretical standpoints emphasises the significant 
difficulties people diagnosed with psychosis present in their interpersonal engagement 
with others (e.g. Davidson, 2003; Fromm-Reichmann, 1950; Kline, Horn, & 
Patterson, 1996; Lysaker, Wickett, Wilke, & Lysaker, 2003; Searles, 1965; Sullivan, 
1962). However, despite the plurality and diversity in the psychotherapeutic literature 
which stresses the aspects of the psychotic state and its ‘distorted’ intersubjectivity, 
there has been an underestimated inclination towards the exploration of 
psychotherapists’ self-experiences and challenges within the intersubjective space of 
psychotherapy and the ways in which these affect the therapeutic process and 
outcome. Even though diverse psychoanalytic discussions regarding the 
countertransference involved in the psychotherapy of psychosis have considered the 
vulnerability of the therapist (e.g. Searles, 1965), it is conceived in a dissimilar way 
than from an intersubjective and relational perspective. As Cohn (1997) has 
addressed, in the psychoanalytic view of the therapeutic relationship the emphasis is 
on transference and countertransference with a preference towards an impersonal 
space and a need for anonymity without considering the place of the ‘real’ 
relationship the intersubjective perspective addresses. However, a growing body of 
contemporary psychoanalytic theorists and practitioners address the significance of 
real engagement between client and therapist with an emphasis on the therapist’s 
openness in the therapeutic space (e.g. Stolorow, 2013) and this will be therefore 
considered.  
 
From an intersubjective point of view, it is impossible to negate the possibility 
of a failure of the therapist to meaningfully engage with the person presenting 
psychosis. Someone might rightly suggest that the person in the psychotic state might 
invite the therapist to engage with a deeply disturbing aspect of herself, in a manner 
that might sabotage the intersubjective space in-between. We cannot, therefore, 
assume that therapists are solely defined by an indisputable capacity for reciprocity 
and dialogue. If we consider that psychosis manifests as a ‘pathological’ form of 
intersubjectivity which has a relational ‘dysfunction’ of self in relation to self and 
					 22 
Other (e.g. Kimura, 1982), we cannot assume the therapist’s intersubjectivity 
‘wholeness’. In the case of individual psychotherapy, it cannot ever be ‘whole’ as it 
consists of two subjectivities that are held in a relational tension and are mutually 
influencing each other. Someone may also argue that within the therapeutic process of 
psychotherapy for psychosis the ‘deficient’ intersubjectivity also occurs due to a 
failing engagement from the professional’s side. Based on my lived experience, the 
therapeutic engagement with psychosis provides the opportunity to shed light on 
personal difficulties in engaging with otherness and these experiences have therefore 
emerged as a powerful initiative in this research project. Along similar lines, below I 
provide a quote from Rumke (1941/1990, p.336) who paid close attention to the 
abovementioned processes and portrays clearly how these are thought of from a 
phenomenological perspective:   
 
As interpersonal relations are not one-sided, the investigator examining a 
sufferer from schizophrenia notices something out of the order within 
himself. What is wrong is then not just the emanating feeling, but a sort of 
destabilization: when establishing an encounter, we usually ‘lean into’ a 
relation, which is stabilized by the process of interaction and 
reverberation that usually gains its own autonomy. We project ourselves 
and create a common space and our mode of self-relation that 
characterizes such projection depends on the autonomy of the smooth-
exchange.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
					 23 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 	
1.1 AIMS OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT  
 
 In accessing my participants’ lived experiences, I have employed a 
phenomenological paradigm and in particular the methodology of Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) (Smith & Osborn, 2008), with the objective of 
gaining access to their subjective experiences in the context of their work with people 
that have been diagnosed with psychosis. A particular focus was placed upon the 
intersubjective elements of the therapeutic processes involved, in order to shed light 
on the clinical implications of working intersubjectively with psychosis, and provide 
directions for further research both within the CoP and existential psychotherapy 
fields, but also in the wider psychotherapeutic community. These particular research 
priorities have not yet been explicitly explored within the CoP literature, and it was 
hoped that this research could contribute to a severely neglected area in the field. 
While I was initially interested in exclusively exploring CoPts’ experiences, after 
revisions I finally decided to include psychotherapists in my sample. With the 
multifaceted challenges of working therapeutically with psychosis being recognised, 
embracing a gamut of background training and orientations offered a more 
comprehensive understanding of the phenomena (and therapists’ stances towards 
them) and the linkage with the extant literature, in order to facilitate widespread 
applicability and dissemination.  		
1.2 EPISTEMOLOGICAL POSITION  	
Although I will thoroughly address the topic of epistemology in the 
methodology chapter, it feels vital at this point to summarise my epistemological 
position with regards to the current research initiative. Having being trained by choice 
as a CoPt within the E-P paradigm, my passion and commitment to this particular 
philosophy have influenced the way I have positioned myself within this paper with 
					 24 
all the accompanying roles of the researcher, interviewer, narrator, and writer. 
Although there are many ways to approach psychosis, my intention has been clear 
from the very beginning: to approach it from an E-P position as a becoming-
counselling-psychologist, less concerned with the origins or aetiology of psychosis 
but mostly focused on practitioners’ lived experiences.  
 
 I zealously consider that I have conducted a valuable piece of research that is 
of direct benefit to both CoP and psychotherapy and particularly to clinicians who 
work with people diagnosed with psychosis. Having employed a phenomenological 
research method, it is important to note that I acknowledge the possible biases within 
the research process itself and the final results which are, as McLeod (2001) 
explained, always influenced by the researcher. He also states that it is impossible to 
separate oneself from the research in order to be an entirely neutral investigator. 
Similarly, Finlay (2008) emphasised that a researcher who attempts an objectivistic, 
distanced or detached attitude sabotages the phenomenological approach. I have 
therefore tried to be as vigilant and reflective as possible and have tried to orchestrate 
the appropriate level of proximity and distance in order to represent my participants’ 
experiences of the explored phenomena as authentically as possible.  
 
 
1.3 SUMMARY OF CONTENTS   
 
 It should be primarily noted that all terminology employed will be thoroughly 
defined and presented within the epistemological and ontological frameworks in 
which this study was conducted. The literature review will commence with exploring 
psychosis from the phenomenological angle through early E-P and contemporary 
phenomenological approaches. An exploration of intersubjectivity through the lens of 
phenomenology will proceed by placing emphasis on intersubjectively informed 
psychotherapeutic approaches. Moving on, I will proceed with a thorough 
engagement with the chosen methodology and methods. Given the selection of IPA as 
the method of analysis, engaging thoroughly with methodology is crucial given IPA’s 
commitment to phenomenological description and interpretation. The analysis of data 
					 25 
proceeds with a clear exposition of participants’ accounts and the process of 
organising and analysing them into themes. In the discussion chapter, I attempt to 
evaluate the results in light of the literature review by presenting additional literature 
that has been considered appropriate. The discussion connects the conclusion to the 
rest of the project including clinical and methodological considerations, limitations of 
the research and shedding light into the possibilities for future research in the area of 
interest.  It should be specified that due to the limitations of space, the following 
sections are not as comprehensive as I would have wished for. Nonetheless, I 
anticipate that the relevant information and presented results will be sufficient to 
engender additional enquiries and discussion regarding the chosen research area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	
					 26 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 	
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
 This section will attempt to include the most significant issues relevant to the 
research question through an integrated exploration of the existing literature by 
focusing significant attention on current epistemological and ontological arguments. 
The intention here is to prepare the reader for the rest of the research, which will 
concentrate on the subjective experiences of CoPts and psychotherapists working 
intersubjectively with psychosis. It is important to stress that CoP’s association with 
diagnostic categories such as psychosis has received little consideration in the 
literature. More specifically, CoPts’ experiences who work with people diagnosed 
with psychosis have not received the appropriate attention and therefore exploration 
of the nature of the therapeutic relationship from a CoP vantage point and a detailed 
emphasis upon the intersubjective dynamics inherent in the therapeutic process appear 
vital. The review will initially attempt an exploration of the phenomenon of psychosis 
by focusing on fundamental phenomenological notions such as intentionality, 
embodiment, temporality, subjectivity and intersubjectivity. A consideration of the 
literature on the psychotherapy of psychosis and the early contributions from the 
existential-phenomenological paradigm through the lens of intersubjectivity will then 
proceed.  
 
 
2.2 PSYCHOSIS  	
2.2.1 Approaching psychosis phenomenologically  
 
Among the plethora of approaches available in understanding and working 
with psychosis (psychiatric, psychological, psychosocial, psychodynamic, 
psychoanalytical, etc.), I am committed to approaching it from the E-P angle, and 
therefore interested in the essence of how psychosis manifests and is subjectively 
					 27 
experienced but most importantly how it reflects a particular way of relating to the 
world. From an E-P perspective, this particular emphasis on lived experience exceeds 
the endeavour to explore the origin of phenomena in the clinical setting. Instead, there 
is an emphasis on how the experience has been transformed and how the person 
experiences and describes this transformation. Moreover, understanding the lived 
experience does not necessarily involve the comprehension of the causes.  For these 
reasons, the aetiological literature will not be explored in the literature review.  
 
 Aside from the idiosyncratic influences which have been unpacked in the 
preface, I undertake that it is important to introduce and answer the following 
question as transparently as possible: Why is it important to engage in 
phenomenological explorations of interpersonal relating in working therapeutically 
with severe forms of distress – and more specifically with psychosis – from a CoP 
perspective? Perhaps, the most substantial reason is that CoP as a division of applied 
psychology, undoubtedly rooted in the phenomenological tradition (e.g. Woolfe, 
1996), is primarily interested in the formation of intimate therapeutic relationships 
and making sense of otherness in the process. We may also undeniably argue that the 
development of an effective clinical practice is partially contingent on being able to 
hold a reflective attitude towards the multidimensional manifestations of 
intersubjectivity within the therapeutic space. Moreover, philosophical and 
phenomenological frameworks affect the way we think about and critically evaluate 
psychiatric disorders from a CoP perspective. What is also significant is that 
phenomenological explorations may be of direct clinical importance to CoPts working 
with psychosis given that phenomenological approaches of other-awareness and self-
awareness suggest different potential ways of constructing therapeutic approaches in 
the psychotherapy for psychosis (Lysaker, Glynn, Wilkniss, & Silverstein, 2010). 
 
Even though this chapter employs an E-P approach in attempting to describe 
and make sense of psychosis and relevant phenomena, I am not suggesting that these 
phenomena can apply to all persons who are diagnosed with psychosis (e.g. Bentall, 
1993). Strict diagnostic tendencies and the inclination to generalise research findings 
on particular clinical phenomena for specific groups are attitudes that both CoP and 
the E-P paradigm seem to challenge. Along these lines, Parnas, Nordgaard & Varga 
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(2010) suggested that since psychosis is a descriptive term with no biological 
indicator of its presence and taking into consideration that a person is always situated 
within a specific existential context, it appears impossible to provide a reliable, 
context-immune list of symptoms for psychosis. Psychosis, therefore, cannot be 
understood outside and independently of the contextual, psychological and existential 
circumstances of a person. Briefly speaking, this project will approach psychosis as 
an altered state of self-awareness and other-awareness that results from a person’s 
way of being-in-the-world1(Heidegger, 1926/2001). I will therefore embrace an 
approach of a deeper phenomenological reflection of the psychotic position of being-
in-the-world, by examining its existential condition, and look for the way in which the 
structure of meaning may be uncovered. The strand of phenomenology this project 
endorses attempts to comprehend and conceptualise phenomena in the closest 
possible accordance with how a person actually experiences these phenomena. Even 
though I will provide a description of the phenomenal features of psychosis as they 
have been described and conceptualised by early and contemporary 
phenomenological studies, I will not restrict the content of this chapter to such a 
description. Phenomenology is not merely a method of taxonomy or nosology that 
seeks to form operational definitions (Mullen, 2007), despite the fact that some of its 
earliest attempts in approaching clinical phenomena have retained and cultivated 
these methods. This is exactly why some of the earliest phenomenological approaches 
to psychosis, and particularly Jaspers’ ‘Descriptive Psychopathology’, have failed to 
comprehensively approach severe distress. Greatly influenced by Edmund Husserl’s 
phenomenological project, Jaspers laid the methodological foundations of descriptive 
psychopathology in psychiatric research and practice (Hafner, 2015). Jaspers adopted 
a sound phenomenological approach in gaining knowledge about psychopathological 
states and placed particular emphasis on encouraging patients to describe the 
phenomena presented in their consciousness as accurately as possible, while he also 
suggested that the psychiatrist’s main endeavour should be directed towards an 
accurate reproduction of the patient’s mental phenomena in order to re-examine their 
interrelatedness (Jaspers, 1959/1963). While in his earlier work he was more open to 
an empathic grasping of the patient’s mental life in meaningful terms, his later work 																																																								1	Being-in-the-world is the foundational and existential a priori state of Being according to Heidegger. 
In his ontological project self and the world are inseparable and are grasped together in the sense that to 
exist as a human being is to coexist (Heidegger, 2001). 
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used Freud’s psychoanalytic, Daseinanalysis’ and anthropological psychiatry’s 
approaches in attempting to ascribe meaningfulness to psychotic states discordant 
with his own project, and he openly criticised all of these attempts in approaching 
psychosis as a comprehensible condition. Although Jaspers’ earlier work placed 
greater emphasis on the subjective experiences of people diagnosed with psychosis 
and strongly suggested that psychiatric symptoms should be approached with 
empathy, he nevertheless in his later work described psychosis as an 
incomprehensible state, which should be treated psychiatrically and not 
psychologically or psychotherapeutically. From an E-P intersubjective perspective, 
Jaspers’ approach to psychosis seems therefore problematic since it negates the 
possibility that a person’s psychotic difficulties could be understood by closely 
examining her personal history and the structural components of one’s being-in-the-
world, while also rejecting the possibility that insight into a person’s mental life can 
be achieved by intuitively and empathically attuning to their experiences. However, 
Jaspers (1959/1963, 1912/1968) offered a sound philosophical and phenomenological 
interpretation of psychiatry’s theoretical and clinical elements, by offering 
comprehensive descriptions of ‘normal’ and ‘pathological’ functioning. 
 
 Before proceeding, I consider it important to briefly describe the strand of 
phenomenology I will be employing in attempting to comprehend the phenomena of 
interest since phenomenology is a complex and heterogeneous school of thought with 
its fundamental philosophy characterised by an internal diversity. Bovet and Parnas 
(1993) have distinguished between three common uses of phenomenology in the 
exploration of clinical phenomena. The first one, common in Anglo-Saxon psychiatry, 
endorses phenomenology as part of a descriptive psychopathology, which mainly 
involves the pure description of psychiatric symptoms. Jaspers’ seminal works (e.g. 
Jaspers, 1949/1963) inform the second approach which is descriptive and concentrates 
on the patient's inner world and experiences, which can only be understood through 
her own narrative with the practitioner reproducing the patient’s experience by 
quoting her self-descriptions. The third approach, which this project endorses, is 
based on existential-phenomenological philosophy (e.g. Husserl, 1936/1970; 
Heidegger, 1926/2001; Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962; Gadamer, 1960/1996; Sartre, 
1943/1956; Buber, 1921/1996) and is interested in identifying, describing and 
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attempting to understand the essential features of being-in-the-world through the 
person’s intentionality.  Intentionality, which is a core concept in phenomenology, 
refers to the directedness of consciousness and considers that we are always conscious 
of something with our subjective experience directed toward that which is external to 
the self (Davidson, 2002). Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) suggested that what remains 
significant when investigating intentionality is the sensing of meaning. He suggested 
that in order to understand human consciousness and its world we must commit to 
exploring the subjective experience and its intentionality and to reveal the meaning of 
all human phenomena within that lived experience. This approach endorses a 
systematic phenomenological investigation of subjectivity and intersubjectivity from 
the first and second person perspectives. In the sections that follow I will present how 
early E-P approaches have conceptualised psychosis, followed by an explanation of 
contemporary phenomenological approaches, and ending with an alternative approach 
grounded in intersubjectivity and a dialectical understanding of intentionality which 
emphasises the intersubjective constitution of self-awareness.  
 
 
2.2.2 Early existential-phenomenological approaches to psychosis 
 
 Some of the most prominent figures in the early E-P conceptualisation of 
psychosis include Merard Boss, Ludwig Binswanger, Eugene Minkowski, Ronald 
Laing and Wolfgang Blankenburg. They, amongst others, gave rise to the so-called 
anthropological psychiatry and their thinking challenged the neurologically focused 
conceptualisations of schizophrenia and psychosis by providing some 
phenomenological and existential insights. Even though their contributions have been 
influential in both the conceptualisation of psychosis and the development of 
psychotherapeutic approaches in the first half of the last century, their insights are 
rarely considered in contemporary E-P approaches to psychosis, let alone the broader 
psychotherapeutic literature. A brief overview of their contributions will be attempted 
in the current section.  
 
					 31 
 The phenomenological psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger and existential 
psychiatrist Merard Boss represented the Daseinsanalysis approach and applied 
philosophical concepts to their psychiatric work with their contributions considered as 
the earliest comprehensive attempts to apply existential phenomenology to 
psychotherapy (Frie, 1997). Their main endeavours were to explore meaning in what 
might at first appear as irrational or ‘mad,’ and they were both leading figures in 
sketching an existential approach towards psychosis and schizophrenia. Firstly, 
Binswanger (1963/1993) did not completely reject the possibility of a biological basis 
of psychosis, although he placed his emphasis on the person’s relations with the world 
and others. He considered that every person has a particular world design, a particular 
way of perceiving the world that is structured a priori and therefore not dependent on 
life experiences. He suggested that no particular traumatic experience could result in 
any form of psychopathology if a specific world design had been absent. This 
existential a priori was one of his main interests in exploring the psychological 
structure of psychosis. He considered the person who experiences psychosis as 
someone who develops an exaggerated relationship with reality and gradually 
experiences tremendous anxiety, despair, and meaninglessness. Binswanger 
introduced Heidegger’s and Buber’s philosophical approach to human relating and 
applied them to psychotherapeutic work under psychiatric conditions. He emphasised 
the importance of paying close attention to the subjective nature of any manifested 
phenomena by highlighting the importance of finding out what a person meant by a 
symptom. Being greatly influenced by Heidegger’s ontology and his notion of being-
in-the-world, he conceptualised psychotic experiences as a form of modification of 
the structural components of one’s basic being-in-the-world (the essential structures 
of human existence such as temporality, spatiality, being-with etc.). Binswanger 
(1963/1993) understood in Heidegger’s being-in-the-world an essential interpretation 
of human relatedness, although he criticised Heidegger for not dealing sufficiently 
with the interpersonal aspect. He suggested that any therapeutic understanding and 
conceptualisation of psychosis could be located within the relationship between the 
therapist and the client. However, one of the main criticisms Binswanger’s existential 
analysis of psychosis and other psychiatric conditions attracted (also from Heidegger 
himself (1954/1968)) was that his approach was more ontic than ontological. He 
concentrated more on how a particular human being responds to the world and others 
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and was greatly interested in a person’s ontic and a priori world design without 
examining for its ontological significance. More specifically, he did not consider 
basic existentials such as being-towards-death and one’s thrownness2 in the world or 
how embodiment is involved in particular psychotic symptoms. Additionally, his 
emphasis on the significance of individual world designs on the manifestation of 
psychotic phenomena seems restrictive and paradoxical considering the significance 
he placed upon a person’s relations with the world and others. Even though he 
strongly suggested that no particular traumatic experience could generate 
psychopathology, a plethora of research findings suggests a significant association 
between early traumatic experiences and the emergence of psychosis (e.g. Conus, 
Berk, & Schafer, 2009), which put his assumptions into great dispute. Nevertheless, 
as Koehler (2004) has emphasised, he was a pioneer in establishing a non-reductionist 
approach to human suffering and distress and more importantly in tackling the issue 
of intersubjectivity in therapeutic work with psychosis. 
 
Boss (1963), on the contrary set up a more ontological project for the 
conceptualisation of psychiatric conditions and particularly for psychosis. He claimed 
that people’s hallucinated and delusional subjective realities should be taken very 
seriously by considering them as manifestations of Dasein’s 3  disclosure. In 
approaching withdrawal, delusions and hallucinations, Boss (1979) presented the 
notions of the erecting of barriers and the dismantling of barriers as features of a 
disturbed capacity to respond to the world. He described how the person in the 
process of erecting barriers gradually withdraws from her relational context, while in 
the state of dismantling barriers the person is gradually led to delusions and 
hallucinations because her intersubjective reality is experienced as very powerful and 
concrete. Boss (1963) in his Heideggerian approach to psychosis suggested that the 
withdrawal from the relational context relates to the disturbances in the fluidity of 
affectivity and it is related to deformations of temporality. More specifically, Boss 
																																																								2	Heidegger (1926/2001) with the term thrownness refers to the fact that existence from its very start is 
found thrown within a particular factical situation with no personal choice involved  3	‘Dasein’ is a German word which translates into “being there” and was a fundamental expression 
introduced by Heidegger (1926/2001) to refer to the experience of being and existence 	
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(1963, p.235) understood psychosis as a disturbance of the specific being-in-the-
world: 
 
 (…) which is the nature of human being. This Being-in-the-world is the 
carrying, sustaining, maintaining, and holding open of that a clear worldly 
realm of perception and responsiveness that all people carry out, though 
each in his own individual way  
 
Even though he was a pioneer in providing a unique ontological understanding 
of psychosis, he neglected to deal sufficiently with the ontic component. Moreover, 
even though he introduced and analysed phenomenological and existential concepts in 
understanding psychosis, he did not deal with the phenomenological method as such 
and its possible application to psychotherapy for psychosis.      
 
Similarly to Boss and Binswanger, Minkowski (1970) was another significant 
contributor to the field of psychosis who positioned the human being at the heart of 
his approach and understood psychosis as affecting the totality of a person. Apart 
from his consideration of the person’s subjective experience, he was the first to 
introduce the notion of time and temporality in psychopathology. He also made links 
to core phenomenological concepts such as embodiment, intentionality, and 
intersubjectivity. He considered temporality as a central and multidimensional type of 
intentionality, involved in almost every part of conscious human life. Minkowski 
explored distorted lived time and its significance in the manifestations of psychosis 
and how certain psychological difficulties are associated with particular experiences 
of time. He associated the distorted consciousness of time in psychosis with the 
directedness of the experience of lived time by relating it to disturbances in self-
experience. Disturbances in self-experience and world experience in psychosis result 
in a loss of vital contact with reality according to Minkowski, leaving the person not 
able to integrate her experiences, which results in difficulties in sustaining a sense of 
self. He conceptualised the loss of vital contact with reality as being associated with a 
loss of a bodily openness of being-in-the-world. Similarly to Boss, he suggested that 
the intersubjective difficulties that develop in psychosis are presented long before 
core psychotic symptoms arise and that alterations in self-experience which are 
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essential for the development of psychosis already exist early in life. By introducing 
his term lived synchronism he clarified how essential temporality is for a person’s 
intersubjective relations and attunement to the world by being temporally connected 
with others in the same intersubjective time.  
 
Greatly influenced by the movement of Daseinanalysis and particularly by 
Binswanger, Laing (1965) also acknowledged that biological factors could predispose 
a person to psychosis; however his project mainly revolved around the 
conceptualisation of self in psychosis. He clearly asserted that the person with 
psychosis withdraws from autonomous selfhood in striving to survive a potential 
obliteration and that her psychotic experiences consist of meaningful attempts to deal 
with the world and others. For Laing, vulnerability to psychosis was linked to a 
fundamental sense of ontological insecurity, which he defined as the state where the 
person’s sense of self and identity are unstable and her sense of reality insecure. 
According to Laing, being unable to take for granted her identity, the ontologically 
insecure person fears engulfment (autonomy will be destroyed by others’ intentions), 
implosion (the real world and others can cause a disintegration of self) and 
petrification (the other has the power to cause depersonalization and turn one into an 
inanimate object). Laing also wrote extensively on how the family and social systems 
affect the development of these fears through the invalidation of experience and the 
communication of ambiguous messages by asserting how these systems 
intersubjectively affect the development of individual consciousness. Laing’s 
understanding of intersubjectivity emphasised how a person is intertwined and 
enmeshed in the world with others. It is upon this condition that he considered that the 
formation of self is a process that never completes. In the case of psychosis, he 
explained how the person is deeply enmeshed with others to the extent that she cannot 
develop a centre of direction by being overwhelmed with a sense that others inhabit 
her thoughts or that she cannot separate her will from their intentions, resulting in a 
crisis of personal integrity. Deurzen (1998) however has argued that Laing did not 
account explicitly that “(…) the ontological insecurity at the core of schizophrenia is 
essentially there in all of us” (p.10) and understood ontological insecurity as pure 
existential anxiety, which is not limited to severely distressed people. Cooper (2009) 
made another significant critical remark on Laing’s style by suggesting that his 
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approach to intersubjectivity advocated a restrictive perspective on the notion of self 
which he thought was located within rather than between the self and the world. 
Nevertheless, despite the aforesaid limitations, his contributions in inviting therapists 
who work with psychosis to question their assumptions about what they define as 
normal and abnormal remain unquestionably momentous and in line with 
Blankenburg’s contributions, who is the last thinker presented in this section.  
 
Blankenburg (1980) was critical of objectivistic psychopathology and 
suggested that sanity-insanity polarity was a dual possibility embedded in the 
fundamental ambiguities inherent in the human condition. He wrote extensively on 
the phenomenon of delusion from an intersubjective perspective and conceptualised it 
as an implicit possibility in our capacity for subjectivity within a shared 
intersubjective reality. Known for considering psychotic phenomena in the light of 
autism, he described how, in the state of autism and particularly the psychotic state, 
lived experience and self become doubtful. He understood psychotic self-doubt from 
an intersubjective perspective as a form of alienation and disengagement and claimed 
that intersubjective coexistence in psychosis is confusing and potentially threatening.  
 
Even though some of the aforementioned thinkers attempted to provide 
assumptions about the aetiology of psychosis – mainly with Binswanger’s a priori 
world designs and Laing’s reference to dysfunctional social and family systems – they 
all remained faithful to the significance of subjective and intersubjective lived 
experience. However, while they described psychotic experiences from an E-P angle, 
they still retained a discourse that endorsed notions of pathology and normality in a 
similar way contemporary diagnostic systems do. Additionally, their 
conceptualisations of the notion of self in psychosis at times fail to recognise its 
intersubjective nature, a theme that will be unpacked in a later section.  
 
	
		  
					 36 
2.2.3 Contemporary phenomenological approaches  
 
 Having already sketched the most significant early E-P contributions to the 
understanding of psychosis, this section will attempt an exploration of contemporary 
phenomenological approaches to psychosis and relevant phenomena. I will explain 
how these phenomenological approaches to psychopathology associate self-
experience and other-experience distortions with the phenomena of delusions and 
hallucinations and how disturbances in affectivity, embodiment and temporality are 
considered to take form in the psychotic state. During the last two decades these 
approaches – mainly represented by researchers and clinicians from 
phenomenological psychiatry – have put the incomprehensibility of psychosis into 
doubt by understanding it as an outcome of abnormal neurobiology and a ‘disorder’ of 
self-awareness and self-experience (e.g. Parnas & Bovet, 2014; Stanghellini, 2009; 
Sass, 2000). These approaches have suggested that a disturbance of the basic sense of 
self – which is conceived at the pre-reflective level of selfhood – is the trait marker of 
psychotic vulnerability. In the following sections, emphasis will be placed upon the 
prominent psychotic phenomena and accompanied processes which these approaches 
seem to have identified, and how they have attempted to make sense of these 
phenomena.   
 
 
The phenomenon of delusions  
 
 
 Delusions in mainstream psychiatry and clinical psychology are mostly 
understood in cognitive terms as ‘false beliefs’ (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013) and are contrasted with ‘normal’ reality. Along these lines, complications in 
perception and distortions in the process of ‘reality’ testing are inextricably associated 
with delusions through a notion of reality often reduced to the physical realm (sensory 
experience believed to be the only valid source of knowledge about reality), which is 
mainly informed by a philosophy of operationalism and logical positivism. Instead, 
phenomenologically speaking, reality is not understood from a physicalism 
perspective but from a position where subjectivity and intersubjectivity are considered 
fundamental (Fuchs, 2015). Phenomenologically, we can therefore speak of a sense of 
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reality instead. As Parnas, Nordgaard & Varga (2010) have suggested: “(…) human 
reality is a reality of a lived world, i.e. a world always imbued with meaning, 
relevance, and objectivity co-constituted by our (inter)-subjectivity, with symbolic, 
social and cultural dimensions” (p.33). The phenomenological approach to delusions 
therefore provides the emphasis on the subjective and lived dimension of this 
phenomenon by questioning the very assumption that a delusion is, in essence, a false 
belief. Recent phenomenological researchers have strongly associated psychosis with 
disturbance of the basic sense of self which is thought to influence the generation and 
experience of delusions (e.g. Sass & Parnas, 2003; Sass, 1992; Parnas et al., 2005; 
Raballo & Maggini, 2005). These studies suggested that the basic sense of self is 
experienced in the first-person perspective where the experiencing subject and its 
thinking are united (Nelson et al., 2008; Parnas & Bovet, 2014). They suggested that 
several forms of delusional processes present difficulties in the first-person 
perspective with evident difficulties on the pre-reflective level of self-awareness. For 
example, in cases of thought insertion the person experiences that her thoughts belong 
to someone else. Similarly in delusions of control, the person truly believes that 
someone else causes her actions. A recent study by Raballo (2012) further supported 
the association between disturbances on the pre-reflective level of consciousness and 
delusional states. The researcher provided several vignettes of individuals expressing 
the experience of psychotic phenomena and demonstrated, through the analyses, the 
presented changes in the structures of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. More 
specifically the cases the researcher presented are described by alterations in the 
stream of consciousness, attunement to others and profound changes in the way 
people experience themselves, others and the world around them. He concluded that it 
is on the pre-reflective level of selfhood that the major disturbances of subjectivity 
take place in the case of psychosis. It is important to also note that similar remarks 
have been also concluded in empirical research conducted outside the 
phenomenological paradigm (e.g. Sierra, 2009).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
					 38 
The phenomenon of hallucinations  
 
 
 Alongside delusions, the phenomena of hallucinations – particularly the 
auditory – are among the most researched phenomena in psychosis (Naudin, Azorin, 
Guidicelli & Dassa, 1996). Hallucinations in psychiatry are usually conceptualised 
sensorily by being contrasted to ‘normal’ perception and are considered to occur 
when internal mental processes are misattributed to an external source (Bentall, 
1993). However, the phenomenological approach follows a different line. For 
instance, Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) rejected the assumption that hallucinations are 
false beliefs and instead suggested that a perceiving subject develops a strange 
relation to the external world through her hallucinatory state. In explaining his 
intersubjective understanding of hallucinations, Merleau-Ponty placed an emphasis on 
the function and meaningfulness of this phenomenon: “The patient’s existence is 
displaced from its centre, being no longer enacted through dealings with a harsh 
resistant and intractable world which has no knowledge of us, but expending its 
substance in isolation, creating a fictitious setting for itself” (1945/1962, p. 342). 
Similarly, contemporary approaches associate the alterations of self-experiences, the 
experience of others and the world to the experience of hallucinations. Naudin, 
Azorin, Gidicelli and Dassa (1996) investigated auditory hallucinations from a 
phenomenological angle and concluded that these cannot be understood as 
disturbances in perception since the ‘voices’ the person hears are not isolated but 
rooted in a story from which they derive their meaning. These researchers suggested 
that the voices could not be understood as separate from the story in which they 
appear but rather develop in tandem with the story that describes them and their 
meaning. The authors have further suggested that the subjective hallucinated story is 
therefore constructed under the influence of the alterations of self and world 
experience.  
 
The fundamental alterations of self-experience and world-experience have 
been systematically related to the generation of hallucinations from a plethora of 
earlier and later phenomenological studies alongside delusions (e.g. Binswanger, 
1963/1993; Blankenburg, 1980; Sass, 1992; Sass & Parnas, 2003). These studies 
suggested that the phenomena of hallucinations exemplify an access to the structure 
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or breakdown of intersubjectivity. More specifically, these studies understand the 
hallucinator’s difficulty in engaging with others through dialogue to be associated 
with the experience of internal voices, which challenge the essential intersubjective 
structure of experience that is oriented upon reference to a common world. Other 
studies explore the relationship voice hearers have developed with their voices. 
Knudson and Coyle (2002) for instance, employed an interpretative 
phenomenological analysis to explore how voice hearers made sense and attributed 
meaning to their voices. They indicated the conceptualisation of voices as dissociated 
aspects of the self and emphasised the dynamics of entering the client’s meaning-
making process and focused on the subjective understanding that clients adopted in 
relation to their voices. Similarly, Mawson et al. (2011) found that voice hearing 
appeared to influence their participants’ sense-of-self and reflected their social 
relationships by personifying their voices.  
 
 
 
Affectivity, embodiment and temporality  
 
 
Alongside delusions and hallucinations, disturbances in affectivity, 
embodiment and temporality are considered fundamental in phenomenological 
thinking and are thought of as strongly interconnected, particularly in the case of 
psychosis (e.g. Mancini et al., 2014). For Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) we can 
conceptualise subjectivity and the first-person perspective through embodiment. He 
particularly suggested that the intentionality of consciousness, our affectivity (how we 
are bodily engaged in situations) and temporality converge to produce subjectivity 
itself. Even though affect is a concept associated with complex and contradictory 
meanings within the psychological literature, for the purposes of this project it will be 
approached phenomenologically as a part of our embodied sensory experience and 
employed almost synonymously with emotions.  
 
The affective states in psychosis are often associated with negative symptoms. 
The DSM associates negative symptoms in schizophrenia and other psychotic 
disorders (especially in the post-acute phases) with disturbances in affectivity through 
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diminished emotional expression (reductions in the expression of emotions in the 
face, eye contact, intonation of speech, and movements of the hand, head, and face) 
and avolition (decrease in motivated self-initiated purposeful activities) while it 
connects these behavioural symptoms mainly with neurocognitive deficits (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). However, studies have also shown that individuals 
with a diagnosis of psychosis often appear oversensitive to emotional stimuli and 
present intense affective reactions especially in paranoid forms of psychosis (e.g. 
Kring, 1999). Even though ‘negative’ symptoms have been associated with limited 
social function and difficulties in relating to others (Frith, 1994; Green, 1996), several 
contemporary studies have systematically provided evidence that many persons with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders can understand others’ 
emotions in certain situations and monitor aspects of their own thoughts and feelings 
excessively (Sass, 1992; Stanghellini, 2004). Salvatore, Dimaggio and Lysaker (2007) 
suggested, in approaching negative symptoms from an intersubjective perspective: 
“These symptoms arise from impoverished goal-oriented action together with a 
chronic disadherence to intersubjective meanings” (p.159). In defining disadherence 
intersubjectively, the researchers asserted that several forms of negative symptoms of 
schizophrenia could be understood by the failure to express oneself, to participate in, 
or be attuned to the context of social interactions. They further stressed the 
importance of the changeable circumstances of the intersubjective context in the 
development of negative symptoms such as the difficulties in communicating 
emotions and understanding others’ emotions and intentions and poverty of speech 
and action. These results suggest heterogeneity with respect to many characteristics of 
affective experience and expression in the psychotic state and have invited the 
attention of phenomenological approaches that have associated embodiment, 
intersubjectivity and temporality as central in conceptualising affectivity in psychosis.  
In approaching flat affect from a phenomenological perspective, Sass (2004) 
suggested that blunted affect is closely related to alterations in the experience of one’s 
body and the world.  More specifically he went on to explain how in the psychotic 
state, the normal fluidity and flow of affective experience and expression is disrupted 
by a fragmented and alienated sense of the lived body (e.g. the body or actions being 
controlled by a distant person or force) which causes a sense of distance between the 
person and the experience of her own emotions.  
					 41 
Contemporary approaches to psychosis have also paid significant attention to 
the phenomenon of disembodiment. As Irarrazaval (2015) stated, the term 
embodiment refers to the existential and experience-based dimension, which involves 
the embodied subject with regard to the intersubjective world. Disembodiment in 
psychosis presents itself as a disturbance in the experience of one’s own body. The 
alienated sense of the body in the first-person perspective in psychosis has recently 
received considerable attention (e.g. Stanghellini, 2009; Fuchs & Schlimme, 2009). 
Stanghellini (2009) for instance presented evidence from transcripts in which people 
with psychosis express feeling detached from their own bodies and in other cases 
describe themselves as empty or hollow. Fuchs and Schlimme (2009) also presented 
evidence in which clients expressed an intense detachment from their own self and 
body through a loss of the sense of agency of their actions and movements, by 
accompanying the development of delusions of alien control. Clients often shared 
experiences in which they felt being somehow outside their body and observing it 
externally: “I have a strange feeling that it’s someone else’s body” (Parnas et al., 
2005, p.252). Another client said, “I sense my body, but it is far away, some other 
place” (Parnas & Sass, 2001, p. 106). In her phenomenological investigation of 
embodiment and intersubjectivity for people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia during 
their first psychiatric hospitalisation, Irarrázaval (2015) concluded that 
intersubjectively speaking, major disturbances in the processes of synchronisation 
with others manifested. She employed in-depth interviews to gather qualitative data 
and recorded that the participants’ bodies lost their central role and familiarity (body 
sensations, movements, perceptions etc.) with difficulties in getting involved with the 
world and others and resulting in various forms of body alienation and intersubjective 
difficulties, particularly in the second-person perspective.  
 
 As has been noted earlier, diverse experiences of disembodiment and 
disruptions in the flow of affective experience are phenomenologically associated 
with distortions in lived time or temporality. The fragmentation of the experience of 
self in time with the accompanied disturbances of the coherence of consciousness has 
often been associated with specific psychotic experiences in phenomenological 
literature. In presenting evidence from several case studies, Fuchs (2013) associated 
thought insertion and auditory hallucinations with ‘inner time consciousness’ and 
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described how this kind of disturbance manifested in a disintegration of intentional 
acts and a fragmentation of self-coherence that resulted in various forms of 
depersonalisation. A plethora of empirical studies has also presented evidence on how 
certain cognitive skills which are associated with lived time were found disturbed in 
psychosis, such as reduced attention span, disturbances in planning and 
synchronisation of speech (e.g. Manoach, 2003; Mishara, 2007). In explaining how 
embodiment and temporality are associated, Fuchs (2013) wrote: “Lived time may be 
regarded as a function of the lived body, opened up by its potentialities and capacities. 
The more we are engaged in our tasks, the more do we forget time as well as the 
body” (p. 80).  
 
 
Summary  
 
  To summarise, the majority of contemporary phenomenological approaches 
to schizophrenia and psychosis have theorised that their primary feature is best 
conceived as a disturbance of self-experience, intersubjectivity, and disembodiment. 
They associate this disturbance with alterations of self-consciousness and self-
experience at both the cognitive and the affective level, and in the perception of the 
body and in the values and beliefs about the world. The period during the formation 
of delusions and hallucinations is mainly perceived as a marker of vulnerability to 
psychosis and as a transformation of the structure of experiencing, with disturbances 
of the world-oriented and self-oriented experience (e.g. Fuchs, 2010). These 
interconnected phenomena are thought of as inherent to the psychotic state and  have 
been organised into a semi-structured interview format titled the “Examination of 
Anomalous Self-Experience” (EASE; Parnas et al., 2005), which is widely referenced 
in current phenomenological approaches to psychosis and schizophrenia. Further 
attention and a critical appraisal of this construct will be attempted in the following 
section.  		
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2.2.4 A critical review of contemporary phenomenological approaches  
 
Having already sketched the major contemporary phenomenological 
approaches to psychosis, this chapter aims to provide a critical review of these 
approaches, based on an E-P intersubjective perspective which in all its forms rejects 
the subject-object dualism, which is central in positivism and abandons the 
generalised once-and-for-all knowledge (Gadamer, 1960/1996). Before commencing, 
it is important to note that the majority of these approaches have been developed 
within psychiatry and therefore complete abnegation of the engagement with basic 
psychiatric discourses (e.g. pathology, anomaly, symptoms) would be almost 
impossible. Despite the differentiation which these approaches have demonstrated 
from mainstream psychiatry in their efforts to endorse phenomenological, 
hermeneutic and existential concepts which is deeply encouraging, it seems that 
matters of professional identity might be causing a conflict in their efforts to fully 
integrate the E-P model. For example, while they have highlighted the significance of 
investigating beyond symptomatic descriptions by suggesting a richer 
phenomenological approach to the understanding of disturbed experience, they do not 
escape from mainstream psychiatry’s operationalist deadlocks and employ a language 
which retains an attitude that incorporates pathology as a foundation which is taken 
for granted. These approaches can also be considered anti-phenomenological and 
reductionistic to some extent since they have suggested that the phenomenon of self-
disorder is developed before the onset of psychosis. They therefore clearly endorse 
principles of prediction (e.g. Edwards & McGorry, 2002; Nelson et al., 2008), which 
are incompatible with the E-P paradigm that they have openly assumed adopting. 
Generally speaking, from an E-P perspective we cannot assume that psychological 
well-being can be predicted by or reduced to the basis of particular symptoms.  
 
Parnas and his colleagues (e.g. Sass & Parnas, 2003; Sass, 1992; Parnas et al., 
2005; Raballo & Maggini, 2005) have defined the pre-reflective, basic level of self-
experience as the subjective experience of agency, coherence, unity, temporal identity 
and demarcation, accompanied by a pre-reflective sense of engagement in the world. 
As has been explored earlier, this phenomenological model considers the changes of 
this pre-reflective, basic sense of self at the core of psychosis. However, it calls 
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attention to some conceptual issues related to the multiple notions of self in the 
literature. Moreover, even though Sass and Pienkos (2013) have also suggested that 
the person’s pre-reflective disturbance is the principal cause for failing to 
meaningfully engage therapeutically, I consider that they have failed to take into 
consideration what might be happening in the intersubjective space ‘between’ client 
and therapist so long as there is no reference to the therapist’s experience, limitations, 
and vulnerability.  
 
From an E-P perspective, these approaches appear problematic in terms of 
employing pathological conceptions of the self, accompanied by diagnostic processes 
and procedures. The terms mental illness, symptoms, schizophrenia, and anomalies 
are often employed with a manner of certainty that seems to objectify mental 
conditions and experience. Regardless of the commitments made to the 
phenomenological thinking, these approaches employ a language that provides an 
unrelenting investment in the medical model and in psychiatric discourse. These 
discourses are not thoroughly reflected and do not have adequate phenomenological 
bracketing, and therefore they carry a great potential to subvert the phenomenological 
thinking they are trying to introduce. Instead, the E-P perspective suggests careful 
attention when referring to human conditions in pathological terms, especially in the 
case of making generalisations. The idea that a genuine science of human experience 
requires its own concepts and methods that cannot rely on imitating the sciences of 
nature forms a central tenet of the E-P movement (e.g. Deurzen, 2002).  Additionally, 
even though some instruments have been developed (EASE, Parnas et al., 2005) for 
assessing self-disorders in the area of diagnosing an early psychosis, and are a great 
example of introducing phenomenological thinking into areas not taken into account 
within the criteriological manuals of diagnostic systems (self and body awareness, 
agency and identity, time flow, understanding others, etc.), they need to deal with this 
issue with greater sensitivity. This is especially true considering the possibility of 
maintaining the stigma of diagnosis. Moreover, this particular diagnostic inclination 
contradicts the very phenomenological philosophy that is supposed to underlie it.  
 
Additionally, Parnas’ and his colleagues’ model of disturbances on the pre-
reflective, basic level of self-experience seems problematic from an intersubjective 
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perspective in that it separates the subjective perception from its intersubjective 
context. For example, they seem to describe a core pre-reflective self as having a 
universal quality without reference to the possibility of lacking generalizability 
outside Western cultural contexts. Therefore, from an intersubjective perspective that 
is sensitive to cultural differences and context, it fails to consider cultural variation in 
the development of a sense of self. Moreover, the concept of a stable, basic sense of 
selfhood as described by Parnas and colleagues (2005) can be challenged from an 
intersubjective perspective which advocates the continuous and dynamic revision a 
sense of self undergoes. The idea of a stable sense of self seems to be universally 
rejected these days even outside phenomenological literature with many different 
schools of thought converging on the idea of multiple selves or the socially 
constructed self, from social constructionist approaches (e.g. Gergen, 2011), to 
developmental neuro-cognitive approaches (e.g. Hood, 2012). What remains unclear 
is whether the conceptualisation of the core self-disorder in psychosis is open to the 
possibility of psychotherapy. The question of how psychotherapy can assist someone 
with basic disturbances of self-experience has not been given enough consideration. 
The risk of cultivating a new therapeutic pessimism should be carefully considered at 
a time when a direction toward recovery is being advocated for people diagnosed with 
psychosis. Moreover, their phenomenological attitude fails to take into consideration 
the significance of intersubjectivity and relationality in the emergence of psychosis 
and at times seems stagnated in a Husserlian transcendental phenomenology of 
consciousness, which, instead of moving toward the phenomenology of existence, is 
more reductive than hermeneutic. Their emphasis on the first-person, subject-oriented 
approach focuses mainly on the person’s conscious experience and explores its basic 
and often implicit structures (Fuchs, 2010) while it neglects the intersubjective, 
second-person approach which will be presented later as an alternative.   
 
To conclude, the majority of the above-mentioned approaches have developed 
an exciting phenomenological account of psychosis having been disregarded for a 
long time in the literature. However, they encase their conceptualisation in an 
objectifying psychiatric diagnostic language that contradicts this very 
conceptualisation, while they engage excessively with the first level of pre-reflective 
self-awareness and overlook the significance of intersubjective, second level 
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reflective self-consciousness and other-awareness. In what follows, an eclectic E-P 
understanding of intersubjectivity is attempted, which will be linked with the 
implications for the psychotherapy for psychosis and particularly the experiences of 
psychotherapists.  
 
 
2.3 A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO INTERSUBJECTIVITY 	
2.3.1 Overview 
 
A phenomenological exploration of intersubjectivity makes up a critical 
section of this thesis as has already been pointed out, and the contributions of 
Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962, 1968), Binswanger (1963/1993; Frie, 1997; Lanzoni, 
2003; Koehler, 2004), Buber (1921/1996, 1947/2006, 1992), and Scheler (1912/1961; 
1912/1970), will mainly inform the form of intersubjectivity which this project 
endorses. I consider that an amalgamation of the individual influence each thinker has 
provided for the concept of intersubjectivity contributes towards a dynamic 
conceptualisation of psychotic experience and the potentials of psychotherapeutic 
praxis. The criterion for placing particular emphasis on these thinkers was based on 
their conceptualisation of intersubjectivity as a primary state, which evaluates any 
kind of experience as intervolved within our being-in-the-world and is perceived as an 
important alternative to the individualism of certain phenomenological approaches, 
which perceive self-consciousness as non-relational (e.g. Sartre, 1943/1956). The 
commended intersubjective approaches refer to the problem of determining the 
relationship between self and other, how self gains knowledge about others and how 
others affect one’s own self-experience and other-experience. Moreover, they place a 
significant emphasis on the second-person perspective, which is significant for the 
conceptualisation of psychosis from an intersubjective point of view, which has been 
neglected in the contemporary phenomenological literature. As Gallagher (2001) 
stated, “In second-person interactions, the mind of the other is not merely hidden or 
private, but is given and manifest in the other person’s embodied comportment” 
(p.203). But before explaining the rationale for excluding other E-P thinkers who 
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have significantly contributed towards the conceptualisation of intersubjectivity (e.g. 
Husserl, 1925/1977; Sartre, 1943/1956; Heidegger, 1926/2001), I will firstly make 
some clarifications in terms of how the concept of intersubjectivity is employed in the 
phenomenological literature. Even though different phenomenological approaches 
deal with the concept of intersubjectivity in a range of ways, what seems to connect 
all existing approaches are their objection towards a strictly solipsistic account of the 
self and an assumption of a shared world. More specifically, Crossley (1996) made a 
clear distinction between egological/transcendental (e.g. Husserl, Sartre) and radical 
intersubjectivity (e.g. Buber). I consider it important to briefly unpack and distinguish 
between the main forms of intersubjectivity as they appear in the phenomenological 
literature in order to explain the version of intersubjectivity I have endorsed in this 
project, which is compatible with the chosen methodology (IPA) and therefore my 
epistemological and ontological assumptions.  
 
Egological intersubjectivity has its origins in Husserlian transcendentalism 
and “(…) involves an empathic intentionality which experiences otherness by way of 
an imaginative transposition of self into the position of the other” (Crossley, 1996, 
p.23). Phenomenologists who support an egological or a Husserlian view of 
intersubjectivity understand the self as the ‘I’ which stands at the back of conscious 
experience and accounts for the unity and continuity of its conscious experiences. 
Husserl’s project clearly suggested that a relationship between subjects is not 
something given and that the person needs to establish a relationship with the other in 
order to overcome the isolation of its ‘I’. For Husserl, the subject (or self-
consciousness) is not enmeshed in the world and always maintains its autonomy and 
agency within an intersubjective world. Husserl assumed that making sense and 
empathising with others requires an imaginative analogical procedure (understanding 
the Other’s experience through a consideration of one’s own experiences), which 
mainly consists of a cognitive conceptualisation. The other in a Husserlian 
conceptualisation is, therefore, an alter-ego, that is very similar to me on an 
embodied, cognitive and affective level.  
 
 
					 48 
On the contrary, radical intersubjectivity “(...) involves a lack of self-
awareness and a communicative openness towards the other, which is unconditional. 
Self engages with other in this modality but has no experience of them as such” 
(Crossley, 1996, p.23). Phenomenological approaches that maintain a radical view of 
intersubjectivity assume the conception of the autonomous ‘I’ as pointless, because 
the ‘I’ only appears in consciousness upon reflection. While Husserl’s philosophy 
emphasised the individual’s relationship with oneself and goes from there to Others, 
Heidegger commences with our relationships with others and then expands his 
exploration of how to regain our relationship with our selves (Thompson, 2005). His 
conception of Dasein as Mitsein (being-in-the-world-with-other-people) suggested 
that we are enmeshed in the world with Others and one cannot extricate oneself from 
this world: “The world of Dasein is a with-world (Mitwelt). Being-in is Being-with-
Others” (Heidegger, 1926/2001, p.155). The Heideggerian ontological perspective 
assumes that people are already pre-reflexively empathic to others because they are 
already ontologically being-with Others and therefore not concerned with the 
Husserlian emphasis on agency and autonomy: “It could be that the ‘who’ of 
everyday Dasein just is not the ‘I myself’.” (Heidegger, 1926/2001, p.150). In the 
following section I briefly explain why Heidegger’s, Sartre’s, and Husserl’s versions 
of intersubjectivity are not entirely in line with this project’s epistemological and 
ontological position that is situated between a radical and an egological understanding 
of intersubjectivity and in line with Crossley’s (1996, p.71) contention that:  
 
Human subjectivity and intersubjectivity, as Buber argues, swing between 
this egological mode of intersubjectivity and the more radical mode. 
Sometimes we are deeply engrossed with others, too engaged to be aware 
of either ourselves or of them. At other times, and rapidly, we can become 
sharply aware of both, constituing them as reflective and reflexive aspects 
of experience.   					
					 49 
2.3.2 A critical review of Heidegger, Sartre and Husserl 
 
Husserl’s contribution to the concept of intersubjectivity was tremendous as 
he was the philosopher who first introduced the concept itself (Zahavi, 1996) and 
considered it to be an essential quality of human existence. He approached 
intersubjectivity not as an outcome of interaction but as a condition for its possibility 
(Duranti, 2010) – therefore making a clear distinction between empathy and 
intersubjectivity – and insisted that throughout our existence in the world we are 
constantly confronted with intersubjective meaning. However, as Sartre (1943/1956) 
has suggested, Husserl failed to find a way to reconcile the intersubjective quality of 
human experience with its subjective foundation because he was over-involved with 
the analysis of the transcendental dimension of intersubjectivity, while his 
commitment to transcendental idealism has led to accusations of endorsing a 
solipsistic approach. According to Duranti (2010), Husserl’s conceptualisation of 
intersubjectivity carries numerous unresolved issues, which are compounded by his 
inclination “(…) to return again and again to the epistemological and ontological 
foundations of his philosophy while providing very few exemplifications of what he 
had in mind” (p. 2). With his overemphasis on the first-person perspective and the 
intentionality of individual consciousness, he neglected to pay attention to the second-
person perspective and the implication of otherness in the intersubjective quality of 
experience. Along these lines, Zahavi (1996) elucidated that: “The main aim of his 
reflections was the formulation of a theory of transcendental intersubjectivity and not 
a detailed examination of the concrete sociality or the specific I-Thou relation” (p. 
229).  Instead, as Ware (2006) commented, in the Husserlian tradition the subject is 
defined as a self-enclosed transcendental ego, which therefore leads to the problem of 
solipsism (the subject is a hermetically sealed individual) since authentically 
encountering otherness becomes impossible.  
 
Moving on to Heidegger’s ontological project on intersubjectivity, it seems to 
manifest in his conception of Dasein as Mitsein or being-with (Heidegger, 
1926/2001). Even though he understood intersubjectivity as an essential and a priori 
determination of Dasein, Heidegger overlooked radical otherness and how 
intersubjectivity is manifested and experienced through concrete encounters with 
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others. He was therefore partly unsuccessful in capturing our unique and essential 
relation to others. As Ware (2006) has commented, Heidegger’s departure from 
Cartesian egology “(...) is deniably radical, yet I do not believe we deepen our 
understanding of intersubjectivity by replacing the notion of a solitary ego with a 
social pre-ego” (p. 503). Sartre, on the other hand, stressed the importance of 
recognising the impact of radical otherness but did not understand intersubjectivity as 
an essential and a priori determination of existence. Zahavi (2001) commented that 
“Compared to Heidegger’s account, Sartre’s treatment of intersubjectivity emphasises 
the transcendent, ineffable and elusive character of the other, and rejects any attempt 
to bridge or downplay the difference between self and other” (p. 158). Sartre’s claim, 
that concrete encounter with the other is experienced as alienation, disregarded the 
common intersubjective platform upon which we are all situated and that any conflict 
would be inconceivable if there were not previously a communal ground and a 
peaceful coexistence (Zahavi, 2002). Sartre (1943/1956) assumed an ‘ontological 
separation’ between self and other in his conceptualisation of being-for-itself and 
suggested that “I am incapable of apprehending for myself the self which I am for the 
Other, just as I am incapable of apprehending on the basis of the Other-as-object 
which appears to me, what the Other is for himself” (p. 327). He therefore understood 
intersubjective relation as pure conflict devoid from the possibility of being-with and 
his understanding of otherness equated with oppression.   
 
The abovementioned approaches to intersubjectivity and otherness have been 
significantly influential within the E-P paradigm. However, the particular limitations 
discussed above illustrate their unsuitability for the purposes of this project in 
exploring intersubjectivity in psychosis, and particularly in the psychotherapy for 
psychosis. In the following section, I turn towards the exploration of the radical 
approaches to intersubjectivity of Merleau-Ponty, Binswanger, and Buber, which I 
consider provide a better understanding of the phenomenon of psychosis and, more 
importantly, the experiences of therapists working with psychosis.      				  
					 51 
2.3.3 The consideration of Merleau-Ponty, Binswanger, Buber and Scheler 	
Maurice Merleau-Ponty  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/1962, 1968) project on intersubjectivity was mainly 
focused on his conceptualisation of intercorporeality, perceptual consciousness, and 
self-alterity. His notion of the intercorporeal in relating to others was fundamental for 
establishing that intersubjectivity is a concrete relationship and suggests that our 
existence in relation to others is something corporeal (Csordas, 2008). Merleau-Ponty 
was not interested in the body as an object in its biological terms but in the lived body 
as a subject, as a being-in-the-world, as open and reflexive, which interacts 
dynamically with the world and others in a reciprocal way. His explanation of 
incorporeal intersubjectivity was investigated through the role of perception, speech, 
gesture, and emotion. As Diamond (1966) has suggested in light of Merleau-Ponty’s 
project on intersubjectivity, emotional bonds among people are possible because we 
live primarily in the other’s gestures and responses. This seems relevant to the 
psychological and psychotherapeutic literature on emotion regulation and 
embodiment (e.g. Schore, 2003). This conceptualisation of the body condemns the 
Husserlian view of self-enclosed viewpoints and suggests an intersubjective 
constitution of the body and its consciousness. Merleau-Ponty’s concept of 
intercorporeality emphasised the social nature of the body and the bodily nature of 
social relationships. Along these lines, Weiss (1999) highlighted that “The experience 
of being embodied is never a private affair, but is always mediated by our continual 
interactions with other human and nonhuman bodies” (p. 5).  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s extended project on perception and intentionality (e.g. 
(1945/1962), included all perceptual processes and their interconnections. It asserted 
that we are constantly in the world of perception, and consciousness is, therefore, a 
perceptual consciousness. Crossley (1996) commenting on Merleau-Ponty’s approach 
to perception asserted that it is an “(…) originary process, rooted in the dialectical 
relationship of the organism and its environment, which gives birth to both the subject 
and the object of perception” (p.27). Perception in this sense is not only an experience 
of objects and subjects but also a meaningful association of them. This “(…) 
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perceptual consciousness or perceptual field forms in the space between perceiver and 
perceived by means of the active engagement of the two” (Crossley, 1996, p.29). This 
intersubjective understanding suggests that perceptions and their intentionality are not 
located inside the perceiver but outside of her, opening her into that world and 
connecting her to the world and others. Likewise, emotions are dialogically 
established and not strictly inner states but intersubjectively definable states, which 
become manifested in the way we act, and this clearly questions the notion of ‘inner’ 
life and ‘outer’ reality prominent in the mainstream understanding of psychosis. 
Crossley (1996) further commented on this and suggested that not only mental events 
are visible from the outside as from within but also “…it follows from this that we 
become aware of our own mental states in the same way that we become aware of the 
mental events of others. Thus, our mental states are, in principle, always 
intersubjectively available by way of our performances” (p. 34). Merleau-Ponty 
advocated that when exploring perception we should be interested in a person’s 
familiarity with the lived world and how the perception of objects consisting of that 
intersubjective world depends on a sense of being affected by and belonging to it.  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s conceptualisation of otherness challenged the solipsistic 
notion of private perceptual worlds. Furthermore, it went a step further to suggest that 
subjectivity and therefore its consciousness is defined not only as an opening onto 
alterity of the other but also as an alterity of the self. This is, according to Zahavi 
(2001), the most significant characteristic of Merleau-Ponty's conceptualisation of 
intersubjectivity. In other words, before a subject is open and available to the other, 
she is already an Other to herself. As Zahavi (2001) articulated: “I can only encounter 
the other if I am beyond myself from the very beginning; thus I can only experience 
the other if I am already a possible other in relation to myself, and could always 
appear to myself as an Other” (p. 159). In a similar fashion, Levinas (1961/1969), in 
his conception of otherness, claimed that in every encounter with an Other there will 
always be an element of the other that will be ungraspable. Expecting a total 
understanding of the other and therefore, a total understanding of self is problematic 
as this objectifies the other’s autonomy and misses something of the other’s humanity. 
Merleau-Ponty clearly claimed that self-experience must enclose an aspect of 
otherness; otherwise, intersubjectivity would not be possible. He assumed that 
					 53 
exteriority is the common denominator between self-awareness and awareness of 
others (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 354):   
 
In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other 
person and myself a common ground; my thoughts and his are 
interwoven into a single fabric, my words and those of my interlocutor 
are called forth by the state of the discussion, and they are inserted into 
a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator. 
 
In other words, in order to be able to experience my own subjectivity on a pre-
reflective level, this very experience must enclose an anticipation of the other. 
Intersubjectivity is possible because the manner through which I experience my own 
subjectivity predicts the way I meaningfully experience the other because the other 
emerges on the horizon of my self-experience. From this perspective, Merleau-Ponty 
understood intersubjectivity as the principal union of perception with which I am 
familiar with others as being analogous to myself (identifying with the body of the 
other, her gestures, actions, emotions and so on).  
 
 
Ludwig Binswanger  
 
 As has been already noted in the section of early E-P approaches to psychosis,  
Binswanger was a pioneer in establishing a non-reductionistic approach to human 
suffering and dealt with the issue of intersubjectivity in therapeutic work with 
psychosis. In this section, I will deal with his contributions to intersubjectivity, which 
are a significant alternative to the individualism of certain philosophical, psychiatric 
and psychoanalytical thought. Lanzoni (2003) proposed that Binswanger’s 
understanding of intersubjectivity in human distress contributed towards the 
emergence of the anti-psychiatric movement. He suggested that a subject emerges 
because of its relation to the other and therefore can be understood in its inter-human 
context. He was greatly influenced by Buber’s philosophy and his conception of the I-
Thou relationship, where communal love and we-ness are considered as the only way 
					 54 
through which the self is revealed. Binswanger (as cited in Frie, 1997, p. 134) 
considered that, 
 
The human being is only “human” in speaking-with-one-another, in the 
communication of I and Thou as we, on the basis of a shared linguistic 
world or a shared linguistic world-design. Language is not a mere 
medium of exchange, but a being-with-one-another in a world that makes 
understanding possible.  
 
Binswanger spoke of the constitutive importance of duality, which he 
understood as an ontological unity that locates the person within a framework of 
meaning. Similarly to Heidegger, he also supported that the human being 
continuously changes in a shared and articulated world and that human development 
takes place only through dialogue with the other. Heidegger’s concept of being-in-
the-world allowed Binswanger to develop a philosophical approach to psychiatry and 
psychopathology which put at its centre the pursuit of understanding of how a person 
inhabits a particular context and how she discovers meaning or not within the limits 
of its context. Along these lines, he considered that the main roles of psychopathology 
was to explore alterations in lived experience, how a person structures her world, and 
how she relates to her environment and others. However, he rejected Heidegger’s 
position that authenticity and self-realisation can be achieved in isolation. Moreover, 
he considered that Heidegger failed to appreciate the importance of the dialogical I-
Thou for the attainment of authentic selfhood, with his fundamental ontology failing 
to value intersubjective relations. Binswanger instead emphasised that self-realisation 
could only be achieved through reciprocity in relation, which he suggested is built 
upon a dynamic balance between separateness and relatedness. The separateness 
involves the acknowledgement of the otherness, the distinctive alterity of the other 
and the experience of authentic selfhood. As Frie (1997, p.106) has noted,  
 
Binswanger insists that intersubjective reciprocity must always be 
predicated upon acknowledgment of the other’s alterity. Without 
affirmation of difference, the other will become dominated and dependent, 
or be reduced to a mere third person, one who stands over and against 
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me. By elucidating the interrelation of separateness and togetherness, 
Binswanger provides a framework within which to understand the 
structure and importance of reciprocity in a love relation. 
 
 
Martin Buber  
 
Given the often described intense alienation, despair and intense self-
reflection people with psychosis experience, Buber’s theory of intersubjectivity and 
dialogical theory are particularly meaningful because he understood that human 
experience, suffering, and reflection are essentially intersubjective processes. The 
concepts that Buber has introduced that are considered as relevant for this project are 
the I–Thou and I–It modes of relating, the space between, and confirmation (Buber 
1947/2006, 1921/1996). According to Buber, the two available responses people have 
in encountering otherness are to authentically relate with the other as a subject (the I-
Thou encounter) or as an object (the I-It encounter). He suggested that both responses 
are vital for the emergence of selfhood and the negotiation of otherness, however, he 
placed significant emphasis on the I-Thou mode of relating. Similarly to Merleau-
Ponty, he understood subjectivity as essentially directed towards alterity (Merleau-
Ponty would say that it is intentional and corporeal), which can take up either the 
form of I-It or I-Thou. He suggested that when engaged in I-Thou, mutuality, 
meaning and co-creation are possible while he attached to his I-Thou 
conceptualisation not only an ontic but an ontological status which he saw evident in 
humans’ intrinsic capacity to know and be known. The highlighted ontological 
primacy of relation suggested that mutuality in the I-Thou relation is manifested in the 
immediacy of the encounter. For Buber human existence is not a self-contained 
phenomenon but something that stretches beyond its own being. This is evident in his 
proposition that the I-Thou is a primary relationship, which enables the emergence of 
the self as a being-in-the-world, contingent upon grasping the being-in-the-world of 
another self.  
 
Buber’s ontological primacy of his project rested mostly on his 
conceptualisation of the space between I-and-Thou. He suggested that the unity 
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between self and other rests on the reality of the division among them. This space in-
between can never be fully understood, nevertheless it is the basis and condition for 
the experience of mutuality: “Spirit is not in the I but between I and You” (Buber, 
1921/1996, p. 89). Intersubjectivity in Buberian terms can, therefore, be understood as 
the space between or the inter-human as Buber called it; an irreducible and primordial 
space. The space between the two embodied subjectivities calls for a mutual 
understanding. Even though, at first glance, someone might assume that Buber’s 
intersubjectivity exclusively describes aspects of concrete encounter and interaction in 
the second personal perspective (perspective-taking, putting oneself in another’s 
shoes, etc.) his understanding of intersubjectivity was deeply embedded within a 
transcendental relation and it is conceptually very close to the primary 
intersubjectivity and intercorporeality of Merleau-Ponty. It is primary exactly because 
it allows the subject to identify her own consciousness in the process of identifying 
the other’s consciousness. Crossley (1996, p.17) describes this clearly: 
 
Only through the mediation of the consciousness of the other can 
consciousness turn back upon itself and identify itself: Consciousness only 
becomes aware of itself when and to the extent that it identifies the 
existence of other consciousnesses. Self-consciousness is an 
intersubjective phenomenon in this sense, achievable only through mutual 
recognition between consciousnesses. 
 
Essential to Buber's notion of the between was the conception that subjectivity 
requires confirmation by the other (Buber, 1992, p. 5): 
 
Man wishes to be confirmed, and wishes to have a presence in the being 
of the other. Sent forth from the natural domain of species into the hazard 
of the solitary category, surrounded by the air of a chaos which came into 
being with him, secretly and bashfully he watches for a Yes which allows 
him to be and which can come to him only from one human person to 
another. It is from one man to another that the heavenly bread of self-
being is passed. 
 
					 57 
Buber, therefore, suggested that confirmation of the self is not equal with a mere 
acceptance of the self or the self having his existence confirmed by the Other, but for 
the self to also be established as an Other, for self and Other. This conception is 
similar to Binswanger’s understanding of mutuality as the result of an interchange 
between separateness and relatedness. It is important to note that for Buber, 
confirmation of the other does not consist of a smooth process and can also take the 
shape of confrontation. He asserted that we could confirm something in the other that 
is in conflict with other aspects of that other and this kind of confirmation can 
underline distress within self and other.   
 
 
Max Scheler  	
Along similar lines with Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenologist Max Scheler’s 
project on intersubjectivity approached human relations as essentially connective and 
meaningful while it condemned the Husserlian outlook of a self-enclosed 
consciousness, and instead suggested an intersubjective constitution of the body and 
its consciousness (Scheler, 1912/1961; 1912/1970). He proposed that the nature of our 
self-knowledge is not purely mental but constituted between and within other people, 
therefore emphasising the intersubjective constitution of our self-experience. 
Similarly to Merleau-Ponty, he also emphasised the significance of the interaction 
between mind and body and proposed that our experiences of self, others and the 
world are not deeply hidden into our minds and isolated from others but instead are 
manifested and expressed in bodily gestures and actions. Scheler also emphasised the 
role of intuition and inter-affective exchanges for gaining access to other’s 
experiences, which he asserted as closely related to our felt sense and emotional states 
and therefore totally relevant to the field of psychotherapy. Moreover, his proposition 
that knowledge of the other is tightly associated with self-experience and that 
boundaries of the self are defined by how integrated a person feels in her community 
(Scheler, 1912/1970), seems greatly related to the conceptualisation of interrelational 
complications in the psychotic state of mind, pointing as it does towards the dynamic 
association between an impoverished sense of self in psychosis and intersubjective 
breakdowns.    
					 58 
2.3.4 Synopsis and implications  		
 This section attempts to amalgamate the intersubjective approaches of 
Merleau-Ponty, Binswanger, Buber, and Scheler, and based on them suggest possible 
implications to the comprehensibility of psychosis. These approaches suggest that we 
are ontically and ontologically inseparable from the world and others, understand 
intersubjectivity as an existential potentiality, an a priori imperative and a mode of 
being which conceptualises the other as a permeable embodied subject.    
 
 From a Sartrean or a Heideggerian perspective, these approaches might be 
criticised as suggesting an exclusively ontic or anthropological conceptualisation of 
intersubjectivity, which focuses mainly on interactional processes. However, based on 
a Merleau-Pontian, Binswangerian, Buberian and Schelerian vantage point, I  
advocate an exploration of intersubjective engagement that has an ontological status 
and endorses an approach that explains the nature of consciousness itself even in its 
pre-reflective sense. As has been already explored, Merleau-Ponty (1968) clearly 
claimed that immediate or pre-reflective embodied self-awareness is intersubjective in 
nature. The intersubjective approaches explored value the conscious and lived 
personal experience while they consider human existence as fundamentally and 
inextricably immersed in its world. Moreover, they move away from the Husserlian 
emphasis on agency and its cognitive and conscious processes and are more focused 
on an embodied, practical and concrete involvement with the world. I suggest that 
approaches that employ the paradigm of impenetrable, radical and extreme otherness 
to intersubjectivity (e.g. Sartre’s) are insensitive to the possibility of mutual 
recognition, especially in the case of psychosis. I also consider this one-sided 
conceptual emphasis of fundamental otherness to be problematic, especially in its 
application to the therapeutic situation as shall be later explained. Their lack of 
attention towards the process of being perceived and experienced (second-person 
perspective) and their overemphasis on the process of perceiving (first-person 
perspective) makes them inadequate to approach human distress intersubjectively, as 
the state occurring in the Buberian and Binswangerian betweenness of the person and 
the world.  
					 59 
Although the connection between psychosis and an intersubjective deficit is 
well documented, this hypothesis seems problematic to a certain extent. How can we 
apply this assumption in the case of a shared psychosis, such as in folie a deux and 
folie a plusieurs? In light of these cases when two or more people are experiencing 
the same psychotic experiences, someone might assume that these people are not 
living in isolated private worlds but instead are intersubjectively and meaningfully 
connected through these psychotic experiences. Moreover, in the cases of 
hallucinations, as is often reported in the literature (e.g. Kobayashi et al., 2004), 
people respond to their hallucinatory voices and hold meaningful conversations with 
them. Someone might rightly suggest that they are not trapped in their own private 
worlds but instead caught in an intersubjective world with their own hallucinatory 
characters and become part of an intersubjective world different from that shared by 
the not-psychotic community (Maung, 2012). What also seems to be ignored is that 
delusions are often presented as fundamentally intersubjective phenomena, both in 
form and content and manifest themselves in an intersubjective situation by 
demonstrating a persistent orientation to others by whom the person feels persecuted 
or manipulated. 
 
Additionally, the person with psychosis is ‘accused’ of embodying an 
impenetrable otherness. Jaspers (1949/1963) for example insisted that the alteration of 
self-experience a person with psychosis goes through is so extreme which makes it 
incomprehensible, and the possibility of empathising and understanding becomes 
almost impossible due to the lack of meaning. Yet, intersubjectively speaking, we 
cannot speak of a lack of meaning as located within the self and therefore cannot 
meaningfully understand the self and her suffering in isolation from its context. From 
a Merleau-Pontian perspective meaning or its lack emerges because is found (or not) 
in the cultural and historical space in which the embodied subject is situated. In 
exploring the pre-reflective structuring of meaning in the subject’s intentionality, 
Merleau-Ponty asserted that it is bodily and socio-cultural in nature and implied that 
pre-reflective consciousness and its intentionality are intersubjectively constituted and 
maintained. However, existentially and intersubjectively speaking we are not only 
defined by our socio-cultural embeddedness. The project of becoming a self also calls 
for an integration of the ‘anonymous’ being or being an anonymous anybody (Keller, 
					 60 
2008). From a Merleau-Pontian and Schelerian viewpoints, the embodied subject is 
not therefore ontologically separated from others, yet is an anonymous existence, with 
its immediate intentionality characterised by an ambiguous structuring of meaning, 
which occurs in perception and expression pre-reflexively (Merleau-Pontly, 
1945/1962). This ‘anonymity’, which might generate a sense of alienation in the 
person, is something universal and can be explored in relation to the experience of 
loneliness and separateness from the world and from others. Alienation is also 
contained in the Buberian betweenness as a collective phenomenon and the 
experience of separateness is transcended without negation of otherness. It accepts 
both otherness and mutuality as valid and recognised in the space between self and 
other, with the philosophically isolated ‘I’ and ‘you’ being replaced with a ‘between’. 
However, from a Buberian viewpoint, this process of oscillating between self and 
other, mutuality and separateness remains a fragile one. Along these lines, Rosfort 
and Stanghellini (2014, p.383) have argued that  
 
The fragile character of human experience stems from a basic dialectical 
interplay of selfhood and otherness at the heart of our identity as human 
persons. To be a person is to live with the intimate alienation that we 
experience in our emotional life. Our emotions are intimate in the sense 
that they are our emotions, and they are alienating in the sense that at 
work in those self-same emotions is an otherness that constantly disturbs 
our sense of being an autonomous self.  
 
These particular considerations generate several reflections within an 
intersubjective conceptualisation of psychosis and its psychotherapy. Someone might 
rightly ask: What does a person’s difficulty in relating to a person with psychosis 
signify about her own relation to self-alterity? How is that person’s self-experience 
affected in enclosing aspects of psychotic otherness? What might the difficulty in 
meaningfully experiencing the other with psychosis say about the possible difficulty 
in allowing the other with psychosis to emerge on the horizon of self-experience? 
What are the dynamics of a person’s oscillations between mutuality and separateness 
in encountering the person with psychosis? Moreover, how does the alienated 
experience of the person with psychosis affect the therapist’s own ambiguous 
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structuring of meaning pre-reflexively? I believe that these are fundamental 
considerations if we are to understand psychosis intersubjectively and promote 
recovery through the praxis of psychotherapy. However, they are hugely neglected or 
not adequately considered in the E-P literature on the conceptualisation and 
psychotherapy of psychosis let alone the broader literature. Intersubjectively 
speaking, the provision of any kind of psychological or psychotherapeutic input for 
the case of psychosis (and any other manifestation of human distress), must therefore 
irrefutably embrace a detailed consideration of the professional’s subjective and 
intersubjective experiences, which appears lacking in the literature. The literature 
seems to bursts with publications which document the experiences of people receiving 
services, and their interpretations based on the theoretical model by which the data are 
explored but lack a detailed analysis of the professional’s involvement and her 
contribution to the process of assessment, therapy, etc. To my own understanding, this 
is no lesser intersubjective deficit than the one the person with psychosis is ‘accused’ 
of.    
 
A holistic approach to intersubjectivity must, therefore, include a second-
person intersubjective methodology and epistemology where it remains necessary to 
explore the experiential perspectives of self and other and to consider the 
phenomenon of the subject reflecting upon its own subjectivity in the I-Thou 
encounter. The second-person approach can provide the conditions for the Buberian 
confirmation and suggest a dialectical process of shared meaning with its goal 
directed towards opening those engaged in it to new worlds of meaning through the 
exploration of what is shared. Since our experience in the world with others is based 
upon co-construction of meaning, the second-person intersubjective encounter 
suggests that through the Buberian notion of mutual interaction in the space between, 
co-construction of meaning is made possible. A second-person perspective in the case 
of the psychotherapy of psychosis appears, therefore, fundamental. The therapist’s 
understanding of the client’s experience must, therefore, remain in the second-person, 
which embraces the sense that the other’s experience belongs to them, whatever is 
experienced and is felt by them in a way that is different from the therapist’s 
experience of it. This process invites the process of recovering understandability, 
which can be a key aspect in overcoming the client’s sense of alienation. Similarly, 
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Gallagher (2011) coming from a dialogical perspective suggested that a second-
person perspective opens up potential ways of approaching autonomy in a new light. 
This kind of potential provides the grounds for reflection on the therapist’s 
intersubjective involvements.  
 
Concluding, the second-person approach to intersubjectivity implies that it 
remains necessary to explore the experiential perspectives of both parties in the 
relation by negotiating the shared focus of attention and trying to make sense of the 
intentionality in both parts. Intersubjectively conceived, there is a circular 
interdependence between the way the person with psychosis experiences the therapist 
and the way she experiences herself and the other way around. Therefore, the co-
construction of intersubjectively shared narratives implies that the detailed 
exploration of a person’s subjective experience of self and other (the person with 
psychosis) allows a better understanding of the person’s relating to the world and 
others with tremendous implications for psychotherapy. In the following section that 
deals explicitly with the psychotherapy of psychosis, I focus on the form and praxis of 
intersubjectively informed psychotherapies for psychosis and the related 
psychotherapists’ experiences through an exploration of relevant literature.    
 
 
2.4 PSYCHOTHERAPY FOR PSYCHOSIS 	
2.4.1 A brief history of the psychotherapy for psychosis 
 
Before the introduction of psychological and psychotherapeutic services for 
people with severe psychological distress, their ‘management’ in asylums consisted of 
cruel actions and compulsory separation from other people and their communities 
(Hamm, Hasson-Ohayon, Kukla, & Lysaker, 2013). The reformation of asylums and 
the development and introduction of ‘moral treatment’ gradually lead to the 
introduction of more humane practices, which however did not include individualised 
care (Scull, 1981). The development of psychoanalysis was another major shift in 
terms of treating people in distress with dignity and respect, and although Freud 
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advocated that psychosis was not a condition which psychoanalysis could treat 
(Freud, 1924/1961), by the 1940s several psychoanalysts illustrated successful case 
studies of people with psychosis (e.g. Fromm-Reichmann, 1954; Sullivan, 1962; 
Searles, 1965). However, despite the enthusiasm, this major shift was brought about 
by anecdotal evidence as the literature on the psychoanalysis of psychosis failed to a 
certain extent to provide the appropriate evidence for its efficacy. This shift was 
gradually followed by an emphasis on medication, rehabilitation and skill acquisition 
and the anti-psychiatric movement gradually evolved in response to these changes, 
especially as a response to the application of medication being the major form of 
treatment (Scull, 1981). Even though intensive therapeutic treatment for psychosis 
was introduced in the United Kingdom by supporters of the anti-psychiatric 
movement such as the maverick R.D. Laing and his colleagues (e.g. D. G. Cooper, A. 
Esterson & J. Berke) at the therapeutic communities of Kingsley Hall and the Arbours 
Association, these were not sufficiently organised and ultimately gained a bad 
reputation. However, Laing and his colleagues were leading figures in supporting and 
promoting intensive psychotherapy for psychosis and their contributions have been 
exceptional in inspiring many mental health professionals to approach psychosis in 
comprehensible terms and challenge the traditional psychiatric approach to treatment.  
 
Additionally, more recently cognitive-behavioural therapy has been adjusted 
for the purposes of psychosis (CBT-p) and more emphasis on individual 
psychotherapeutic interventions has been cultivated (Hamm et al., 2013). Even though 
there is a growing body of literature suggesting the effectiveness of CBT-p (e.g. 
O’Connor & Lecomte, 2011), a large body of evidence also advocates its inefficiency 
(e.g. McKenna & Kingdon, 2014). At the same time, there has been an increasing 
interest in the conceptualisation of recovery from psychosis that has given rise to a 
renewed attention on the role of psychotherapy, with service-user-led organisations – 
such as the Hearing Voices Network – playing a major role in the movement from 
symptom management to recovery (Cotton & Loewenthal, 2011). The recovery 
approach with its emphasis on psychotherapy is mainly informed by integrative 
approaches to psychotherapy such as intersubjectivity informed CBT (e.g. Hasson-
Ohayon, 2012), psychoanalytic/intersubjective (e.g. Harder & Folke, 2012), 
phenomenological/humanistic (e.g. Pienkos & Sass, 2012) and narrative/dialogical 
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approaches (e.g. Lysaker et al., 2011). Although the effectiveness of symptom-
focused approaches such as CBT-p is partly demonstrated by randomised trials, these 
approaches to psychotherapy are awaiting further rigorous evaluation.   
 
Despite the recent excitement and interest in the aforesaid psychotherapeutic 
approaches, there is great resistance to their introduction in mental health services. 
The lively debate about their endorsement as evidence-based practices, the evidence 
that the development of a therapeutic alliance with this client group appears difficult, 
and the financial restrictions involved (Hamm et al., 2013) have all contributed 
towards this resistance. This is notwithstanding the fact that people with psychosis 
often ask for psychotherapy (e.g. McCabe, Health, Buns, & Priebe, 2002, also argued 
by user-led research e.g. Faulkner & Layzell, 2000; Thomas & Bracken, 2004). 
Particularly in the United Kingdom, during the ‘acute’ phase of psychosis in inpatient 
settings, CBT-p, family interventions, some adjusted group therapy, art and music 
therapy are usually employed. The National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence clearly recommends: “Do not routinely offer counselling and supportive 
psychotherapy (as specific interventions) to people with psychosis or schizophrenia” 
(NICE, 2014, p.26). With the psychotherapy for people with psychosis being broadly 
neglected in general and with present treatments mainly involving the use of 
medication – and in some cases even electroconvulsive interventions – it is clear that 
the medical-biological model has not been questioned sufficiently. In this context, the 
intersubjective aspect this project endorses appear highly pertinent for both the 
development of psychological and psychotherapeutic interventions but mostly the 
consideration of the interpersonal processes involved in psychosis. 
 
 
2.4.2 Therapists’ experiences   
 
 As has  already been shown, the literature on therapists’ experiences and 
processes in their work with psychosis remains scarce, particularly within the 
phenomenological and counselling psychology literature. In this section, I provide a 
					 65 
brief description of some studies that have dealt with this issue that are predominantly 
derived from the psychoanalytic and early E-P schools of thought. 
 
 The psychotherapy of psychosis does not regularly appear in the CoP 
literature. There is a significant scarcity of research in exploring how CoPts construct, 
make sense of and work with psychosis and psychiatric diagnoses in general. Some 
recent and interesting publications are important to mention here. Larsson (2010) 
interviewed CoPts working with a diagnosis of ‘schizophrenia’ with an interest in 
exploring their general work and found that they had a tendency to negotiate their 
relationship with their clients, their professional identity and the organizations they 
worked for. In addition, he found that there were a number of complexities in their 
relation to the diagnosis of ‘schizophrenia’, for instance how to negotiate the balance 
between phenomenology and empiricism. Additionally, Lamproukou (2014) 
interviewed CoPts working within the NHS and found that while they expressed the 
experience of a plethora of tensions in their working environment, they also 
developed a variety of coping strategies to deal with these tensions, such as holding a 
pluralistic stance, assimilating the medical model with their own value base system 
and prioritising the clients’ needs over the NHS guidelines. What was particularly 
significant is that all participants had a strong therapeutic identity and reported 
practicing in accordance with CoP values which mainly prioritise a relational 
approach and a tendency towards the deconstruction of pathological conceptions. 
Along similar lines, Davies (2013) interviewed CoPts who worked with clients who 
had been given a psychiatric diagnosis and found that many participants expressed 
feelings of uncertainty when working with this diagnosis. The positions the 
participants adopted in order to deal with uncertainty included a combination of 
uncritically adopting the diagnosis, challenging the diagnosis, and compromising and 
avoiding the diagnosis in their efforts to deals with feelings of uncertainty. The 
researcher concluded that overall the participants lacked confidence in working with 
diagnosis and struggled to adapt to medical model contexts. Lastly, Larsson, 
Loewenthal, & Brooks (2012) explored how CoPts working with ‘schizophrenia’ 
experienced the work and found that they constructed their experiences of working 
with these individuals in a ‘relational’ way by relating to the person’s experience and 
normalizing the experience while there was a particular emphasis on the therapeutic 
					 66 
relationship rather than technique. However, the authors also stressed that the dangers 
of pathologizing language are always present. What the literature therefore seems to 
suggest, is that CoPts working with a diagnosis in medical settings such as the NHS, 
seem to express a certain level of uncertainty, anxiety and ambivalence relating to 
issues of diagnosis. 
 
 What the in-depth exploration of the literature on the psychotherapy for 
psychosis has demonstrated is that earlier publications are more attentive and explicit 
on issues concerning the psychotherapist’s experience, with early psychoanalytic 
work (e.g. Fromm-Reichmann, 1954; Searles, 1965; Sullivan, 1962) and early E-P 
work (e.g. Minkowski, 1933/1970; Rumke, 1941/1990; Binswanger, 1963/1993; 
Laing, 1965) more keen to engage with this dimension. This lack perhaps reflects 
Buber’s assertion of the incongruity of the relationship in psychotherapy due to a 
power imbalance between client and therapist. He suggested that there is an 
asymmetry within the therapeutic encounter in the sense that both the client’s and 
therapist’s gazes are usually directed towards the client’s condition and not at the 
therapist’s (Friedman, 2002). Even though recent contemporary psychoanalytic 
literature deals with the countertransference, this body of knowledge is considered to 
be relatively small (Horowitz, 2002). Traditionally, psychoanalysis employs the 
notions of transference and countertransference to deal with the therapeutic 
relationship. However, the epistemological and ontological position this project 
endorses instead takes a phenomenological and intersubjective position on the 
relational view of the therapeutic situation and understands it as real. As Cohn (1997) 
has stressed, the E-P perspective suggests that a person cannot be a screen for the 
projections of another and does not encourage an impersonal stance from the 
therapist. Even though a critical appraisal of countertransference from an E-P 
perspective will not be discussed in this project, some early and later psychoanalytic 
work regarding the therapists’ processes and experiences in the psychotherapy for 
psychosis (which come close to a phenomenological understanding) are briefly 
considered.  
 
 Interpersonal psychoanalytic accounts on countertransference often report that 
working with psychosis elicits intense feelings of sadness, despair, terror, 
					 67 
hopelessness, anger, frustration and anguish (e.g. Horowitz, 2002; Baranger & 
Baranger, 2008; Grinberg, 1962; Heimann, 1950; Langs, 1978; Little, 1951; 
Kernberg; 1965; Sullivan, 1962). Searles (1965) wrote lengthily on the experience of 
these feelings and the use of the self in the psychotherapy of psychosis. He strongly 
recommended that the potential for recovery, which takes place in the therapeutic 
relationship, concerns both therapist and client. He suggested that the therapist is 
involved in a dynamic process which entails her personal healing as well and 
demonstrated through an abundance of case studies how the difficulties of 
engagement from the therapist side are mainly due to the retrospection and 
recognition of less healthy parts of herself. However, he demonstrated clearly that this 
is the condition upon which a therapeutic bond can form. Sullivan (1962) with his 
interpersonal approach to people with psychosis also demonstrated the therapist-as-
person approach to psychotherapy with personal involvement, vigorous questioning, 
and rigorous listening by making use of his own emotional responses. He too believed 
that the psychological disturbance in psychosis echoes something inherent in 
everyone. Moreover, Benedetti (1992) a renowned psychoanalytic psychiatrist who 
worked extensively with psychosis suggested that the suffering a person with 
psychosis goes through consists of the most severe issues the human mind encounters. 
“Tackling them means illuminating the human being with signification and sense, 
gaining a better understanding of the human being in general, not only of the 
psychotic person” (Benedetti, 1992, p. 15). Fromm-Reichmann (1954) talked 
extensively along similar lines of the therapist’s processes/difficulties and stated that 
“Psychiatrists can take it for granted now that in principle a workable doctor-patient 
relationship can be established with the schizophrenic patient. If and when this seems 
impossible, it is due to the doctor’s personality difficulties, not to the patient’s 
psychopathology” (p.91).  
 
 Additionally, therapists’ understanding of the meaningfulness of their 
therapeutic interventions and relationships with people with psychosis has been often 
reported as shaken (Horowitz, 2008). Horowitz (2006) stressed that the therapists’ 
difficulty in creating meaning out of their clients’ experiences is of a common feature 
in work with psychosis: “(…) no therapist immersed in work with the long-term 
mentally ill is spared the agonising search for a common thread in the swirl of chaos” 
					 68 
(Horowitz, 2006, p. 177). Moreover, therapists’ empathic attunement to clients has 
been described as severely restricted when confronted with experiences within the 
therapeutic relationships that elicit strong emotions in therapists (Wilson & Lindy, 
1994). Apart from the compromises in therapists’ empathic and reflective capacities, 
therapists working with psychosis come across difficulties that relate to a sense of fear 
in working with this client group even before encountering the client. The common 
discrimination against people diagnosed with schizophrenia and other psychotic 
disorders that seems to be common among mental health professionals as well 
(Thompson et al., 2002), generates a negative climate even before the professional 
starts working with a client. The generated social stigma towards psychosis according 
to Benedetti (1987) creates a sense of fear, which in turn creates a form of a 
generalised social aggression towards the person diagnosed with psychosis with 
related resistances from the therapists’ side and resultant complications in the 
therapeutic process. 
 
 Another noteworthy observation comes from Searles (1961) who has written 
extensively about the therapist’s anxious need to provide ‘antidotes’ for the clients 
and rescue them from their circumstances and experiences, particularly in the cases 
where these experiences provoke extreme amounts of anxiety and terror for the 
therapist. This experience of terror was also stressed by Fromm-Reichmann (1959) 
who suggested that persons diagnosed with psychosis embody fundamental elements 
that the rest of us manage to suppress in order to avoid the experience of the terror 
they generate; however, by so doing, we miss the opportunity to gain awareness into 
our own processes. Along these lines, Brody and Farber (1996) explored therapists’ 
attitudes towards their therapeutic relationships and found that despite the excitement 
and lack of boredom inherent in their work, therapists expressed intense emotions of 
anxiety, frustration and hopelessness. A multifaceted combination of 
countertransference responses was also reported, while at times a strong wish to 
abandon the work and refer clients elsewhere predominated. Additionally, in 
exploring the beneficial aspects of psychoanalytic psychotherapists’ experiences of 
their work with psychosis, Laufer (2010) proposed that therapists reported 
transformational and learning experiences in their work. The author highlighted that 
the majority of her participants shared that their clients taught them something 
					 69 
essential about the human condition. She particularly commented that their experience 
“(…) reveals our vulnerability, our dependency on each other, and that’s very 
threatening for people. They’re just a reminder of how fragile we all are, and that’s 
scary for people” (p. 170). 
 
From the early E-P tradition, some inspirational work includes the work of 
Minkowski (1933/1970) and Rumke (1941/1990). Rumke introduced the term 
praecox feeling to demonstrate the therapist’s difficulty in connecting with people 
with psychosis, by explaining that it mainly consists of feelings of bodily unease, 
echoing the detachment and alienation of the client. He placed significant emphasis 
on embodied intersubjectivity and strongly suggested that the diagnosis of psychosis 
should be grounded not on individual symptoms but on the difficulties experienced by 
the therapist with regards to the affective exchange and the bodily feelings arising 
because of that. As Rumke (1941) has suggested: “As interpersonal relations are not 
one-sided, the investigator examining a sufferer from schizophrenia notices 
something out of the order within himself” (p.336). Rumke implied that the 
therapist’s self-relation changes and the experience of rupture in the therapeutic 
relationship also results due to a failing of engagement from the therapist’s side. 
Minkowski (1933/1970) in a similar fashion with Searles and Fromm-Reichmann 
suggested that both therapist and client change in the therapeutic relationship. He 
aspired towards a better understanding of a person’s situatedness by immersing 
himself in his clients’ life and sharing their experience and considered that the 
therapist’s own emotional reactions could be used as a precious exploratory and 
therapeutic ‘instrument’.  
 
 The revival of phenomenological and intersubjective conceptualisations of 
psychosis appears to influence diverse psychotherapeutic modalities including the 
cognitive-behavioural, humanistic, psychoanalytic/psychodynamic and the 
narrative/dialogical (Lysaker et al., 2011). This has been one of the essential 
motivations in recruiting psychologists and psychotherapists from diverse modalities 
for the purposes of this project. As Markin (2014) has pointed out, “It’s our relational 
stance which bridges theoretical differences. It’s our concern for the quality of 
therapeutic relationship which binds our diverse orientations” (p.329). However, I 
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consider that the contemporary literature on intersubjective approaches to psychosis 
lacks a detailed examination of the psychotherapist’s role and lived experience of 
psychotherapeutic processes. Even though the majority of contemporary 
phenomenological literature exhibits a ‘two person psychology’ it still employs an 
‘egocentric’ position, in the sense that it mainly focuses on the person who receives 
therapy and considerably ignores the therapist’s experience. In the cases where the 
therapist’s experience is considered, more emphasis is placed on her interventions and 
other-experience rather than the inclusion of a detailed exploration of her lived self-
experience as situated in the betweenness of the therapeutic process and how her 
experience of therapy intersects with the manifestation of psychotic phenomena. 
Taking into consideration the preceding exploration of intersubjectivity, I suggest that 
this tendency is to a certain extent anti-intersubjective and calls for reconsideration.  
 
 In conclusion, these approaches not only suggest that psychotherapy for 
psychosis and its recovery are possible but also consider in detail the therapist’s 
involvement and difficulties in the therapeutic process as an inextricable aspect of the 
psychotherapy of psychosis. They also demonstrate that in order to intersubjectively 
and meaningfully approach clients’ experiences, we must authentically come to grips 
with aspects of our own selves that we usually tend to avoid because they connect us 
with painful facts about our vulnerable human condition. Moreover, these approaches 
suggest that an attentive engagement with clients allows us to rediscover aspects of 
ourselves, obliterate the separation between ‘madness’ and ‘sanity’ and learn about 
being human and being transformed. Strongly espousing these views and based on my 
lived experiences, I consider that a deeper understanding of the psychotic state 
provides the opportunity to rediscover and re-evaluate our notions of self and 
otherness. As Friedman (2002) has suggested: “(...) the abyss in the patient calls for 
the abyss, the real, unprotected self in the therapist” (p.190). 
 
 
 
 
					 71 
2.4.3 Intersubjectivity informed psychotherapy for psychosis 
 
Some of the attempts made in considering intersubjectivity in psychosis from 
a phenomenological perspective seem to provide a limited and encapsulated 
conceptualisation of the experience of psychosis. For example, in recent 
phenomenological literature, the terms psychotic intersubjectivity or schizophrenic 
intersubjectivity are introduced in an attempt to conceptualise and define 
intersubjectivity in psychosis (e.g. Bradfield & Knight, 2008; Bradfield, 2002; 
Bradfield, 2006). I suggest that this is a deterministic and anti-phenomenological 
approach: one which provides an encapsulated experience of intersubjectivity in 
psychosis and is presented as a kind of core symptom from a third-person perspective 
without properly taking into account the second-person perspective which is relevant 
for psychotherapy and recovery. Besides, an intersubjectively informed 
conceptualisation of human distress should challenge the employment of ‘symptoms’ 
as are commonly used in the literature. Intersubjectively informed psychotherapy for 
psychosis must make attempts to comprehend the subjective and intersubjective 
nature of a person’s life-world by exploring the multidimensional architecture of that 
life-world and gradually establishing a personal and meaningful narrative of it. Rather 
than treating ‘symptoms’ it should explore the function of particular irregular 
fragments in the life-world’s architecture and investigate how these contribute 
towards the existing structure of the whole ‘edifice’. The notion of a symptom as 
employed in the common biomedical, psychiatric and often psychological discourse is 
acknowledged as a manifestation of pathological functioning. Instead, 
phenomenologically approached, it is understood not as something to be removed or 
treated, but as a meaningful component of that architecture which calls for someone’s 
attention and Buberian confirmation. A phenomenological approach attempts to make 
visible and understand the structural interconnection between psychotic experiences 
and provide continuity and coherence to them. It requires a kind of understanding that 
“(...) seeks to find the logos of the phenomena in themselves, not in subpersonal 
mechanisms” (Fuchs, 2008, p.280). The Heideggerian notion of aletheia as 
unconcealedness seems pertinent here. Heidegger (1926/2001) wrote extensively 
about the notion of aletheia and clarified the significance of a meaningful disclosure 
of one’s ontological ‘world’ in a process where a personal ontology is being made 
					 72 
accessible and intelligible. Phenomenologically speaking, a symptom, therefore, 
appears as openness, a dynamic opportunity for deciphering a person’s life-world, a 
portrayal of her ontological essence and a fragment of a person’s aletheia. Along 
these lines, Stanghellini (2013) described the symptom as a salience, a knot in the 
texture of a person’s life-world, like a tear in the matrix. He suggested that it “(...) 
awakens one’s care for oneself in a double sense: since it reflects and reveals alterity 
in oneself—in it alterity becomes conspicuous; and since from the vantage it offers 
one can see oneself from another, often radically different and new, perspective” 
(p.337). 
 
 A current revival of phenomenologically and intersubjectively informed 
psychotherapies for psychosis has been observed (Silverstein & Lysaker, 2009) and 
while although limited, suggests the primacy of the second-person perspective and 
puts the therapeutic relationship at the core of the process, which is perceived as the 
totality of the interpersonal meeting. Phenomenological research evidence not only 
suggests that mutual recognition is possible through the psychotherapy of psychosis, 
but further recommends how the establishment of mutuality and ‘betweenness’ allows 
the person to develop a more robust pre-reflective self-awareness and a second-person 
perspective (e.g. Stanghellini & Lysaker, 2007; Nelson & Sass, 2009; Perez-Alvares 
et al., 2008). For instance, Stanghellini and Lysaker (2007) have examined 
psychotherapy transcripts of sixty persons with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and 
argued that the second-person intersubjective approach assisted persons with 
psychosis in developing strong first and second-person perspectives. Their analysis 
highlighted the significance of focusing on the here-and-now and the you-and-I of the 
therapeutic relationship. More specifically they observed that the negotiation of both 
the therapist’s and client’s narratives in their betweenness pointed towards shared 
meaningfulness and was considered essential for recovery. Along similar lines, 
Stanghellini and Lysaker (2007) suggested that the second-person approach assisted 
persons with psychosis to recover by opening up their perceptions and expanding 
their self-experience beyond the experience of self as psychotic. Moreover, Perez-
Alvarez, Garcia-Montes, Perona-Garcelan, and Vallina-Fernandez (2008) suggested 
that their intersubjective commitments to psychotherapy have allowed people with 
persistent hallucinations to negotiate their relationships with their voices and have 
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stressed the importance in exploring how the person with hallucinations is engaged in 
an intentional relationship with his ‘object’ of hallucination. They concluded that the 
exploration of the directedness of how a person’s consciousness diverts from a shared 
to a solipsistic world – and how it might be played out in the psychotherapeutic dyad 
– remains of vital significance from an intersubjective psychotherapeutic perspective.  
 
 Additionally, recent research papers and in-depth case studies have suggested 
that intersubjectively informed psychotherapies which stress the significance of 
affective reciprocity not only proved this reciprocity possible but further suggest that 
it supports peoples’ journeys toward recovery (e.g. Holma & Aaltonen, 2004; 
Seikkula et al., 2006; Stanghellini & Lysaker, 2007; Dimaggio et al., 2008; Harder & 
Folke, 2012; Lysaker et al., 2013; Irarrazaval & Sharim, 2014). Irarrazaval and 
Sharim (2014) for example, explored persons’ biographical milestones of their acute 
episodes of psychosis and suggested that the intersubjective dimension of their life 
stories shed light not only on the interpersonal processes involved in psychosis but 
also in the psychotherapeutic relationship. They have also emphasised that in the 
cases where therapeutic interventions were delivered throughout the acute phases of 
psychosis and comprised of efforts to reduce ‘positive’ symptoms without paying 
attention to their intersubjective elements, the possibility for relapse was very high.  
 
Although not explicitly informed by phenomenological principles, a fairly 
recent and exciting approach to psychosis originates from the Western Lapland in 
Finland, called the ‘Open Dialogue’ approach, which is based on social 
constructionist frameworks and dialogical and family therapy principles. The 
unconventional and intersubjectively oriented ‘open dialogue’ approach suggests that 
instead of focusing on particular techniques, the therapeutic team works together with 
the family and patient (initially on a daily basis, and usually from the patient’s home), 
and focuses mainly on how the patient, her family and the therapists are all involved 
in dialogical processes. The main aim of the approach is promoting a multi-voiced 
and democratic dialogue between the patients and their families and/or their 
significant others. This approach conceptualises psychosis in comprehensible terms 
and suggests that psychotic phenomena consist of meaningful responses to particular 
traumatic experiences. The emphasis placed on transparency, the tolerance of 
					 74 
uncertainty for everyone involved in the process (patients, their family and the 
therapists involved) and the exploratory and subjective approach towards expressed 
thoughts closely matches some E-P approaches to psychotherapy, such as that of 
Spinelli (1997), which emphasise the attitude of ‘unknowing’ in the therapeutic 
relationship. It is important to note, that the “open dialogue” approach has recently 
received worldwide attention since a plethora of evidence seems to suggest that its 
employment prevents young people who present with psychotic difficulties from 
developing chronic symptoms and needing to use psychotropic medication (e.g. 
Gromer, 2012; Seikkula & Alakare, 2012).  
 
  The revival of phenomenologically and intersubjectively informed 
psychotherapies for psychosis draws our attention to the possibilities of the 
psychotherapy for psychosis despite the pessimism evidenced in the literature. Even 
though a plethora of therapists from diverse theoretical orientations experience the 
development of the therapeutic relationship as challenging (e.g. Evans-Jones, 2009) 
evidence also demonstrates good levels of therapeutic relationship (e.g. Hammond, 
2004; Dow, 2003; Svensson & Hansson, 1999; Evans-Jones, Peters, & Barker, 2009; 
Frank & Gunderson, 1990; Startup, Wilding, & Startup, 2006).  
 
 
2.5 RATIONALE OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT 	
2.5.1 Research focus 		
 The preceding review has demonstrated the lack of published literature in 
exploring the lived experiences of CoPts working with psychosis with particular 
emphasis on intersubjective elements in the therapeutic process. A recent interesting 
study conducted by Larsson, Loewenthal and Brooks (2012) also stressed this issue. 
In this study, the researchers employed a critical discursive methodology and 
interviewed eight counselling psychologists who worked with psychosis, in order to 
explore their understanding of the diagnosis of schizophrenia. The researchers 
					 75 
concluded that although the CoPts constructed their experiences in a relational 
manner, the employment of a pathologizing discourse was nevertheless present. The 
authors emphasised the unrepresented contributions of CoP in the literature and the 
prominent lack of the exploration of CoPts’ experiences in working with this client 
group. In light of these results and according to the detailed literature search 
conducted, to my own knowledge, no research study has been conducted until the 
present, to explicitly explore intersubjective approaches to the psychotherapy of 
psychosis from a CoP perspective. It was because of these limitations that the 
rationale for conducting the current study was developed and gradually formed my 
research question. More specifically, the main research question of this research 
attempt was: What are CoPts’ and psychotherapists’ lived experiences of the 
therapeutic process in working intersubjectively with people with psychosis? Specific 
emphasis was placed upon the exploration of therapists’ self-experience, other-
experience and their understanding of the dynamic processes in the space in-between.  
 
2.5.2 Relevance to counselling psychology and psychotherapy 
 
As has been already discussed, this project is not only interested in exploring 
the lived experiences of CoPts in working with psychosis but also those of 
psychotherapists, since their experiences may also be of direct relevance to the field 
of CoP. In this study, psychotherapists identify practising from an intersubjective 
perspective with a focus on the mutual, and shared an understanding of the client’s 
distress by considering both the client’s and the therapist’s involvement in the 
therapeutic relationship. Since both CoPts and psychotherapists are trained to practice 
within a variety of modalities, with a range of manifestations of severe distress and 
that this particular way of working and intersubjectivity are also of primal 
significance to the work of CoPts (Lane & Corrie, 2006), the psychotherapists’ 
reflections are considered valuable. Moreover, given the increasing numbers of CoPts 
who are now working in settings where they encounter people given a diagnosis of 
psychosis, the exploration of their self-experience, Other-experience and lived 
experience of the therapeutic process are significant for the field of CoP. The 
phenomenological nature of this study can, therefore, provide data and knowledge 
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which resonates with both CoP’s and psychotherapy’s practices and which they will 
both find useful in practice, supervision, and research.  
 
2.5.3 A reflexive account  
 
It is important to firstly mention that I have kept a research/reflexive diary 
throughout the research as a ‘monitoring tool’ in order to grasp, record and reflect on 
as many as possible assumptions and biases, which arose in consciousness throughout 
all the stages of the research. As Kasket (2012) has addressed, an intrinsic 
characteristic of the E-P approach to CoP is to bracket one’s assumptions and biases 
as much as possible in both research and practice. In order to attend to this process, 
one should address these assumptions and reflect upon them. For this reason, the 
reader of this project should expect to read several forms and levels of the personal 
reflexivity processes (some have been already presented in the preface) which have 
mainly derived from my personal reflexivity diary kept throughout the research 
process. At this particular stage, personal reflexivity is about recognising that the 
positions I took as the researcher throughout the literature review in a dynamic 
combination with my previous lived experiences of therapeutic work with psychosis 
have affected the approach with which I conducted, transcribed and analysed my 
participants’ interviews. For example, I recognise that my own lived experiences in 
inpatient settings and training in E-P CoP, have impacted the ways in which I have 
explored the literature, emphasised several authors and constructed my critical 
attitude towards certain theoretical and clinical approaches. It is, therefore, likely that 
my experiences had an impact on my expectations of the findings in terms of my 
assumptions and biases. For instance, before the construction of my interview 
schedule and the recruitment of participants, I had a strong expectation that the 
prospective participants would have shared similar concerns with my own around 
issues of diagnosis, stigma, intersubjectivity and strong therapeutic bonds with people 
diagnosed with psychosis. These expectations were thoroughly reflected in my 
reflexive diary and discussed in research supervision in an effort to approach 
participants’ interviews as openly as possible.  
 
					 77 
 I would also like to provide a brief reflexive account regarding the process of 
constructing the literature review. All preparatory reading and construction of this 
particular chapter have been very challenging and energy consuming, which 
employed a lengthy, yet exciting and fruitful period of immersing myself in the 
literature. However, having been so engaged with the literature, I often wondered if 
this hard work also informed against the anxiety of approaching a concluding ‘truth’. 
I often had to remind myself that there was no final truth waiting to be discovered 
amongst the plurality of standpoints I was exposed to. As Spinelli (2014) has 
addressed, “The existential thought argues that the quest for any fully-realized and 
permanent coherence, completeness or fulfilment in one’s lived experience of being 
can only ever be just an attempt, a movement towards, rather than an arrival” (p. 8). 
Moreover, a reflective stance towards my ‘bulimic’ attitude in the process of 
discovering, reading and ‘digesting’ tons of literature, shed light on the underlying 
tendency to procrastinate and stretch the time boundaries of the projects’ time 
planning. My prolonged engagement with the exploration of the literature felt related 
to the underlying awareness of my inevitable ‘death’ as a student and a resistance in 
taking a leap of faith and moving closer to the possibility of becoming a fully 
recognised professional, and therefore diving into uncertainty.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
					 78 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 	
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
 Having already sketched the rationale of this project and reviewed the related 
literature, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the rationale behind the chosen 
methodology for exploring my research question. I will clarify how my 
epistemological standpoint informed the chosen methodology and methods and 
explain why quantitative methods were rejected in favour of qualitative methods. I 
will further elucidate why I have chosen Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
(IPA) among the many qualitative approaches available in relation to the 
epistemological positioning of the research question and continue with an exploration 
of the philosophical foundations of IPA. What follows is a careful consideration of 
the most pertinent alternative qualitative methodologies that were finally disregarded 
in favour of IPA and issues around validity, quality and reflexivity will bring the 
methodology chapter to an end.  
 
 Methodology is the all-encompassing approach to research and includes both 
philosophy and methods. According to Van Manen (1990) “(…) methodology is the 
theory behind the method, including the study of what method one should follow and 
why. The Greek hodos means “way” and methodology means the logos (study) of the 
method (way). So methodology means “pursuit of knowledge” (p.7-8). This section 
considers the philosophy and process of pursuing knowledge through a detailed 
exploration of the methodology of interest and incorporates the consideration and 
exploration of the underlying research paradigm, the epistemological, ontological and 
axiological stances that inform the methodology. As Ponterotto (2005) has advocated 
methodology “(…) refers to the process and procedures of the research (…) research 
method flows from one’s position on ontology, epistemology, and axiology” (p.132). 
More specifically, this project is based on an interpretivist research paradigm and 
axiology, endorses subjectivist epistemology and relativist ontology, and employs 
naturalistic methodology and methods.  
					 79 
3.2 THE BASIS FOR ADOPTING A QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY 
 
 The debate about the efficacy of qualitative versus quantitative methodologies 
from a CoP vantage point (and in other applied psychologies) is a long-standing one. 
In the case of CoP, it echoes its often-discussed identity complications and 
oscillations between the scientist-practitioner and reflective-practitioner positions 
(that is, between the human and the natural sciences). The conflicted epistemological 
and ontological positions that CoP is called to contain within both research and 
practice has given rise to discussions about the pluralistic stance CoP should endorse 
in both arenas. It suggests that CoPts could effectively use quantitative and qualitative 
approaches by engaging with methodological pluralism (Hanley, Cutts, Gordon, & 
Scott, 2013) but also considers how research findings come together with theories of 
psychological practice (Cooper & McLeod, 2001). The relational and dialogical 
approach to research and practice which CoP emphasises seems to fit well with the 
philosophical underpinnings of both methodological and therapeutic pluralism. As 
Manafi (2010) stressed, CoP has always been tightly grounded in a philosophy that 
endorses dialectic ways of practising and relational ways of doing research. In other 
words, I suggest that we are invited to engage our own and other epistemological and 
ontological assumptions in a dynamic dialogue. This does not negate the possibility of 
the emergence of incongruity, conflict, and uncertainty. On the contrary, it brings to 
the fore a vibrant tension with which we are called to engage constructively and 
creatively by embracing a critical and evaluative stance towards others and our 
assumptions. As Downing (2000) suggested, this dialectical initiative brings to the 
surface dilemmas that are not always resolved and the possibility that agreements or 
synthesis between viewpoints will not always take place.   
 
 This project with its emphasis on intersubjectivity from an E-P vantage point 
employed throughout (understanding of phenomena and therapeutic process, personal 
reflexivity, collecting data, etc.), endorses a pluralistic philosophy by acknowledging 
otherness in all its forms. With pluralism suggesting that any significant question can 
be approached and answered differently (Rescher, 1993), I also acknowledge that 
different therapeutic approaches have different – of equal value – stories to narrate 
(hence, the participants of this project practise different therapeutic modalities). With 
					 80 
relevance to methodological pluralism, I acknowledge the otherness of quantitative 
designs, which have contributed to both counselling and psychotherapy (McLeod, 
1994) and therefore respect the usefulness of quantitative approaches for particular 
types of investigations, for instance when a research question invites large sample 
sizes and generalisable results with an emphasis on cause-effect relationships. 
However, the deep exploration of the diversity of meaningful intersubjective 
experiences this project aspired to engage with invited the consideration of a 
qualitative investigative position. My decision to employ a qualitative approach was 
therefore mainly informed by the nature of my research question (what are the lived-
experiences of therapists working intersubjectively with psychosis?). Additionally, 
my personal experiences and values and my training in E-P CoP and its core 
philosophical values have influenced the genesis of my research question.  
 
 CoP is strongly related to the E-P paradigm, which provides a foundation in 
qualitative research methodologies and their relational epistemologies (Thayer-Bacon 
et al., 2003). For these reasons, in the next sections I engage with an exploration of 
the epistemological, ontological, axiological and methodological grounds on which 
qualitative methods rest, and how these are compatible with E-P CoP, and also 
whether they fit well for the purposes of my research question. It is important to 
elucidate that the exploration of the literature also informed the choice of 
methodology, in the sense that the sophisticated and idiographic nature of 
intersubjectivity – as the literature indicated – which this project engaged with, could 
not be explored in quantitative operational terms, hence a qualitative exploration of 
the subjective nature of the multiplicity of participants’ experiences justified the 
adoption of a qualitative design. Some brief definitions will be useful before delving 
into the topic. While epistemology is concerned with how we know what we know, 
ontology is concerned with the nature of reality and being and what can be known 
about reality. Methodology refers to the process and procedures of research, and 
axiology is concerned with the role and values of the researcher in the research 
process (Ponterotto, 2005).  
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Epistemology 
 
 Qualitative methods are based on the interpretive research paradigm, which 
assumes different points of view that provide distinctive characteristics of a 
subjectively experienced reality (Kiddler & Fine, 1997). This reminds us of 
Kierkegaard’s (1844/1973) suggestion that we should hold a subjective position 
towards knowledge of the world and others. Similarly, I make the assumption that the 
experiences that my participants shared in this study are subjective and therefore the 
knowledge generated through results provides a subjective knowledge of 
intersubjective approaches to psychotherapy. Quantitative research methods’ 
positivistic paradigm would have been inappropriate for this project’s research 
question and also incompatible with my personal epistemological positioning, as it 
assumes that through precise methods the researcher can reveal objective data for an 
objective reality (McLeod, 2001). The subjectivist epistemology that qualitative 
methods are based on assumes instead that it is not possible to quantify the subjective 
nature of feelings, thoughts, and behaviours and considers knowledge to be subjective 
and contextualised (Langdridge, 2007). This echoes Nietzsche’s (1873/1962) 
criticism of objectivity and truth when he strongly asserted that truth is relational and 
that we cannot approach any form of absolute truth. Moreover, the researcher is 
expected to interact with and affect participants and results while being affected 
herself in the process (Richardson, 1994), which resonates with Buber’s (1921/1996) 
notion of mutuality and intersubjective processes taking place within and between 
people. This embedded notion of intersubjectivity in the formation of knowledge and 
the process of research fits well with the second person approach to intersubjectivity 
upon which this project places emphasis. Moreover, it is incompatible with 
quantitative methods’ objectivist epistemology, which considers that any form of 
knowledge can be measured in objective terms, with the world experienced and 
described objectively and the researcher independent from the phenomena of 
investigation.  
 
 
 
 
					 82 
Ontology 
 
 Ontologically, qualitative methods maintain a relativist approach by rejecting 
the existence of absolute truth, and assume reality to be subjective, multiple, 
meaningful and intersubjectively constructed by people (McLeod, 2001; Langdridge, 
2007). Husserl (1925/1977) insisted that scientific knowledge cannot be separated 
from our subjective way of understanding phenomena of the lived-world and 
therefore implied that our understanding of phenomena is not separated from our own 
lived experiences. As I have already described in the preface, my own experiences in 
working with psychosis affected my understanding of psychosis and this influenced 
the formation of my research question. I am therefore well aware that my assumptions 
related to the psychotherapy of psychosis have affected my personal style in the 
interviewing process and the formation of my results. Quantitative methods take a 
completely different turn with the researcher adopting an ontological position that 
makes her assume that to avoid biasing the results she needs to remain objectively 
detached from her participants. This project’s research question and my personal 
epistemological and ontological positioning assume an intersubjective construction of 
research findings and therefore a research methodology advocating that the researcher 
should adopt a detached approach towards participants was rejected.    
 
Axiology  
 
 The constructivist-interpretivist nature of axiological assumptions in 
qualitative methods considers the research process and outcomes as value-laden. The 
implication of considering the researcher’s values as an inextricable part of the 
research process is that it provides the space for their comprehension and challenge 
(Willig, 2008). E-P thinking places a considerable emphasis on how our speaking 
position and our values affect the understanding of phenomena under investigation 
(e.g. Deurzen, 2002). On the contrary, quantitative research’s axiological assumptions 
– which seemed incompatible for this project – assume that the researcher should 
strive for a value-free and unbiased approach since it views values as emotive and 
therefore outside of the sphere of scientific interest (Mcleod, 2001).  
 
					 83 
Methodology  
Methodologically, qualitative approaches follow an inductive process of 
research. They therefore take into consideration the effects of the context throughout 
the research process while they also assume that both researcher and participant shape 
the form the results take (Ponterotto, 2005). On the contrary, the deductive process of 
quantitative methods is involved instead with cause and effect relationships without 
being sensitive enough to context issues (McLeod, 2001). Instead, this project’s 
emphasis on intersubjective dynamics maintained sensitivity to contextual issues 
throughout.  For example, both my personal and participants’ social contexts and the 
relationships between the two have been considered as significant in the analysis and 
interpretation of the data which emerged. Along these lines, Heidegger (1926/2001) 
and Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) emphasised the importance of context when 
exploring phenomena by placing particular emphasis on culture, history and time and 
understood them as the basic structure of human understanding. Moreover, Sartre 
(1939/1962) has also emphasised the social and political dimension of human 
understanding.  
To conclude, the purpose of this research is to explore the intersubjective 
experiences of practitioners who work with psychosis. The epistemological, 
ontological, axiological and methodological stance of CoP (particularly from an E-P 
perspective), the objectives of this research and the literature review, justified the 
adoption of a qualitative approach, whereby the generated knowledge was grounded 
in the subjective and diverse intersubjective experiences of participants.  
 
3.3 EMBRACING THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD  
 
 From the numerous qualitative methodologies available, I have adopted a 
phenomenological one for this study. As Osborne (1994) has suggested “The majority 
of qualitative methods have a phenomenological component. The most obvious 
reason for the shared phenomenological component is the interest in personal 
perspectives upon experience rather than or in addition to a third-person perspective” 
					 84 
(p.185). This decision was informed by my research initiative (Willig, 2008) in 
exploring participants’ manifold lived intersubjective experiences through a careful 
consideration of their life-world. Along these lines, Van Manen (1990) emphasised 
that phenomenological methodologies are mainly concerned about lived experiences. 
Moreover, as McLeod (2003) has suggested, “(…) the aim of phenomenological 
research is to achieve an authentic and comprehensive description of the way in which 
a phenomenon is experienced by a person or group of people” (p. 79). 
Phenomenology has its origins in European philosophy and is closely related to the 
work of Edmund Husserl who is considered the founder of contemporary 
phenomenology (Langdridge, 2007). In this section, I will present an overview of 
phenomenology, explain the choice of IPA as the chosen methodology by presenting 
its philosophical and theoretical foundations and show why other possible qualitative 
methodologies were rejected. 
 
 
3.3.1 A synopsis of phenomenology    
 
Phenomenology was established by Edmund Husserl and involves “(…) the 
study of human experience and the way which things are perceived as they appear to 
consciousness” (Langdridge, 2007, p.10). An essential concept within Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology is that of intentionality, to which he paid significant 
attention (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009). In other words, he asserted that 
experience is always an experience of something and that the intentional relationship 
between what is experienced and the way it is experienced should be of utmost 
importance for a phenomenologist. Husserl’s phenomenological method asserts that 
in order to approach the real meaning of an experience we need to suspend our 
assumptions and biases which are universally inextricable aspects of all lived 
experiences and focus on a detailed description of the experience itself (Smith & 
Osborn, 2008). For this reason, he introduced the notion of ‘epoche’ and 
‘phenomenological reduction’ which are conceived as the processes of bracketing 
one’s assumptions about investigated phenomena to be able to grasp and describe 
them in their ‘totality’ (Willig, 2008). Moreover, he introduced the concept of 
					 85 
‘imaginative variation’ which is the process of imagining the experience of inquiry 
from as many perspectives as possible, to suspend all assumptions and biases of a 
phenomenon and therefore consider it from the other person’s perspective 
(Langdridge, 2007). In other words, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology was 
descriptive in nature and its main objective was the focus on the objects of 
consciousness as they appear in consciousness by suspending what is thought to be 
known about them (Willig, 2008). 
 
Heidegger, who is also considered as a major figure in the field of 
phenomenology, was greatly influenced by Husserl but had a quite different 
viewpoint. He enriched phenomenological philosophy with an alternative interpretive 
and existential approach instead of Husserl’s descriptive one by putting emphasis on 
the persons’ concrete engagement with the world and their inseparability from it 
(Heidegger, 1926/2001). He suggested that because we are always immersed in the 
world and since we can never distance ourselves from the world and others, we are 
always in a process of interpretation. His position contributed towards a ‘hermeneutic 
turn’ in phenomenology by suggesting that any phenomenological investigation 
embraces an embedded interpretive process (Polkinghorne, 1989). For Heidegger, 
consciousness cannot be separated from the world in order to be examined and 
understanding the objects of consciousness is not a way we know the world but rather 
the way we are. 
 
 Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962), who also contributed to phenomenological 
philosophy and particularly hermeneutics, also suggested that we are always 
immersed in and inseparable from the world and proposed that this is necessary for 
effectively grasping and making sense of lived experiences. This intersubjective 
element in his theory, which has been already discussed in the literature review, 
echoes the value-laden axiological and relativist ontological assumptions of 
qualitative methods: it assumes the contextual and intersubjective status of reality and 
truth but also the subjective nature of the researcher’s interpretations which are 
grounded on how her embodied consciousness is attached to the contextual world and 
therefore determine how she perceives it. 
 
					 86 
Influenced by both Husserl and Heidegger, another key figure, which 
contributed towards the hermeneutic turn in phenomenology, was Gadamer 
(1960/1996) with his project on hermeneutics closely associated with that of 
Heidegger’s. He too understood language, understanding, and interpretation as 
inseparable structures of our being-in-the-world and suggested that: “(…) 
understanding occurs in interpreting” (Gadamer, 1960/1996, p.389). Central to his 
project on interpretation was the concept of ‘horizon’, which he understood as a scope 
of vision that incorporates all that is seen and experienced from a particular 
viewpoint. For Gadamer, the process of interpretation involves a ‘fusion of horizons’, 
which as he suggested encompasses a dialectical interplay between the interpreter’s 
assumptions and the meaning of the text (Smith et al., 2009). He understood the 
process of questioning as an integral part of the interpretive process as it allows the 
development of multiple horizons.    
  
The phenomenological literature appears divided between a descriptive and an 
interpretive phenomenology, with Husserlian phenomenologists concentrating on a 
detailed description of experiences and bracketing of personal assumptions while 
existential/interpretive phenomenology are interested in hermeneutics and the 
impossibility of ever reaching the Husserlian reduction.  The next section deals with 
this issue in more detail by examining the basis upon which Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis was chosen as the most appropriate methodology for this 
project.  
 	
3.3.2 The choice of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) 	
 Having reached the decision to employ a phenomenological methodology, my 
subsequent reflections were related to whether I was going to adopt a descriptive or 
an interpretative phenomenological method, which would serve the purposes of my 
research question and my E-P epistemological assumptions. Although all 
phenomenology is traditionally descriptive and places emphasis on description rather 
than explanation, it is usually divided into descriptive and interpretative or 
hermeneutic phenomenology (Finlay, 2012). As Finlay (2011) has stressed, the 
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descriptive phenomenological approach is the most faithful to Husserlian 
phenomenology and mainly concentrates on identifying the essence of the 
phenomenon being investigated through phenomenological reduction (Langdridge, 
2007). I consider that the traditional descriptive approach’s (e.g. Giorgi’s approach, 
1970, 1997) emphasis on intentionality and the rigorous description of experience as 
it emerges in consciousness is very significant. However, the firmness of the 
descriptive approach in avoiding any form of interpretation by sticking to description 
seemed incompatible with my own intersubjectively informed epistemology. I have 
already discussed why I consider Husserl’s version of intersubjectivity as missing a 
core element in terms of disregarding the embeddedness and enmeshment of 
experience with the world and others, something that the hermeneutic turn in 
phenomenology has significantly stressed. The interpretive approach does not 
separate description from interpretation and instead understands interpretation as 
unavoidable. Mainly informed by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer and Ricoeur, 
it emphasises our inescapability from the automatic processes of meaning-making and 
interpretation. Moreover, it assumes that a complete bracketing of knowledge and past 
experiences about any investigated phenomenon is impossible (Smith et al., 2009). 
Abiding by the hermeneutic idea, I considered that a purely descriptive approach was 
almost impossible to achieve and that my participants’ shared experiences of working 
intersubjectively with psychosis during the interview process were based on a 
platform that embraced mutual understanding, co-creation and therefore 
interpretation. Additionally, even though the descriptive approach attempts to engage 
with experience, it over-relies on the “bracketing” process with little room for the 
integration of interpretation. The essentially interpretative nature of the phenomena in 
question (intersubjective experiences) has therefore necessitated a method that can 
integrate a more active interpretative element. I considered that the descriptive 
approach was not suitable for this project since it would not allow me to incorporate 
my personal understandings of the participants’ understandings and this 
intersubjective ‘deficiency’ discouraged me. 
Among other phenomenologically informed methodologies, this project 
adopted Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) as the most appropriate 
methodology since it is based both on description and interpretation (Smith et al., 
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2009). This decision was based on the epistemological and ontological positions of 
myself as the researcher and hence the project, particularly with the recognition that 
IPA holds an idiographic approach to research, which is informed by E-P philosophy 
with emphasis placed on both description and interpretation, subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity. What follows is the description of IPA’s philosophical origins and 
how its core epistemological and ontological assumptions fit well with the research 
question of the project.  
IPA is a methodology that focuses on a thorough investigation of lived 
experience and as Smith et al. (2009) explained, it “(…) enables that experience to be 
expressed in its own terms, rather than according to predefined categories” (Smith et 
al., 2009, p. 32). My research question invited the exploration of the in-depth 
experiences of practitioners and also the meaning they attached to these experiences 
and this clearly meant that I had to recruit a small number of participants in order to 
be able to explore their experiences in detail. As Smith et al. (2009) stipulated, IPA 
focuses on people’s experiences and their understanding of these experiences or 
specific phenomena and hence a small sample size is suggested. IPA was also 
considered appropriate because by paying close attention to individual accounts, it 
has the potential to disclose interesting and valuable insights for psychotherapeutic 
practice that challenge assumptions around the psychotherapy for psychosis. As 
Creswell (1998) suggested, the reality of a set of human experiences could be 
uncovered through the detailed yet subjective descriptions provided by the research 
participants.   
Another significant factor that contributed towards the adoption of IPA for this 
project is its emphasis on intersubjectivity and reflexivity, which is aligned with my 
personal epistemological position in acknowledging the significance of the Buberian 
‘in-between’. IPA’s focus on sense-making within the intersubjective realm 
emphasises the relational nature of engagement and the processes taking place 
between participant and researcher. It considers that sense-making is possible because 
of our enmeshment with the world (Smith, 1996). Even in the cases when sense-
making seems challenging, IPA suggests that the researcher should make focusing on 
the betweenness a priority. Binswanger’s contributions to intersubjectivity and the 
dialogical understanding of a person have also been of great influence to the decision 
					 89 
of adopting IPA. Frie (2010) suggested that he was perhaps the first to apply concepts 
from phenomenology, hermeneutics and dialogical philosophy to psychiatric and 
psychotherapeutic theory and practice. Binswanger was clear that the reductionist 
approach that psychology adheres to, which suggests the split between subject and 
object – and therefore a split between self and other – should be replaced by a 
hermeneutic exploration of the person in her life-world by considering how she 
relates to self and others. His phenomenological approach to the totality of a person 
suggested a careful reflection on her linguistic, affective, and bodily expressions. His 
approach to the psychotherapy of psychosis also seems pertinent here. His 
hermeneutic and existential approach to psychotherapy offers a dynamic 
conceptualisation of intersubjectivity (as has been already discussed) but also 
provides an essential framework for relational research. This is attuned to CoP’s 
philosophical values and particularly resonates with its axiological and ontological 
assumptions. For Binswanger (1963/1993) the Heideggerian ‘being-with’ and 
Buberian ‘in-between’ were fundamental to practice and suggested that we should be 
concerned with understanding the position and context from which a person’s 
statements make sense. IPA fully adopts this stance and as Smith et al. (2009) 
suggested, Binswanger’s approach “(…) foreshadows the ‘insider’s perspective’ 
which is one core element of IPA, and the phenomenological turn in recent work with 
psychosis” (p. 150).   
	
3.3.3 The consideration of alternative methodologies  
 
 Despite the fact that my personal E-P assumptions and research question fit 
well with the adoption of IPA, the process of identifying the most appropriate 
methodology encompassed a careful examination of other possible methodologies. In 
this section, I deal with an exploration of Narrative Analysis, Template Analysis, 
Discourse Analysis and Grounded Theory – which were considered as alternative 
methodologies – and explanation of the reasons for their rejection.  
 
 
 
					 90 
Narrative Analysis 
 
 Narrative Analysis (NA) was also taken into consideration. This methodology 
is mainly based on the social constructionist epistemology and attempts to analyse the 
linguistic representation of narrative accounts and reveal their structure by paying 
close attention to the restrictions and opportunities these structures pose upon human 
experience (Willig, 2008). The researcher is engaged with a specific experience that is 
presented in participants’ stories through the analysis of the discourse. Smith et al. 
(2009) recognise that this is an effective methodology for researchers interested in 
exploring participants’ experiences through narrative. Although I acknowledge the 
emphasis it places upon language and the verbal expressions of participants that can 
provide clues about their individual ways of sense-making, it was rejected. I 
considered that its emphasis on linguistic and narrative analysis does not leave 
enough space for considering how the participant is making sense of her experience. 
Moreover, interpretation is informed by social theory and for the purposes of my 
research question, a more comprehensive interpretative approach was preferred.    
 
 
Template Analysis 
 
 Template analysis (TA), which was developed by King (1998), is very similar 
to IPA in the sense that is engaged with a similar analytical process (semi-structured 
interview, thematic analysis). However, it is also very different from IPA as it holds a 
more deductive approach. The themes do not emerge from the data but are pre-
selected through the exploration of previous related research and guide the researcher 
in analysing her data (Langdridge, 2007). In IPA, which is grounded in an inductive 
method instead, the themes emerge from the data during and not before analysis. 
What seemed tempting about TA is that the actual phenomena of investigation not 
only emerge through the literature review but also through the meaning that the 
participants ascribe to them before the interviews. Before conducting interviews, the 
researcher administers questionnaires in order to decide upon the themes that she will 
be subsequently discussing in the interviews (Langdridge, 2007). Although this can 
allow more participant involvement, upon more reflection I thought that what 
					 91 
precedes the participant involvement (defining the themes from the literature review) 
counteracts this very involvement. The purpose of the project is to reveal the 
individual meanings of intersubjective experiences in the psychotherapy of psychosis 
that are grounded in practitioners’ experiences instead of employing pre-selected 
themes.  I was interested in reflecting upon the practitioners’ experience though the 
double hermeneutic concept (I will discuss this later) and therefore recognising the 
co-creative element of the research process where both researcher and participant are 
equally involved.  
 
 
Discourse Analysis 
 
 I consider discourse analysis (DA) as a very attractive method from a socio-
political standpoint and as has already been shown, the E-P tradition acknowledges 
the impact of our socio-political situatedness. What I found mainly attractive was the 
notion of a shared use of language, which it considers as the creator of meaning that 
constructs our understanding of reality and defines our social roles (Murray, 2008). 
For this particular project, it would have been interesting to explore how participants 
employ language for describing their experiences as such an exploration can shed 
light on the creation and maintenance of psychiatric discourses and the construction 
of personal and group identities. However, the purpose of this project was to explore 
how practitioners make sense of their intersubjective experiences and not the ways in 
which these experiences are narrated based on socially available discourses. DA was 
finally discarded as a possible methodology because I was mainly interested in 
exploring participants’ experiences from a meaning-making perspective and I 
considered that my participants’ meaning making could have been undervalued with 
discourse analysis. Also, DA does not embrace a holistic intersubjective approach to 
language in the sense that is perceived as a social phenomenon as compared to IPA, 
which holds a more comprehensive approach. 
 
 
 
 
					 92 
Grounded Theory 
 
 It should first be mentioned that the original positivistic approach of grounded 
theory (GT) proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) was rejected for this project, as it 
is incongruent with my epistemological stance. Instead, Charmaz’s version of 
grounded theory was instead considered for this project, which intends to generate 
theory (Willig, 2008) and through the exploration of the phenomenon under 
investigation to provide an exploratory framework. At first glance, the development 
of an exploratory framework seemed tempting due to the lack of literature for the 
phenomenon under investigation, but upon further consideration, it was discarded at it 
strays from the E-P epistemological grounding of my research question. The emphasis 
on the development of a theoretical framework wouldn’t leave much space for 
grasping in detail the intersubjective experiences of participants. Moreover, one of the 
main principles of GT is the assumption that within the data there is certainly 
something to be discovered. My epistemological stance is in conflict with this 
principle as I am interested in exploring participants’ subjective interpretations of 
their intersubjective experiences and through them revealing in which ways these 
were different or similar and therefore I do not assume that within the data lies 
something to be discovered.  
 
 Considering the limitations of the above-mentioned methodologies in light of 
my research question and E-P assumptions, IPA was therefore considered to be the 
most compatible methodology. The next section deals with the philosophical and 
theoretical underpinnings of IPA.  
 			  
					 93 
3.3.4 Philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of IPA  
 
 IPA was developed by the psychologist Jonathan Smith and is primarily 
grounded on phenomenology, hermeneutics, and idiography. Smith and Eatough 
(2006) explained that the main purpose of IPA is to deliver a rich analysis of 
participants’ experiences through a consideration of the totality of their life-world. 
Even though it is informed by the Husserlian descriptive tradition in terms of focusing 
on the first person perspective, intentionality, and consciousness, it also embraces the 
hermeneutic turn in phenomenology (already discussed), which is mainly informed by 
Heideggerian, Merleau-Pontian and Sartrean existential thinking, and Gadamerian 
and Ricoeurian hermeneutic/interpretative thinking (Smith et al., 2009). IPA 
considers the fundamentality of intersubjectivity throughout the research process by 
approaching both participant’s and researcher’s lived experiences as inseparable from 
the world and particularly the research context. It therefore assumes a dynamic 
interplay between them, which meaningfully affects findings. This intersubjective 
element is integral in IPA’s theory of the ‘double hermeneutic’, which suggests an in-
depth exploration of the participant’s experiences through the active role of the 
researcher. It also suggests a mutual interpretative interplay between researcher and 
participant where “(…) the researcher is trying to make sense of the participants 
trying to make sense of their world.” (Smith & Osborn, 2008, p.53). The ‘double 
hermeneutic’ has been a very crucial element in my decision to consider IPA as the 
most appropriate methodology, considering the project’s emphasis on 
intersubjectivity. I considered that it could assist the interpretation of the 
multidimensional intersubjective experiences of participants through my 
intersubjective understandings emerging between the data and myself. This process 
recognises this because it assumes that all our experiences are intersubjectively 
situated, as this is fundamental to understanding the other’s experience. 
 
 IPA is grounded on an idiographic and not a nomothetic approach to 
knowledge and therefore is not concerned with creating general laws of human 
experience and behaviour from large samples. Instead, it is focused on a detailed 
exploration of the participant’s subjective experience and therefore recruits small 
samples. The purpose of the present study is aligned with the idiographic approach 
					 94 
and seeks to provide a thorough exploration of practitioners’ experiences that work 
intersubjectively with psychosis. Therefore, the analysis of results will not be used to 
generate generalisations. Participants were therefore provided the space to explore in 
detail their personal understanding of their experiences with an emphasis on what was 
particularly important about working intersubjectively with psychosis. 
  
 Even though IPA is mainly grounded on phenomenology, hermeneutics, and 
idiography, it is also concerned with cognition and social constructionism. Smith et al. 
(2009) suggested, “Cognition occurs within the informal, intuitive domain of 
reflective activity in the natural attitude. It is dynamic, multi-dimensional, affective, 
embodied, and intricately connected with our engagement with the world” (Smith et 
al., 2009, p.189). They therefore conceptualise cognitions as being rooted in the 
realms of interpretation and therefore encourage the exploration of their subjective 
meaning. Lastly, IPA’s emphasis on intersubjectivity and hermeneutics entails an 
exploration of a person’s meaning-making processes, which it understands to be 
inexorably connected to her linguistic and socio-cultural history. Because of these 
particular assumptions, it also espouses a ‘light’ form of social constructionism 
(Smith et al., 2009). Smith et al. (2009) particularly suggested that IPA recognises 
that people can revisit and modify the meaning they attach to their experiences 
through symbolic or cognitive action. Hence, they have implied that the researcher 
should be attentively taking into consideration the cultural, ethical and political views 
of her participants in how these might be influencing the way they are making sense 
of their experiences.  		
3.3.5 A critical appraisal of IPA  
 
 The epistemology upon which this project is grounded anticipates that all sorts 
of qualitative methodologies have limitations and this does not exclude IPA. As Smith 
(2011) has suggested, since qualitative research methodologies are quite new in 
psychology, we can expect alterations and improvements in the years to come. Hence, 
despite the preference of IPA as the most appropriate methodology, some of its 
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limitations must be examined, mainly because these limitations must inform 
considerations around quality and rigour.  
 
 Kaptein (2011) and Todorova (2011) have both agreed that IPA is almost 
completely focused on individual experience and therefore fails to consider the social 
context within which the experience is situated. Clearly, as has been already 
demonstrated, IPA’s philosophical foundations consider that any kind of experience 
takes place in a context and is therefore influenced by its dynamics (social, historical 
and linguistic). Smith himself has considered this criticism reflectively and while he 
re-emphasised that one of the unique characteristics of IPA includes the detailed 
exploration of individual lived experience, he encouraged researchers to conduct 
research that is sensitive to the social context (Smith, 2011). Smith’s invitation seems 
to parallel this project’s emphasis on intersubjectivity. Through the analysis of results 
I have therefore taken into consideration participants’ felt-sense of their experiences’ 
‘thrownness’ into the social milieu and as socially and intersubjectively situated. 
  
 Moreover, Chamberlain (2011) suggested that IPA’s methods overemphasise 
procedural features associated with thematic structures and pointed towards a ‘poor’ 
method of analysis. He commented that the prescriptive recommendations which are 
usually proposed for the analysis of data in IPA are not genuinely informed by 
hermeneutics but instead guide researchers to search the data closely for ‘subthemes’, 
and to, therefore, categorise and connect these into broader ‘themes’ and present 
these, supported by data quotations, as the findings.  
 
 From an epistemological and theoretical inconsistency perspective, Willig 
(2013) and Langdridge (2007) have both challenged IPA’s reliance on the social 
cognition paradigm, in other words, its confidence in exploring how a participant 
employs certain ideas and beliefs to make sense of the world. Having read several 
IPA research projects, I have also noticed that many of them tend to focus on the 
cognitive aspect of participants’ experiences. Considering this project’s 
epistemological position which focuses on how intersubjective processes are involved 
in the co-creation of meaning, I was committed to not following a deductive approach 
to the exploration of participants’ cognitions as is usually done in mainstream 
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psychology, but that I would instead engage in a thorough exploration of their 
existential implications within the broader conceptualisation and totality of their 
experiences. As Binswanger has suggested, “Even intersubjective cognition is a kind 
of (inner) perception, with which we grasp the occurrence of the other mind directly” 
(as cited in Frie, 2010, p.84). Even though Binswanger’s approach seems quite 
extreme here and to a certain extent incompatible with IPA’s epistemological and 
ontological origins because it is “(…) the version of the phenomenological method 
that accepts the impossibility of gaining direct access to research participants’ life-
worlds” (Willig, 2013, p.260), I suggest that not only – to a certain extent – does it 
echo this project’s sensitivity to the intersubjective constitution of self and therefore 
its cognitions and emotions but it also tackles the subject-object dualism implied by 
cognitive theory for which IPA has been often critiqued for endorsing. Along similar 
lines with Binswanger, this project’s understanding of perception suggests that the 
‘inside’ is dependent on the ‘outside’ - that our cognitions are not hermetically sealed 
within our mind, and that the foundation of our understanding of another employs 
intersubjective perception and cognition. Even though IPA has often been criticised 
for over-relying on the idea of internal cognitions that can be accessed, it should be 
noted that it does not consider cognitions as isolated and separated functions but as an 
aspect of being-in-the-world (Smith, 1996). My epistemological and ontological 
stance towards intersubjectivity, which has been informed by IPA’s philosophical 
origins, acknowledges the intersubjective nature of all lived experience and the 
assumption of the co-creation of experience – and therefore that of cognitions.  From 
an E-P perspective all lived experiences must be understood within the context in 
which they happen and therefore it was imperative to address how I, as the researcher, 
have possibly impacted participants’ cognitive and affective flow of their narratives. 
This process was explicitly addressed in the process of analysis of each transcript and 
some evidence of this will be demonstrated in reflexivity sections extracted from my 
reflexivity diary.  
 
 The consideration of some of the criticism IPA has invited over the years 
assisted a comprehensive evaluation of its methods. Re-taking into consideration its 
philosophical and theoretical assumptions in parallel with my research rationale and 
epistemological position helped me to carefully adjust the methodology to the needs 
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of the current project – with particular emphasis on intersubjectivity – without turning 
the methodology to something else by also doing justice to its uniqueness.   
 
3.4 ENSURING QUALITY AND RIGOUR 
 
 This section deals with clarifying the particular attention that was paid towards 
the critical issue of assessing the rigour of the research process throughout, which as 
Finlay (2006) has suggested consists of one of the major challenges with which 
qualitative researchers are confronted. Since this is a qualitative piece of work, the 
conceptualisation of validity, quality and rigour are differentiated from how it is 
apprehended from a quantitative perspective, which deals with the development of 
‘objective’ knowledge derived from ‘objective’ realities. The epistemological 
assumptions of qualitative methodologies that are based on subjective and 
intersubjective grounds inform therefore the conceptualisation of quality and rigour. 
Based on Finlay’s (2006) and Ballinger’s (2006) recommendation for evaluating 
qualitative research, I particularly refer to the significance of the process of tracking 
personal bias and bracketing presuppositions, the ethical considerations of 
participant’s otherness (discussed in the methods chapter) and the process of 
reflexivity (discussed in the next section). Moreover, the project endorses the 
principles that Yardley (2000) has proposed for ensuring quality in qualitative 
research, which has been recommended by Smith et al. (2009) and includes sensitivity 
to context, commitment, and rigour, transparency and coherence, impact and 
importance, which I address in the following paragraph.  
 
 ‘Sensitivity to context’ suggests that the researcher must be very careful in the 
process of selecting the appropriate methodology and participants. As has already 
been shown, I have been very thoughtful around the choice of the most appropriate 
methodology. In the method section I will explain my rationale behind the recruitment 
criteria and other issues on recruitment that I have thoroughly considered. 
‘Commitment and rigour’ ensure that the researcher is competent enough both in 
terms of her engagement with the topic but also with her skills in data collection and 
analysis. I have already clarified how my research question and interest in the 
					 98 
psychotherapy for psychosis emerged because of my personal experiences and intense 
involvement with people diagnosed with psychosis before conducting this research. In 
terms of skills in data collection and analysis, I have been in regular supervision with 
both my primary and secondary supervisors throughout the research process while I 
also attended seminars, which dealt with issues around data collection and analysis in 
qualitative methods and IPA in particular. Taking into consideration the criterion of 
‘Transparency and coherence’, I have been aiming for transparency throughout the 
project by presenting a step-by-step account of all processes involved and making 
sure that my writing style is coherent, professional and informed by the 
epistemological and ontological position to which it adhered. Lastly, considering the 
criterion of ‘Impact and importance’ that invites the consideration of how the piece of 
research can be of particular relevance to the professional and research community, I 
have already shown how my research project can have a powerful impact in the fields 
of CoP and E-P psychotherapy in both the clinical and research domains, particularly 
because of the dearth of literature on the subject.     
 
 
3.5 THE PRIMACY OF REFLEXIVITY  
 
 As has been already mentioned and revealed so far, this project has adopted a 
reflexive stance towards all the stages of the research process (choosing my research 
topic, preparation of literature review, recruitment, data collection and analysis and 
discussion of results). As Finlay (2006) has suggested, reflexivity is an essential 
indicator for evaluating the quality of the research process. This is also in line with 
IPA’s emphasis towards a constant audit of the research process and therefore, I have 
kept a reflexive diary throughout, noting my biases and assumptions as they 
manifested in the process, my subjective engagement through the stages, and how this 
has impacted the hermeneutic process and data. Willig (2001) also stressed the 
importance of reflexivity and suggested that any qualitative researcher should be 
thoughtful of both their epistemological and personal reflexivity throughout the 
process. As has been already demonstrated in this chapter, my own epistemological 
and ontological assumptions are in line with the philosophical and theoretical 
					 99 
foundations of the chosen methodology and diverge from a positivist understanding of 
existence. My E-P position has been transparent throughout the process and I am 
aware that my personal assumptions about knowledge in general and the world, and 
the relativist ontology and interpretive epistemology I have espoused, have therefore 
influenced the research throughout. From a personal reflexivity perspective, I am also 
aware how my personal and professional experiences have influenced the way I have 
constructed this project, the way in which I have engaged with my participants and 
the way I have analysed the data. Because of the significance of reflexivity this 
project advocate, the reader should expect to locate sections of personal reflexivity.  
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CHAPTER 4: METHODS  
 
 
The ‘Methods’ section will deal with a detailed description of the research processes 
and a thorough consideration of procedures and steps of analysis. A thorough 
consideration of the adoption of videoconferencing as a method of data collection will 
be discussed and ethical issues will be considered. The chapter completes with a 
consideration of personal reflexivity processes throughout the data collection and the 
phases of analysis.  
 
 
4.1 SAMPLING, RECRUITMENT AND DEMOGRAPHICS  
4.1.1 Sampling  
 
This project employed purposive sampling by selecting a small and 
homogenous group (Smith et al., 2009) of six participants. In contrast to the random 
or representative sampling strategies quantitative research usually adopts, IPA focuses 
on the detailed analysis of the experiences of small samples most suited to the 
research question (Smith & Osborn, 2003). As Langdridge (2007) suggested, by 
employing a purposive rather than a random sample more detailed information can be 
collected about a particular group of people who are considered suitable for the 
exploration of the examined phenomenon (in this case intersubjectively informed 
psychotherapy for psychosis). A distinctive feature of IPA consists of its commitment 
to a detailed interpretative account of the cases included, therefore sacrificing breadth 
for depth. In the recent past, five, six or seven has been recommended as a reasonable 
sample size for a student project using IPA (Smith & Osborn, 2008). Even though my 
initial aim was to recruit between seven to eight participants, the project finally 
recruited and interviewed six participants due to low response. Notwithstanding the 
difficulties in recruitment, the richness of the data that was produced through the 
interviews established that six interviews were sufficient for meaningful analysis to 
take place.  
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4.1.2 Inclusion criteria  
 
The project initially aimed at recruiting English speaking, qualified 
counselling psychologists (registered with the BPS and Health and Care Professions 
Council (HCPC)) who work intersubjectively with people diagnosed with psychosis 
on a one-to-one basis. However, as difficulties in recruiting CoPts who work with 
psychosis were expected (Larsson, Loewenthal, & Brooks, 2012) – the recruitment 
process resulted in a very low response rate – I subsequently decided to also recruit 
psychotherapists (registered with the UKCP) who identified themselves as working 
from a relational/intersubjective vantage point with people diagnosed with psychosis. 
Moreover, the intersubjective therapeutic stance with which the participants identified 
was considered more important compared to their therapeutic techniques (e.g., Geekie 
& Read, 2009) or theoretical orientation. In other words, participants were invited to 
share their intersubjective experiences from an experiential and not a theoretical 
perspective. By incorporating a pluralistic stance, the gamut of background trainings 
and therapeutic orientations was assumed to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of the phenomenon under investigation and an association with the 
existing literature, to facilitate applicability and dissemination. Moreover, the length 
of participants’ post-qualification experience was not considered to be an inclusion 
criterion because the research question invited participants to reflect on their 
subjective experiences, irrespectively of their years of clinical practice.  																	
4.1.3 Recruitment  
 
After the project gained ethical approval by both Middlesex University and the 
New School of Psychotherapy and Counselling (NSPC) (see Appendix I), an 
advertisement (Appendix II) was created and posted at the Society of Existential 
Analysis (SEA), the BPS division of Counselling Psychology, and the Universities 
Psychotherapy and Counselling Association (UPCA) websites. Moreover, the 
advertisement was forwarded to organisations and charities that campaign for mental 
health issues such as MIND, SANE, Mental Health Foundation, Mental Health 
Research UK and Rethink Mental Illness. The International Society for Psychological 
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and Social Approaches to Psychosis in the United Kingdom (ISPS-UK) was also 
approached and the advertisement was forwarded through the organisation to 
connected psychologists and psychotherapists who work with psychosis. A ‘snowball 
sampling’ method was also employed whereby participants who already expressed an 
interest for participating were encouraged to inform other colleagues who also met the 
selection criteria and could possibly be interested in participating. As Patton (2002, 
p.243) suggested, snowball sampling “(…) identifies cases of interest from people 
who know people who know people who know what cases are information-rich, that 
is, good examples for study, good interview subjects”. After several practitioners 
expressed an interest in participating (by receiving e-mails through a particular e-mail 
account I created for the purposes of this project: 
andreas.vassiliou.research@gmail.com), a screening procedure took place in order to 
make sure that they met the inclusion criteria. It should be noted that the most 
successful recruitment method proved to be the ‘snowball sampling’ as four out of the 
six participants who were recruited were informed and encouraged by the rest of 
participants who were already taking part and were informed by the advertisement 
which was forwarded to them by the aforementioned organisations. For those who 
met the criteria, a ‘Participant Information Sheet’ (see Appendix III) was firstly 
forwarded, and after they had carefully reviewed it, a ‘Background Information Sheet’ 
(see Appendix IV) and ‘Informed Consent Form’ (see Appendix V) were forwarded, 
which they were then encouraged to read carefully, sign, and return electronically. For 
each participant who agreed to take part in the project, a date and time were then 
arranged and participants were encouraged to contact me if they had any further 
enquiries regarding the interview procedure before the actual interview took place. 
Since at the period of recruitment I was located abroad, I decided to interview 
participants through videoconferencing (Skype) and therefore agreement upon the 
place of an interview was not needed. Based on this decision, pre-interview 
communications were considered fundamental in order consider participants’ 
experience and comfort level with the selected method of data collection and 
technology. All participants expressed that they were comfortable with 
videoconferencing, however they were encouraged to make sure that on the actual 
date of interview that they set up their internet connection, microphone and camera 
for a smooth videoconference experience.  These pre-interview communications were 
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also aimed at reducing the pressure on both participants and myself and provided the 
appropriate space for remaining clarifications and proved valuable for developing the 
relationship needed for a productive and open dialogue throughout the interview. As 
Finlay and Evans (2008) have stressed, “In this pre-research stage, the foundations of 
mutual trust within a dialogical relationship need to be put in place and the research 
aims and process generally agreed upon. In Buber’s terms, we are called on to move 
beyond functional ‘I-It’ relationship in which we see the other in terms of their use to 
us, towards an I-Thou relationship – one of openness to their personhood” (p.1).  
 
4.1.4 Demographics  
 
Table 1:  Demographic Data  
  
PARTICIPANT 
PSEUDONYM 
  
 
GENDER 
 
AGE 
 
PROFESSION 
 
ETHNIC 
ORIGINS 
 
THEORETICAL  
ORIENTATION 
 
CLINICAL 
EXPERIENCE 
SECTOR 
 
 
YEARS OF 
EXPERIENCE 
 
1. 
 
Paula 
 
Female 
 
 
31 
 
 
Counselling 
Psychologist  
 
 
White 
(British) 
 
Integrative  
 
Public (Assertive 
Outreach Mental Health 
& Early Intervention 
Teams) 
 
 
3 
 
2. 
 
Barbara 
 
 
Female 
 
38 
 
Psychotherapist  
 
White 
(Israeli of 
European 
origins) 
 
Psychoanalytic  
 
Public (Inpatient, 
Outpatient, & 
Rehabilitation Settings)  
 
 
10 
 
3. 
 
Beth 
 
 
Female 
 
36 
 
Counselling 
Psychologist 
 
 
White 
(Greek/Bri
tish) 
 
Integrative   
 
Public (Community 
Mental Health Team 
and Residential Care)  
 
 
7 
 
4. 
 
Carla 
 
Female 
 
58 
 
Psychotherapist 
 
 
White 
(Greek)  
 
Phenomenological 
& Psychoanalytic 
 
Public (Inpatient 
Settings) 
 
 
22 
 
5. 
 
George 
 
Male 
 
38 
 
Counselling 
Psychologist & 
Psychotherapist 
 
 
White 
(German) 
 
Existential-
Phenomenological 
& Psychoanalytic  
 
Public (Inpatient 
settings) & 
Private 
 
 
10 
 
6. 
 
John 
 
 
Male 
 
62 
 
Psychotherapist 
 
White 
(British)  
 
Psychoanalytic 
 
Public (Inpatient 
settings, Residential 
Care and Early 
Intervention Services) & 
Private 
 
32 
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In the table above (Table 1), I present the main demographic information, 
which was taken into consideration for the analysis of the data in general. The 
pluralistic stance this project has endorsed invited both the unique contributions of 
CoPts and psychotherapists and their diverse theoretical orientations. Participants’ 
professional identities were considered significant in terms of their subjective 
experiences in working with psychosis and the way in which they made sense of their 
intersubjective work could have been influenced by these experiences. The 
exploration of the possible differentiations amongst them was therefore considered 
important. Also, even though I assumed that participants’ shared experiences of their 
intersubjective work with psychosis were independent of their theoretical orientations 
(hence they were not invited to conceptualise intersubjectivity from a theoretical point 
of view per se, but from an experiential perspective instead), these were considered as 
qualitative indicators of the broader sense-making tendency of their experiences.  
 
Furthermore, in consideration of participants’ ethnic origins, the qualitative 
and phenomenological origins of this project directed a critical focus onto the 
researcher role and this included race and ethnicity variables which are considered to 
interact with participant variables and data collected (Springman, Wherry & Notaro, 
2006). For example, the fact that all participants shared a White/European origin and 
a middle-class background was taken into consideration in the analysis of data 
because it has affected the interview process and data collected: also that I, the 
researcher, share an ethnic and linguistic background with some participants. 
Matching researcher and participant ethnic and racial backgrounds have been shown 
to enhance comfort levels throughout the interview process and increase participants’ 
disclosures (Sherman, 2002). What I noticed with two participants (Beth & Carla) 
with whom I shared the same mother tongue (Greek) was that they were sharing their 
vulnerability in a more direct and explicit manner throughout their interview as 
compared to the rest of the sample. This was perhaps also related to my interview 
style, which as I have retrospectively reflected upon, was more encouraging in 
sharing a fuller description of their stream of consciousness by focusing on the here 
and now of the interview and their emotional temperatures in the process. I am also 
assuming that the fact that interaction was taking part through a language different 
from our common first language, being more open in the here and now of the 
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interview process acted as a compensatory mode for negotiating proximity. Moreover, 
even though participants’ years of clinical experience or settings within which they 
have worked were not taken into consideration in the inclusion criteria, they were 
considered demographically significant in exploring how the multiplicity of 
professional settings (emphasis on context) within which the practitioners gained their 
experience through the years, could have possibly influenced their intersubjective 
experiences.  
 
 
4.2 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS   
 
 The consideration of ethics consists of a fundamental dimension of qualitative 
research and this project is in line with the ethical guidelines of the New School of 
Psychotherapy and Counselling (NSPC), Middlesex University, the British 
Psychological Society (BPS), and the Health and Care Professions Council (HCPC). 
Therefore, the BPS’s (2014) ‘Ethical Code of Human Research Ethics’, HCPC’s 
(2015) ‘Standards of Proficiency – Practitioner Psychologists’, Middlesex 
University’s (2015) ‘Code of Practice for Research: Principles and Procedures’ and 
NSPC’s (2013) ‘Research ethics guidance notes’ were thoroughly read and 
considered throughout all the research processes. It is important to mention again that 
the project went through NSPC/Middlesex University ethics approval process 
(Appendix I). Moreover, a Levinasian (Levinas, 1969) perspective that places concern 
for the other at the centre of ethics is in line with this project’s approach and therefore 
the ethical concerns for the research participants were placed above ‘instrumental’ 
processes and procedures. I, therefore, considered it to be imperative throughout the 
research processes to acknowledge my participants’ otherness and treat all of their 
shared experiences and personal values with respect. I also tried to be as sensitive as 
possible in my questioning style throughout the interview process with each 
participant and adapted it accordingly in order to match the particular intersubjective 
dynamics of each interview.     		
					 106 
4.2.1 Anonymity and confidentiality  	
Participants were not invited to protect details, by not using names or any 
other identifying details for themselves or their clients, so that their flow of 
expressivity during the interview remained intact. Therefore, real names and any other 
details were omitted on their data sheets/files and a coding system was introduced to 
identify individual participants, in case this was necessary. It should be noted that two 
of the participants (Beth & George) asked that I exclude from their transcripts some 
particular information they had shared during their interviews and therefore for 
purposes of confidentiality these were completely omitted from their original data and 
are not shown anywhere in the text. Participants were also clearly advised through the 
‘Informed Consent Form’ that excerpts from their transcripts might be published 
verbatim as anonymous. Moreover, all data were saved both in electronic (stored on a 
computer with a password known only to the researcher and encrypted methods were 
applied) and hard copy versions (kept protected in a locked storage). It should be 
specified that when I refer to the protection of data here, I am referring to research 
data (interview recordings, questionnaires, transcripts, and coded/analysed data) and 
participants’ personal information collected during the study (consent and background 
information forms and email addresses). Lastly, all original data will be destroyed 
after the completion of the study.  
 
 
4.2.2 Informed Consent  
 	 The ‘Informed Consent Form’ together with the ‘Participant Information 
Sheet’ is intended to provide possible participants with clear and simple information 
about the research project. After the screening process of professionals who showed 
an interest in participating was completed, informed consent was requested via a 
signature from all participants who met the inclusion criteria. Moreover, the consent 
form advised all participants that they had the right to withdraw at any time in the 
research process. Both the participants and I kept a copy of the signed consent form.  
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4.2.3 Debriefing  
 
Debriefing is an essential part of qualitative research and as the BPS (2014) 
specifies, effective debriefing terminates the act of participation, and provides closure 
for the participant. After the completion of each interview, all participants were 
referred to the ‘Debriefing Form’ (Appendix VI) which they had previously received 
electronically, and were invited to share anything that concerned them about their 
interview or the research in general. The debriefing was focused on the rights and 
well-being of the participants and it was intended to make sure that all participants 
left the interview without having any kind of concerns, uncertainties or questions 
about their involvement in the interview. Moreover, they were encouraged to contact 
me if any kind of concern came up upon reflection regarding their participation or if 
for any reason they felt distressed so that I could offer them a second meeting. It is 
reasonably assumed that all participants are in supervision – since it is considered a 
professional requirement and that they, therefore, have a safe space to take any arising 
issues. It should be noted that no participant has communicated with me after the 
completion of their interviews.  
 
 
4.3 DATA COLLECTION  
4.3.1 Videoconference as a tool for qualitative research 
 
The decision to conduct interviews via online videoconferencing (Skype) was 
based on the convenient way it offers for meeting participants, since they are 
geographically dispersed - including myself as I was based outside the United 
Kingdom. Skype is inexpensive, geographically flexible, user-friendly and easy to 
install/use. Moreover, the ease of audio recording was a key benefit, as computer-to-
computer conversations were easily recorded with simple additional software. 
Participants were therefore informed that since the quality of digital recordings by 
using a separate Dictaphone during Skype videoconferencing may not be clear 
enough, computer-based recording software was installed which was integrated with 
Skype and recorded the conversation through an audio mode. More specifically, for 
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my research, I used ‘Call Recorder’ software for Macintosh (iMac). ‘Call Recorder’ is 
inexpensive and records audio interviews effectively while screening out Internet 
noise. It was set to automatically record once the Skype conversation commenced and 
it never failed. It should be also noted that no serious issues with sound quality, 
microphones, webcam malfunctions or Internet connection speeds took place with any 
participant during the interviews. In the following sub-sections, I place emphasis on 
some particularly sensitive issues involving the adoption of videoconferencing as a 
method of data collection.    
 
 
 
Verifying identity and emergency resources  
 
 Even though I was not physically present with the participants, their identity 
was verified through their online presence via videoconference, their e-mail addresses 
and Skype usernames and passwords. Moreover, in case I had to deal with a 
participant’s emergency situation during the interview (e.g. physical injury, accident, 
etc.), I made sure that I had access to emergency resources located near the 
participant’s address, such as a significant other or the local police department, which 
required that the participant’s details and location were known. 
 
 
 
Security and privacy issues  
 
 The exchange of e-mails, in general, can be problematic in terms of privacy, 
confidentiality and security. As the recruitment process took place through the 
exchange of e-mails, I was aware of and complied with current legislation regarding 
unsolicited ‘spam’ e-mails. Because the security of unencrypted e-mails is low, and e-
mail content can be inadvertently disclosed on the Internet or to local and other 
computers (Car & Sheikh, 2004). To secure emails effectively I encrypted the 
connection from my email provider, my actual email messages and my stored, cached, 
and archived email messages received from research participants.  
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 For all interviews, participants and myself were located in our own private 
space and during the videoconference interaction the participant and myself were the 
only individuals privately involved in the process. I made sure that no data of the 
interviews became publicly available in any form, excluding the verbatim excerpts for 
which participants had given their consent. Moreover the process of online 
interviewing did not leave permanent records of communication and it is important to 
specify that no written communication (use of synchronous online chat) took place 
through Skype during the videoconference. Video teleconferencing, in general, has 
possibly the lowest potential for increased security and though identity confirmation 
is not a problem, blocking someone else from interrupting the video stream is 
typically difficult (Suler, 2004). Skype employs sophisticated video encryption and 
for the purposes of the current study, some extra security features were employed 
(Secure Socket Layer). Another potential privacy issue that was addressed was 
making sure that nobody else was present or likely to walk into my or the 
participant’s room during the interview. Participants were informed about this issue 
and were advised to take all the necessary steps to ensure that they used a private 
room during the interview to eliminate the possibility of potential interruptions or 
distractions taking place.  
 
 
Working alliance and intersubjectivity  
 
 Since the project itself was interested in exploring intersubjectivity, the 
exploration of embodied subjectivity emerging through videoconferencing was 
considered significant. My experience of Skype interviewing proved that 
Videoconferencing offers a conversational quality that most closely matches face-to-
face dialogue, and as Salmons (2012) has suggested can be employed with semi-
structured or unstructured interview styles without reducing the range or complexity 
of issues discussed or the emotions of the interviewee. Even though some researchers 
argue that it may be more challenging to develop a ‘working alliance’ through 
videoconferencing (e.g. Ivey, Ivey, & Zalaquett, 2011), my experience proved the 
opposite. Web cameras usually offer just a ‘head shot’, which makes it challenging 
for the researcher to be able to notice body language cues throughout the interview. 
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For this particular reason, I personally situated myself in front of the camera in a way 
that permitted almost a whole body capture and also invited participants to situate 
themselves similarly, in a wider picture mode. This provided the opportunity for a 
more embodied interaction and with eye contact, gestures and verbal cues all visible, 
a rich intersubjective exchange was possible.  
 
 Langdridge (2007) emphasised the role of the body in the process of 
interviewing from a phenomenological perspective and suggested that with online 
interviewing, there is a rupture between self and other. His main argument is that the 
opportunity to perceive the presence of the other through the full range of senses 
available can easily be sabotaged through online encounters. However, he did not 
explore the use of synchronous online methods of engagement through the 
employment of videoconferencing in his consideration of the significance of 
corporeality. My experiences of videoconferencing in the interview processes 
provided the potential to empathically and reflexively attend to my participants’ 
verbal and embodied presence by paying attention to both of our behavioural 
presentations. In my reflexive diary, I have noted and paid attention to significant 
embodied responses throughout the interview process, which were crucial for the 
interpretation and meaning-making processes during the data analysis. The 
videoconference was therefore experienced as a unique way of interacting for both 
participants and myself and did not restrict interpersonal understanding. By the end of 
each interview and during the debriefing process participants were invited to reflect 
upon their experience of the online interview and all of them shared that it has been a 
rich experience.  
 
 
4.3.2 Construction of questionnaire, interviewing schedule and progress    
 	 Since the project attempted to explore participants’ thoughts, feelings, and 
narratives in a detailed fashion, a semi-structured interview was conducted with each 
participant. Smith et al. (2009) suggested that this is the preferred method for data 
collection in the case of IPA. Open-ended questions were therefore introduced which 
allowed participants to talk about their experiences in a flexible way. Several prompts 
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were also prepared for each question and were employed selectively with each 
participant when they had difficulty navigating around some questions or if they were 
drifting away from the phenomenon under exploration. The process of preparing the 
interview schedule (Appendix VII) was informed by the research question and helped 
to define explicitly what I was hoping to get from my interviews. More specifically, I 
was explicitly interested in exploring:  
 
- Considering that participants understood the psychotherapy of psychosis as the 
relational encounter rather than anything else, how do they experience their 
intersubjective encounters with these people and what meaning do they attach 
to these experiences? 
- How do they understand their relational way of working?  
- What is their felt sense of clients and their experiences within the 
intersubjective space of therapy?  
- What kinds of therapists’ self-processes are in place within the intersubjective 
space of therapy?  
 
 It must also be noted that the interview schedule was partly restructured after 
the first pilot interview as new insights were gained and therefore some questions 
were rephrased or adapted in order to allow a closer exploration of the phenomena 
being examined. The pilot interview that was undertaken with one of the female 
participants was significant in that it provided me with the opportunity to become 
more familiar with the interview schedule and enabled its appropriate reformation in 
order to ensure that questions and prompts were helpful enough for participants in 
order to allow access to their relevant experiences. The pilot interview was also 
significant in that it provided me with the opportunity to reflect upon my interview 
style. After its transcription and analysis, what became evident was that at times I 
rushed to impose several questions without allowing the participant the appropriate 
time to process the questions and reflect on her thoughts and emotions, which mainly 
resulted because of my anxiety in conducting my first IPA interview. Despite the 
limitations of the pilot interview, I was able to form a strong alliance with the 
participant and rich data were therefore generated and I have therefore decided to 
include it in the study.  
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 I was very aware of the limitations of my interview style in the pilot and the 
interviews that followed and I tried as much as possible to be patient and provide 
participants with the appropriate space and time to reflect. I also tried to introduce 
questions from the interview schedule in the smoothest way possible throughout the 
interviews as well as further questions that emerged from the conversations, in order 
to allow participants to elaborate on their responses. The phenomenological 
exploration of the research questions was situated on the premise of limiting as much 
as possible personal assumptions and ideas, and to focus on what emerged during the 
interview process. The aim was to explore the depth and complexity of participants’ 
meaning making by being an active listener and by allowing the participant to lead the 
interview, rather than my directing it rigidly, based on the interview schedule. 
Overall, it felt to me that I was able to access what I needed in order to answer my 
research question and this was not only related to a careful construction of the 
interview schedule but also due to the strong working alliances that had been 
developed with participants, which provided them with the appropriate platform to 
openly share their experiences and related vulnerabilities. 
 
 
4.4 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 The analysis of transcripts was a long and analytical process however it 
proved to be the most stimulating and creative part of the research process overall. As 
Smith et al. (2009) have suggested, the analytic focus of IPA involves the already 
discussed ‘double hermeneutic’ principle in which the researcher is trying to make 
sense of the participant trying to make sense of her experience. My own 
interpretations and sense-making processes were therefore introduced to participants’ 
experiences and my own lived experiences of being-with the participants. The 
analytic process included both interrogation and empathy as suggested by Smith and 
Eatough (2006) and this meant that I was simultaneously involved in a process of 
attempting to empathically make sense of participants’ experiences and their 
understanding of them and also keeping some distance and adopting a reflective and 
questioning stance in order to allow further revelations.  Moreover, the intersubjective 
focus of this project encouraged a consideration of the intersubjective dynamics 
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between the participants and myself as the researcher, which was taken into account 
throughout the analysis and interpretation of data. Even though I have considered the 
relationships between participants and myself as an opportunity to emphasise 
important features of the research topic itself, these have not been presented in the 
paper as explicitly as I would have wished and this subject will be reflected in the 
methodological consideration of the discussion chapter.    
 
 
4.4.1 Transcription  
 
 I have personally transcribed all interviews, which was an extremely time- 
consuming, and at times exhausting procedure. However, it also proved to be a very 
constructive process, which allowed a dynamic reconnection with not only the 
interview and connection with participants’ narratives and lived experiences but also 
with my own experiences during the interviews. I created a specific transcript format 
(Appendix VIII) that felt more comfortable, with margins that provided the space for 
the introduction of descriptive, linguistic and conceptual commentaries and space for 
the emerging themes. The transcription of each interview was initiated a day after I 
conducted it (and lasted on average between 2-3 days), as I wanted to capture 
participants’ lived experience as chronologically close to the interview date I could. 
This allowed a stronger cognitive and emotional proximity to their narratives and also 
preserved as much of my reflexive process as possible. In my reflexive diary, I 
dedicated a specific part to recording my personal processes during the transcription 
of each interview. What I noticed was that during the transcription process I was 
sometimes finding it difficult to listen and transcribe my own voice and I was 
becoming at times self-critical especially in moments when I felt that I had lost 
opportunities for assisting participants to further elaborate on their own experiences 
by moving on to something that felt more important to myself. These particular 
moments were noted and taken into consideration during the analysis of each 
transcript as they assisted the development of themes.  
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4.4.2 The steps of data analysis  
 
 Smith et al. (2009) made it clear that their recommended steps of analysis do 
not provide a definite account, with the current literature on analysis not endorsing a 
definite routine for engaging with the data. However, since it was the first time I was 
conducting an IPA, I felt that the sufficiently clear steps of analysis Smith et al. 
(2009) recommended, provided the space for an analytical and reflective engagement 
with the data, which allowed me to find my way through the process. It is important 
to specify that I have adopted an ideographic approach, therefore commencing the 
analysis with a detailed exploration of the first interview transcript before moving to 
the next one. This assisted the process of becoming as intimate as possible with a 
participant’s experience while each reading provided new understandings.  In the 
remaining part of this section, I present the steps of data analysis that I undertook for 
each participant’s transcript, informed by Smith et al. (2009)’s recommendations.     
 
 
Exploration of the first interview transcript  
 
 Firstly, I carefully listened to the interview while having reference to my 
reflexive diary, which included notes taken after the completion of the actual 
interview and notes taken during the transcription. This ensured appropriate 
bracketing and allowed an explicit consideration of personal biases and assumptions 
before I immersed myself in the data and started developing themes. It is also 
important to mention that after the completion of each interview and before 
transcription, I listened to the interview several times in order to deeply engage with 
not only the participant’s meaning-making processes and lived experiences but also 
my own meaning-making processes alongside the participant’s. This also provided a 
more embodied engagement with the data. What followed was reading and re-reading 
the transcript several times in order to detect anything that seemed to be thought 
provoking or noteworthy. The process of reading and re-reading elicited the first 
commentary notes which encompassed descriptive comments. I situated these on the 
right margin of the transcript (describing the content of participant’s narrative). The 
left margins of the transcript included two separate columns with space for linguistic 
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commentary (focusing on participant’s way of communicating experience) and 
conceptual commentary (an overall interrogative and conceptual engagement with 
participant’s narrative). This process was repeated again and again until I felt 
comfortable enough with the comments’ clearness and comprehensibility. I then 
gradually started identifying themes (noted in the first left column of the transcript) 
that came to the fore through the consideration of all commentaries that appeared to 
provide access to the phenomena under investigation.  
 
 
Linking the emerging themes  
 
 Since the previous process produced numerous themes, on a separate piece of 
paper I noted all of them and started looking for possible connections amongst them 
with this process shaping sub-ordinate and super-ordinate themes. Because this 
process meant that I was working away from the original transcript, sub-ordinate and 
super-ordinate themes were then double-checked with the original transcript to ensure 
their consistency with the actual data and the final produced themes were then 
organised into a table. The interpretative process of producing and listing themes 
included a consideration of my personal way of making sense of the participant 
alongside what the participant actually shared. Some of the specific techniques Smith 
et al. (2009) have suggested for looking for patterns and connections across themes 
were considered and included abstraction (putting like with like and developing a 
new name for the cluster), subsumption (emerging themes becoming super-ordinate 
themes by attracting other associated themes), polarisation (exploring transcripts for 
oppositional relationships), contextualisation (identifying the contextual or narrative 
elements within an analysis), numeration (considering how frequently a theme is 
supported), and function (themes are explored for their function within the transcript). 
It should be noted that ‘Appendix IX’ includes a full analysis of the first interview 
transcript.  
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Moving on to the remaining transcripts    
 
 The previous procedures were employed for all remaining participants and a 
list of final themes for each participant was then developed. The previously suggested 
methods in looking for patterns among themes within individual transcripts were also 
taken into consideration for exploring the connectivity of themes between 
participants. Each table of themes which was developed for each participant was 
considered in relation to all other transcripts in order to explore in detail which 
themes from one transcript was connected to other themes and other transcripts. This 
complex procedure involved some rearrangement and renaming of themes in order to 
construct higher order concepts that transcripts shared. I was finally able to produce a 
table of master themes which I felt provided a comprehensive summary of their 
experience by mirroring their experience as a whole. A master table with major 
themes and subthemes for the entire sample is presented as Table 2 in the ‘Results’ 
chapter, while a table with relevant excerpts from participants’ transcripts 
corresponding to each major theme and its subthemes is presented in Appendix X.  
 
 
4.5 REFLEXIVITY, BRACKETING AND PERSONAL BIAS   
 
 The phenomenological grounds this project rest on considering the 
engagement with and bracketing of personal assumptions and biases significant as one 
immerses oneself into the data. Therefore a reflexive stance was highly significant in 
terms of assisting the process of engaging with personal biases. Personal reflexivity 
involves “(…) reflecting upon the ways in which our own values, experiences, 
interests, beliefs, political commitments, wider aims in life and social identities have 
shaped the research. It also involves thinking about how the research may have 
affected and possibly changed us, as people and as researchers” (Willig, 2001, p.10). I 
was therefore more interested in recognising and capturing personal biases by 
articulating and making sense of them rather than over-concerned about their 
minimisation. The relativistic nature of my own ontological stance towards 
intersubjectivity and the psychotherapy for psychosis required reflexive bracketing, 
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which was focused on making personal values and cultural suppositions transparent 
prior to conducting interviews. What also assisted this process was the writing of the 
‘Preface’ in which I have reflectively introduced and explored myself as the 
researcher and author of this piece of work, and how personal experiences have given 
shape to it. Overall, the reflexive process involved reflexive bracketing which 
demanded the development of a “thoughtful, conscious self-awareness” (Finlay, 2002, 
p. 532). Although complete bracketing of personal assumptions was impossible, such 
bracketing facilitated greater transparency in the research process (Walters, 1995). As 
Gyulay, Mound and Flanagan (1994, p.33) have stressed, “The investigators 
disciplined themselves to keep original assumptions and judgments separate in order 
to remain open to the emerging data. Although it is impossible to be totally free of 
bias, this technique helps reduce bias”.  
 
 The initial method which was employed in order to track and engage with 
personal bias comprised of the practice of reflecting and recording these processes in 
my reflexive diary, which started in the early stages of the research design, proceeded 
through the data collection and analysis phases and ended with the project’s final 
interpretative position. One of the major purposes of the diary was to 
facilitate ‘epoche’ by being in touch with my reflections and thoughts that I 
intentionally had to set aside including value judgments of the data. Early notes kept 
in my reflexive diary included examples of personal experiences of working 
therapeutically with people diagnosed with psychosis and supervision notes from my 
clinical work. Moreover, it included reflections of several definitions of 
intersubjectivity which I came across throughout the exploration of the literature, and 
how I finally decided to apply the concept for the purposes of the project.    
 
 Moving further into the consideration of reflexivity on the process of 
conducting the interviews, one important issue which needs to be addressed concerns 
my strong sense that pre-understandings and personal experiences had a positive 
effect on my interviewing style as they provided the space for more insight 
throughout the process of assisting participants into a detailed exploration of their 
own accounts. Having had the experience to work relationally with psychosis in the 
past, I could partly relate to participants’ experiences, which I assume was implicitly 
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communicated through my responses. Moreover, the process of attending as 
thoughtfully as possible to participants’ narratives was interrupted occasionally. 
Sometimes a part of me felt detached from participants in my effort to set aside my 
pre-understandings, while at the same time another part felt fully involved within the 
intersubjective space of the interview through a dynamic process of participatory 
sense-making, mutual incorporation, and dialogic connectedness. This dynamic 
process prompted the necessity to orchestrate the appropriate amount of distance and 
closeness to participants, which despite its challenges, proved to strengthen my 
reflective capacities during the interviews and assisted the interaction and 
cooperativeness between participants and myself. As discussed by Reid, Flowers and 
Larkin (2005), participant-researcher interaction is a particular strength of IPA as this 
method explicitly acknowledges its influence in the analytic process. The notion of 
intersubjectivity, which was employed as a discursive tool, helped to elucidate the 
complex ways my thinking and feeling were intertwined into the interview process, 
and thus became an integral part of them. The process of separating personal past 
knowledge and experiences from participant’s accounts has been a significantly 
challenging task. During the interviews, I often had a strong sense that I was taking up 
contradictory stances that generated an internal conflict on both a cognitive and an 
emotional level, which was experienced as an inseparable part of the bracketing 
process. Below, I present an excerpt taken from my reflexive diary that demonstrates 
the process of critical self-reflection with regards to the ethics of staying as close as 
possible to the participant’s narrative during the interpretative process: 
 
 
“I am reading again and again the passage in the transcript where Paula 
is describing her experience of dissociation with a client during a moment 
of feeling disconnected and struggling to make sense of the client’s 
narrative. I remember vividly where I had a ‘eureka’ moment and what 
vibrantly came to mind was Merleau-Ponty’s concept of self-alterity. I 
caught myself in a process of detaching from the participant and 
indulging myself with reflections on phenomenological approaches to self-
alterity. I remember catching myself thinking: Is her expressed difficulty 
to make sense of her own experience not exclusively caused by something 
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external, outside of herself i.e. the client’s otherness? Can we say that it’s 
an experience of self-alterity? In other words is she experiencing self as 
Other in that moment of dissociation? She understands dissociation as an 
outcome of not being able to make sense and right there in a parallel 
process I was detaching from her in my effort of what felt like actually 
making sense of her experience, however in this process I have ‘lost’ the 
participant and myself within that space and I did not stay to explore 
further what was that experience of dissociation like for her and not for 
me! I lost a big opportunity to help her elaborate on her own experience 
and I must be careful not to construct meaning out of her own experience 
devoid of her own contribution in that, when I develop her themes. I must 
be careful not to represent within her themes an imposition of my own 
interpretation by using the concept of self-alterity’s in a manner which is 
far away from the core of her experience. But even If I do so, will she 
appreciate me exploring her experience from that angle, my own 
otherness, or will she experience it as me being positioned in a way she 
cannot relate to? More importantly, will she feel that I was not paying 
enough attention to her story? Have I ‘betrayed’ her openness? Feeling 
guilty and confused” (Personal Reflexive Diary, 15th March 2014)    
 
 
 Moreover, being fully involved meant that I was allowing the voices of 
subjectivity to emerge authentically in coming to an understanding of what the 
participants meant in their personal accounts. These conflicting polarities often 
brought strong feelings of vulnerability and helplessness to the fore, connecting me 
with personal memories of working therapeutically with people experiencing 
psychosis. A parallel process was taking place that was powerful enough to affect my 
embodiment at certain moments. Some of the participants’ responses and reflections 
on specific clients that came up during the interviews provoked varying emotional 
impacts on my own personal recollections of past clients. It was, therefore, helpful to 
keep detailed notes in my reflexive diary about the emotional impacts “...in order to 
prevent the worse excesses of the projection of the researcher’s own subjectivity in to 
the research itself and also to maximize the possibility of discovering that which was 
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otherwise hidden in the data” (Langdridge, 2007, p. 80). Below I present an excerpt 
taken from my reflexive diary that was recorded right after Carla’s interview. It 
demonstrates a moment of strong dialogic connectedness and my emergent need to 
disclose a similar experience with the one she was narrating. Even though I had 
finally decided not to disclose what I was going through while attending to the 
description of her vivid experience, my own response was recorded and taken into 
consideration when developing her themes in order to protect the process of theme 
development from the impact my own past experiences:    
 
“Touching and being touched…containing and being contained…I 
remembered my client _______ as Carla is speaking here. I remember her 
eyes as she was expressing how she was emotionally impacted when she 
kindly touched the client on the shoulder to contain him. I remembered 
our last meeting with _______ on the ward before he committed suicide. I 
felt completely connected to Carla. An experience of merging…I felt that I 
was containing her but I also felt contained. Tears came to my eyes and I 
struggled not to share this. I didn’t…I should have…I shouldn’t…I tried 
to swallow what I felt and thought. Why did I do that? I had to give Carla 
the space she needed to explore this. This was not my time. But it was 
OUR time together. There was so much ambivalence then and now. I 
crossed my legs and I started coughing. I felt so confused, sad and 
nostalgic” (Personal Reflexive Diary, 2nd February 2015)    
 
 	 Despite challenges similar to the one described above, a phenomenological 
attitude during the interviews helped the bracketing of experiences and pre-
understandings of several areas that were explored with participants such as 
intersubjectivity, delusions, hallucinations, the psychotherapy of psychosis etc. Even 
though bracketing was never fully achieved, by being cautious and recording my 
biases supported the analysis of data and my efforts to take an ethical stance towards 
participants’ otherness. My familiarity with the phenomenological method – having 
being trained in E-P psychotherapy – assisted my interviewing style by focusing on 
the essences and structure of the phenomena and their underlying universals.  
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
5.1 OVERVIEW  	
 The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive and clear 
exploration of the identified major themes in the analysis of data with their 
accompanied subthemes. Excerpts from all participants’ transcripts are employed to 
demonstrate these (Appendix X). More specifically, Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis (IPA) of the six semi-structured interviews revealed four major themes, 
which were identified as follows: 1) The primacy of sense-making, 2) A relational 
approach to therapy, 3) Therapist’s processes in the rupture of relatedness and 4) The 
lived experience of being-with.  
 
 Apart from representing the project’s research question in the most thorough 
way possible, the abovementioned themes were predominantly constructed because of 
their natural emergence from the analytic process. They signified most precisely what 
the participants communicated about the experiences which were being explored 
throughout their interviews. It has been clear since I began to immerse myself in the 
data that my idiosyncratic approach to data analysis and interpretation – and therefore 
the subjective nature of emerging themes and subthemes – would be the actual 
strength of this project. It therefore goes without saying that a different researcher 
would have approached the data in different ways. As it will become evident from the 
subsequent presentation of results, some themes and subthemes overlap between and 
within themselves. A careful procedure was undertaken during their development in 
order to capture this overlap and equal attention has been paid to individual themes 
and their interrelationships while some have been confidently discarded as they did 
not fit the overall developing analysis. The relationships between and within themes 
will become evident in the following sections through the presentation of each one 
separately and also by paying attention to areas of difference and divergence within 
subthemes across participants. For the demonstration of results I have described each 
major theme and subtheme separately and have included excerpts from participants’ 
transcripts in order to support the presentation of each sub-theme. I used the following 
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pseudonyms and initials for the participants: Paula (P), Barbara (BA), Beth (BE), 
Carla (C), George (G) and John (J). Moreover, in Appendix X, I have included a table 
with all representative excerpts for each subtheme for all participants as due to space 
limitation it would have been impossible to include all excerpts within the main text 
of analysis. Readers can, therefore, consult Appendix X for a more comprehensive 
consideration of the data. Additionally, Paula’s (P) full transcript can be found in 
Appendix VIII and the full analysis of her transcript in Appendix IX. Table 2 below 
demonstrates the four identified major themes and their accompanied subthemes for 
all participants with an incorporated checklist, which demonstrates the subthemes that 
represent participants’ experiences. In the remaining section of this chapter, I provide 
a detailed elaboration of each of the identified major themes and their subthemes.  
 
Table 2: Table of major themes and their subthemes for the entire sample 
 	
 
MAJOR THEME 
 
SUBTHEME 
 
PARTICIPANT 
 
 
P 
 
BA 
 
 
BE 
 
C 
 
G 
 
J 
 
1. THE PRIMACY OF SENSE-
MAKING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 FOCUSING ON MEANINGFULNESS AND 
COMPREHENSIBILITY 
 
	
P 	
	
P 	
 
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
 
1.2 THE IMPACT OF LIVED EXPERIENCES ON 
DISTRESS AND PSYCHOSIS  
 
	
P 	
 
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
 
1.3 LOOKING AT SELF PROCESSES  
 
 
P 	
 
P 
 
P 	
	
 
P 	
 
P 	
 
P 	
 
1.4 UNDERSTANDING INFORMED BY HOW 
THERAPIST IS AFFECTED 
 
	
P 	
 
P 	
 
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
 
2. A RELATIONAL APPROACH 
TO THERAPY  
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 PRIORITIZING AND MAPPING RELATIONSHIPS 
 
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
 
P 	
 
P 	
	
P 	
 
2.2 THE USE OF FIRST AND SECOND PERSON 
PERSPECTIVES 
 
	
	
 
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
	
 
2.3 THE FLEXIBILITY OF BOUNDARIES  
 
	
P 	
 
P 
	
P 	
 
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
 
3. THERAPIST’S PROCESSES IN 
THE RUPTURE OF 
RELATEDNESS 
 
3.1 SENSE OF AUTONOMY THREATENED 
 
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
 
3.2 DISRUPTION OF REFLECTIVE CAPACITIES AND 
CONTRADICTIONS 
 
	
	
P 	
	
	
P 	
	
	
P 	
	
	
P 	
	
	
P 	
	
	
P 	
 
3.3 ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY  
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
	
	
P 	
 
3.4 COMPENSATORY MECHANISMS 
 
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
 
4. THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF 
BEING-WITH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 RELATEDNESS AND CONNECTIVITY 
 
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
 
 4.2 THERAPIST’S SELF-EXPERIENCE  
 
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
 
4.3 OSCILLATIONS BETWEEN DISTANCE AND 
PROXIMITY   
 
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
 
4.4 BESTOWING MEANING  
	
P 	
	
	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
	
P 	
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5.2 MAJOR THEMES AND SUBTHEMES  	
5.2.1 Major theme 1: The primacy of sense-making  		
			
 The first major theme was titled ‘The primacy of sense-making’. The noun 
‘primacy’ accompanies the notion of ‘sense-making’ in order to communicate the 
prominence of comprehensibility for the entire sample. Even though all participants at 
the beginning of their interviews were invited to share how they understood 
psychosis, they spent altogether a substantial amount of time throughout their 
interviews explaining the prominence of making sense of clients’ experiences. As will 
be shown below, they often discussed the experience of making sense because they 
seemed to perceive this as a vital and challenging part of their clinical work. 
Moreover, as this project was interested in exploring practitioners’ experiences who 
work intersubjectively with psychosis, it was not surprising that all participants’ 
meaning-making processes were mainly focused on the meaningfulness of psychotic 
experiences and the impact their clients’ lived experiences and relationships with 
others had on their development and manifestation. Therefore, the first major theme is 
significant in two ways: Firstly, all participants shared a common focus on the 
importance of making sense of clients’ experiences. Secondly, the understanding of 
psychosis for these practitioners was concentrated on meaningfulness and function, 
issues with the sense of self, the impact clients’ lived experiences had on their distress 
and psychosis, and also meaning-building which emerges by reflecting on how the 
MAJOR THEME 1: 
THE PRIMACY OF SENSE-
MAKING 
SUBTHEME 1: 
FOCUSING ON 
MEANINGFULNESS 
AND 
COMPREHENSIBILITY 
 
SUBTHEME 2:  
THE IMPACT OF LIVED 
EXPERIENCES ON 
DISTRESS AND 
PSYCHOSIS  
SUBTHEME 3: 
LOOKING AT SELF-
PROCESSES 
SUBTHEME 4:  
UNDERSTANDING 
INFORMED BY HOW 
THERAPIST IS 
AFFECTED  
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therapist is affected within the therapeutic relationship. These four emergent 
subthemes are explored and described in detail below.  
 
 
5.2.1.1 Subtheme 1: Focusing on meaningfulness and comprehensibility 
 
 The first subtheme ‘Focusing on meaningfulness and comprehensibility’ 
captures participants’ processes in making sense of their clients’ experiences. They all 
passionately demonstrated the thorough attention given to these experiences and how 
affected they are by them. Despite the related difficulties that were often described by 
participants, they all seemed to approach experiences in comprehensible terms by not 
only paying attention to what these subjectively meant for their clients but also what 
they meant for the therapeutic relationship itself.  
 
 “Other times is really difficult, but sometimes is easy to reflect upon why 
it would come about at certain times. Or the fact that is real for her”, “So 
that sort of fantasy gives her a purpose, something quite meaningful and 
important and actually her life has been empty in many ways (…) so this 
fantasy is extremely valuable really” (P: P22/L114-115 & P21/L108-111)  
 
 In these passages Paula describes how at times she finds it difficult to attach 
meaning to clients’ experiences but that she acknowledges and validates the 
subjective nature of her client’s experience and the function that it serves. The 
meaningfulness of her client’s fantasy is contextualised and understood as her 
subjective way of coping with life’s difficulties. Participants’ difficulties in reflecting 
about their clients’ and their own experiences will be explored in more detail in a 
following major theme from the angle of reflectivity and relatedness.  
 
 
 “Yeah. Also it has a function for them but it also has a story. It tells their 
story” (B: P17/L61) 
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“So it’s a question of just gradually making a psychological story that is 
useful to…rather than these strange bits of biology, and, totally explain it 
in biological terms. It’s actually a psychological one. This makes sense in 
terms of his life and very…not just intellectually, way of understanding, 
but that the understanding was highly relevant to his real life issues” (J: 
P22/L187-189) 
 
“(…) but although it was very, very difficult to understand and it was, 
emm…it seems like the…basically there was meaning behind the voices 
and the delusions and that sort of thing” (BE: P9/L56-57) 
 
 Barbara, John, and Beth have stressed the function and meaningfulness they 
ascribed to delusions and hallucinations in a similar way by considering them as 
narrations of their clients’ life stories. John particularly emphasised the psychological 
value and meaningfulness of his client’s paranoia, which he understood as relevant to 
his real life issues while also de-emphasising biological approaches to psychotic 
phenomena.  
 
 “And then, he, he started feeling that I was, telling me that I was a witch 
that was doing spells on him. But see everything was meaningful. You 
know, even though his story sounded crazy, the feelings behind his 
psychosis were so real. Very real actually. Yes, the feelings were 
authentic, and I could relate to that”, “All the paranoia, the hallucinations 
in the room, was he, he was creating another persona in the room, one 
that he preferred compared to the actual person, me, I mean” (C: 
P14/L90-92 & P33/L258-259) 
 
“But the whole point I’m trying to make here it is about something, it’s 
something about finding meaning in these things and understanding them 
intersubjectively. So for him the fantasy of a bottle that explodes was 
something that he brought in to test how far or close he can get to me, 
whether I could manage his madness, his anxiety and so on”, “And then I 
said something around, I wonder whether it’s important to know you can 
					 126 
blow the situation up if it became too much” (G: P15/L248-249 & 
P15/L249-251) 
  
 Carla’s and George’s understanding of their clients’ experiences are explored 
through particular examples in which their meaningfulness is provided by reflecting 
on the dynamics within the therapeutic relationship. Carla emphasised that even 
though she struggled to make sense of the semantics of her client’s narrative, the 
affective component of the story was meaningful, and she could therefore relate to 
that. She therefore implied the importance of being able to relate at least partly to a 
client’s experience in order for meaning to emerge. Moreover, her understanding of 
her client’s hallucinations and delusions were understood as the client’s meaningful 
response about his experience of the therapeutic relationship. Similarly, George talked 
about a client who came into a session with a bottle of water, fantasising and 
threatening that he could explode the room with it. He stressed the importance of 
understanding the intentions behind this behaviour by approaching it intersubjectively 
and therefore, for George, sense-making is dependent upon an exploration of what 
happens between himself and the client. Overall, participants’ perception of their 
clients’ difficulties appeared to be dependent upon their manifestation within the 
dialectical relationship that seems to reveal meaning and function. The process of 
meaning-building seems therefore mainly contextualised in the present-moment 
dynamics of the therapeutic relationship.   
 
 
5.2.1.2 Subtheme 2: The impact of lived experiences on distress and psychosis  	
 
 The second subtheme illustrates the emphasis all participants gave to the 
impact of their clients’ past and current lived experiences on the formation and 
maintenance of psychotic experiences, focusing particularly on interpersonal 
difficulties. More specifically, their process of making sense of clients’ distress 
involved meaningful connections with their past and current relationships, how past 
traumatic experiences and resultant distress have impacted them and how their current 
relationships are affected by their present-day difficulties. Overall, all participants 
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considered relational issues as fundamental in the development of their understanding 
by pointing towards the impoverishment in interpersonal relationships and they 
ascribed a basic relational deficit and alienation to their clients’ experiences. 
Moreover, participants understood their clients’ distress and described their 
experiences as not separate from the life context in which they manifest and the 
contents and meanings of psychotic phenomena were understood within the context of 
their lives.  
 
“She has suffered severe neglect and some degree of abuse although that’s 
not clear, so it’s not so clear to work with but loads of attachments 
difficulties in relationships, family relationships that had broken down, she 
hasn’t been able to maintain a job, so this fantasy is extremely valuable 
really” (P: P21/L106-111). 
 
“(…) she was pretty much brought up in .............., in the psychiatric 
hospital, her mother, this is what we were told… She was born in  
.............., then went to some sort of orphanage for kids, and anyway, in 
and out of .............., pretty much it was her home…she had learned to live, 
she lived with a man at that time, and subversive prostitution, and very 
severe, well I imagine very severe voices (…)” (BE: P19/L159-163)  
 
“I mean, again the difficulties, I mean he had difficulties in relating to all 
significant others in his life, he was very, very alone, and it was very sad 
for me. He went through so many different traumas in life, horrendous 
experiences and his psychosis exactly, this exactly was, his psychosis was 
developed in order to deal with all that” (C: P32/L247-249) 
 
“Affect was in the voices. And of course as well as having being on the 
receiving end of a lot of cruelty and humiliation, it meant he…quite 
detached from many things (…)” (J: P22/L177-178) 
 
          These passages provide specific examples that demonstrate participants’ 
hypothesis that their clients’ traumatic experiences are related to the development of 
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psychotic phenomena. Paula described how her client’s experiences of abuse, neglect 
and attachment complications within the early family environment were related to his 
current relational and social difficulties. Her understanding of her client’s intense 
fantasies was informed by how the early traumatic experiences and relational deficits 
have affected her while she attributed meaningfulness and value to these phenomena, 
which were understood as a subjective way of coping against her past and current 
relational complications. Beth similarly made a link between her client’s traumatic 
past experiences, maltreatment and abuse with the experience of auditory 
hallucinations. Additionally, Carla made a clear link between her client’s traumatic 
experiences and the development of psychotic phenomena by stressing how 
relational difficulties between her client and others were related to the development 
of his psychosis in order to deal with his aloneness. Moreover, John suggested that 
his client’s early experiences of being on the receiving end of extreme cruelty and 
humiliation fragmented his trust towards others and he has therefore developed 
detachment from others and the world. John’s clients’ traumatic experiences were 
associated with the affective states of his auditory hallucinations. John and Carla 
have further demonstrated their clients’ relational difficulties by focusing on their 
existential aloneness:  
 
“(…) what comes to mind is that these patients are often very much on 
their own, which is both a source of safety and a great pain to them, 
existentially alone” (J: P28/L235-236) 
 
“(…) if he’s very close he’s threatened with someone, if he’s very far away 
again he feels that he is left alone. It’s very, it’s an antiphasis” (C: 
P4/L20) 
 
 These excerpts stress the emergence of clients’ contradicting emotional states 
in their negotiation of separateness and the need to maintain a safe distance from 
others to protects their autonomy. I particularly remember John’s facial expression 
and body language while describing his clients’ aloneness. A sudden sadness was 
evident in his tone of voice, and his frowning forehead and clenched lips conveyed an 
empathic understanding for his clients’ struggles. In that moment I strongly felt his 
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concern for clients and how seriously he takes his work. It also made me wonder what 
his zealous involvement with this client group might say about his relationship with 
his own vulnerabilities, a subject I will be dealing with in a subsequent theme.  
 
 
5.2.1.3 Subtheme 3: Looking at self-processes  
 
 The concept of self in general and the disruptions to the client’s sense of self 
and identity in particular was a theme that manifested in all participants’ discourses 
when exploring how they understood their clients’ difficulties. The quotes below 
illustrate that participants understood their clients’ disrupted sense of self as linked to 
issues of autonomy, individuation and the challenges in separating  self and other.  
 
 “Emm, I guess there is a very disrupted sense of self. Sense of identity 
really that people are lacking, a coherent story about themselves, who they 
are, apart from those experiences” (P: P9/L30-31) 
 
“I would consider that the build-up towards it will be that some sort of gap 
started in terms of who they are and the direction of their going and then it 
was too much so they got psychotic” (BA: P16/L53-55) 
 
“(…) that some people with a diagnosis of psychosis would sit in front of a 
mirror, and look at themselves a lot. And I was told, oh people with 
psychosis have difficulty with mirrors and they shouldn’t have mirrors and 
they sit and look at themselves in the mirror. And I thought, I'm wondering 
why are they doing that. My hypothesis is that they don't know what they 
look like. Not really, but what I mean is that they have no sense of 
themselves, or a little sense of themselves (…)” (BE: P37/L378-381) 
 
 
           Paula shared that one of the common characteristics among her clients is that 
their sense of self and identity appears disrupted. She particularly talked about their 
difficulties in making sense of their experiences by constructing a coherent story about 
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their sense of self. The importance of meaning making is once again exemplified while 
her clients’ struggles in acknowledging who they are apart from their psychosis are 
highlighted. Similarly, Barbara talked about a ‘gap’ in terms of her clients’ sense of 
self and how this is related to their directedness towards the world. Beth made an 
interesting contribution by sharing that she has often witnessed clients spending a 
considerable amount of time in front of mirrors and inspecting themselves. Her 
assumption is that clients with psychosis have a diminished sense of self and their lack 
of being sufficiently reflected by someone is demonstrated by their relationship with a 
mirror in both a symbolic and pragmatic sense. Her understanding of clients’ 
experiences and behaviours once again demonstrated a dynamic tendency for meaning 
making even by observations made outside of the therapy room.  
 
Carla, George and John clarified their understanding with regards to clients’ 
fragmented sense of self by paying attention towards the difficulties in individuating 
and being able to differentiate between themselves and others: 
 
“And this is because of the difficulty, often, in differentiating themselves 
from others, some basic boundaries, yes are not there. So they have a 
fragmented sense of self, yes, their identity is not whole, constantly 
disrupted” (C: P6/L28-29) 
 
“(…) to challenge their thinking and to realize what I am experiencing 
may not be what somebody else is experiencing” (G: P12/L184-185) 
 
“Because well as you know, well sometimes there can be great confusion 
or loss of boundaries as one of the common features in the more severe 
psychosis a lot of being unable to differentiate between self and other, (p) 
(…)” (J: P14/L90-91) 
 
 Carla suggested that the boundaries between self and other are missing and as 
a result clients’ sense of self is experienced as disrupted with subsequent difficulties 
in negotiating the appropriate distance from others.  Along similar lines, John and 
George argued that the difficulties in differentiating between self and other are 
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common in their work with George emphasising that part of his therapeutic work with 
clients is assisting them to regain their autonomy and realise that they have a separate 
and differentiated mind from others. Overall, in what participants have articulated, it 
appears that two key difficulties of their clients’ self-processes were identified. Paula, 
Beth and Barbara stressed the understanding of an impoverished sense of self, and 
Carla, George and John the undifferentiated self.  
 
 
5.2.1.4 Subtheme 4: Understanding informed by how therapist is affected  
  
 The last subtheme of the first major theme captures a fundamental component 
of participants’ meaning making processes and exemplifies the significance of paying 
attention to the processes within the therapeutic relationship in making sense of 
clients’ experiences. Participants implied that paying close attention to their cognitive 
and affective changes within sessions and how clients generally affected them assisted 
the meaning-making process. In the passage below, Barbara illustrates an ambivalent 
attitude and feelings towards her client, an ambivalence that manifested in her verbal 
and bodily expressions: 
 
“(…) emm…she went from foster house to foster house and she is 
very…very…spoilt. Emm she is very hurt…and she is sweet…very very 
sweet. And she creates like people want to adopt her. No, I don’t want to 
adopt her, I have my children and I don’t want to adopt her. I wouldn’t 
take her home. And I brought that to supervision. Now this was me 
talking...with my issue, in front of her, and see the way I felt, rejecting her 
in a way helped to understand about her own difficulties (…)” (BA: 
P46/L204-207) 
 
Observing her bodily reactions and witnessing her emotional shifts through her 
moment-to-moment expressivity intrigued me. She jumped from her chair and 
appeared upset as she was describing her client as being spoilt, while in the next 
sentence as she describes the client as having been hurt and being sweet, her eyes 
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softened, and seemed to communicate a sense of sadness. The mood seemed to shift 
again, and with what appeared to be an angry tone in her voice, she described a view 
about the client’s tendency to maintain a particular attitude in her interactions with 
people by anticipating the possibility of her adoption (having a difficult life 
background, having been an orphan from a very young age). Barbara, through her 
vivid symbolism in her discourse declares her difficulty in allowing the client to come 
closer to her and to assume responsibility for this. By paying close attention to the 
symbolism of adoption and the great responsibilities an adopter’s role entails in 
pragmatic terms, my interpretation here is that Barbara perhaps struggles to adopt a 
position which protects her role as the therapist by implying that her need to come 
closer to the client and reflectively engage with her client’s need to feel protected, is 
being sabotaged by a deeper fear. It can be assumed that this generates an internal 
conflict, which is revealed through her intense mood shifts throughout the passage.  
She however acknowledged that her response of rejecting the client was a part of her 
own personal difficulties and emotional defences. Moreover, how she was affected is 
understood by herself as a way through which she can make better sense of her client’s 
deeper fears by connecting with her expectations of being rejected by a possible 
‘adopter’ but also her lived experience of being an orphan from a very young age and 
the emergent emotional difficulties. Along similar lines Carla, John and George shared 
the importance of paying attention to their own processes in the process of making 
sense of clients’ difficulties: 
 
“And how the patients affect me, says a lot about how I understand what 
they are going through, and, yes, also what their psychosis is all about. 
And how I am affected, you see, says as well a lot about my, (p), yes my 
own difficulties” (C: P21/L161-162) 
 
“The degree of anxiety or feelings informed me, was very helpful and 
informed me about the patient’s subjectivity (…). The case when one’s 
responses parallel patient’s but in this case was such a powerful feeling 
and that’s why I put it together and it told me something about the patient. 
Suddenly it made me feel much more close to the patient” (J: P21/L394-
396) 
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“That is the essence of working intersubjectivity. Take his experiential 
world, bring it into the intersubjective space, and in fact we may have 
different approaches to it, but using that space to connect me to the 
person, and how it impacts me tells me what might be going on with them, 
to then allow them to open their mind further” (G: P21/L394-396) 
  
Carla specified that by paying attention to the way in which her clients affect her 
she is more able to make sense of their psychosis and related difficulties while also 
allowing access to her own difficulties and vulnerabilities. Similarly, John shared that 
by reflecting on his own powerful feelings towards the client helped him to make 
sense of his subjective world and therefore to ascribe meaning to his experiences. For 
George the space in-between himself and clients allowed him to connect and attune to 
their experiential world, which in turn provided an opportunity for making sense of his 
circumstances and difficulties.  
 
 
5.2.2 Major theme 2: A relational approach to therapy 	
		
 The second major theme encompasses the participants’ approach to therapy 
and portrays their unique therapeutic style in the case of working intersubjectively 
with psychosis. As was anticipated, all participants retained a relational approach to 
psychotherapy according to their own accounts as to how they work with psychosis; 
this was anticipated because the project invited practitioners who work 
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intersubjectively with psychosis. Despite the fact that participants represented diverse 
theoretical orientations (integrative, psychoanalytic, and existential-
phenomenological), they shared remarkable similarities, which demonstrated that 
their relational approach and deep concerns and emphasis on the dynamics of the 
therapeutic relationship prevailed over their theoretical differences. Both counselling 
psychologists and psychotherapists demonstrated in-depth relationships with clients 
and supported the essential principles of empathy and validation of their clients’ 
experiences and relational difficulties within and outside the therapeutic relationship. 
This major theme was developed as an outcome of congruent continuation to the 
previous theme, which dealt with issues of making sense in that all participants’ 
understanding of their clients’ difficulties proved to have informed their relational 
approach to therapy. This theme is also significant as it captures the experiential value 
of participants’ declaration of an intersubjective approach to the psychotherapy of 
psychosis.  
 
 
5.2.2.1 Subtheme 1: Prioritising and mapping relationships  	
 The first subtheme deals with participants’ emphasis on prioritising and 
exploring clients’ relationships with others but also the therapeutic relationship itself. 
Even though participants’ accounts implied that they tend to work with whatever their 
clients bring, they also described opportunities in sessions to assist clients in 
reflecting on their significant relationships. During their interviews participants also 
seized opportunities to unfold and passionately discuss their relationships with clients, 
which mirrored their authentic emphasis on relational processes. While in the 
previous major theme participants demonstrated their understanding of psychosis with 
clients’ relational difficulties highlighted, in this subtheme participants discussed how 
their therapeutic approach is informed by their thoughtfulness and emphasis towards 
relational difficulties and how they therapeutically engage to deal with them.   
 
“And it was I guess this was something that we talked not only with me but 
with the team as well and how he related to the team generally, that he 
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would engage and form relationships and to open up about his experiences 
and then he pulled back. So it’s about sort of noticing that with him (…)” 
(P: P17/L87-90) 
 
“But for me, the main work, and she did, and she is in a very different 
place now, and the main work was, with her peers (…) We were sort of 
observing what happens for her there and looking at it” (BA: P81/L415-
417)  
 
 “(…) but you know, this, I really also took into account how he related to 
everybody else in the residential home (…)” (BE: P23/L258-259) 
 
“We went from there and in the end we managed to get to what was really 
at hand, which is putting boundaries in relationships. There have been 
none with his relationship with parents (…) we thought about different 
ways of disconnecting” (G: P15/L270-273) 
 
          In these passages Paula, Barbara, Beth and George expressed their therapeutic 
emphasis on their clients’ intimate relationships. All of them have stressed the 
importance of inviting clients to explore how they related with others, which was 
understood as part of their relational approach. All participants have also placed 
emphasis on their tendency to prioritise and explore relational processes within the 
therapeutic relationship during sessions: 
 
“It would come up in the process. Noticing patterns, the here and now 
statements and what happens between us” (P: P38/L178) 
 
“What I, what I consider very interrelational, emm...is, I, use myself a lot. 
And, and the work. So, my relationship with them, you know, how they 
view me, or how I view them, emm…or you know, when they shout, how 
I’d feel, or you know (…)” (BE: P15/L111-113) 
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“(…) talking about that, you know, talking about us, what’s missing, 
what’s not there” (BA: P81/L411) 
“So, I mean I suppose, a simple answer is in a way being prepared to 
voice out what’s happening in the interface between us. If there is 
something which needs thought” (J: P26/L220-221) 
 
“(…) our relationship is vital, and it happens right there, there, so yes, we 
take considerable time to see what happens between us” (C: P19/L145) 
 
 All participants have demonstrated through several examples how 
interrelatedness is put into perspective and given prominence for exploration during 
sessions, while a sense of cooperativeness with clients is communicated. By sharing 
with clients how their experiences impact them, the focus of participants’ work seems 
directed towards the relationship’s dynamics while the therapeutic focus on reflecting 
on the relationship’s limitations and how to make best use of the relational space 
prevails. As appears evident in the excerpts, the importance of focusing on the space 
in-between and voicing how participants make sense of the interface between 
themselves and clients is emphasised.  		
5.2.2.2 Subtheme 2: The use of first and second-person perspectives 		
 The second subtheme deals with participants’ use of first and second person 
perspectives during sessions. The therapeutic processes explored were found to 
involve the provision of an intersubjective space where therapists were often 
mirroring and reflecting clients by communicating from the position of the second 
person perspective how clients appeared to them and how they understood their 
experiences but also how they made sense of the therapeutic relationship. 
Additionally, participants illustrated through several examples the importance of 
using the first person perspective particularly through their use of self:  
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“So I would bring my opinion, I would bring the way I perceive sometimes 
the way I...feel about them, “And for him to really know what I feel 
towards him, to be aware of what I think about him and how I am with 
him” (BA: P48/L225 & P53/L248) 
 
“So I would, you know, bring up you know, on occasions when I thought 
was helpful, a feeling, you know I was whatever, how they made me feel, 
and always explain why I did it”, “(…) so with this last example is that I 
used myself more than I would with someone else who hasn't got so many 
paranoid thoughts. I brought more of what I was thinking into the play. So 
yes maybe I use myself a bit more with people that are more paranoid”  
(BE: P44/L454-456 & P15/L116-117) 
 
“I would let him know how I am affected by his stories, his feelings, their, 
yes (p). Because it is very important to let him know how he affects me, 
and us, the dyad, he hasn’t learned that so far in life. If he knows how I am 
affected he is more able to understand his own position between the two of 
us (…)”(C: P18/L132-134) 
 
          All participants have demonstrated their deliberate openness towards clients 
through a thoughtful use of self, by sharing how their clients affect them in the first 
person perspective. The above passages demonstrate how participants valued their 
transparency to clients and how they have understood this as a learning experience for 
clients. Participants’ attempts in sharing with clients their cognitive and affective 
states portray their relational approach but also their own availability and authentic 
presence. Even though they have mainly understood their use of self and self-
disclosures as parts of their authentic responses towards clients, I tentatively suggest 
the possibility that these self-disclosures could also be understood as participants’ 
efforts to be revealed as an Other in the therapeutic relationship. Considering 
participants’ emphasis on issues around clients’ undifferentiated sense of self and how 
strongly this impacts the therapeutic relationship (explored in detail in a subsequent 
subtheme), self-disclosures could be understood as critical processes in which the 
client is confronted with the therapist’s otherness.    
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The use of second person perspective/mirroring was also stressed: 
 
“(…) and I kept on saying well you know, I can see someone who is feeling 
anxious and you know I can see that from your brows, or from your sweat 
or you know because I was trained in that way. Or your eyes are doing this 
and your face looks a little bit more red, looks you've got more blood in 
your head, you got emotional or whatever, or you’re anxious. And yes, to 
me it was working, getting him to develop slowly his sense of self, by me 
reflecting what I see and slowly, slowly believing what I was seeing (…)” 
(BE: P40/L406-409) 
 
“(…) I mean I would do a lot of mirroring and describe to him what I see, 
and how I see him, and what I reckon he is experiencing etc.” (C: 
P19/L142) 
 
          Participants’ use of first and second person perspectives is closely linked to the 
subtheme that dealt with participants’ hypothesis on clients’ impoverished sense of 
self. Participants’ understanding of clients’ impoverished sense of self and difficulties 
in differentiating between others are exemplified in participants’ relational approach to 
therapy and particularly through the use of first and second person perspectives. This 
is considered to assist clients in developing a more coherent and stable sense of self. 
This is also exemplified in George’s passage below in which he stressed the 
importance of the second-person perspective in helping his clients to develop an 
awareness of their impact on others and therefore developing a capacity for perceiving 
themselves as separated from others and maintaining a stronger sense of autonomy:  
 
“I use my own response to the person, the patient, to inform what I think is 
going on with them, I sometimes use my own reaction to them to help them 
to make sense of experiences, which with some psychotic people can be 
helpful because they often have no awareness of the impact they have on 
others” (G: P14/L216-218)		
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5.2.2.3 Subtheme 3: The flexibility of boundaries  
 
           The last subtheme of the current theme deals with participants’ articulated 
tendency to adjust the therapeutic boundaries of their work, which were found to 
extend beyond the space of actual therapy. This proved to be an extension of their 
relational approach to therapy but additionally it has proven to be affected by the 
context within which participants found themselves working. Participants’ flexibility 
was therefore understood as a response to the multi-layered challenges they came 
across within their working environments but also resulted from the particular 
challenges which manifested in their work with psychosis which appeared in 
congruence with their relational approach, in their effort to reach their clients. While 
participants found these adjustments of boundaries congruent with their therapeutic 
approach they often mentioned or implied several accompanying challenges that will 
be further explored in the following major theme that deals with contradictions. 
 
          Carla, who is based at an inpatient ward, communicated her understanding of 
how her work settings affect the therapeutic boundaries. Her understanding is that 
someone who works with clients manifesting psychotic difficulties must be prepared 
to work more flexibly as compared to working with other client groups. She therefore 
considered it as an indisputable part of her work:  
 
“You see, the settings someone works in are very powerful. I mean, yes, so 
I see the patient outside of the therapy room, because I can’t and they 
can’t avoid it. And sometimes it’s helpful but other times no. So the 
boundaries are different, change, and on the other hand you can’t do 
something differently. Working with psychosis needs to, someone needs to 
be prepared to challenge their boundaries, yes, I mean you can see from 
this very example” (C: P31/L230-233) 
 
          In the passage below, Paula described how her client’s emotional difficulties in 
committing to a therapeutic contract were contained by the service she worked at 
(Assertive Outreach Team), which offered flexible support for clients with longer 
term needs. Paula explained that the flexibility of settings provided the client a safe 
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and stable platform that could absorb his inconsistency and respond according to his 
needs: 
 
“But it felt that it was a huge thing for him to start to open up all of those 
details so he would...he back off and then he would engage and my team 
allows the possibility for that, than I am there available. I mean in the 
team we hold a caseload of 100 clients that would disengage and engage 
again. So he disengaged and said he didn’t want to work anymore but then 
he wanted to come back in and wanted to reengage with psychology” (P: 
P17/L84-87)  
 
Barbara also described the flexibility of boundaries by explaining how involved she 
felt in her clients’ lives and by providing examples of working alongside her clients’ 
parents: 
 
 “(…) I do case presentations, so we are very involved in their life. With 
their parents, and there are parents’ meetings at times. So we are very 
involved in their lives”, “(...) they have therapy twice a week with their 
personal therapist, groups and all kind of other things. So we see them 
twice a week for 45 minutes. And then in the kitchen, and in the field trips 
and in parties etc etc etc. But that’s our time with them” (BA: P81/L420 & 
P40/L175-176) 
 
Barbara mentioned that she gets the chance to see and socialise with clients outside of 
the therapeutic setting which although not an explicit part of her responsibilities is 
something that she naturally does and which is partly inevitable due to her work 
environment (inpatient rehabilitation centre). In the first passage Barbara repeated 
twice that she felt very involved in her clients’ lives. This repetition of her perceived 
role exemplifies the sense of being too involved, which will be explored in the 
following major theme in dealing with participants’ processes in the rupture of 
relatedness and their emotional responses in the process of negotiating a distance from 
clients. In a quite similar incidence when George decided to accompany his client to 
the hospital for an appointment, he described the power of that experience. He declares 
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the importance of adjusting his approach to the client by engaging in a dialogue and 
participating in his linguistic meanings and therefore assisting him to feel safe by 
containing his disempowerment. This is explained in the passage below:  
 
“And because he had such a sense of disempowerment, I agreed with the 
care coordinator and the psychiatrist that I was going to get him 
………….…we had already spent hours getting there because underground 
was not an option, we took the bus and I had to sit next to him on the bus 
and there was a promise, and while on the bus we had an agreement, we 
had to talk about horror movies because for whatever reason this made 
him feel safe. So we were on the bus, talking very loudly about horror 
movies (…)” (G: P15/L253-259) 
 
Beth also explained how she found it helpful to be more present in her clients’ 
life. Even though the examples she provided below seemed part of her role at the 
residential home she worked at, she considered this level of flexibility as an essential 
part of her therapist’s role, which provided her with the opportunity to bring more of 
herself to the therapeutic relationship, congruent with her relational philosophy of the 
psychotherapy for psychosis:  
 
“(...) you know how very helpful it is to be more present, and bring 
yourself more to the relationship and because we didn't just do therapy 
together, we, I also go for coffee with the other residents, which is part of 
them getting out in the community, and we also go to meetings for them, to 
find a job, or going to a group, or to the theatre, so my role isn't just to do 
the therapy and go. They see me in other realms, so we sit in the kitchen 
and have a coffee, and then we do therapy” (BE: P24/L275-277) 	
John also provided examples that demonstrated his active involvement in his clients’ 
life. Below he described his spontaneous and authentic gesture in assisting his client 
with moving home during a period of crisis in her life: 
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“(…) sometimes a spontaneous gesture in which one does something 
outside of the norm that can be helpful. I don’t do this in a planned way, 
but I can remember working with an asylum seeker patient with psychosis 
who had, who was very on the edge…emm…and I think she was pregnant 
at the time and suddenly there was a crisis and she had to move at the 
weekend, and having got any sort of facilities and no money and things 
like that and I found myself with the care coordinator actually physically 
helping her move some heavy, you know washing machine you know things 
like that from one thing to another, and that meant a lot to her that I was 
prepared to do that” (J: P12/L77-81) 
 
John understood his response to be helpful as it meant a lot to his client and he 
indicated similarly to Carla about a therapist’s preparedness in being more flexible and 
available to clients. Moreover, he provided another example when he went for a walk 
with a client and explained how important that has been for the client who lacks the 
experience of someone responding to him with care and emotional availability: 
 
“(…) one day I went for a walk with him for a session, and I can’t 
remember the circumstances that provoked that but just seemed the right 
thing to do, talk to him in a less formal setting and that meant an 
enormous amount to him (...) but this gesture I think means a lot to 
patients, who have lacked that experience of having a genuine, people 
being out there for them” (J: P13/L83-87) 	
Overall, all the examples that participants have shared, stressed the recognition 
of the importance of these events in the clients’ lives, but also the therapists’ role as 
human beings and supporting the client to achieve what are routine activities of 
human life. This exposes just how damaging psychosis can be, and how it affects the 
clients lives, such that the therapists support the clients in this way that is outside the 
usual realm of therapy, yet is perhaps necessary as part of a caring profession. 
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5.2.3 Major theme 3: Therapist’s processes in the rupture of relatedness  
 
 
 
 
Moving on to the third major theme and dealing with participants’ processes 
during the experience of rupture in their relatedness to clients, the focus shifts mainly 
towards noteworthy moment-to-moment therapeutic processes. Even though the 
ruptures in participants’ relationships with clients have been experienced and 
described in multifaceted ways, their experiences of rupture generally capture the 
sense of emotional disconnection from clients. The analysis of finding has revealed 
four distinctive and common categories of experiences. These comprise of a shared 
sense that their autonomy was under threat, a related disruption of their reflective 
capacities during sessions, parallel reflective disruptions of reflectivity during their 
interviews and the tendency to assume responsibility for the experienced ruptures. 
Lastly, several compensatory mechanisms of dealing with these difficulties were 
assumed, which involved the employment of diagnostic and psychiatric discourses 
during the interviews – which seemed incongruent with their perceived relational 
approach – and a perceived sense of ‘specialness’.   
 
 
5.2.3.1 Subtheme 1: Sense of autonomy threatened  
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The first subtheme deals with participants’ sense of being under threat on both 
an affective and cognitive level. For the majority of participants for instance, a 
fragmentation of a coherent gestalt of their experiences during sessions was 
noticeable which was understood as affecting their attunement to clients with a 
resultant disturbance of their self-experience during critical moments. Moreover, all 
participants’ autonomous processes of sense-making were experienced as being 
attacked at some point during sessions, while they all experienced moments in which 
their lived experience became doubtful with disruptions in the flow of their affective 
experience. Participants’ subjective sense of autonomy violations was therefore 
understood as synonymous with their diverse experiences of being intruded upon by 
clients. In the following passages Paula described her subjective experience of 
dissociation during a moment of disconnection from her client:  
 
“I think it makes me back off a bit. Probably, erm even to a degree, it 
might sound extreme but sort of dissociate a little bit. I guess I see myself 
from as her. Finding it very difficult to make sense of what I am sort of 
seeing. I guess I feel something’s thrown at me” (P: P28/L141-143) 
 
This excerpt exemplifies the multi-layered challenges and related paradoxes of 
feeling disconnected from clients. When Paula was invited to reflect on her 
experiences of not being able to relate to her client she expressed feeling frustrated 
which in turn was closely related to disengagement. She described the experience of 
dissociation as relating to her disconnection and her difficulty in making sense of 
what was experienced in the there and then. What is also significant to note here is 
Paula’s gaze, which in a way seemed to parallel her dissociative experience by 
appearing lost in the room while describing her experience of dissociation, and 
therefore stressed the significance of what was shared. Her expressed detachment 
from the client and her own cognitive and affective states appear related to what was 
happening in the space in-between. In other words, the experience of alienation and 
separateness in the space in-between seems related to a destabilisation in her sense of 
self and self-experience. Moreover, what appears paradoxical in a sense is that even 
though Paula’s description was of an experience of disconnection, she describes how 
in that moment she might have perceived herself through the client – which implies a 
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level of attunement with her client’s state. The quote “I guess I feel something’s 
thrown at me” implies that Paula’s autonomy was shaken, feeling that something was 
thrown at her from the client, with her self-experience estranged from what she 
already knew. On the other hand, her expressed paradoxical attunement with the 
client bombards her with something that is unfamiliar and yet greatly affecting.  The 
experience of dissociation might point towards an altered state of self-consciousness 
or perhaps a connection with an affective state, which is newly acknowledged yet 
causes confusion and is subjectively experienced as intruding on her own autonomy. 
While the previous passage describes an experience of dissociation when feeling 
disconnected from a client, in the passage below Carla shared her experience of 
depersonalisation in response to similar difficulties: 
 
“(...) really, I couldn’t bear the fact that we came closer. I remember 
vividly that I had some moments of depersonalization in that session. I 
mean, gosh, I am sure I sound like a psychotic here, but that is the point 
actually. That this client allowed me the opportunity to sit further with my 
own difficulties in relating. I remember at some point observing my hands, 
I don’t know, it felt like I wanted to make sure it was me there. I wasn’t 
sure how I felt, my thinking felt attacked, I lost the client inside me”, “But 
it was clear to me afterwards that something happened with my autonomy. 
See, my, my autonomy was shaken to say the least.  Gosh, it was difficult. 
Very difficult” (C: P16/L110-111 & P15, L/100-103) 
 
 Carla expressed her emotional difficulties, which resulted after coming closer 
to her client in both a physical and an emotional sense. “I couldn’t bear the fact that 
we came closer” indicates that this experience of coming closer was something to be 
avoided and therefore she felt ‘trapped’ in that moment of emotional intimacy. But 
why did Carla feel so threatened by this relational moment? What has that moment 
stirred in her? According to Carla, what followed in that session were several 
moments of depersonalisation. Carla explained that this experience of 
depersonalisation that followed the strong relational moment shed light on her own 
difficulties in relating. She described in more detail the experience of 
depersonalisation, which resulted in a kind of disembodiment, by vividly 
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remembering herself inspecting her hands as a way for confirming her body, her 
existence in the room. Confused about her affective state at that moment she felt her 
thinking was under attack while she declared that she lost her client from inside her, 
which explains the experience of alienation from the client. Carla has therefore 
described how her transformation of self-experience which related to both her 
detachment from the client and herself was associated with feeling divorced from her 
own personal physicality and her cognitive and affective states. Her perceptual 
consciousness appeared as a process embedded in the dialectical relationship with her 
client, which was experienced as an intense disruption of her autonomy. Additionally, 
Barbara’s and Beth’s descriptions below also illustrate the experience of autonomy 
disruptions: 
 
“No. No. All I said is that I am not a hugging person etc. When we talked 
for the 8 hours no. I kind of understood that this is not what I can bring to 
her, at least not at this stage. This was too much for me, it was already an 
intrusion”, “If what was going on is the lack of connectivity and I feel 
threatened possibly by it, then I’m tensed. It’s both. And threatened, in the 
sense that I don’t know what’s happening, where it’s me, the client, 
something strange. Sometimes it feels like, when not connected, that the 
client will cause something in me…not actually, but you know” (BA: 
P94/L486-488 & BA P47/L214-215) 
 
“(…) so I have explained very clearly, so this thing was very present, that I 
wasn't interested in a relationship with him, and why, and yes, this was too 
much for me, boundaries were shaken, and so, and this was, intruding” 
(BE: P23/L262-265) 
 
 Barbara stressed how intruded upon she felt by her client’s presence (referring 
to her self-harming client discussed earlier). Even though the client had never asked 
for physical proximity, Barbara felt the need to communicate that she was not a 
hugging person, which seems to express a need for protecting her physical space and 
autonomy from such a possibility. Moreover, in the second quote, she made a clear 
link between her experience of disconnection from this particular client and a sense of 
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threat. When Barbara felt disconnected from her client there was anticipation that 
something unknown and threatening would have emerged and therefore there was an 
expectation that she had to protect herself in maintaining her autonomy. By also 
feeling intruded upon by a client who had expressed his sexual interest towards her, 
Beth articulated her frustration and shared how she experienced the blurred 
therapeutic boundaries. Along similar lines, John and George demonstrated the 
impact of therapeutic ruptures on them:  
 
“So it’s inevitable that (p) almost inevitable that the distortions will 
appear and manifest themselves in the intersubjective relationship with the 
therapist. As well as of course with family members and those distortions 
can be, can cause problems in their own right for myself as a therapist.  It 
can be distressing, disturbing, confusing, painful, shameful, humiliating, 
intruding, so an essential capacity of the therapist is to do what they can to 
contain the impact of the distortions within themselves, manage them...” 
(J: P7/L25-28) 
 
“When it becomes overwhelming for me, so I’m on a physical level a very 
freaky person. I’m very up-close with people, I’m very touchy. That 
doesn’t bother me. It starts to bother me when I sense that there is a 
complete dissolution of boundaries, and when I actually start feeling that 
this is going a bit mad and when I actually start to experience a full sense 
of madness which I’m not comfortable with” (G: P30/LP22-23) 
 
 While John described the impact of his clients’ cognitive distortions on him by 
explaining how these distortions became significant within the intersubjective space, 
George described his understanding of the dynamics between himself and his clients 
in the case of ruptures in their relationship. His understanding is that the threat to his 
autonomy is generated by what he described as the “dissolution of boundaries” 
between himself and clients, which is related to the accompanying feeling of a “full 
sense of madness” with which he admits feeling uncomfortable. The notion of 
differentiating between self and other, which has been already discussed in previous 
subthemes, is once again highlighted. However, in this case George talked about his 
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own difficulties in differentiating, which he understood as an outcome of his 
excessive engagement with the client. George’s experience of ‘madness’ in sessions is 
understood as moments where self-experience becomes doubtful because of his felt 
sense of the dissolution of boundaries and therefore as a disruption of his autonomy. 
George employed the term “madness”, which may give a clue that perhaps in his 
experience psychosis may be fundamentally linked to the experience of this 
dissolution of boundaries. This is closely associated to the alienated and incomplete 
sense of self that was described in earlier themes and perhaps implies that this is what 
participants might be experiencing parallel to their clients’ experiences.  
 
 
5.2.3.2 Subtheme 2: Disruption of reflective capacities and contradictions  
 
 This subtheme deals with participants’ accounts of disruptions to their 
reflective capacities when working with psychosis. This is related to the previous 
subtheme in the sense that participants’ autonomous sense-making capacities seem to 
be affected at some point in their work. What became evident through all the 
participants’ accounts is that the disruption of their reflectivity appeared as an 
inescapable phenomenon in their work while for some these difficulties were also 
manifested during their interviews. In particular, George’s and Carla’s accounts 
revealed significant contradictions during their interview in response to these 
disruptions, and a particular emphasis on their cases will be apparent within this 
subtheme.     
 
 Paula expressed that sometimes it felt almost impossible to make sense of how 
her client understood their relationship, and that even though she had developed a 
formulation felt that this was interrupted by the challenges and discontinuity brought 
up in their work: 
 
 
“Or there was a time when she called me the pixie lady for about a year. I 
guess, I think this is a very difficult case and sometimes it’s almost 
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impossible to reflect upon these things”, “I mean, I have a formulation, 
but there is too much there to make sense of. There is too much 
discontinuity and it’s impossible to put the links back again and that she 
has a coherent sense of self or how I would like her to have”  (P: 
P23/L119-120 & P27/L138-139) 
 
Paula found this client’s case so complex that it was difficult to formulate with the 
breaks in the continuity of the intersubjective experience which made it difficult to 
formulate the case. She made an implicit connection between her confusion and her 
client’s incoherent sense of self, and her need for a coherent reflective capacity is 
echoed in her wish for her client’s stable sense of self. Along similar lines and in the 
state of lack of connection to her client, Barbara seemed to find hope important, by 
holding on to the anticipation that some kind of understanding might emerge in her 
work with her client, or that there was some kind of explanation and meaning to be 
found there: 
 
“(…) I can imagine there is emm…a more connected explanation, because 
this is again something, from, nothing connected so I don’t, I, I, don’t have 
an image for (p) you to form an understanding or to feel what’s going on, 
except from the fact that there is nothing to hold on to”, “But I don’t have 
a sense of…so, if I don’t have a sense, I don’t know, I also don’t know 
myself in it. Because I don’t have a sense, because I can’t put it on her, I 
can’t put it on me. I don’t know. So I can’t just describe openly what’s 
happening” (BA: P67/L329-331 & P81/L404-406) 
 
It is interesting to observe the usage of particular words in describing the difficulties in 
making sense, like “connected explanation,” and “image” which brings to mind the 
image of a fragmented puzzle which needs assembling. In these emerging difficulties, 
there is a further challenge in describing what happens in the moment with Barbara 
repeating the word “sense” and its lack. In demonstrating his difficulties to reflect and 
make sense of his involvement during sessions, John demonstrated the importance of 
distance and time in allowing reflection to emerge. He understood his lack of 
reflection as related to being “caught up in” an undifferentiated state between himself 
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and clients, which relates to the previous subtheme and the felt sense of autonomous 
sense-making processes being violated: 
“Because well as you know, well sometimes there can be great confusion 
or loss of boundaries as one of the common features in the more severe 
psychosis a lot of being unable to differentiate between self and other, (p) 
and to some extent one might sometimes find oneself doing things and only 
afterwards realize what was getting caught up into (...)” (J: P14/L90-92) 
 	 Carla and George both demonstrated their difficulties in reflecting on their 
relationships with clients during sessions with some powerful contradictions evident 
in their interviews. They both appear to contradict themselves at several points in 
their interviews, with these contradictions revealing not only how their reflective 
capacities were affected during sessions but also during their interviews. Their 
excerpts below contain some rather contradictory experiences and explanations, 
which may be a further illustration of the difficulties participants experienced with 
their reflective capacity while working with people with psychosis: 
 
“We work together for almost two years now, no, that is wrong; I think a 
little bit more. Actually almost three years? You see what is happening 
here already, thinking about this patient makes me block, not thinking as I 
normally do”, “(…) I mean, confusion, do you see what I mean? (p) (…) 
and there is confusion, when coming closer to him I feel attacked 
symbolically, my thoughts, and it is very strong. I mean, it is many things 
together. So I kind of, find it difficult to think properly...”, “(…) I want you 
to come closer. Which is not difficult to me, but yes”, “This is the beauty of 
working relationally. I mean it comes naturally to me, yes, and I don’t find 
it difficult”, “(...) you know sometimes it was very difficult to understand 
what he was saying, I couldn’t follow his stories, and I couldn’t connect 
with his emotions (...)” (C: P8/L44-45, P21/L157-160, P20/L153, 
P20/L149 & P33/L257) 
 
“But I personally don't find that difficult at all”, “So my experience is that 
I can completely make sense of the patient's experience”, “So there is an 
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example where I got the feeling where this is too horrific. Either I can sit 
with that or I can’t actually say that I can relate to it because I couldn't”, 
“(…) when I actually start feeling that this is going a bit mad and when I 
actually start to experience a full sense of madness which I’m not 
comfortable with”  (G: P3/L44, P5/L56-57, P20/L362-363 & P30/L553) 
 
 In brief, the difficulties in maintaining a reflective capacity appeared closely 
related to all participants’ experiences of ruptures in their therapeutic relationships. 
The absences in participants’ self-reflection seem to parallel clients’ self-reflective 
absences, which were stressed earlier in this chapter and related to issues of self. In 
the last two subthemes of this section, how participants dealt in response to the 
challenges of maintaining their reflective capacities and the related ruptures in 
therapeutic relationships are explored.  
 
 
5.2.3.3 Subtheme 3: Assuming responsibility 			 Participants’ relational approach and resultant dynamic involvement with 
clients appeared to have generated an awareness of their own position and constitutive 
function within the therapeutic relationship. What became evident in the majority of 
participants’ accounts were numerous attempts to assume responsibility for the 
experiences of disruption in relatedness. Even though the readiness to accept and 
express responsibility varied from participant to participant, the assumption of 
responsibility for the majority of them manifested at times through self-critical 
statements:  
 
 “(…) I’ll be struggling with my confidence regarding the interventions”, 
“Yes. So I’ll be wondering whether I should be working with this person”, 
“I am feeling quite responsible for that really” (P: P24/129, P25/L133 & 
P35/L168) 
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 “(…) it doesn’t give her anything, it has nothing to offer”, “(…) but 
failure; guilt also comes up…again some come or less. I don’t know if 
there is a word for about…to feel unethical, like I am not doing my job” 
(BA: P71/L349 & P75/L379) 
 
“ (…) I think it was, it was totally my issue”, “(…) and I think it was 
completely my issue to carry on pretty much from where we were”, “I 
thought it was my fault” (BE: P26/L303, P27/L310 & P34/L356) 
“And there, there is responsibility. Responsibility falls on me”, “I’m 
always asking myself, where has it gone wrong? (…) Or what’s the 
consequence of me having not done this, or said this, on, on, the 
relationship between us” (J: P27/L229-232 & P26/L218) 
 
“And it felt like it was totally my own fault of what happened, I mean this 
whole disruption between us”, “Oh, it was horrible. I felt very upset, and 
angry with myself, guilty. That it was my entire fault” (C: P13/L87 & 
P15/L98) 
 
 Overall, as is evident from all the excerpts above, the experience of doubting 
oneself as a therapist and being self-critical seems to be associated with the 
participant’s tendency to assume responsibility for the therapeutic ruptures and this is 
another example of how deeply affecting relational failures for therapists are. 
Moreover, their readiness to accept responsibility seems related to experiences of 
therapeutic impasses and the anxiety generated by the anticipation of therapeutic 
change.  Someone might assume that participants’ assumption of excessive 
responsibility and their sense of being burdened by stagnations in the space in-
between might be mirroring clients’ state of helplessness and express participants’ 
difficulties in finding active ways to encourage the assumption of responsibility 
considering clients’ greatly disadvantageous circumstances.     
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5.2.3.4 Subtheme 4: Compensatory mechanisms  
 
 Having already sketched how participants understood their own involvement 
and processes related to the relational difficulties emerging in the space in-between 
themselves and clients, the current theme deals with the detected ‘manoeuvres’ 
participants seemed to have taken in order to deal with and survive these relational 
challenges. The subtheme was named “compensatory mechanisms” in an attempt to 
capture how participants responded in order to compensate the experiences of 
alienation from their clients. At times this created a frightening confrontation with a 
sense of groundlessness related to the difficulties. Two key mechanisms were 
identified: A need to seek structure, at times through the employment of technical and 
psychiatric language or seeking particular interventions – incongruent with 
participants’ therapeutic approaches – while the second involved participants’ sense 
of specialness and differentiation from their teams and colleagues.  
 
 In response to her expressed difficulties in making sense and relating to her 
client’s experiences, Paula adopted psychiatric categories in her discourse, which 
were very rare in her interview overall: 
 
“I think there is a fine line for this particular lady between personality 
difficulties and psychosis. And, there are times when there is clear 
psychosis and other times a borderline personality disorder element in 
terms of her seeking care”, “(...) sometimes when I start looking for tools 
and they might inevitably be CBT related tools, because CBT has a lot of 
tools, more of the doing interventions I wonder if that relates to a, I guess 
it’s another way for me to sort of structure myself and make sense of 
what’s happening but also possibly sometimes another detachment from 
the being-with” (P: P23/L119-121 & P61/286-288) 
 
The employment of psychiatric discourse appears incongruent with Paula’s 
professional identity as a counselling psychologist and as will be evident from a 
subsequent excerpt in which she differentiated her therapeutic approach and 
conceptualisation from the rest of her team, which was medically and psychiatrically 
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oriented. Paula explained how she understood the function of her need to employ 
specific interventions in the state of feeling detached by her clients. She explained 
how her need for some kind of structure in moments where meaning-making of the 
in-between processes seemed difficult was related to her experience of detachment. 
Paula distinguished between two modes of existing in sessions, the doing and being-
with mode, and explained how her doing mode is used against her detachment from 
clients. In the excerpt below she further demonstrated how she understood her 
difficulties in ending sessions by expressing her need to focus on something that is 
more real and less subjective:  
 
“I guess it makes me think about that kind of attaching and moving away 
to a degree. I think there is a way in which I support that in terms of how I 
ground people and at the end of sessions and focusing on something that is 
reality based and more real. But I am detaching a bit in that, in sort of 
ending the encounter” (P: P51/L250-252) 
 
          In this excerpt Paula shed light on her approach and related process during the 
endings of sessions. What I find interesting in her statement is the employment of the 
verb “ground” which she related to endings. Her subjective sense of groundlessness 
resulting from the detachment and difficulties in relating seemed to have generated a 
need for inviting clients to engage with subject matters that are based on objective 
grounds. But why was this elucidation referring particularly to the endings? We might 
assume that her need to ‘land’ both herself and clients on a stable and safe platform 
seems to provide a sense of security compared to the experiences of ‘turbulence’ 
preceding the ending. However, this process seemed to make Paula detach, perhaps 
because she adopted an inauthentic stance incongruent to her therapeutic approach, 
but necessary in order to survive confusions, and to deal with detachment while 
managing the ending. Similarly to Paula, Barbara’s need for engaging with something 
tangible and structured is informed by her difficulty in meaning making and her sense 
of aloneness, which is further exemplified through the use of the word “substance”: 
 
“Yeah, yeah. Alone, lost, unclear. It’s not even, it’s not even, I was kind of 
thinking failure. But it’s not even that. It’s before that. It’s not even failing 
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to do something. Hmm…Yeah and then (p) in a sense it’s difficult ethically, 
because we are suppose to do something. This is the occupation of change. 
Profession of something…of substance”,“And I have another one that I 
am only working for…it’s more on the ADHD, borderline area, but we are 
only working for a month and a half, he is going to be leaving now he will 
not stay, anyway, very difficult to connect with…”, “And she was 
diagnosed at our unit with paranoid schizophrenia and the other girl is 
like hardcore borderline and something in that mixture, kind of went 
through…a layer and it wasn’t working. Too many issues yes, borderline 
and psychosis made the relationship difficult” (BA: P72/L359-361, 
P66/L314-315 & P81/L418-420) 
 
Barbara described her anxiety regarding the difficulty in connecting with her client, 
while a sense of being stuck predominated. Her feelings of aloneness and confusion 
in sessions generated an elated sense of responsibility that in turn resulted in ethical 
dilemmas about what the work should be like. A perception of therapy’s main 
ambition as being directed towards changing people appeared somewhat at odds 
with an interrelational approach to therapy. It seems that her state of being stuck 
with this particular client invited the compensatory tactic of revisiting the perceived 
objective of the profession, in order to counterbalance confusion and aloneness. 
Analogously with Paula, Barbara employed psychiatric discourses when she went on 
to explain the relational difficulties that emerged in her work with the aforesaid 
clients. Likewise, Barbara seemed to engage with this language only in the cases 
when she was describing relational difficulties and her experience of being 
disconnected from clients. Additionally, Beth also employed psychiatric discourse 
while describing difficulties of a relational nature with her client. Apart from the use 
of words like “disorder” and “diagnosis” she also employed the word “functional”, 
which connotes with Paula’s and Barbara’s notions of objectivity and practicality:  
 
“(...) who I had problems connecting with has a diagnosis of bipolar 
disorder, slash psychosis (…) Because he is actually a quite functional 
person. Emm…very, very functional. So, emm…he had a lot of difficulties 
with people he lived with, the less functional. He had issues with 
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superiority and inferiority, that sort of thing. Narcissistic type difficulties” 
(BE: P23/L210-214) 
 
 Moving on to the exploration of participants’ second ‘compensatory’ 
approach, evident in John’s, Carla’s and George’s accounts in the following excerpts 
was their perceived sense of specialness of their therapeutic approach due to an 
expressed differentiation from other approaches and colleagues: 
 
“I think he realized that what we, me and my colleague were offering him 
was something different from what he’d experienced before”, “…so I think 
the fact that he (p) rather than other approaches which were trying to sort 
of get rid of the voices and things like that and so on and suppress them 
and so on...” (J: P21/L145-146 & P21/L147-148) 
 
 “But again it’s very difficult, very few of us work intersubjectively”, 
“And very few of us do this work”, “But the other co-workers, are not 
always ready, I mean I don’t blame them. They are not always ready to 
understand what’s going on with, emm…they sometimes raise obstacles, 
their thinking it’s not sensitive to the therapeutic process.” (C: P35/L290, 
P36/L294-295 & P35/L285-26) 
 
“Most people I do think have neurotic defences, which protect them from 
truly engaging with the reality that nothing is quite real and that life is 
quite mad if we truly, truly look at it. And few people have the capacity for 
that”, “...and I have worked at an interpersonal level with them that other 
people would have been mortified by...”, “(…) a lot of people would not 
make this effort to break into their world because either they don’t care or 
they are terrified” (G: P6/L82-84, P9/L128-129 & P25/L456-457) 
 
 Overall, it seems that all participants’ expressed sense of specialness and 
differentiation is introduced while discussing the relational challenges experienced in 
their work by considering themselves as part of a minority group of people who work 
intersubjectively with psychosis. My assumption is that their need to maintain some 
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of their sense of self-importance and communicate that their work has some deep 
significance are closely associated with the experienced relational challenges in their 
work. In other words, the generation of a sense of specialness seems to accommodate 
the sense of a relational failure, in order to make it tolerable and assist the survival of 
therapists’ roles under challenging relational circumstances.  
 
 
5.2.4 Major theme 4: The lived experience of being-with 
 
 
 
 
 The last major theme was named “The lived experience of being-with” and 
was inspired by Paula who explicitly employed the term ‘being-with’ several times 
during her interview. The current theme captures the depth of participants’ deeply 
affecting experiences while attuning to their clients’ lived experiences and 
worldviews. While in previous themes participants’ descriptions of their clients’ 
interpersonal difficulties have been portrayed, in the current theme their descriptions 
of their clients’ capacity for interpersonal dialogue are also presented. Moreover, 
while participants have demonstrated the dynamics of distance and relation, the 
function of distance and disconnection for participants will be stressed. This theme 
also captures participants’ demonstrations of how their sense of self underwent 
several transformations during sessions and how it was inextricably linked to their 
encounters with clients. Lastly, despite participants’ struggles to reflect and make 
sense of their own and clients’ experiences that have already been described, this 
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theme shows how their sense of connectedness and attunement to clients was 
experienced as the generator of meaning.  
 
5.2.4.1 Subtheme 1: Relatedness and connectivity  
 
 The first subtheme deals with participants’ sense of reciprocal connectedness 
to clients and how these experiences manifested during sessions. Moreover, 
participants’ subjective understanding of how connectedness affected the overall 
therapeutic relationship and outcome is addressed.        
 
 In reflecting about her experience of connectedness with clients and how it 
manifested within sessions, Paula expressed her openness through the emergence of 
humour in her encounters with clients: 
 
“(…) sometimes with humour, or sometimes it can actually come out of the 
discussions with them, it comes out of the more human relationship, rather 
than me trying to employ a diary for them if I am using a CBT 
intervention. And I guess that brings me back to the difference between 
being and doing and being aware of that. And being-with allows forming 
the relationship (…)”, “I guess I am more present emotionally in terms of 
acknowledging the whole person, not just the psychosis so we might not be 
talking about that. With that I am more present within myself, I bring more 
of myself to that” (P: P39/L186-189, P40/L191-192) 
 
 In comparing moments of connectedness to those when she felt less engaged, 
she ascribed humanness to the relationship (“being”). This was contrasted to those 
moments she felt inclined to deliver specific interventions (“doing”). Paula clearly 
explained how the experience of being-with was a precondition for the development of 
a therapeutic relationship. She demonstrated that when she felt connected to clients 
she was more emotionally present which resulted in an acknowledgment of the 
wholeness of her clients’ experiences. Her description implied a deep involvement 
while her emotional availability, which enabled her to draw on her own experience, 
					 159 
and this in turn facilitated the relationship. Cherishing the wholeness of the human 
being and the client’s experiences beyond their distress accompanied her willingness 
to bring more of herself to the encounter, with the dialogue concerned with matters 
beyond psychosis. Along similar lines, Barbara and Beth stressed the importance of 
connectedness and reciprocity in their work:  
 
“It happens naturally and today you know when we were going towards 
the end of therapy he knows exactly how I feel towards him.”, “(…) we 
have a very strong relationship (…) but there is this lacuna, this area that 
we don’t enter. And that possibly is you know, a deeper level of 
connectivity. It’s not that it doesn’t exist. It’s not that there is nothing to 
hold on to”, “You know, to see the potential I think that’s what connects 
me to clients, some kind of potential that you can connect with them, have 
a bigger space in them”, “(…) I think we’ll be able to pass through it 
because, because it’s somewhere that we need, so that we can get 
connected with this lack”, “(...) and I think if I would think hard I can find 
the places where he was there for me. But I think that's very important”, 
“Well, I think I get something from it also. They become meaningful, for 
this connectivity they become significant. So it’s a good place” (BA: 
P32/L128, P82/L424-426, P37/L159 & P81/L409) 
 
 Apart from Barbara’s semantics, her quiet tone of voice and faintly amused 
gaze throughout her description communicated and made evident that her relationship 
with this particular client meant a great deal to her. The sadness related to their ending, 
which was intensely communicated through her eyes, coloured her description 
throughout.  Her openness and emotional transparency to the client not only 
highlighted her relational approach but also demonstrated the importance of 
connectivity throughout her work.  At a later stage, Barbara described her 
connectedness with another client through the introduction of the word “lacuna” which 
I consider interesting in the passage. On the one hand it communicates a sense of risk 
inherent in the space in-between in the sense that it embodies a potential for further 
connection which Barbara finds challenging, and simultaneously it is the space that 
separates Barbara from her client. In other words, it is the space which separates and 
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unites. Regardless of how the word “lacuna” is used from either the angle of 
linguistics, music or manuscripts, signifying a lexical gap, a missing section of a text, 
or an extended silence in a piece of music, it is generally considered as an inextricable 
part of the whole. Similarly for Barbara, this lacuna or lack in the in-between, seems to 
represent an inextricable part of her relationship with her client which embodies an 
opportunity.  
 
 The expressed experience of reciprocity and experience of connectivity and 
meaningfulness was also stressed by Beth: 
 
“But we had a lot of moments where I felt that we were connecting if you 
want to call an I-Thou relationship. The, I don't know if I can describe it 
completely”, “Sorry perhaps I'm going too much into it. But I was 
extremely connected to him and by using myself I think slightly too much I 
became I sort of followed the vulnerable child a bit too much, and he was 
actually very helpful, he kind of realised that not in these exact words we 
were able to sort of organise that together. So he would, yes. Anyway I 
don't want to go too much into it. He helped me and I helped him”, 
“Actually, talking about him I have a physical reaction, my stomach is 
hurting. And I'm imagining that probably at the time of, having that 
physical reaction, I certainly would have tears in my eyes, and yes, and 
normally when I feel emotional I also have pain in my stomach”, “A lot of 
sadness it was very overwhelming, he was somebody I got very attached 
with, and it was very sad when he left”   (BE: P30/L322, P40/L428-430 
P33/L340-343 & P34/L352) 
 
 The powerfulness of the experience of attunement and connectivity to her 
client finds expression in Buber’s proposition of I-Thou with a sense of mutual 
support during sessions. She highlighted her connectedness to her client by stressing 
how her excessive use of self was regulated through her client’s support. Despite the 
spirit of cooperativeness communicated, Beth also hesitated to proceed in further 
exploration of her relationship with this client. It felt like she was setting a boundary 
in terms of how much she was willing to disclose. The “perhaps I’m going too much”, 
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“I don’t want to go too much into it” and the firm “he helped me and I helped him” 
communicated a hesitation to further delve into the relationship with a need to protect 
something. Perhaps Beth’s wariness during the interview to explore how this client 
affected her found a way to channel through an embodied response. Something very 
powerful that could not be silenced or ‘ingested’ easily made its way through Beth’s 
stomach and signified not only her deep connectedness to the client and sadness 
which came with ending but also communicated that her attunement to the client’s 
experiences allowed access to something personal and painful. Her bodily 
responsivity at the time of the interview, therefore provided an indication of how both 
her body, cognitive and affective states were all participating in the formation and 
maintenance of interpersonal understanding. Moreover, Carla and George also shared 
the reciprocal nature of their therapeutic relationships which is demonstrated in the 
excerpts below: 
 
“(…) our relationship is able to contain me. Not only me, both of us, but I 
am talking about me here so, yes”, “How can a disturbed person, and 
sorry, I am saying disturbed only because I can also speak of my own 
disturbances, yes…I mean it is not label or, you know, we all are to 
different degrees. So how can disturbed people hold me emotionally?”, “I 
often look forward for our session, it is so easy now to follow him, emm 
and also, he knows that, he feels that, yes, he tells me that sometimes. I get 
so many things as well, from him (p) he seems to, he holds for me, and not 
only him, he holds parts of me, if you prefer, contains some of the 
craziness that you don’t get with other patients (…) it is a very strong 
connection, I feel for him, emm…I mean I care for him a lot, we have a 
space, we created a space, which is very safe for both of us” (C: P9/L53-
55, P10/L63-65 & P34/L266-270) 
 
 By referring to the experience of feeling contained by her client, Carla made a 
comment about her understanding of how the client had contributed to the containment 
of their relationship overall. Even though this partly implied how she understood both 
herself and the client as equal partners in their relationship, her acknowledged 
experience of unpredictability and expression of surprise, also communicated a sense 
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of decenteredness. Carla’s intense involvement and emotional transparency brought  
her vulnerability to the fore, and the client’s containment perhaps decentred her 
perception of power dynamics. Therefore, despite her commitment to a relational 
approach and mutuality, the lived experience of being contained destabilised her 
perceived therapist role. Also, the experience of connectedness and mutuality is 
demonstrated by explaining how connectivity and reciprocity have assisted the 
development of a safe and dynamic space that generated meaningfulness. 
 
  Additionally, George also expressed the experience of mutuality and 
reciprocity by explaining how both parts of the relationship were offering something 
significant, and how his clients contained his madness: 
 
“…as much as I contain sanity for that patient that they can’t hold, they 
could hold my madness because that’s their base position”, “I find these 
people much more real and they contain a part of me that these people 
cannot contain. And there is the sadness. I feel left afterwards, I feel lost 
with that. Because I certainly think as I said earlier on, the world is mad. 
The experience of life is mad”, “(…) if he was a private patient and if I 
was to get paid for it, I’d happily see him twice a week for the rest of my 
life. He fascinates me. He’s funny when he’s okay, tremendously funny. 
Because he sees so many things in the world that other people don’t see, 
more nuances that I find funny”, “Often working with psychotic patients, 
they can open up a world for me, which I often find fascinating and I can 
see it with them, and yes, I lose that. And I do find that very, very sad. So it 
is not just them, there is certainly a part of me that does find that sad but 
unfortunately is part of the profession” (G: P27/L506, P28/L512-514, 
P25/L463-465 & P26/L492-494) 
 
 George’s connectedness to clients provided him with an opportunity to rest his 
anxieties on his clients’ worldviews. His connectedness to a client who has already 
been discussed in a previous subtheme is described above through a longing for a life-
long collaboration. George described the relationship as a fascinating learning journey 
for him while he particularly stressed the impact and meaningfulness of his client’s 
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worldviews. George’s sadness for what gets lost on a personal level is passionately 
portrayed.    
    
 Overall, all participants have revealed very powerful issues relating to the 
balancing of the therapeutic relationship. They all seem to be aware that the 
relationship is crucial and they are surprised by how connected they feel with their 
clients. By allowing their clients to connect with them in a human congruent way, 
they are perhaps providing something helpful to the client that is perhaps different to 
people who present with non-psychosis difficulties. This subtheme has described how 
crucial it is to use the relationship as a key therapeutic modality in people with 
psychosis. By really coming close to the person in a genuine way it also involves 
giving a bit of the participant’s self to the client, which at times seems to be 
experienced as a terrifying experience.  
 
 
5.2.4.2 Subtheme 2: Therapist’s self-experience  
 
 Despite participants’ experiences of cognitive and emotional destabilisations as 
an outcome of intense relational work with psychosis, the exploration of their 
experiences in attuning and connecting to their clients’ experiences and worldviews 
disclosed that their dialectical relationships revealed aspects of self-perception and in 
some cases generated a sense of self-transformation. Some participants implied 
through their examples the experience of having their clients emerge on the horizon of 
their self-experience, which proved that the way they experienced themselves 
predicted the way they experienced their clients. Even in cases where participants’ 
self-experience encompassed moments of disembodiment and disruptions in the 
fluidity of their affective experiences (as in the cases of Paula and Carla), it also 
demonstrated that their sense of self was inextricably linked to the encounters with 
clients and their otherness. The current subtheme deals with an extension of these 
processes by demonstrating how therapeutic relationships of mutual regard, assisted 
the majority of participants to revisit their sense of self in the process of recognising 
and valuing their clients’ otherness. In the following excerpts participants have 
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demonstrated how the space in-between provided an opportunity for connecting with 
and revisiting their own sense of self: 
 
 “I guess it comes up with just the acceptance of things. Much more 
existential level really. You know really difficult things happen in life and I 
suppose with that probably my awareness that difficult things happen in 
my life as well and how do I deal with that. And about being more 
grounded in that and I think the warmth is also from the position of the 
awareness of myself and from my own experiences of [P] if that makes 
sense really”, “And in the rest of my working life I am not religious as a 
person necessarily (…) I sort of resist to that but in my client work I accept 
it and see that it has value for people but it forces me really to question my 
own beliefs. If I’m truly present with someone it challenges me” (P: 
P43/L203-205 & P45/L214-216) 
 
 The description of Paula’s experience demonstrated how the space in-between 
constituted a space through which a dynamic identification with the client’s 
experiences was made possible. This provided an opportunity for Paula to connect 
with aspects of her own lived experiences and life difficulties and how these have 
deeply affected her. An acknowledgement of her client’s difficulties that were earlier 
understood as lacking meaning were here revisited, and understood as embedded with 
meaning. Paula’s self-awareness went through a transformation and given the 
opportunity to sit with her client’s facticity became able to sit with her own facticity 
too. Her existential awareness that was brought to the fore through this experience was 
also related to how warmth and acceptance towards her client and herself were 
generated. Paula further explained how in the state of being “truly present” with 
clients and confronted with their otherness – which involved the awareness of her own 
flow of experience and the acknowledgement of clients’ experiences – she felt 
challenged to revisit her own stance towards social, cultural and spiritual issues. In 
other words, clients’ otherness according to Paula provided her with the opportunity to 
revisit her own worldviews despite the challenges that came about along the process. 
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 In describing the difficulties to enter the “lacuna” space in her work with a 
client that has been discussed earlier, Barbara also explained how these were 
associated with an anticipation of connecting with her own issues while Beth 
demonstrated her sense of appreciation related to the experience of mutual 
connectedness: 
 
“Like a simpler aspect would be my issues. So why I went to become a 
psychologist, that my, my struggles in psychology (…) And I guess it is, it’s 
like an echo of being rejected, or hurt, and being tempted to do something 
that doesn’t fulfill itself. It’s that, that area. That’s the place that I can 
possibly connect with” (BA: P84/L430-433) 
 
“So I actually liked that, I liked that Ι was connected, for them and also for 
me, for me, as a person, I had difficulty my life, I wasn't connected with my 
emotions and I didn’t learn to do it, I avoided them for a long time so it is 
something that I learned and I liked”, “(…) I think it's quite important, I 
feel I can relate to these people. To some extent. And I feel very, so I 
connect with myself, with what I am and also I find it intellectually quite 
interesting. But more on an experiential level” (BE: P33/L343-344 & 
P49/L494-496) 
 
 Barbara went on to describe particular challenges like her struggles with the 
profession and her perceived identity as a psychologist. Her hesitation to enter a space 
of further mutuality and connectedness seems to have provided access to her self-
awareness and the anticipation of being rejected or hurt by her client. The intensity of 
her self-experience appears therefore related to the experience of being confronted 
with a possibility of further connection. Additionally, Beth’s experience of 
connectedness to her client provided her with the opportunity to revisit a past sense of 
self that she described as unable to connect with her emotions. The ability to attune 
with her own emotions by connecting to clients’ experiences was celebrated, and her 
current sense of self was inseparably connected to her encounter with clients. This was 
illustrated when she described how her ability to identify and relate with clients 
allowed access to her sense of being.  
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 Lastly, both Carla and George also shared very clearly how the experience of 
connectedness and being-with their clients provided the space for self-awareness, self-
reflection and self-transformation:  
 
“I really felt his pain, and mine. I was going through a very stressful 
period on a personal level at the time”, “You know, I felt that I suddenly 
became something I wasn’t aware of before, like I, I, but that I also wasn’t 
aware of. Something that terrified me. Yes, I did feel terrified. Also, 
because, you know, because of the experience of not knowing who I was in 
that moment, but also because of coming closer to a part of myself which 
was scary”, “(…) I mean coming closer to him, meant that I was becoming 
closer to parts of myself that I didn’t know existed to a certain, yes, to a 
certain extent. What comes to mind now is issues around identity and 
sense of self. This patient’s unstable sense of self threatened me but not 
only, I mean (p), it also enlightened something, to a certain extent, very 
existential about my sense of self in many ways. I mean my identities or 
roles let’s say, as a therapist, as a mother, as a daughter etc and how they 
are connected or not” (C: P13/L84-85, P16/L105-107 & P18/L124-128) 
 
“(…) things got under my skin where I couldn’t step out of because I 
encountered a level of terror, that I had, or despair, that I had previously 
not found in myself. So either I took on the person’s despair or because I 
allowed myself to connect, I found a level of despair in myself that I 
previously not been aware of. And it was scary. That sometimes happens. 
But that I can only call it the very depths of despair. Where everything is 
lost for example and one has a snapshot moment whereby you realize you 
can’t hang on to anything in life truly” (G: P20/L353-356) 
 
 Carla described her affective state while connecting to her client’s difficulties 
and explained how her compassion towards her client was associated with the 
awareness of her own personal struggles at the time. Moreover, a deeply felt 
communion between Carla and her client was illustrated, through which the 
identifications with the client appeared to have generated an intense and terrifying 
					 167 
self-experience although she was able to experience her self as differentiated. Her self-
awareness in the passages above was related to the reflections on her awareness of the 
awareness of the client. The recognition of her own vulnerable parts allowed a further 
formation of a bond between her and the client and the dialogic connectedness became 
the vehicle for exploring unknown and terrifying aspects of herself. The illumination 
of these ‘untrodden’ territories of self was therefore embedded within the relational 
space between Carla and her client and the intensity of her self-experience was related 
to the intensity of her confrontation with the client’s otherness. Carla’s existential 
awareness of issues around identity and sense of self were exemplified and the client’s 
unstable sense of self seemed to have allowed access to her multiple self-positions, 
their congruence and connection and also their disparity. George also demonstrated the 
frightening experience of transformations in his sense of self. His experience of being 
strongly affected through his connectedness to the client, and the inescapable 
encounter with the terrifying despair that he found himself consumed with, was 
portrayed in the expression “things got under my skin”.  George’s modification of his 
sense of self became a terrifying experience as it communicated a sense of petrifying 
helplessness and immobilizing vulnerability, which he vividly described as the very 
“depths of despair”.  
 
 
5.2.4.3 Subtheme 3: Oscillations between distance and proximity  
 
 Carla and George both inspired the title of the current subtheme since they 
both explicitly discussed the notions of “distance” and “proximity” during their 
interviews. Moreover, all participants in their own unique ways and through several 
examples shared their experiences and understandings regarding the altering moments 
between distance/separation and relatedness/confrontation. Some participants 
mentioned how in moments of subjective threat, reflectivity was made possible only 
when they maintained a distance from clients. More specifically, they shared that 
when their reality or autonomy felt threatened, they tended to erect a wall in the space 
in-between. Additionally, participants’ oscillations between distance and proximity 
appeared to generate rapid affective and cognitive changes with accompanied 
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transformations of their sense of self – as has been already explored in the previous 
subtheme. Participants’ experiences of oscillations brought to the fore the possible 
function of maintaining a distance, by maintaining their distinctiveness from clients 
especially in moments where their autonomy was shaken, or when they felt a merging 
or colluding with clients.   
 
 Paula in this passage below expressed how she understood the function of the 
employment of cognitive-behavioural interventions in her work with a client who 
shared intense fantasies: 
 
“(...) and I think sometimes when I start looking for tools and they might 
inevitably be CBT related tools, because CBT has a lot of tools, more of 
the doing interventions I wonder if that relates to a, I guess it’s another 
way for me to sort of structure myself and make sense of what’s happening 
but also possibly sometimes another detachment from the being-with. And 
I guess that’s quite interesting if we are reflecting on it in that way. Often 
it seems very natural and perhaps it’s a useful thing to do and bring some 
of that to my work. But I think it’s also helpful to reflect on it really” (P: 
P61/L286-290) 
 
 By making use of CBT interventions she felt able to ‘protect’ herself from 
those moments of being-with that she could no longer sustain. These interventions 
provided Paula with the opportunity to contain her detachment from the space in-
between by also allowing the formation of helpful reflections regarding the in-between 
processes.  Moving from the being-with to the doing mode was therefore understood 
as an essential dynamic of her therapeutic work with psychosis. The phrase 
“structuring myself” employed by Paula signified the awareness of an unstable sense 
of self in the mode of being-with. With a sense of self being perceived as lacking 
structure and stability, the enrichment of her therapeutic position with further tool-
related interventions assisted the rendering of a stable sense of self, otherwise subject 
to uncertainty. In exploring their relationships with particular clients Barbara, Beth 
and Carla expressed their need to pull back from the work. In the passage below, 
Barbara demonstrated the naturalness of this process: 
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“(…) we started with a lot of mistrust and then he settled well into my 
world, you know I liked him, he has good aspects but he can throw me out 
at any time. But the same can happen with me. In and out, but see it’s part 
of the process, the relationship” (BA: P27/L107-109) 
 
 While Barbara expressed how she had experienced her client’s unpredictable 
disengagement from their relationship, she also shared how this was held true for her 
as well. She went on to talk about how the “in and out” manifestations were 
understood as an inescapable part of the therapeutic process and relationship. In 
reflecting on the endorsement of a second-person perspective approach against her 
client’s paranoid thoughts, Beth also shared that a need to disengage from the 
relationship emerged and was related to her own need for reflection and 
disentanglement from the in-between processes: 
 
“And, the main work I did was reflecting and bringing myself fully into 
what was happening. He would be like “oh so you're thinking this, and you 
must be thinking that” so very paranoid, a lot of paranoid thoughts. And I 
would go back, and sit with myself, and I need my space to think and 
understand” (BE: P39/L395-397) 
 
Along similar lines, Carla described how the emergent need for emotional and 
physical proximity to her client and resultant responses generated an emotional 
conflict in her: 
 
“I really felt his pain, and mine. I was going through a very stressful 
period on a personal level at the time. So he didn’t say anything, and I 
didn’t, I just left and when I entered my office I felt so ashamed I did that. 
(…) I couldn’t breathe for a while. So yes, it was so strong, and then when 
he, when he (P) when he came for the next session I was very passive, I 
didn’t allow him to..well…it was strange, I felt guarded” (C: P13/L84-86) 
 
 She described feeling ashamed for having touched her client on the shoulder 
to communicate her compassion and acknowledgement towards his difficulties. Her 
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deeply felt connection to the client overwhelmed her affective state with related 
embodied responses emerging and with her breathing difficulties communicating the 
entangled affective response. But what might such a powerful affective and embodied 
response to her emotional proximity to the client have entailed? Her panicked body 
and breathing difficulties manifested as a response to an interpretation of a threat that 
was also felt during the next session, which produced a need for self-protectiveness. 
Carla shed light on the nature of this threat in the following passage:   
 
“So, but also because before I was talking about how important it is to 
find the good balance between distance and proximity, generally with all 
kind of, you know clients but in psychosis it becomes very important, more 
important. Yes, so part of this distance, which is very important as well 
because the client also needs help to understand that is separated from you	
But no, not just the client, me as well. If I don’t move back it feels like I’ll 
get swallowed.” (C: P19/L136-138) 
 
 Carla stressed how the importance of finding a good balance between 
proximity and distance prevailed in her work with psychosis. The function of this 
distance was concentrated on the differentiation between Carla and her clients, while a 
fear of the possibility of being “swallowed” by clients was declared. Carla’s 
previously discussed sense of threat seemed related to her sense of autonomy being 
threatened. The need to pull back assisted the development of autonomy and 
separation.  Similarly with Carla, George explicitly demonstrated the importance of 
paying close attention to how he and his clients negotiated proximity in the space in-
between in the excerpt below. He explained how he existentially understood his efforts 
to drag clients out of their isolation and what this process entailed. He stressed, that 
the right amount of distance and proximity must be estimated and negotiated 
according to both the clients’ and his own capacities for confrontation, otherwise both 
might end up feeling overwhelmed and the relationship might disintegrate:  
 
“So how close I can come, or how far away I need to be is exactly what I 
need to work with. Because again there again, in an existential sense all 
I’m trying to do with a psychotic patient is to drag them out of isolation. 
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And in order to drag them out of isolation I need to find the right distance. 
Not too close, not too far, to allow them to safely make a connection with 
me. If I’m too far away, they will not reach me, I will not reach them. If I 
go too close, they’ll get overwhelmed or I’ll get overwhelmed or we get 
messed up and it collapses. So the whole, and this is generally for me in 
therapy, the whole game or dance is about the negotiation of the perfect 
proximity” (G: P29/L527-531) 
 
          Overall, all the participants reflected on the processes related to their need for 
separation from clients during sessions. The majority of them explained how the 
disruption of boundaries in the space in-between generated uncomfortable feelings in 
them and described the importance of considering how one moves in and out of the 
edges of the therapeutic boundaries in an effort to make sense of what lies in the space 
in-between. Participants needing to differentiate and distance themselves seemed 
informed by a deeply felt communion and symbiosis, with resultant difficulties in 
untangling what belongs to whom. This is clearly demonstrated in George’s and 
John’s accounts below: 
 
“I’m very up-close with people, I’m very touchy. That doesn’t bother me. 
It starts to bother me when I sense that there is a complete disillusion of 
boundaries, and when I actually start feeling that this is going a bit mad 
and when I actually start to experience a full sense of madness which I’m 
not comfortable with. And that usually feels, happens when I feel I have 
lost all differentiation and I no longer know where is me, where is them” 
(G: P30/L551-554) 
 
“(...) which gives you that certain amount of freedom to move, and once 
you got to that edge you stop yourself and you might be moved towards 
that edge and then to have just enough space before you go too far to 
rethink what’s going on” (J: P14/L93-95) 
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5.2.4.4 Subtheme 4: Bestowing meaning  
 
 All participants understood their clients’ delusions and hallucinations as 
meaning-bestowing processes. The final subtheme emphasises how participants 
understood meaningfulness as been established in the space in-between and as an 
inextricable part of their connectedness to clients. The unlocking of meaning in the 
space in-between participants and clients assisted the facilitation of self-reflection for 
both interlocutors, and also reflection concerning the relational processes. Even though 
the decipherability of direct or indirect intersubjective meaning was not based upon a 
particular principle for exegesis, the principal condition according to participants 
pertained the sense of connection amongst themselves and clients. The role of inter-
affective relatedness in understanding clients’ circumstances and experiences in 
interpersonal understanding is stressed, with meaning found embedded within the 
context of the therapeutic relationship that served as a relational home for both 
participants’ and their clients’ vulnerabilities.   
      
 When Paula was invited to further explore how she understood her relationship 
with clients in the state of being-with, she explained that the relationship was 
experienced as more real and with less battle for meaning:   
  
“Much more real. Less of a battle. I guess there is less of a battle for 
meaning really. I suppose is the difference there between trying to sort of 
either dissect or change meaning from a sort of CBT perspective. Working 
with beliefs or questioning delusions or whatever might be. To just being-
with, hearing how they make sense, how the client makes sense of things. 
But often I think if someone’s not ready to question or to change meaning 
they would have got it out in the first place. But again if they might be 
questioning meaning then this brings us more back to the relationship. So 
being present there and observing it. And this allows them to be present, I 
see that they feel not judged and more accepted and feel warmth in the 
relationship. Humanistic stuff”, “(...) which enables them to deal with 
things in the here and now and to help them deal with some aspects of 
psychosis rather than to battle with it” (P: P42/L197-201 & P13/L61-62) 
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 The use of the word “battle” exemplifies the sense of protracted polemic 
involved in the process of challenging clients’ worldviews and belief systems. With 
the anticipation of emergent meaning as the possible prize gained from this battle 
collapsing, Paula explained how meaning was instead accentuated when she was more 
attuned to her clients’ experiences and provided them the appropriate space to 
construct the meaning they wanted in the space in-between. Meaning was therefore 
understood as an outcome of relational processes and more particularly through 
Paula’s validation and acknowledgment of her clients’ otherness. Beth also explained 
her understanding of a close association between the emergence of meaningfulness 
and the sense of strong rapport in describing the difficulties regarding the 
comprehensibility of her client’s experiences and resultant therapeutic rupture. She 
elucidated how the therapeutic relationship represented a space within which meaning 
was redefined and established for both herself and the client while she declared how 
her anxiety concerning the emergent rupture was contained by the space in-between: 
 
“And other things which did not make any sense to me, but if the 
relationship wasn’t strong, I mean, I wouldn’t be able to return, and make 
sense, and the same applied for him as well. All I’m trying to say is that I 
was very anxious but our strong relationship allowed meaning and 
survived the rupture” (BE: P26/L303-305) 
 
 Along similar lines, Carla described how her client’s delusions were 
understood and contextualised within their relationship with meaningfulness 
understood as an outcome of relatedness: 
 
“But yes, with this patient the connection is strong, and it is important 
because, this is exactly why, I mean it is why we are able to understand his 
delusions, that why they are meaningful”, “And one of the things that I 
kept reflecting about while I was talking to you, is how powerful it is for 
me as the therapist to be able to construct meaning with the client. And for 
me the only authentic way to do that is when the relationship is put on the 
spot, in, yes in the sense that we are connecting and disconnecting yes, but 
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that it’s part of the relationship. That safe space which is co-created is the 
cave where meaning is located” (C: P34/L276-278 & P36/L295-298) 
 
 When Carla was invited at the end of her interview to make some possible final 
remarks or to add anything that was of personal importance in her therapeutic work 
with psychosis, she expressed that throughout the interview she kept reflecting about 
the powerfulness of the experience of co-construction of meaning with her clients. She 
pointed towards the acknowledgement of an authentic way of working that comprised 
the prioritisation of the therapeutic relationship despite the constant oscillations 
between connection and disconnection that were thought of as integral parts of the 
encounter. Carla’s metaphor of the therapeutic relationship as the “cave” where 
meaning finds its home, demonstrated how the ‘we’ of a mutual psychotherapeutic 
enquiry facilitated the co-construction of meaning within a space which invited 
exploration and collaboration. The intersubjective construction of meaning is also 
illustrated in George’s excerpt below. He explains that making sense of his client’s 
experiences in relational terms in turn provided meaning for both himself and the 
client:  
 
“But the whole point I’m trying to make here it is about something, it’s 
something about finding meaning in these things and understanding them 
intersubjectively. So for him the fantasy of a bottle that explodes was 
something that he brought in to test how far or close he can get to me, 
whether I could manage his madness, his anxiety and so on. And from 
there on he did that for 3 to 4 sessions and it was not an issue after, it 
stopped”,“So if you truly allow yourself to immerse yourself into the 
narrative of someone with an inner psychotic episode, what you come out 
with is the experience of how they are relating to the world, or how they 
are situated in the world, how free or not free they feel there, and it's 
always internally coherent”, “So every meaning that develops, every 
emotion that develops, develops from relationality or relatedness in that 
matter. Thereby we can only understand it and work with it in that 
domain” (G: P15/L247-252) 
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 George’s validation of his client’s need to blow up the therapy room through 
the hypothesised explosives contained within a bottle of water decoded the symbolic 
relevance of this desire. George explained how the decipherability of this symbolism 
related to the relational processes in the space in-between and provided the 
opportunity for accessing the intersubjective meaning of the client’s fantasy. 
Therefore, interpersonal understanding emerged through George’s connectedness to 
his client, with the meaningfulness of this fantasy being embedded within the 
therapeutic relationship. George explained how his dedicated immersion in his clients’ 
narratives resulted in a deeper existential understanding of their situatedness in the 
world and their sense of freedom. He specified that the development of meaning was 
contingent upon the quality and depth of the therapeutic relationship, while meaning-
building was understood to be possible only through the platform of relatedness. In 
discussing his experience of intense feelings of shame and humiliation in his work 
with a client, John also explained how the emergence of meaningfulness in the space 
in-between was closely related to his connectedness towards the client: 
    
“(...) in this case was such a powerful feeling and that’s why I put it 
together and it told me something about the patient. Suddenly it made me 
feel much more close to the patient (...) But here, this was something that 
lasted for weeks and months and opened the door to many other… (p). A 
much richer understanding of psychosis actually”, “So it’s a question of 
just gradually making a psychological story that is useful to (...) This 
makes sense in terms of his life and very…not just intellectually, way of 
understanding, but that the understanding was highly relevant to his real 
life issues. But also it makes sense through our relationship” (J: 
P19/L131-133 & P22/L187-189) 
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5.3 SYNOPSIS   
 
 In this chapter, the four master themes and constituent fifteen sub-themes were 
explored, and exemplified through close analysis of participants’ experiences. As it 
became evident in the analysis of findings, despite the optimistic attitude expressed by 
all participants towards their clients, it was evident that the experience of working 
with psychotic difficulties left participants feeling deeply affected. Their lived 
experiences and reflections revealed powerful considerations and implications for 
clinical practice that will be explored in the following and last chapter of this project. 
It is also noticed that the presentation and interpretation of findings are not exhaustive 
and I clearly consider that a different researcher might have concentrated on different 
areas of participants’ experiences. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 	
6.1 INTRODUCTION 	
 In this chapter, the developed major themes and subthemes will be considered 
and evaluated within the context of the existing literature. Each of the master themes 
will be therefore presented and discussed in light of the existing literature in the field 
of psychotherapy for psychosis, including theoretical considerations mainly from an 
E-P perspective, which has been the epistemological and ontological position of the 
project. Some reflective and critical methodological considerations will be also 
addressed and recommendations for further research in the fields of counselling 
psychology and psychotherapy will be discussed.  
 
6.2 DISCUSSING THE MAIN THEMES   	
6.2.1 The primacy of sense-making  	
 The analysis revealed that all participants often discussed the primacy of 
sense-making (attaching meaning to clients’ experiences and focusing on 
comprehensibility) and perceived it as a vital and challenging part of their work with 
psychosis. Despite the challenges that surfaced in participants’ efforts to ascribe 
meaning to their clients’ experiences (reflectivity difficulties, ruptures in relatedness, 
transformations of sense-of-self, rapid cognitive and affective shifts), in the course of 
therapy these were approached in comprehensible terms and were thought of as 
carrying some significant psychological value. Participants, therefore, approached 
their clients’ experiences not as problematic ‘symptoms’ but as meaningful responses 
towards their deeper crises. Along these lines, Rosenfeld (1987), who worked 
extensively with psychosis from a psychoanalytic perspective, suggested that even the 
most ‘disturbed’ phenomenon, if approached carefully, could communicate something 
meaningful to the therapist. As Laing (1965, p. 15) has also noted: “(…) the mad 
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things done and said by the schizophrenic will remain essentially a closed book if one 
does not understand their existential context”. In contrast to this approach, the 
application of dominant operationalised classifications such as the DSM implies that 
the practitioner attaches less importance to the person’s subjective experience and 
suggests the non-comprehensibility of hallucinatory and delusional experiences. This 
Jasperian attitude of ascribing non-comprehensibility to psychotic experiences seems 
to have dominated traditional and contemporary psychiatry. It is important to note that 
although Jaspers (1959/1963, 1912/1968) described psychosis mainly as an 
incomprehensible state that should be treated psychiatrically and not psychologically 
or psychotherapeutically, he also placed great emphasis on the subjective experiences 
of people diagnosed with psychosis and strongly suggested that psychiatric symptoms 
should be approached with empathy. He offered a sound philosophical and 
phenomenological interpretation to psychiatry’s theoretical and clinical elements and 
approached psychosis as a process which affects the totality of the human being.  
 In opposition to the mainstream psychiatric approaches’ emphasis towards this 
non-comprehensibility, diverse clinical and research authors from the psychoanalytic 
(e.g. Fromm-Reichmann, 1954; Sullivan, 1962; Searles, 1965) the humanistic (e.g. 
Rogers, Gendlin, Kiesler & Truax, 1967) and the existential/phenomenological (e.g. 
Binswanger, 1963/1993; Boss, 1963; Blankenburg; 1980; Parnas, Nordgaard & 
Varga, 2010) approaches have all strongly and systematically supported the 
comprehensibility and meaningfulness of psychotic phenomena. The 
psychotherapeutic experience of working with psychosis has shown that what initially 
might present itself as incomprehensible, in the course of therapy and with patience 
gradually becomes clearer. Indeed, Barbara, John and Beth stressed the function and 
meaningfulness they ascribed to delusions and hallucinations by particularly 
considering them as narrations of their clients’ life stories. George’s emphasis on the 
co-construction of meaning and his experience of his clients’ ability to uncover 
meaning from their experiences are in line with evidence in the literature, which 
suggests that auditory hallucinations and delusions are meaningful or insightful to the 
people experiencing them (e.g. Bentall, 1993; Dorman, 2003). Participants’ 
exemplification that a common communicative platform between them and clients 
assisted the process of recovering understandability – described as a key facet in 
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assisting clients to overcome their alienation – has been also stressed by recent 
phenomenological literature (e.g. Holma & Aaltonen, 2004; Seikkula et al., 2006). 
Moreover, early existential approaches to psychotic phenomena such as the 
Daseinanalytic method of Boss (1963, 1979) emphasised that our effort to understand 
the fact that a person is able to hallucinate under certain circumstances is associated 
with an awareness of the preliminary nature of our reflections. Boss (1963) attributed 
a transcendental quality to hallucinations and defined them as “…a de-construction, a 
disclosing of ways of discovering phenomena and of relating to them which are 
completely covered up in the waking state of an average existence” (p. 229). Along 
similar lines, Du Plock (1995) suggested that a person’s hallucinations should be 
taken very seriously and one should acknowledge these experiences as experientially 
valid. He prompts therapists to examine how these hallucinations fit into the wider 
map of existence by stressing how they can provide the route to great insight into the 
person’s difficulties and towards recovery. It is also important to add that new 
promising developments in the field of neuropsychiatry, that link phenomenology 
with neuropsychological models, point towards the development of models that are 
based on common cognitive processes and therefore increase the ‘understandability’ 
of psychotic experiences. For instance, a recent theoretical paper by Kendler and 
Campbell (2014) argues that dysfunctional brain processes in psychosis should be 
apprehended from the angle of neuropsychological models to ‘translate’ brain 
dysfunction into the mental. Despite the clear distinctions made between 
functional/dysfunctional, healthy/pathological states which are challenged from a 
phenomenological perspective, these approaches contribute towards an empathic 
understanding of the subjective experiences of psychosis and therefore cultivate a new 
climate in the realms of contemporary psychiatry by pointing towards the possibility 
of understandability and recovery.        	
 Recovery in psychosis is progressively conceptualised on an international 
level as encompassing positive transformations in how people reflect about and 
experience themselves as individual human beings in the world (Silverstein & 
Bellack, 2008) and has been associated with an approach to therapy that values the 
importance of encouraging comprehensibility. In a recent quantitative study by 
Klaphecka, Lincolnb and Bock (2014), the researchers assessed and compared the 
					 180 
meaning of psychosis as perceived by clients, their relatives and clinicians and 
explored factors related to inconsistencies between them. These results indicated that 
despite the fact that relatives and clinicians tended to have a less optimistic view of 
long-term effects compared to clients, overall participants demonstrated that making 
sense of psychosis supported insight and recovery. Moreover, a strong agreement was 
found among clients, their relatives and clinicians regarding a relatively positive, 
meaningful picture of psychosis. These results add to a growing number of qualitative 
and quantitative studies which suggest that a meaning-guided approach to the therapy 
of psychosis, characterised by the development of insight in both therapists and 
clients, has been related to better outcomes, while it points towards the possibility of 
recovery (e.g. Bock et al., 2010; Cavelti et al., 2012; Hasson-Ohayon et al., 2009; 
Lincoln, Lullmann & Rief, 2007; Lysaker, Yanos & Roe, 2009). Additionally, recent 
work has also emphasised the therapist’s role in supporting clients to approach their 
experiences in a meaningful manner. This has been shown to enhance a sense of 
agency and the processing of distress (e.g. Dilks, Tasker, & Wren, 2008; Lysaker, 
Wickett, Wilke & Lysaker, 2003). Along similar lines, all participants in this study 
have provided numerous examples in explaining how their approach towards the 
meaningfulness of their clients’ experiences have assisted them in handling their 
distress while it also cultivated a climate of cooperation in the therapeutic 
relationship.      
 Participants’ emphasis on how their clients’ past and present lived experiences 
and relationships have influenced the development and maintenance of their distress 
and how this was related to the impoverishment of their significant relationships were 
also stressed. In line with these results, a number of research paradigms informed by 
diverse epistemological and ontological assumptions have unanimously presented 
evidence pointing towards the impoverishment of interpersonal relationships for 
people diagnosed with psychosis, while they have consistently ascribed a basic 
relational deficit and self-alienation as the sine qua non for this state (e.g. Fuchs, 
2005; Parnas & Sass, 2001; Stanghellini, 2004). Participants understood their clients’ 
psychotic experiences as meaningfully related to their life contexts and circumstances, 
as recognised in the phenomenological literature. For instance, Naudin et al. (1996) 
described a phenomenological investigation of auditory hallucinations and concluded 
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that these cannot be understood as disturbances in perception since the ‘voices’ the 
person hears are not isolated but rooted in a story from which they derive their 
meaning. Similarly, by suggesting that a person is always situated within a specific 
existential context, Parnas, Nordgaard and Varga (2010) in their phenomenological 
analysis of psychosis, concluded that it is impossible to provide a reliable, context-
immune list of symptoms for psychosis as it cannot be understood outside and 
independently of the contextual psychological and existential circumstances of a 
person. Similar evidence comes also from cognitive models of psychosis – 
Birchwood, Fowler and Jackson (2000) developed a cognitive model of voice hearing, 
which asserts that the way a person evaluates voices will impact their emotional and 
behavioural responses to this experience. By employing a questionnaire methodology, 
the authors explored the experiences of voice hearers with a diagnosis of psychosis 
and found that people who experienced extreme powerlessness in their relationships 
with others were more likely to express analogous experiences through voice 
interactions. The researchers claimed that clients’ interpersonal traumas can generate 
cognitive schemata, through which the perception of others as threatening emanates 
and therefore these affect their relationships and partly explain their tendency to 
isolate. It was suggested that these schemata not only affect the person’s cognitive 
and affective states – and therefore their relationships with others – but also their 
relationships with voices. This is also in line with Chadwick’s (2006) suggestion that 
clients’ traumatic experiences assist the development of negative schematic 
experiences of self, which are personified through voice hearing. All of the above 
literature points towards the significance of lived experiences on the formation and 
understanding of psychotic phenomena and how these are meaningfully associated 
with the person’s context. This is in line with participants’ emphasis of their clients’ 
past traumatic experiences in the process of making sense of their experiences. The 
association between traumatic experiences (not restricted to childhood) and the 
development of severe distress has a long history in psychological and 
psychotherapeutic research from both the qualitative and quantitative angles. For 
example, cross-sectional studies have provided consistent evidence that negative self-
perceptions, severe anxiety, and depression in psychosis are highly related to 
traumatic experiences (Bebbington et al., 2004; Gracie et al., 2007). Additionally, 
childhood trauma such as physical, emotional and sexual abuse and neglect have been 
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consistently related to the shattering of the child’s relational world (Stolorow, Atwood 
& Orange, 2002) and later developments of psychotic experiences (Morgan et al., 
2007; Silverman, Reinherz & Giaconia, 1996; Teicher, Samson, Polcari  & 
McGreenery, 2006; Varese et al., 2011).			
 With regard to how participants have understood and discussed their clients’ 
self issues, two key difficulties in self-processes were identified: the impoverished 
sense of self and the undifferentiated self. These results point towards a 
phenomenologically informed cognitive apprehension of the construction of self in 
psychosis proposed by Trower and Chadwick (1995). The authors outlined two key 
forms of threat in the process of the construction of self, which are highly relevant to 
participants’ accounts: the insecure self and the alienated self. The authors suggested 
that in the state of the insecure self, the person can construct self-presentations but 
others are usually perceived as neglectful or absent and consequently these self-
representations are not adequately acknowledged, causing instability and 
impoverishment on the level of sense of self. Moreover, in the state of alienated self 
the person cannot differentiate herself from others because the other is experienced as 
overly present and intrusive and therefore the person struggles to differentiate her 
sense of self from the intrusive other. Participants’ understanding of these self-issues 
has also been closely related to the manifestation of psychotic phenomena with the 
early and contemporary E-P literature having paid close attention to these (already 
discussed in the literature review). For instance, the notion of the self seems central in 
the conceptualisation of delusions and has been strongly connected to self-
consciousness (e.g. Blankenburg, 1980; Naudin et al., 1996; Sass & Parnas, 2003; 
Sass & Pienkos, 2013). The forerunner of phenomenology, Franz Brentano, suggested 
that any reflection of the self must deal with the difficulties of consciousness first 
(Rancurello, 1968) even though in his later work he did challenge the primacy of self-
consciousness (Gadamer, 2000). Phenomenologically conceived, the delusional state 
is characterised by an altered experience of the external world with preceding self-
experience transformations (experience of one’s own body, emotions and stream of 
consciousness). These suggested disturbances in self-awareness and self-experience 
are similar to the conception of depersonalisation (Parnas & Zahavi, 2002) in which 
the person’s contents of consciousness are experienced as alien parts. Along similar 
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lines, Schneider (1959) described this state as an ipseity disturbance which manifests 
through several delusional forms such as thought insertion. Zahavi (2008) described 
ipseity or mineness, as the quality of ‘being mine’ of the experience on a pre-
reflective self-consciousness level which reveals the self as a part of all our 
experiences. Sartre (1943/1956) has also suggested that self-consciousness at its most 
primitive state is about having a first-personal access to one’s own consciousness and 
is characterised by an essential self-referentiality (ipseity). He noted, “Pre-reflective 
consciousness is self-consciousness. It is this same notion of self, which must be 
studied, for it defines the very being of consciousness” (Sartre, 1943/1956, p. 114). 
Heidegger (1926/2001) also appears relevant here as he also talked of mineness in the 
sense that the world that I experience is always mine and that nobody else experiences 
it the way that I do. In the case of psychosis, it has been hypothesised that this state of 
mineness becomes disturbed with the person struggling to disentangle his own 
intentions, cognitions and affects from those of others (e.g. Laing, 1965). This is 
closely related to participants’ shared experiences and their understanding of their 
clients’ difficulties to differentiate between themselves and others. Beth’s assumption 
that her clients’ diminished sense of self is related to the lack of having being 
sufficiently reflected by an other in the past, appears in line with psychoanalytic and 
E-P literature, which suggests that our sense of self and self-consciousness are closely 
related to the look, validation or invalidation of the other. Sartre (1943/1956) strongly 
supported this argument and asserted that people gain an ontological status and 
experience themselves as objects in the world only through the other:  “…a man 
evaporates without an eye witness” (Sartre, 1945/1963, p.168). Additionally, Laing’s 
(1965) concept of ontological insecurity appears pertinent here. He asserted that the 
person with psychosis experiences extreme existential anxiety that relates to the fear 
of the disintegration of self by others’ intentions. The instability and uncertainty of 
our sense of self has been also extensively discussed in the psychoanalytic literature 
particularly by the self-psychology school of thought. For instance, Kohut (1972) in 
his conceptualisation of psychosis asserted that if a person has not been validated and 
acknowledged enough earlier on in life, she will later develop narcissistic rage and 
retreat to grandiose and paranoid states of mind.  
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 Participants described how their attunement to their clients’ paranoid states of 
mind has left them feeling deeply impacted on a cognitive, affective and embodied 
level. All participants implied that paying close attention to their own cognitive and 
affective changes during sessions assisted the sense-making of their clients’ distress 
and therefore highlighted the relational emphasis in the process of constructing 
meaning. Along similar lines, Gelso and Hayes (2007) proposed that therapists’ 
cognitive, affective and bodily states should be carefully considered throughout the 
course of therapy as they can considerably impact the therapeutic process and 
outcome. Moreover, Searles (1965) and Heimann (1950) have also strongly suggested 
that therapists pay close attention to their feelings when working with psychosis as these 
can possibly guide them towards a deeper understanding of the clients’ processes. 
From a psychoanalytic perspective this points towards the concept of 
countertransference. Even though there are numerous psychoanalytic definitions of 
the concept that are not congruent with this project’s epistemological grounds (as has 
already been discussed), for the purposes of this chapter it will be defined as the 
therapist’s total response to the client. As I have already stressed, psychoanalytic 
explorations of therapists’ experiences in working with psychosis are valuable 
considering the dearth of literature on the topic and psychoanalysis’ emphasis on 
therapists’ experiences compared to other approaches. In reviewing evidence from 
diverse approaches and discussing how clients’ experiences impact therapists, 
Jennings (1987) argued that the experience of therapeutic work with psychosis from 
psychoanalytic, existential, person-centred and family psychotherapy perspectives has 
encouraged a more active use of the therapist’s own feelings. But what might this 
‘active use’ actually entail from an intersubjective perspective? In the discussion of 
the following theme this will become clearer by exploring participants’ use of self and 
emotional transparency.  
 Despite participants’ deep anxieties, fear and sense of helplessness, which 
appear in line with literature suggesting that the therapist’s experience often 
comprises of narcissism, helplessness, avoidance and fear (e.g. Laufer, 2010), 
participants also expressed that their powerful emotional reactions towards their 
clients’ experiences provided access to further connection and generated compassion. 
This is also in line with empirically oriented studies, which have explored 
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countertransferential feelings in therapists’ work with psychosis and have suggested 
that positive and protective feelings such as sympathy and compassion were often 
expressed by therapists (Schwartz, Smith & Chopko, 2007). Moreover, Laufer’s 
(2010) phenomenological exploration of psychoanalytic therapists’ experiences 
revealed how therapeutic relationships provided the opportunity for therapists’ 
transformational and learning experiences. Additionally, therapists have also 
expressed that therapeutic relationships taught them something essential about the 
human condition and reminded them of their human fragility. Similarly, this project’s 
participants also addressed how clients have provided access to their own limitations 
and vulnerabilities, which is in line with earlier studies that pointed towards the 
discovery of the therapist’s most deeply repressed feelings within her over the course 
of therapy (e.g. Benedetti, 1987). Despite the destabilisation that this might cause for 
the therapist, as results have revealed, it gradually allows a space for further bonding 
and can assist the development of a form of empathy towards the other which 
becomes less threatening and more accessible.  
 The consideration of both Rumke’s (1941/1990) praecox feeling and Buber’s 
I-and-Thou seem relevant here. I suggest that a conceptual blending of both 
contributions provide a dynamic alternative to the notion of countertransference from 
a phenomenological perspective. Their propositions assert that by closely examining 
one’s responses towards the interlocutor, one can gain insight into their cognitive and 
affective states. Rumke’s praecox feeling asserts that the therapist’s emanating 
cognitive, affective and bodily reactions towards the client should be taken into 
consideration in ‘diagnosing’ psychosis. The totality of the therapist’s response to the 
client, according to Rumke, reflects not merely the absence of direct contact but the 
client’s state of alienation. It is suggested that the therapist’s difficulties in connecting 
and engaging are related to self-relation changes as an outcome of being confronted 
with the client’s otherness. The therapist’s response can therefore inform the therapist 
about the client’s state and the therapeutic dialogue can become the vehicle for 
exploring clients’ being and how they relate to others. Additionally, Buber’s 
dialogical analysis proposes a deeply felt communion between interlocutors 
experienced through intersubjective dialogue and points towards a state of shared 
cognition and affect. According to Buber, through dialogic connectedness both 
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interlocutors are immersed in one another without losing their sense of self and 
autonomy, however, attending to the shared state in-between them can assist their 
understanding of one another. In other words, Buber suggests that their inter-affective 
relatedness generates interpersonal understanding with their cognitive and affective 
states not completely hidden from one another. The conceptualisation of cognitions as 
not hermetically sealed within minds, and the assumption that the foundation of our 
understanding of another employs intersubjective perception and cognition is also 
stressed by theoretical considerations from the enactivist approach to cognition (e.g. 
Gallagher, 2001). The enactivist approach to social cognition suggests that social 
interaction can constitute social cognition. These approaches emphasise the embodied 
and embedded approaches to cognition and stress that our cognitions are constituted 
by the brain-body-world interaction. Gallagher (2001) for instance has proposed an 
enactivism informed interaction theory and suggested: “…in second-person 
interactions, the mind of the other is not entirely hidden or private, but is given and 
manifest in the other person’s embodied comportment” (p. 203). This seems in line 
with participants’ attention to the second personal interaction process, which suggests 
that interaction in itself constitutes their understanding of clients. As Fuchs and De 
Jaegher (2009) have proposed, sense-making is a relational and an affect-laden 
process. De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) defined this participatory sense-making as 
“…the coordination of intentional activity in interaction, whereby individual sense-
making processes are affected and new domains of social sense-making can be 
generated that were not available to each individual on her own” (p. 13).  
 
6.2.2 A relational approach to therapy 
 
 Participants portrayed a relational approach to their practice and their 
intersubjective work with psychosis, as exemplified through descriptions of their 
therapeutic approach which  emphasised the emergent here-and-now relational 
‘microcosm’ between themselves and clients. They all indicated the importance of 
developing and exploring the therapeutic relationship in their work and overall the 
experience of a good therapeutic relationship stretched beyond a satisfying 
therapeutic alliance and was described as situated on a platform of dynamic 
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interpersonal exchanges. Even though the role of therapeutic rapport in the 
psychotherapy for psychosis has been significantly undervalued in the literature, 
existing evidence points not only towards the possibility of robust therapeutic 
alliances but also towards how these are related to positive outcomes and recovery 
(e.g., Evans-Jones, Peters, & Barker, 2009; Sachse & Elliott, 2001). As Stanghellini 
and Lysaker (2007) have demonstrated, intersubjectively informed psychotherapy is a 
process that takes place not internally but externally in the space in-between therapist 
and client, and therefore that space should be given particular emphasis especially in 
the case of psychosis, where relational difficulties are considered as its sine qua non 
characteristic. Evidence that the therapeutic relationship consists of an important area 
for exploration in therapeutic work with psychosis comes from several approaches, 
including the psychoanalytic (e.g. Fromm-Reichmann, 1950; Searles, 1965; Sullivan, 
1962; Harder & Folke, 2012), person-centred (e.g. Rogers et al., 1967), integrative 
(Lysaker, Lysaker & Lysaker, 2001), E-P (e.g. Binswanger, 1963/1993; Pienkos & 
Sass, 2012; Minkowski, 1933/1970) and even the cognitive approaches that 
traditionally have not been considered sensitive enough to the processes of the 
therapeutic relationship. For instance, Hasson-Ohayon (2012) suggested that 
traditional CBT approaches to psychosis do not sufficiently address the person’s 
metacognitive and relational difficulties and therefore recommended an integration of 
intersubjective approaches to existing CBT models in order to integrate 
intersubjective processes into CBT interventions. She particularly recommended the 
importance of focusing on explorations of the here-and-now and the therapeutic 
relationship which suggests the benefits of the therapist’s self-disclosure. A recent 
and exciting evolution is observed in cognitive therapy for distressing psychosis 
(Chadwick, 2006), where among other advances, it honours the exploration and 
validation of the therapeutic relationship and highlights the significance of client-
therapist collaboration. Also, a ‘Metacognitive Narrative Psychotherapy’ approach 
that is informed by both metacognitive models and dialogical narrative 
understandings of self and psychosis has been developed by Lysaker, Lysaker, and 
Lysaker (2001), which particularly addresses the in-session explorations of the 
therapeutic relationship. Additionally, mentalization-based approaches to 
psychotherapy for psychosis that are in line with phenomenological approaches and 
also consider ipseity disturbances in psychosis (the difficulties of a person in having a 
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sense of being the subject of one’s experience), provide evidence that impaired 
mentalization (the capacity to think about mental states in the self and others) is 
increasingly considered as a vital area for exploration in psychosis (e.g. Brent, et al., 
2014). Brent et al. (2014) suggested that mentalization-based psychotherapies could 
facilitate recovery and assist the person in developing her social understanding by 
inviting her to the evaluation of how her states of mind are related to specific 
interpersonal circumstances including the therapeutic relationship.  
 
 In a recent mixed methods study, Green at al. (2008) have explored how 
people with severe distress evaluated their long-term relationships with therapists who 
provided recovery-oriented approaches and concluded that in the cases where the 
therapeutic relationship was addressed and collaboration between therapist and client 
was considered fundamental, a significant decrease in psychiatric symptoms and an 
enhanced quality of life was mentioned. Additionally, in their grounded theory 
analysis of therapy and recovery processes in psychosis, Dilks, Tasker and Wren 
(2012) analysed nineteen taped transcripts from therapy sessions taken out of twenty-
six interviews with psychoanalytically oriented psychologists and found that the 
therapist’s main role was understood as a dialogical process constantly negotiated 
between therapist and client. The researchers concluded that these dialogical 
processes are fundamental for the psychotherapy of psychosis by supporting 
therapists’ efforts to preserve an observational standpoint on their own processes and 
allowing them to provide new viewpoints on distressing experiences to the client. 
From an intersubjective perspective, exploring and building the therapeutic 
relationship is therefore perceived as a pivotal aspect of therapy (e.g. Gabbard, 1994) 
and good levels of therapeutic alliance have demonstrated greater acceptance of 
therapy, less usage of medication and better long-term outcomes (Novalis, Rojcewicz 
& Peele, 1993).  
  
 The Participants’ tendency to prioritise and explore relational processes within 
their therapeutic relationships during sessions was also demonstrated through their 
descriptions of employing the first and second person perspectives. More specifically, 
the use of first person perspective employed the participants’ use of self, emotional 
transparency, and careful self-disclosures while the second person perspective 
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employed mirroring, and the acknowledgment and validation of clients’ experiences 
by providing the perspective of another ‘you’. Participants’ introduction of the first 
person perspective in their dialogues with clients has also been accounted in the 
literature from diverse theoretical approaches. For instance, McWilliams’ (1994) 
psychoanalytic approach, suggests that especially in the case of psychosis, the 
therapist’s demonstration of trustworthiness must pertain to a more active effort in 
expressing her acceptance of the client and being more emotionally honest compared 
to the work with other client groups. She suggests that the therapist working with 
psychosis should offer a more transparent acceptance and validation of clients’ way of 
being and that therapy requires more emotional disclosures compared to other client 
groups because as she explains people with psychosis could easily feel ‘betrayed’ if 
their therapist consistently conceals her emotional state from them. Moreover, in a 
recent paper published in The Psychologist, Ruddle and Dilks (2015) have 
commented that their discussions with colleagues who work with psychosis revealed 
numerous and strategic use of self-disclosures in their therapeutic work with 
psychosis. They also added that in their personal work have also noticed the particular 
value of self-disclosures due to the specific challenges in engaging people who are 
distrustful or socially isolated.  They explained that because of the stigma and social 
exclusion resultant from a diagnosis of psychosis, the development and maintenance 
of relationships are challenging tasks and therefore the therapeutic relationship 
provides the client with an extremely valuable opportunity to experience a trusting 
relationship, with therapist’s self-disclosures, therefore, assisting this process. This is 
in line with participants’ understanding of the role of self-disclosures particularly in 
the cases where clients’ intense paranoia was associated with frequent uses of self, as 
in the cases of Beth and Carla. Similarly with results from previous studies (e.g. 
Ruddle & Dilks, 2015;	Traynor, Elliott & Cooper, 2011), Beth and Carla asserted that 
the explanation of their thinking, feeling and motives behind interventions was more 
often employed in their work with intensely paranoid clients who tended to 
misapprehend their comments. Offering them transparency about their motives and 
actions decreased their suspicion and assisted the development of trust and alliance. 
Even though the issue of trust was understood as essential to the development of 
therapeutic relationships, it is important to note that, as noted by Brown et al. (2009), 
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there is a scarcity of research exploring trust within mental health settings and it, 
therefore, merits further research.  
 
 The development of trust and maintenance of empathic attunement was also 
associated with participants’ employment of the second person perspective in 
sessions. Moreover, the majority of participants’ tendency to address clients in the 
second person was understood as part of the process of assisting them in developing a 
more robust sense of self and a capacity for self-empathy. Participants’ understanding 
of clients’ difficulties in differentiating from others seems to reflect the use of the 
second-person perspective, which according to their accounts assisted the process of 
cultivating the sense that others are distinctive from oneself. Likewise, Lysaker and 
Lysaker (2006) suggested that therapists could reflect the influence of clients’ 
experiences on their social relationships and emphasise mirroring from the second 
person perspective of whatever the client is revealing from moment to moment. The 
authors suggested that by paying attention to the process of being perceived and 
experienced, and by assisting the client in developing an awareness that others are 
aware of them, this can help the client to develop a less threatening apprehension of 
others and a more stable sense of self. In phenomenological terms, the client is able to 
accept the therapist’s reflection of her in the second person and therefore an 
affirmation of the client’s self-consciousness is highlighted. From a Merleau-Pontian 
point of view (1945/1962) (see the consideration of Merleau-Ponty in the literature 
review) we might suggest that since perceptions and emotions are not exclusively 
located inside the person but are opening her into the world and connecting her to the 
world and others, through the second person perspective the therapist and client can 
generate an intersubjective understanding within the context of the therapeutic 
relationship, which can help the client to construct a coherent narrative about their 
self and therefore build a more stable sense of self. Stanghellini and Lysaker (2007) 
have analysed vignettes from several sessions of psychotherapy for psychosis and 
showed that this approach has assisted clients to develop a first and second person 
perspective, which were both related to their recovery. This has also been supported 
by other research, in which clients revealed that the process of recovery from 
psychosis involved a strengthening of their sense of self (e.g. Davidson, 2003). From 
a Buberian vantage point, the therapist is, therefore, confirming and accepting the 
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client by making her present, which he considered as the only route to becoming a 
distinctive person (Buber, 1921/1996).  
 
 From a Buberian perspective, an intersubjective approach to therapeutic work 
necessitates that the therapist relates to the client as a whole, which means bringing 
one’s totality into the relationship and being able to carefully draw on all facets of 
oneself. Participants’ use of self and emotional transparency with clients in these 
terms was understood as a hallmark in their approach to clients and was found in the 
flexibility of therapeutic boundaries. Additionally, participants’ articulated tendency 
in adjusting the therapeutic boundaries – found extended beyond the space of actual 
therapy – was also related to the process of confirming clients and accepting their 
circumstances and experiences. This proved to be an extension of their relational 
approach to therapy but additionally it has proven to be affected by the context within 
which participants found themselves working. Their articulations of boundary 
crossings comprised of issues to do with self-disclosures, length and places of 
sessions, physical touch, activities outside of the therapy room, incidental encounters 
and some forms of dual relationships. All participants understood boundary crossings 
as helpful in their clinical work and their meaning was found situated within the 
context in which therapy took place such us the nature of clinical settings, 
consideration of particular client issues and the therapist’s own processes in response 
to clients difficulties. For instance, participants who were involved in community 
work as part of their professional responsibilities expressed more intense interactions 
and more boundary crossings. These results support similar findings elsewhere. 
Priebe and McCabe (2006) suggested that there are crucial differences between 
services delivered in the community for people with severe distress compared to those 
provided within pure psychotherapy contexts. Their research’s results proposed that 
interventions in the community comprised of more intense interactions in both quality 
and quantity and therefore professional/personal boundaries became intensely 
permeable, something the authors suggested has not been satisfactorily addressed in 
the literature.  The flexibility of boundaries has also been addressed by other studies 
that have explored therapeutic relationships in work with psychosis, and suggested 
that the flexibility of boundaries was generated by contextual factors and was 
understood as an integral and beneficial part of a responsible practice and involved 
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sensitive and suitable adjustment of therapeutic parameters (Mearns, 2003; Traynor, 
Elliott & Cooper, 2011; Warner, 2001).  
 
 
6.2.3 Ruptures in relatedness and the lived experience of being-with   
 
 
 Participants appeared to understand the therapeutic alliance as part of a 
continuous process of intersubjective negotiation and suggested through particular 
examples that the emergence of inescapable ruptures in relatedness signified 
opportunities for the transformation of therapeutic relationships despite the experience 
of intense reflective disruptions. As Buber (1947/2006) has argued, in any authentic 
dialogue we tend to oscillate between closeness and distance, acceptance and 
disagreement. The implications of Buber’s viewpoints on dialogue to the 
psychotherapy of psychosis as Buck, Buck, Hamm and Lysaker (2015) have 
suggested are tremendous, and advocate that the therapeutic encounter can encourage 
reflection if the therapist provides clients the opportunity to move back and forth from 
I–Thou to I–It modes of relating. Buber suggested that an oscillation between the two 
should be expected and acknowledged. The current analysis revealed that these 
oscillations were also significant for participants’ capacities for reflection. The 
majority of participants elucidated the importance of moving in and out of the edges 
of the therapeutic alliance in an effort to make sense of what lay in the space in-
between. This demonstrated that their immersion in their clients’ experiences implied 
subsequent detaching in order for meaning to be generated and also in being able to 
evaluate how these have personally impacted them. In other words, a Buberian 
approach to intersubjectivity advocates that both dialogue (I-Thou) and monologue (I-
It) are essential in the therapeutic setting. Even though Buber (1921/1996) suggested 
that I–Thou interactions occur through authentic dialogues, he also proposed that 
when an I–Thou encounter has been experienced, it cannot be sustained for extended 
periods of time since its intensity requires that it must alter to an I–It encounter in 
which the other becomes analysable and classifiable (e.g. Carla: “(…) really, I 
couldn’t bear the fact that we came closer). This resonates with the participants’ 
tendency to employ psychiatric classifications in order to describe their clients’ 
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difficulties when unfolding moments of therapeutic ruptures (elsewhere absent from 
their interviews) and therefore possibly assigning an illusion of objectivity in their 
difficulties in sitting with the unknown. Existentially approached, principles cannot 
substitute our experience (e.g. Deurzen-Smith, 1990) and the space in-between 
requires that we continually attend to our experience and the unknown that is 
embodied in the other and the space in-between. Kierkegaard’s understanding of 
dreading the unknown appears pertinent here. He asserted that our fear of the 
unknown as infinite brings awareness to our own finiteness and therefore generates 
dread (Kierkegaard, 1844/1973). The therapist is therefore invited to acknowledge 
and tolerate the dread evoked by the in-between uncertainties, an extremely 
demanding task especially in the case of psychosis, which resonates with participants’ 
experience of relational ruptures.   
 
 Delving deeper into participants’ experiences of relational ruptures and 
parallel with results from previous studies (e.g. Wilson & Lindy, 1994), the analysis 
revealed that participants’ empathic attunement to clients was understood and 
described as demarcated when faced with clients’ experiences that provoked strong 
emotions in them. Participants’ sense of self, cognitive and affective states during 
critical disengagement moments were described as going through several 
transformations (e.g. John: “the distortions will appear and manifest themselves in the 
intersubjective relationship with the therapist”, Carla: “I feel attacked symbolically, 
my thoughts, and it is very strong”, “You know, I felt that I suddenly became 
something I wasn’t aware of before). This kind of rapid cognitive and affective 
changes points towards participants’ intense involvement with clients, with whom 
they are deeply engaged in a reciprocal dialogue in which no one is left untouched. 
Atwood (2012b, p.22) who has worked extensively with psychosis from a 
phenomenological/psychoanalytic perspective illustrated similar remarks: “(…) there 
is no such thing as detached observation. It means that the transformations that occur, 
if any do, include both participants. (…). A psychotherapeutic dialogue, if it is in any 
measure successful, always illuminates and transforms the worlds of both of the 
people involved, and as far as I am concerned, this is actually self-evident.” Along 
similar lines, Rumke (1941/1990, p. 336) suggested, “As interpersonal relations are 
not one-sided, the investigator examining a sufferer from schizophrenia notices 
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something out of the order within himself” (p.336). Rumke implied that the 
therapist’s self-relation changes and the resultant fear and transformations of 
cognitive and affective states are understood to be related to the experience of her 
disconnectedness from the client. Moreover, Fromm-Reichmann (1952) understood 
the therapist’s fear as a common emotional response related to the sense of threat 
emanating from the content of a client’s anxiety that makes her work particularly 
demanding whilst distracting her from the client. The therapist according to Fromm-
Reichmann “…may become too preoccupied with his own need for safety, security 
and prestige, hence too defensive and argumentative, to relate himself successfully to 
schizophrenic patients” (p. 92). Additionally, both Karon (1992) and Searles (1965), 
who have worked extensively with psychosis, have all argued that therapeutic work 
with psychosis can generate terror in the therapist as her connectedness to the client 
and the apprehension of her psychotic state brings to the fore painful truths about 
human existence that the therapist might have blocked from awareness. Similarly, 
participants in this study discussed how the revelation of personal agonising 
limitations in their work caused several destabilisations and communicated that the 
associated fear had a remarkable effect on their therapeutic stance, while it was 
related to the experience of relational ruptures. Carla’s reflections on her experience 
of a strong therapeutic rupture portray this poignantly: “This patient’s unstable sense 
of self threatened me but not only, I mean (p), it also enlightened something, to a 
certain extent, very existential about my sense of self in many ways”. As Atwood 
(2012b, p.53) commented: “When we listen to the human stories told by our most 
disturbed patients, we also rediscover aspects of ourselves. It has been a central aim 
of my lifework to erase the sharp boundary that has been drawn to separate madness 
from sanity, returning the phenomena of severe psychological disorders to the circle 
of the humanly intelligible”.  
 
 Participants also demonstrated that in the cases in which clients evoked severe 
anxiety and feelings of confusion in them, in order to ‘protect’ themselves they tended 
to erect barriers between their own reality and that of the client’s. Along these lines, 
Campling (2015) suggested that as defensive walls are erected, feelings of 
vulnerability become more profoundly suppressed, with the capability for empathy 
declining. The author has stressed that our contact with emotional distress can be 
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equally disturbing with that of the person experiencing it, and therefore defensive 
styles of coping are regularly generated in the professional in an effort to protect 
herself from experiencing resultant feelings of confusion and emotional pain. The 
experience of becoming overly attached to clients and the participants’ sense that 
clients became overly attached to them appeared to have generated a subjective sense 
of autonomy violation with resultant experiences of rupture. I suggest that these can 
be understood as the expression of agency at the expense of relatedness. Similar to 
accounts from other authors (e.g. Searles, 1965) it could be also proposed that 
participants’ anxiety in sharing a subjective symbiotic oneness with clients made them 
feel incapable of experiencing themselves as differentiated and hence the subjective 
autonomy of their sense of self was experienced as under threat.  Consequently, these 
ruptures can be understood as resulting from the dialectical tension between the need 
for autonomy as against the need for relatedness. Participants’ experiences of ruptures 
in relatedness were also linked to disruptions in their autonomous reflective 
capacities. I propose that their experiences of strong emotional intimacy with clients – 
at times described as a source of threat – can shed light on the experiences of 
difficulties in reflective action. Despite the emphasis on the meaningfulness and 
comprehensibility of their clients’ experiences and worldviews and whereas the 
literature consistently refers to clients’ lack of capacity for self-reflection (e.g. Brent 
et al., 2014; Parnas & Sass, 2001), what became evident through all participants’ 
accounts was their own disruptions of reflective capacities that appeared as an 
inescapable phenomenon in their work. Therefore, there seems to be a parallel process 
in place between participants and their clients with regards to reflective difficulties. 
Even though the literature keeps pointing out that people with psychosis struggle with 
self-reflection, it is interesting to observe that participants have also at times struggled 
with their own reflective capacity. Considering the complex processes of reflection in 
the space in-between client and therapist as results have revealed but as is also evident 
in the literature (e.g. Brent, 2014), and the experience of intimacy in the therapeutic 
relationships experienced as overwhelming for both clients and therapists (e.g. 
Searles, 1965), I particularly emphasise the vital nature of reflectivity in the space in-
between given that it is particularly crucial to being able to understand clients’ 
experiences.  As Buck et al. (2015, p. 157) have suggested, the literature lacks a 
systematic consideration “…on the kinds of processes that occur between clinician 
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and patient that promote the kinds of reflection which are at the core of recovery”. As 
already mentioned, a significant implication that emerges from applying Buber’s 
(1921/1996) approach to dialogue is that for a therapeutic relationship to promote a 
genuine and transformative reflection both interlocutors in the dyad must be able to 
move back and forth between I-Thou and I-It modes of relating.  
 Another common characteristic among participants was their expressed self-
awareness related to self-doubt and a sense of incompetence during their descriptions 
of relational ruptures in sessions with clients. While in the field of psychotherapy in 
general the therapist’ self-awareness is considered as valuable for the therapeutic 
process (e.g. Norcross, 2000), all participants have at times described distracting 
feelings of incompetence that were understood as an inescapable part of their work 
with psychosis (e.g. Paula: “I’ll be struggling with my confidence regarding the 
interventions”, Barbara: “it doesn’t give her anything, it has nothing to offer”). 
Although feelings of uncertainty about one’s effectiveness are the most commonly 
reported ones in the profession of psychotherapy irrespective of years of experience 
and expertise (Mahoney, 1997) and it is not unusual for even experienced therapists to 
feel suddenly incompetent and hopeless in the face of extremely anxious and/or 
traumatised clients (e.g. Herman, 1992), it is important to contextualise these in the 
case of working intersubjectively with psychosis in order to shed light on the 
underlying dynamics and how these are related to participants’ ways of being-with 
clients. As I have already highlighted in the results’ section, it may be that 
participants’ sense of excessive responsibility and powerlessness in the cases of 
relational ruptures might be mirroring clients’ state of helplessness. This exacerbates 
participants’ difficulties in finding active means to encourage clients towards 
dialogue. Even though all participants stressed the experience and importance of 
collaborative work, this did not negate the emergence of incongruity and uncertainty 
in their therapeutic relationships, which in turn generated anxiety and destabilisation. 
Similarly, Dilks, Tasker and Wren (2012) suggested that even though therapists have 
understood the process of therapy as a collaborative one, their results revealed that it 
was the therapist who assumed responsibility for sustaining the core processes in 
therapy. The researchers identified an assumption of responsibility as a consequence 
of therapists’ efforts to maintain dialogues in the space in-between. Likewise, 
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considering participants’ therapeutic emphasis on dialogical and relational processes, 
it is not surprising that in those cases of relational ruptures and difficulty in sustaining 
the dialogue, feelings of uncertainty and powerlessness were generated in participants 
with a tendency to assume further responsibility and in the face of therapeutic 
ruptures they felt lost and incompetent. Similar feelings of confusion and 
incompetence were revealed by Gendlin (1967, p.372) who described the experience 
of working with psychosis in the following way: “We wonder what to do with all this 
richness of events which occurs in our own moment-to-moment experience (…). We 
are in conflict, not knowing whether to push harder or to attempt being even safer. We 
blame ourselves for too much helpless waiting, then minutes later, for too much 
interruption, pressure, and demand”. Participants have also demonstrated that in the 
state of therapeutic impasses and related difficulties in sustaining the dialogue, 
participants’ reflective capacities were experienced as minimised. The relationship 
between the sustenance of dialogue and intact reflective capacities was also explored 
in Allen, Burbach and Reibstein’s (2012) IPA study. The researchers interviewed 
seven clients who had attended a family intervention service for psychosis and their 
results revealed that sustaining the dialogue within sessions enabled both therapists 
and clients to hold a reflective stance regarding clients’ distressing experiences. 
Similar to this study’s results, what seems to have assisted the maintenance of 
reflectivity was the creation of meaning inherent in a dialogue that assisted the 
validation of multiple perspectives. 
 As the analysis of findings has revealed, participants’ difficulties with 
reflection, which were closely linked to relational ruptures, were also related to 
experiences of sense-of-self-transformations. Incidents of extreme cognitive, affective 
and sense-of-self disruptions in the case of relational ruptures were exemplified by 
Paula’s and Carla’s descriptions of dissociative and depersonalisation experiences. 
Even though all participants portrayed cognitive and affective disruptions, the cases 
of Paula and Carla are both worth taking into further consideration as they shed light 
on critical intersubjective processes in the ruptures of relatedness. Both participants 
expressed that in these cases, ‘contents’ of their consciousness were experienced as 
alien parts, which in a way seem to parallel clients’ experiences (delusions and 
hallucinations). In the cases in which Paula and Carla experienced thoughts and 
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emotions that seemed incongruent with their pre-established sense of self, they felt 
alienated in the space in-between and also estranged from their own sense of self. In 
the state of this intersubjective destabilisation their first person perspective and self-
experience were experienced as suddenly shaken. Not able to find an alternate self-
position in order to survive this decenteredness and while struggling to maintain some 
aspect of self-consistency, the first option available seemed to be attuning to their 
clients’ affective states. This demonstrates Bernstein’s (2002) argument – 
commenting on Levinas’ assertion that to overcome alienation the person should 
orient herself towards the other and not through a flight into the self – who suggested 
that the alternative perspective of the other allows us to ‘escape’ from our self and 
transcends it. However, if we assume that a similar kind of ‘escape’ took place in 
participants’ cases, this seems to have generated a sense of intense fear and at times 
was experienced as an intrusion to their autonomy (e.g. Paula: “I felt something was 
thrown at me”). Phenomenologically conceived, these transformations are considered 
to take place on a pre-reflective self-consciousness level (Zahavi, 2008). Merleau-
Ponty (1968) seems relevant here when he claimed that our immediate or pre-
reflective embodied self-awareness is intersubjective in nature. In these terms, 
participants’ lived personal experience can be considered fundamentally and 
inextricably immersed in the space in-between, an immersion that may be associated 
with perceptual and affective processes that transforms their ontological framework of 
self-experience and disconnects them from meaningfully bonding with clients. While 
this is not the participants’ total experience, it is worth discussing because it portrays 
how powerfully affecting intersubjective work with psychosis is for therapists. The 
analysis suggested that participants’ disruptions of their fluidity of affective 
experiences affected their directedness towards the moment of the therapeutic 
encounters and contributed towards the disruption of relatedness. Taking a 
Binswangerian and Buberian intersubjective approach, I suggest that these forms of 
disruptions are given birth at the interface between self and other and are related to 
how participants processed their clients’ otherness. Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) 
emphasised that through our lived experiences with the other, a revelation of their 
aspects of self that we were previously unaware of can shed light on aspects of our 
own self-alterity (already discussed in p.48). Considering a Merleau-Pontian 
intersubjective approach that apprehends self-alterity as an extension of the other’s 
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otherness, it can be tentatively suggested that participants’ lived experience of being 
confronted with their clients’ otherness and resultant experiences of depersonalisation 
and dissociation might indicate their own structures of self-alterity. In Merleau-
Pontian terms (1945/1962) the therapist’s self-awareness consists of an awareness of 
the client – and therefore their psychotic processes – and her openness to the client is 
therefore predicated on the assumption that she is to a certain extent a stranger to her 
own self. I suggest that this has implications for an intersubjective approach to the 
psychotherapy of psychosis. The phenomenological thoughtfulness on the otherness 
of psychotic experiences and the responsive manifestations of self-alterity in the 
therapist (depersonalisation and dissociation) seem therefore not only strongly 
interrelated but can also enlighten the psychotherapy of psychosis in a manner which 
could tackle the particular needs and vulnerabilities that are unique to therapists 
involved in this kind of work. 
 
 Merleau-Ponty asserted the possibility for an ontological unity between 
persons by encountering the other’s alterity (Ware, 2006). This also relates to 
Vygotsky’s (1962) contention that a person’s intrapersonal world consists of an 
internalisation of interpersonal existence. It can be therefore inferred that participants’ 
experiences not only challenge the Jasperian (Jaspers, 1963) conception of 
psychosis’s incomprehensible otherness but also accentuate its penetrative authority. 
By being penetrated by clients’ otherness, participants’ self-relational stance went 
through several alterations, which point towards the assertion that a person’s self-
experience is established and inhabited by the other who pervades through and 
disrupts the experience of autonomy in relatedness. From an I-Thou Buberian point of 
view, we can suggest that through their genuine dialogues with clients, participants 
became part of the client’s otherness, and the resultant terror and accompanied felt 
sense of autonomy violation have generated the need for disentanglement with 
relevant disembodiment, depersonalization, and dissociation experiences. This very 
intense experience of participants’ self-decenterness in the state of being penetrated 
by clients’ otherness, challenges the notion of autonomy from an intersubjective 
perspective while it also demonstrates our enmeshment with the world and others 
(Heidegger, 1926/2001). Heidegger’s conception of Dasein as Mitsein (being-in-the-
world-with-other-people) suggested that one is enmeshed in the world with Others 
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and one cannot extricate oneself from this world: “The world of Dasein is a with-
world (Mitwelt). Being-in is Being-with-Others” (Heidegger, 1926/2001, p.155). A 
manifestation of this, which also points towards the intersubjective constitution of 
common cognitive and affective experiences is illustrated in the clinical literature in 
cases of a shared psychosis, such as in folie a deux (e.g. Wehmeier, Barth & 
Remschmidtet, 2003) where two or more people are experiencing the same psychotic 
experiences. Even though this phenomenon remains largely unexplored, the limited 
literature seems to suggest that the clients’ psychotic experiences can become 
‘transmittable’ to the therapist in occasions of therapeutic interchanges over a 
prolonged period of an intimate therapeutic relationship (e.g. Maroda, 2004). 
Similarly, in his passionate account of a case study with a client experiencing intense 
hallucinations and delusions, Atwood (2012b, p. 51) commented: “(…) I began to feel 
a trembling and a stirring in my lower abdomen, as if the energies had somehow 
entered into my body as well. This effect, rather disturbing in the moment of its 
occurrence, arose because of the deep identification with the concretizations of her 
experience I had been attempting to cultivate”. This is similar to participants’ 
experiences which left them feeling deeply affected with their sense of self 
experienced as unstable and destabilised and seem to parallel their understandings of 
clients’ sense of self difficulties and point towards the angst associated with the 
tension of being a self (Kierkegaard, 1844; Heidegger, 1926/2001; Sartre, 1943). 
Ricoeur (1965/1970) also appears relevant here with his suggestion that the method in 
which we sense our selfhood is primarily disturbed because our experience of 
ourselves is emotionally fragile and human thinking is always “wounded thinking” 
(cogito blessé). Therefore, from a Merleau-Pontian perspective, the delicate integrity 
and imperfect structure of the project of developing as an embodied self applies to 
every embodied subject, whether with or without psychotic difficulties, which 
resonates with participants’ experiences. The realisation of this limitation seems 
highly relevant to therapeutic work with psychosis. It seems to generate an intense 
vulnerability in therapists, which should be anticipated and thoroughly acknowledged 
and reflected.    
 
 Despite the multi-layered challenges already discussed, all participants 
portrayed a strong confidence regarding the benefits of the psychotherapy for 
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psychosis for both their clients and themselves. Highlighted in their accounts, the at 
times mistrustful attitude towards their contributions for the generation of therapeutic 
change in consideration of their clients’ recovery was understood as an inextricable 
part of the therapeutic journey. Their confidence in the benefits of therapeutic work 
that outweighed their mistrust seems to have assisted the development of strong 
alliances and the encouragement of engagement. These results are in line with a study 
by Evans-Jones et al. (2009), which highlighted the prominence of therapists’ 
confidence and experience in establishing therapeutic relationships within the context 
of CBT for psychosis. Moreover, supporting evidence presented from earlier (e.g. 
Binswanger, 1963/1993; Fromm-Reichmann, 1954; Laing, 1965; Sullivan, 1962) and 
later studies (e.g. Lysaker et al., 2013; Atwood, 2012a), are in line with participants’ 
descriptions that revealed experiences of genuine partnerships in the process of 
exploring the meaning of their clients’ experiences and the underlying dynamics of 
the therapeutic relationship. Their experiences of connectedness and mutuality were 
demonstrated by illuminating how connectivity and reciprocity assisted the 
development of a safe and dynamic space that generated meaningfulness. Similarly to 
Atwood’s (2012b) accounts, the personal significance of connectedness for 
participants was illuminated through an emphasis on the opportunities provided to rest 
their anxieties on their clients’ experiences and worldviews. By coming genuinely 
close to their clients and through their emotional openness and immediacy, 
participants appeared to realise experientially how crucial it is to use the relationship, 
while their emphasis on the priority of the therapeutic relationship as the generator of 
change and meaningfulness is in line with consistent and substantial amounts of 
research advocating that the therapeutic relationship has a superior effect on outcomes 
than the particulars of any theoretically-driven intervention (e.g. Wampold & Imel, 
2015). 
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6.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNSELLING PSYCHOLOGY   	
6.3.1 Implications for practice 
 
 The phenomenological understanding of psychosis explored in the literature 
review, which consisted of a blending of earlier and more recent theoretical and 
clinical phenomenological contributions, was implicitly but significantly reflected in 
all participants’ lived experiences and points towards a new life for the psychotherapy 
of psychosis in the light of phenomenology as has also been pointed out in recent 
literature (e.g. Perez-Alvares et al., 2008). This was partly expected considering 
CoP’s emphasis on the phenomenological (e.g. Lane & Corrie, 2006). Even though 
the majority of participants did not theoretically identify with the E-P paradigm, the 
detailed exploration of their lived experiences has pointed towards sensitive 
intersubjective issues endorsed in the principles of phenomenologically informed 
psychotherapies for psychosis - such as clients’ intersubjective breakdowns and issues 
with self, the emphasis on the endorsement of a second person perspective and 
therapist’s self-disclosures, matters around the co-creation of meaning and an 
emphasis towards the exploration of the here-and-now processes of the therapeutic 
relationship. Taking into consideration participants’ relational emphasis that strongly 
resonates with CoP’s practice, several subjective implications can be noted. As du 
Plock (2006) has suggested, CoP has traditionally considered the therapeutic 
relationship as the strongest therapeutic medium.  
 
 Contrary to the view of the therapeutic relationship as irrelevant to the 
provision of psychological interventions for the case of psychosis (Coleman & 
Jenkins, 1998), the results of this project point in the opposite direction. Participants’ 
emphasis on the value of the therapeutic relationship and their indications of the 
significance of employing a relational approach to the psychotherapy of psychosis not 
only resonate with recent phenomenological research (e.g. Stanghellini & Lysaker, 
2007) but also with current – though limited – qualitative research conducted 
specifically on CoPt’s work with psychosis (Larsson, 2010; Larsson, Brooks, & 
Loewenthal, 2012). They suggested that irrespective of participants’ theoretical 
orientations, the common focus was oriented towards the therapeutic relationship, 
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which also resonates with NICE (2014) recommendations.  Even though NICE 
considers empathic relationships as an inextricable part of recovery-focused 
approaches to psychosis, it is very discouraging that these recommendations remain 
loosely presented since they are not highlighted in the psychological therapies 
options. Also, it is clearly recommended that counselling and supportive 
psychotherapy should not be routinely offered to people with psychosis, especially in 
inpatient settings. However, some of the experiences presented in the present 
research, such as Carla’s intersubjective work offered on an acute psychiatric ward for 
the last twenty-two years, strongly suggest that intersubjective psychotherapy can be 
helpful for people with distressing psychosis.  
 
 Considering the upward trend in qualitative research that strongly 
recommends relational approaches for psychosis, these kinds of contradictions need to 
be constructively challenged while clinical guidelines should be reviewed in light of 
these qualitative research results. As Tan, Stokes and Shaw (2009) have 
recommended, even though qualitative research is progressively being used by 
NICE's clinical guideline developers there is certainly room for further recognition, 
evaluation, and amalgamation of qualitative evidence in clinical guidelines. 
Additionally, in a broader sense the common factors model in psychotherapy seems 
pertinent here. Meta-analyses have provided strong and extensive evidence that 
support the common factors theory in the field of psychotherapy and suggest that it is 
not the type of therapy that is important, but the common factors such as therapeutic 
alliance, empathy, cultural adaptation, and therapeutic process (Wampold, 2015). The 
common factors model of therapeutic change and the evidence that the relationship is 
critical to any kind of psychotherapy above and beyond the model employed 
(Wampold & Imel, 2015) suggests that this extensive evidence needs to be critically 
addressed in clinical guidelines. Both CoP and phenomenologically informed 
psychotherapies, which prioritise the therapeutic relationship and process, need 
therefore to systematically address these issues on a political and strategic plan level.  
Moreover, considering the growing number of CoPts employed in the NHS and their 
significant contributions to clients who are given a psychiatric diagnosis (Cooper, 
2009), CoP through its professional bodies must therefore systematically and 
methodically map the existing policies, their clinical guidelines and the obstructions 
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in the policy processes regarding the implementation of therapeutic approaches to 
psychosis and identify influential policy stakeholders in order to inform future policy 
development and implementation. Despite the political, social and economic 
challenges that come along with this recommendation, I strongly consider that it is 
ethical response not only for our professional identities which comprise the qualities 
of a deeply caring profession but similarly for our clients’ complex needs and 
difficulties.  
 
 Additionally, even though the results suggest that CoPts are tremendously well 
placed to provide therapeutic support to persons with psychotic difficulties, it seems 
clear that further encouragement is required to bring more CoPts into this field. 
Hence, it is suggested that there is a pivotal necessity for the profession of CoP to be 
represented in diverse professional areas, particularly in those where the medical 
model of distress predominates, in order to safeguard the commitment of our work 
towards our clients’ wellbeing.  
 
 The consistent employment of diagnostic labels and the medicalisation of 
distress is based on the assumption that the so-called ‘mental illness’ is located within 
the person and her brain while her disturbed experiences are generally defined as 
phenomena that are separated from the life context in which they are expressed 
(Irarrazaval & Sharim, 2014). This project’s intersubjective focus which is clearly 
linked to the recovery movement asserts instead that any form of experience always 
includes the person’s relations and interactions with others and strongly recommends 
a more comprehensive perspective of psychotic experiences as these can be 
understood within the contexts of a person’s life. Similarly, results have also shown 
that participants’ destabilising experiences were strongly interconnected with the 
context of therapy and working settings but mostly to the deeply affecting therapeutic 
bonds developed with clients. More specifically, results revealed that intersubjective 
work with psychosis consisted of an intense process of altering moments between 
distance/separation and relatedness/confrontation for both clients and therapists. It is 
therefore suggested that this dynamic form of oscillation in the space in-between 
should be given particular emphasis considering that these can generate rapid 
affective and cognitive changes and reflective breakdowns, with accompanying 
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transformations of the therapist’s sense of self. Participants have suggested that the 
oscillations between emotional distancing and relatedness have been significant in the 
maintenance of their reflective capacities and therefore this is something practitioners 
should take into consideration when working interrelationally with psychosis. 
Moreover, results clearly suggest that the prevailing psychological interventions for 
psychosis should consider the intersubjective and dialogical processes that can 
facilitate the appropriate reflection and acknowledge the forms of relatedness implied 
by the intersubjective approaches of prominent thinkers such as Buber and Merleau-
Ponty. Despite participants’ successful efforts to deeply and relationally engage and 
connect with clients, results point also towards a careful consideration of the resultant 
reciprocal connectedness and how this can affect the overall therapeutic relationship 
and outcome. Strong therapeutic bonds in the psychotherapy for psychosis can be 
deeply affecting for both client and therapist and this should be anticipated.  
 
 Participants have clearly demonstrated how their attachments to clients 
generated a sense of subjective threat and destabilised their sense of self to the extent 
of experiencing moments of disembodiment and disruptions in the fluidity of their 
affective experiences. This points towards the intersubjective and fluctuating nature of 
our sense of self, and the E-P approach can significantly contribute towards this 
essential insight – especially in therapeutic work with psychosis, where issues relating 
to the sense of self for both clients and therapists prevail. Existentially perceived, the 
inherent difficulties in self-awareness remain an essential difficulty in all varieties of 
human existence, whether in the presence or absence of psychosis and this should be 
acknowledged. Along these lines, results have suggested the employment of ‘self-as-
a-process’ or ‘self-as-transformation’. I take the ancient Delphic apothegm ‘Know 
Thyself’ as an invitation to turn towards this process rather than turning towards the 
self as a fixed structure. The medusa gaze of the essentialist position objectifies the 
self by conceptualising it as a substantial and solid structure. It is a gaze turning 
‘someone’ into ‘something’ inflexible, stone-like, and permanent, therefore negating 
our temporal nature and refusing to embrace the elusiveness of selfhood. The 
existential outlook takes a Heraclitean spin instead: everything flows and nothing 
stands still (Kirk, 1954). I therefore suggest that the existential approach, which 
assumes that the self cannot be taken for granted as it is constantly in a state of 
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transformation (e.g. Kierkegaard, 1844/1973; Heidegger, 1926/2001), must be taken 
into careful consideration by all therapists across all modalities especially in the case 
of intersubjective work with psychosis where issues with sense-of-self-
transformations prevail for both clients and therapists.  
 
 
6.3.2 Implications for supervision and training 
 
 Even though clinical supervision is generally considered to be part of a 
reflective and ethical clinical practice across all therapeutic modalities and client 
groups (BPS, 2010), in the case of working with psychosis I suggest that it includes 
even further pivotal support for the therapist. Considering the destabilisation of 
participants’ reflective capacities, a safe and reflective supervision space may be 
critical for cultivating the recovery of understandability of the client’s psychotic 
experiences, and the in-between intersubjective therapeutic processes appear to 
consist of a pivotal condition for this kind of work. The provision of specialist 
supervision sensitive to intersubjective processes is considered fundamental in order 
to allow therapists the space to share and process the strong cognitive, emotional and 
embodied responses towards their clients. Supervision must, therefore, place a 
particular emphasis upon therapists’ self-processes, which can foster a mutual 
communicative platform between client and therapist. Since the ruptures of 
relatedness are thought of as an inextricable part of therapeutic work with psychosis, 
which affects the therapist tremendously, perhaps also supplementary support 
additional to standard supervision might be necessary. This might comprise of 
attendance of specific workshops, group and/or peer supervision through which 
therapists can exchange experiences and the challenges in their work in an effort to 
contain their destabilisations and facilitate therapeutic progression. Supervision 
groups might particularly be an effective way of bringing out and processing 
therapist’s self-experiences that relate to their work with psychosis which brings to 
the  surface intense feelings of helplessness and vulnerability. For instance, a group 
supervision setting sensitive to Yalom’s (Yalom & Leszcz, 2005) group processes 
such as universality (assisting therapists to appreciate that they are not alone in their 
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vulnerabilities) and catharsis (supporting therapists to discharge suppressed feelings 
through disclosures) can be a greatly supportive contribution to their work and help 
them to recognise and accept their vulnerabilities and intersubjective complications as 
inevitable conditions of their work. Moreover, considering participants’ emphasis on 
the powerful role of boundary crossings in their work, it is suggested that supervision 
must provide the appropriate space for reflection on the nature of dual relationships 
and boundary concerns by assisting the therapists’ self-reflective awareness especially 
in those cases when boundaries become blurred.   
 
 In light of the current findings, it also appears sensible to address some 
sensitive issues regarding the curriculum of CoP and provide some recommendations 
for training purposes. Considering CoPts’ increasing interest in getting involved with 
psychosis in research and clinical terms, training courses can play a key role in 
promoting trainees’ interest in this arena and cultivating a climate that will encourage 
trainees to work with severe distress. This is also echoed in the results of Larsson’s 
(2010) discursive analysis on CoPts’ experiences in working with psychosis, in which 
CoPts considered their training courses as not nurturing their confidence in working 
with psychosis. Considering that training courses place particular emphasis on 
intersubjective and relational issues and this particular prominence is exactly what 
appears to be significant in the therapeutic work with psychosis, training courses 
must, therefore, develop curriculums that are more sensitive to therapeutic work with 
severe distress, while they can also provide their trainees with relevant placement 
opportunities. 		
6.4 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND LIMITATIONS   	
 
 Even though the current research has offered a useful account of CoPts and 
psychotherapists’ experiences of working with psychosis, it is recognised that there 
are a number of limitations to the research which need to be contemplated. This 
section of the chapter will deal with methodological reflexivity and attempt to provide 
remarks regarding the projects’ limitations.  
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 First and foremost this has been my first experience in conducting an IPA 
project and because of this I struggled with my confidence throughout the research 
process. Research supervision has been vital in this regard as it has provided an 
essential space for reflection and encouragement. At this final stage of the research 
process and upon reflection, I feel that I would have preferred to conduct certain 
features of the research differently, particularly regarding the interviews. Even though 
my experience of interviewing participants has been deeply affecting, having had 
more experience in conducting IPA semi-structured interviews could have assisted a 
deeper engagement with participants. I, therefore, assert that a lack of confidence has 
influenced my interviewing attitude. For instance, being overly concerned about 
suspending pre-conceptions, I sometimes missed opportunities to carefully share with 
participants, personal and similar experiences to those they had shared. There were 
certain moments in which if I had attempted to, such disclosures could have perhaps 
assisted the intersubjective flow of the interviews in a way that could have provided a 
deeper access to participants’ experiences and felt-sense.  
 
 Although the sample was represented by a broad range of settings from which 
participants gained their experiences and included both male and female practitioners 
and also a representation of several theoretical perspectives, some noteworthy 
limitations must be reflected. Firstly, all participants in the sample were Caucasian 
and therefore it can be argued that the sample was not representative with regard to 
culturally varied perspectives. It would have been interesting to investigate non-
Western perspectives on intersubjective approaches to psychosis considering the 
possibility that non-Western cultures might hold different views on mental health. For 
instance, a three-decade long international research conducted by the World Health 
Organisation (Hopper, Harrison, Janca, & Santorisu, 2007) has revealed that people 
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia in developing countries tend to do better in the long 
term (fewer admissions, being employed, social communities participation etc.) 
compared to people in developed countries. The study concluded that the tight social 
networks in the developing countries include the person with psychosis as an essential 
part of the community. Intersubjectively speaking, it seems therefore that people in 
developing countries are assisted in retaining their subjectivity as opposed to 
developed countries where the person with psychosis is often stigmatised, considered 
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defective and remains often unemployable. Therefore, practitioners originating from 
developing countries could have enriched the data with alternate perspectives on 
psychosis and its therapy.     
 
 Moreover, another limitation that relates to sample issues concerns the 
selection criteria. Despite the screening process that took place in order to ensure that 
all participants met the inclusion criteria, all participants were self-selected and all 
identified themselves as working intersubjectively with psychosis. As results have 
revealed, despite the challenges inherent in their work, the positive nature of their 
descriptions implied positive and significant experiences through their work with this 
client group. However, perhaps other practitioners, who also work with psychosis and 
describe their approach as mainly intersubjective, might be less enthusiastic about 
their work with psychosis and hence are not represented by this project.  
 
 Another significant limitation concerns how much participants’ experiences 
were captured through the medium of language. In an attempt to explore this 
complicated theme, I provide a brief theoretical reflection and then move into the 
particulars of my research experience. Although an interview itself can be 
simplistically described as a linguistic event, I suggest that communication, 
intersubjective and embodiment processes – fundamental parts of the overall 
interview process – cannot be strictly reduced to a behavioural-verbal exchange 
merely mediated by language. Instead, language is a more complicated medium and 
as Gadamer (1960/1996, p.469) has suggested language is “(…) a medium where I 
and the world meet”. When a person is describing her experience through language, 
we cannot therefore consider that the use of language in these terms is 
comprehensively descriptive of her own and other experience. Taking a Heideggerian 
route, I suggest that language is rather a section of that subjective experience. 
Therefore, the manner in which language is used does not limit its utility in 
representing, describing or reflecting an inner or outer world but instead, and 
according to Heidegger (1926/2001), it partly ‘unconceals’ being itself since being 
can never be fully realised, completely revealed or unconcealed.  
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 Taking into consideration these limitations of language, the researcher is 
therefore recommended to turn her attention towards the intersections between the 
body and speech in order to gain better access to participants’ experiences. Merleau-
Ponty’s understanding of ‘parole parlante’ (speaking speech) in The Visibile and the 
Invisible (Merleau-Ponty, 1968) appears pertinent here. In approaching the 
complicated processes of language, he understood and described speech as 
embodying our challenges in attaching meaning to our experiences in the process of 
self-reflexively communicating these experiences to self and others. He therefore 
asserted that body and language are tightly conjoined, which has significant 
implications for interviews that are interested in accessing a person’s lived 
experiences. Regarding my own journey in the research process, I have realised with 
the completion of data analysis that I could have paid more attention to participants’ 
and my own embodiment processes during the interviews. Even though I often invited 
participants to reflect on their felt-sense during their interviews in an effort to 
appreciate their experience more fully, and tried as much as possible to capture their 
non-verbal communications in the analysis of findings, I consider that this attitude 
could have been more fully employed. I sometimes struggled to decipher participants’ 
symbolisations in their descriptions of their experiences and have later thought that 
inviting them to turn towards their embodied situatedness and engagement during the 
interview could have assisted this process. I also consider that this limitation concerns 
IPA as methodology overall since its attention towards the embodied can become 
more comprehensive, despite its commitment to and incorporation of a Merleau-
Pontian philosophy. My experience of IPA as a novice phenomenological researcher 
has therefore demonstrated that the methodology itself could not facilitate a detailed 
enough attendance towards the intersubjective context within which embodied 
communication between participants and myself took place, which is in line with 
criticism that IPA has received in recent years (e.g. Murray & Holmes, 2014). This 
impression was further reinforced by an additional emphasis that was paid towards 
the intersubjective processes between participants and myself, considering that 
interviews took place through videoconferencing and that exploration of embodied 
subjectivity emerging through videoconferencing was considered significant. 
Additionally, perhaps the explorations of embodied subjectivity emerging through 
videoconferencing were not adequately addressed in this study. Despite the good 
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working alliance throughout videoconferencing with participants evident in the 
development of results but also in their feedback during the debriefing process, 
possibly a more thorough and methodical approach towards the exploration of the 
implications in online interviewing could have been addressed. I therefore also 
suggest that IPA researchers should be more sensitive towards the incorporation of 
the focus on participants’ bodily experience (e.g. employing Gendlin’s ‘focusing’ 
method, 1996) since IPA seems to be lacking a more detailed approach towards the 
embodied and the felt-sense. As Murray and Holmes (2014, p.18) suggested in their 
critical appraisal of IPA, “(…) our impression of the IPA literature was that the body 
itself is often absent, or simply presumed to exist behind straightforward 
descriptions”. Therefore, results have only reflected and captured a part of 
participants’ experiences and I accept that the methodology employed could not reach 
the full richness of their experiences. Along these lines, some novel 
phenomenological research has recently been presented which suggests that to attain 
the richness of human experience, researchers should investigate the employment of 
multimodal means of data collection and analysis. Boden and Eatough (2014) in their 
expanded version of hermeneutic-phenomenological research suggest that a 
comprehensive exploration of an experience must also acknowledge and explore its 
sensory features, thus constructing a more accurate description and interpretation of 
the phenomenon under investigation. The researchers’ multimodal approach suggests 
the employment of three dimensions of sense experience: the felt-sense, the aesthetic 
aspects of language and visual imagery. In their exemplary demonstration of their 
multi-modal approach (an emphasis towards metaphors, analogies, imagery and 
employment of drawings) towards the explorations of experiences of guilt, the 
researchers illustrated how concealed fragments of their participant’s experiences 
were encouraged to surface and assisted the elucidation of the guilt-experience in its 
wholeness. Therefore, a similar multimodal approach can be employed in future 
explorations of intersubjective approaches to the psychotherapy of psychosis, 
particularly in an effort to explore more fully therapists’ strong emotional reactions 
towards their clients.    
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6.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
 
The discussion of results and methodological reflections indicate certain areas 
that may merit further investigation in both the fields of CoP and psychotherapy. As 
has been already stressed, there is a dearth of research in the field of CoP on relational 
approaches to psychosis; however this has been partly expected considering the fact 
that since CoP’s establishment as a profession, only a small minority of CoPts has 
been therapeutically involved with this client group. However, the fact that recent 
years have witnessed an increasing number of CoPts working with psychosis points 
towards the expectation of further research attempts to investigate in more detail the 
intersections between CoP and psychosis. More specifically, what has been 
particularly neglected in recent literature and deserves further research are 
phenomenological explorations of therapists’ subjective and intersubjective 
involvement and how these can inform the therapeutic process.   
 
Considering the increasing numbers of CoPts working in medical and 
psychiatric settings, it may be useful to explore CoPts’ views on how their work with 
psychosis is evolving in these settings and how their contributions are perceived 
within their multidisciplinary teams. Additionally, future explorations of CoPts’ 
perceived professional identities would merit further research in an attempt to explore 
possible shifts in their perceptions and related processes, and how these possible shifts 
affect their clinical work. Future research could also investigate what is happening on 
an international level regarding intersubjective approaches on severe distress from a 
CoP perspective and how the profession’s identity is succeeding outside the UK.  
 
This study was exclusively interested in exploring therapists’ experiences of 
therapeutic and intersubjective processes in their work with psychosis. The clients’ 
perspective was not therefore incorporated. A more inclusive approach towards the 
understanding of intersubjective processes could incorporate a synchronous 
exploration of clients’ parallel experiences and hence future studies could concentrate 
on exploring both therapists’ and their clients’ perspectives to allow a deeper 
examination of the impact of an intersubjective approach on the therapeutic praxis. As 
Larkin, Boden and Newton (2015) have suggested, approaching and making sense of 
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service users’, carers’ and professionals’ views is vital in order to joint these groups 
with the scope to “co-design” possible improvements.  
 
Participants who took part in this project are therapists who approach 
psychotic phenomena in comprehensible terms and have strongly differentiated 
themselves from the stereotypical conceptualisation of psychosis as an 
incomprehensible state. This evolving perspective that is based on the significance of 
meaningfulness challenges an assumption of incomprehensibility and points towards 
the possibility for recovery with possible implications for the client’s processing of 
internalised stigma. A great deal of research suggests that people diagnosed with 
psychosis internalise social stigma and experience discrimination caused by their 
diagnosis (e.g. Dickerson, Sommerville, Origoni, Ringel, & Parente, 2002). 
Therefore, future research could focus on the exploration of the intersection between 
intersubjective approaches and the impact these might have on clients’ apprehension 
of stigma by recognising the possible shifts in the range of strategies employed by 
persons diagnosed with psychosis to ward off social stigma.  
 
Considering the powerful impact certain clients’ experiences caused on 
participants and their significant responses towards these, future research could also 
explore in more detail how clients’ particular experiences (e.g. delusional and 
hallucinatory states) impact on the practitioner and how the nature of these impacts 
inform particular therapeutic responses. Considering participants’ expressed cognitive 
and affective transformations when attuning to clients’ emotional states, it is therefore 
suggested that further research could explore in more detail the processes of affect 
exchange based on an intersubjective understanding. Moreover, another important 
aspect that seems to have greatly affected participants’ experiences and merits more 
research concerns the effect of settings. Taking into consideration how participants’ 
experiences of their therapeutic relationships were considered greatly affected by their 
settings, further research could also explore in more detail how particular services and 
settings affect the relational dynamics and therapeutic outcomes.    
 
Lastly, taking into consideration the employment of video-conferencing 
interviews in this project that proved to be an effective mechanism for data 
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generation, some further research can be conducted regarding the effectiveness of the 
employment of videoconference in qualitative research, across diverse research 
participants and topics. It seems that very few studies employ videoconferencing as a 
primary research method, which can serve as an alternative, practical and cost-
effective method to more traditional face-to-face interviews. Research is needed in 
order to shed light on how and when to employ videoconferencing in qualitative 
research by paying attention to particular procedures and considerations and also a 
deeper exploration of the development of rapport and cooperation between 
researchers and participants. Some of the important aspects which seem to have 
positively contributed towards the generation of rich data in the case of this project 
point towards the initiation of pre-interview communications with participants in an 
effort to reduce the sense of relative anonymity and affirm their familiarisation with 
the medium of Skype. Moreover, my sensitivity towards the non-verbal cues and 
embodied expression of participants assisted the development of rapport while it 
provided me with valuable information regarding participants’ experiences during the 
interview, which in turn assisted the analysis of results. I suggest that all these 
dimensions require further investigation especially in cases where participants from a 
more vulnerable position are recruited and will be disclosing difficult experiences.  	
6.6 PERSONAL REFLEXIVITY  
 
 
 At this point, I would like to share some personal reflections that have 
emerged in the process of developing the discussion chapter with the reader. As has 
been already stressed, the consideration of reflexivity has been of vital importance 
throughout this project. However, despite the aforesaid emphasis, I must admit that at 
times I have struggled with how much personal reflexivity I should incorporate in the 
text throughout the different phases of the project. My frequent ambivalence was 
mainly related to the dilemma of how much of my own personal accounts I was ready 
to share without overly biasing the results and also without excessively exposing 
potential personal vulnerabilities. A significant vulnerability which surfaced through 
my engagement with the project relates to the insight of how my professional and 
research interests in psychosis have both been shaped by a personal struggle for 
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connectedness with others and an attempt to overcome isolation, particularly during 
early adulthood. Moreover, having not conducted qualitative research in the past and 
writing from the first person perspective being greatly unfamiliar to me, these 
challenges proved to be more uncomfortable than comfortable, which also contributed 
to my experience of ambivalence. Moreover, reflections on my relationship with the 
project itself brought to the surface the recognition of a common denominator 
between participants’ descriptions of their clients’ experiences, their own therapeutic 
experiences and my experience of relating to the research process, which all seem 
related to the dynamic of oscillating between the need for merging and separation. 
Similar to participants’ experiences of a constant negotiation between proximity and 
distance in their therapeutic relationships, I often became aware of my own 
oscillations between proximity and distance, which manifested in the felt need to keep 
a distance from the data before moving to the next step. Again, similarly to 
participants’ experiences, the distance has proven to be effective in terms of assisting 
my reflective capacities. The intensity of participants’ reflective difficulties that has 
been described as an inescapable phenomenon in their work with psychosis has 
therefore manifested as an inextricable phenomenon in my own process of 
constructing this piece of work at several stages of the research process. I assume that 
the manifestation of these dynamics not only points towards the proposition that these 
parallel processes have resulted because of a common commitment and passion for 
the phenomena under investigation for both myself and participants on a powerful 
platform of mutuality and co-construction of meaning, but also suggest that my 
intersubjectively informed interpretations of participants’ experiences were closely 
related to our quality of relatedness and connectedness. Moreover, it points towards 
the Merleau-Pontean assertion, which Zahavi (2001, p.241) beautifully describes, and 
suggests: “(…) subjectivity is not hermetically sealed up within itself, remote from 
the world and inaccessible to the other. Rather, it is above all a relation to the world, 
and Merleau-Ponty accordingly writes that an openness toward others is secured the 
moment that I define both myself and the other as co-existing relations to the world”.  
  
					 216 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION  		
To my own knowledge, this is the first phenomenological research that has 
been conducted from an E-P CoP perspective that focuses explicitly on practitioners’ 
subjective experiences in their intersubjective work with psychosis. From a 
phenomenological angle, I have attempted to shed light on complicated 
intersubjective dynamics in therapists’ processes of their negotiation of psychotic 
otherness in the therapeutic scenario. The exploration of therapists’ experiences in 
engaging with clients’ otherness demonstrated their emphasis on the intersubjective 
dynamics in the space in-between and showed the deeply affecting nature of their 
therapeutic relationships on self-experience and other-experience. Despite the 
destabilisations and perplexities involved in therapists’ lived experiences in the space 
in-between (disruption of reflective capacities, ruptures in relatedness and intense 
cognitive and affective transformations), their deeply caring attempts to meet clients’ 
otherness with curiosity and respect, have not only emphasised that interaction with 
clients’ otherness involved them in a transformed appreciation of their otherness, but 
also highlighted how clients’ otherness provided them with an opportunity to surprise 
themselves and revisit their sense of self by revealing aspects of themselves of which 
they had previously been unaware. Merleau-Ponty (1962) considered this 
transformative interaction between self and other to be fundamental in his strong 
opposition to the assumption of an absolute dichotomy between self and other. The 
other according to Merleau-Ponty intrudes upon the self not only because 
identification is already assumed but also because the other’s otherness is that which 
has the power to produce change within the self. Despite space restrictions limiting 
further, more detailed, explorations of intersubjective processes, I am convinced that a 
close reading of this thesis could act as a catalyst for further dialogue about the use of 
intersubjective approaches in therapeutic work with psychosis.  
 
In a broader sense, this project suggests that the tight association between the 
other’s otherness and our sense of self are understood as a mutual determination and 
definition of each other, which dismantles the assumption of their in-between barriers  
providing ‘immunity’ and an opening to the ‘irrational’ or ‘psychotic’ subject as the 
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epicentre of the subject of the signifier. In other words, the Otherness becomes the 
mirror of our temporal sense of self, which is embodied in the gaze of the Other as a 
form of identity within us. The results of this project suggested that as therapists we 
must keep our clients’ otherness in sight as the absolute priority of our therapeutic 
endeavours. The essential questions about our clients’ otherness must attach meaning 
in the dialogues we hold with our own selves since our reflections on our relationship 
with the Other manifests our very relationship with our selves.   
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Appendix II: Project’s Advertisment  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
RESEARCH PROJECT: 
VOLUNTEERS NEEDED 
 
RESEARCH CONDUCTED BY ANDREAS VASSILIOU, 
COUNSELLING PSYCHOLOGIST IN TRAINING 
 
 
The research aims at exploring Psychotherapists’ and Counselling Psychologists’ 
experiences of working either in their private practice or in a different context and on a 
one-to-one basis with individuals experiencing psychosis. You must be an English speaking 
qualified Counselling Psychologist (registered with the BPS and HCPC) or Psychotherapist 
(registered with the UKCP) or both. You must also consider the therapeutic treatment of 
individuals that have been diagnosed with psychosis as the relational encounter rather than 
anything else. 
 
It is important to be elucidated that interviews will exclusively take place through Skype by 
employing both a microphone and a camera. 
 
The research project has received full ethical approval by NSPC and Middlesex University ethics 
panel and is supervised by 
Dr Rosemary Lodge (rosemary.lodge@virginmedia.com) &  
Dr Andy Fox (andyp.fox@gmail.com) 
 
 
 
Contact details for participation: andreas.vassiliou.research@gmail.com 
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Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
 
Study Tittle: The I-Thou intersubjective arena of the psychotherapy for psychosis: 
An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis of counselling 
psychologists’ and psychotherapists’ perspectives of working with 
psychosis 
 
 
Being carried out by, 
 
Andreas Vassiliou 
 
 
As a requirement for a Doctorate in Existential Counselling Psychology from NSPC 
and Middlesex University. 
 
 
NSPC Ltd 
258 Belsize Road 
London NW6 4BT and Middlesex University 
          
 
 
Dated:  03/09/2014 
 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide to 
participate, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and 
what it will involve. Please take your time to read the following information carefully, 
and discuss it with others if you wish. Please ask if there is anything that is not clear 
or if you would like more information. Take your time to decide whether or not you 
wish to take part.  
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1. What is the purpose of the research? 
 
This study is being carried out as part of my studies at NSPC Ltd and Middlesex 
University. The proposed research aims to explore psychotherapists’ and counselling 
psychologist’s intersubjective experiences of working therapeutically with individuals 
manifesting psychotic symptomatology. There has been considerable emphasis in 
psychotherapeutic and psychological literature on the distortions of intersubjectivity 
in psychosis and its prodromal states and many mental health professionals view 
within the relational frame of the clinical encounter the manifestation of such 
distortion. However, there has been little conceptual bridge building between 
therapists’ and psychologists’ experiences of self and other when working through a 
dialogical-intersubjective manner with clients diagnosed with psychotic disorders and 
the impact on the therapeutic process. In order to investigate this further we need to 
explore a phenomenological account based on individual meanings attached to 
intersubjectivity as constructed by therapists and psychologists who have had 
experience in working therapeutically on a one-to-one basis, with individuals 
diagnosed within the schizophrenic spectrum. In-depth semi-structured interviews 
will be employed to explore clinicians’ experiences and understanding of 
intersubjective encounters and the meaning they attach to these experiences. The 
interviews will be analysed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). 
You are being asked to participate because you have replied to the relevant 
advertisement to volunteer for this project.  
 
2. What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
You will be interviewed on one occasion and the interview will be conducted through 
Skype on your own convenient date and time. The semi-structured interview will take 
about an hour and the information gathered from the interview will be analysed by the 
employment of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis methodology.  
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3. What will you do with the information that I provide? 
 
I will be recording the interview on a digital recorder, and will transfer the files to an 
encrypted USB stick for storage, deleting the files from the recorder.  All of the 
information that you provide me will be identified only with a project code and stored 
either on the encrypted USB stick, or in a locked filing cabinet.  I will keep the key 
that links your details with the project code in a locked filing cabinet. For the purpose 
of your anonymity protection, your name will not appear on your data sheets/files and 
a coding system will be introduced to identify you, in case this should be necessary. 
In the attached consent form you are informed that in the case you agree to participate 
in this study, excerpts from your data may be published verbatim as anonymous 
example. Moreover, data will be kept stored on a computer with password known 
only to the researcher and you will be allocated a pseudonym of your own choice. The 
information will be kept at least until 6 months after I graduate, and will be treated as 
confidential.  If my research is published, I will make sure that neither your name nor 
other identifying details are used. Data will be stored according to the Data Protection 
Act and the Freedom of Information Act.  
 
4. What are the possible disadvantages of taking part? 
 
During your interview, you will be asked several questions with regards to your 
relational/intersubjective experience of working with clients that have been diagnosed 
within the schizophrenic spectrum. Talking about personal experiences may 
sometimes be distressing for certain participants.  If so, please let me know, and if 
you wish, I will stop the interview. Also, although this is very unlikely, should you 
tell me something that I am required by law to pass on to a third person, I will have to 
do so.  Otherwise whatever you tell me will be confidential.  
 
 
5. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
As it has been mentioned earlier, there has been little conceptual bridge building 
between therapists’ and psychologists’ experiences of self and other when working 
through a dialogical-intersubjective manner with clients diagnosed with psychotic 
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disorders and the impact on the therapeutic process. The benefits of taking part in this 
study might not be direct, but it is possible that it will be beneficial for the 
professionals within counselling and psychotherapy dealing with clients experiencing 
psychosis and therefore for their clients. Moreover, being interviewed about your 
experience as a therapist/psychologist might provide you the opportunity to reflect on 
your clinical practice and professional and ethical stances within the discipline of 
counselling and psychotherapy.  
 
6.  Consent 
 
You will be given a copy of this information sheet for your personal records, and if 
you agree to take part, you will be asked to sign the attached consent form before the 
study begins.  Participation in this research is entirely voluntary.  You do not have to 
take part if you do not want to. If you decide to take part you may withdraw at any 
time without giving a reason. If we decide that we will be using Skype for the 
purposes of conducting the interview then consent form will have to be signed and 
returned to me prior to the interview either via fax, through the post or it can also be 
scanned and sent via e-mail.  
 
7. Technical issues 
 
Since the quality of digital recordings using a separate recorder during Skype 
videoconferencing may not be clear, computer-based recording software will be 
employed which integrates into Skype and records the audio mode. It is important to 
specify that only audio recording will be employed for this study.  
 
8. Pre-interview communication  
 
 
It is considered as vital to arrange a pre-interview online meeting in order to include 
an assessment of the experience and comfort level with the selected technology (i.e. 
Skype). If you do not feel very comfortable with Skype, a time will be arranged when 
we can meet online using the interview technology as part of the preparation.  
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9. Emergency concerns   
 
In the case of having to deal with an unfortunate emergency situation happening to 
you during the interview (e.g. physical injury, accident) I will need to have access to 
emergency resources located near where you are located, such as a significant other or 
the local police department. This necessitates that your full name and surname and 
location are known. It is also significant that you make sure that a significant other is 
informed about the date and time of the interview, but also where you will be located.  
 
 
10. Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
This research is organized by myself in collaboration with my primary and secondary 
research supervisors and it is funded exclusively by myself.  
 
11.  Who has reviewed the study? 
 
All proposals for research using human participants are reviewed by an Ethics 
Committee before they can proceed. The NSPC research ethics sub-committee has 
fully approved this study.  
 
12. Expenses 
 
Since the interviews will be conducted exclusively through Skype, there are no 
specific expenses relating to participants’ recruitment.  
  
 
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet. 
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If you have any further questions, you can contact me at: 
 
 
 
New School of Psychotherapy and Counselling 
254-6 Belsize Road 
London NW6 4BT 
Andreas.vassiliou.research@gmail.com or vassiliou.andreas1@gmail.com  
 
If you any concerns about the conduct of the study, you may contact my primary 
supervisor: 
 
Dr Rosemary Lodge 
New School of Psychotherapy and Counselling 
254-6 Belsize Road 
London NW6 4BT 
rosemary@nspc.org.uk 
 
Or 
 
The Principal 
NSPC  Ltd. 254-6 Belsize Road 
London NW6 4BT 
Admin@nspc.org.uk 
0044 (0) 20 7624 047 
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
 
 
 
The following information will be used for qualitative purposes (i.e. to indicate the quality and 
level of this study). All information will be treated confidentially. Nevertheless, if you don’t 
want to answer some of these questions, please feel free not to.  
 
  
1. Are you (please tick the appropriate answer)  
     
    Male __   Female __  
 
 
2. How old are you?   [      ] years  
 
 
3. How would you describe your ethnic origins? (Please tick the appropriate category)  
  
(a) White 
* British     __ 
* Irish     __ 
* Any other White background _________________________________________ 
 
(b) Mixed 
* White and Black Caribbean  __ 
* White and Black African  __ 
* White and Asian   __ 
* Any other mixed background_________________________________________ 
 
(c) Asian or Asian British 
* Indian     __ 
* Pakistani    __ 
* Bangladeshi    __ 
* Any other Asian background ___________________________________________ 
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(d) Black or Black British 
* Caribbean    __ 
* African    __ 
* Any other Black background  ___________________________________________ 
 
(e)Chinese or Other Ethnic Group 
* Chinese    __ 
* Other Ethnic Group ___________________________________________________ 
 
 
6. Are you (please circle) 
Counselling Psychologist,  Psychotherapist,  Both 
 
 
7. Years of clinical practice post qualification? 
 
___________________________________________________ 
 
 
8. How would you describe your therapeutic orientation (Please Circle) 
 
Integrative      Pluralistic      Psychodynamic     Psychoanalytic      Person Centred    
Cognitive Behavioural       Existential  
 
Other (please specify) _____________________________________________ 
 
 
9.  In what particular setting have you worked with this client group and for how long? 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix V: Informed Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Middlesex University School of Health and Social Sciences 
Psychology Department 
Written Informed Consent 
 
Title of study:   The I-Thou intersubjective arena of the psychotherapy for psychosis: 
An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis of counselling 
psychologists’ and psychotherapists’ perspectives of working with 
psychosis 
 
Academic year:  2013-2014 
Researcher:        Andreas Vassiliou  
 
Supervisor:         Dr Rosemary Lodge  
 
 
I have understood the details of the research as explained to me by the researcher, and 
confirm that I have consented to act as a participant.   
 
I have been given contact details for the researcher in the information sheet. 
 
I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary, the data collected during the 
research will not be identifiable, and I have the right to withdraw from the project at 
any time without any obligation to explain my reasons for doing so. 
 
I understand that the interview will be audio-recorded solely for the purposes of the 
research study as described in the Participant Information Sheet. 
 
I further understand that the data I provide may be used for analysis and subsequent 
publication, and provide my consent that this might occur. 
 
 
__________________________   ___________________________ 
                Print name           Sign Name 
Date: _________________________ 
 
To the participants: Data may be inspected by the Chair of the Psychology Ethics panel and the Chair 
of the School of Social Sciences Ethics committee of Middlesex University, if required by institutional 
audits about the correctness of procedures. Although this would happen in strict confidentiality, please 
tick here if you do not wish your data to be included in audits: ___________ 
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Debriefing Form 
 
 
For the Study entitled: 
 
 
“The I-Thou intersubjective arena of the psychotherapy for psychosis: An 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis of counselling psychologists’ and 
psychotherapists’ perspectives of working with psychosis” 
 
 
Dear participant, 
 
We would like to thank you for taking the time to participate in this research project.  
If you have any concerns about your participation or the data you provided in light of 
this disclosure, please don’t hesitate to discuss this with us. We will be happy to 
provide any information we can to help answer questions you have about this study.  
If your concerns are such that you would now like to have your data withdrawn, we 
will do so. Moreover, if you feel distressed for any reason because of your 
participation we will be able to offer a second meeting to discuss any issues and 
concerns that came up for you.   
 
For any questions and concerns about your participation in the study, please contact 
me at: 
 
Andreas Vassiliou 
New School of Psychotherapy and Counselling 
258 Belsize Road 
London  
NW6 4BT 
andreas.vassiliou.research@gmail.com or vassiliou.andreas1@gmail.com  
 
Or my primary research supervisor at:  
 
Dr Rosemary Lodge 
New School of Psychotherapy and Counselling 
258 Belsize Road 
London  
NW6 4BT 
rosemary@nspc.org.uk  
 
Please again accept our appreciation for your participation in this study. 
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Appendix VIII: Paula’s original transcript  	
TRANSCRIPT NOTATIONS  	
(P):                  Significant pause  
(p):                  Brief pause 
....:                  Real name (person, organization, setting, etc.) omitted to safeguard 
anonymity 
__:                  Information omitted to safeguard confidentiality  
 
ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT 
 
 
 
R1: Hi ___________ nice to see you here. Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in my research.  
 
P1: Thank you. It’s my pleasure. Hold on fixing the camera. Small complications but I should be fixing that in seconds.  
 
R2: Take your time.  
 
P2: Right all set now.  
 
R3: Well obviously because English is not my mother tongue, if you find difficulties in understanding what I’m saying or if I’m not clear, 
just ask me back.  
 
P3: That’s fine  
 
R4: Right, I’ve received your background information sheet. Sorry for sending it last minute, I forgot it.  So…one of the things you didn’t 
complete was your orientation.  
 
P4: Oh. I must have missed that. Well I guess primarily I see myself as an integrative therapist.  I use some CBT; I particularly like some 
narrative therapy ideas, certainly with the sort of client group that I work with its mostly integrative really.  
 
R5: OK 
 
P5: Yeah  
 
R6: Well. As you’ve read in the information sheet I am interested in exploring how therapists or counselling psychologists work with 
psychosis from a relational and intersubjective vantage point. Just to start, what has actually interested you in my research topic?  
 
P6: Emm, I guess that I don’t know many counselling psychologists that specialize in working with psychosis or trained to take that as a 
speciality so I think that some of the skills that we have are a strength really in working with the group of people I work with because we 
are able to engage people well. We have a lot of skills of just being present for clients that I think enable you to sustain a relationship when 
it’s very difficult. So I’ve always felt like that, and yeah but I don’t see many counselling psychologists do what I do. So I suppose I wanted 
to support, more of the interest of that in terms of the research as well really.   
 
R7: OK. So from your own clinical experience what is your understanding of psychosis, I mean both conceptually and in terms of the 
clinical presentation of the clients?  
 
P7: I guess I describe it as a sort of breaking down of stories of experiences in some ways, disintegration of somebody’s thoughts, sense of 
identity but also the being, as someone having lost touch with reality in that process as well. Yes, if that’s a simple explanation for such a 
complex thing. Yeah, I think that’s how I see it.  
 
R8: You said disintegration.  What do you mean by that?  
 
P8: Emm, an inability to make meaning. From, possibly from, through past experiences, or through, perhaps there has been trauma. Emm, 
in that a person is unable to sort of confront on an emotional level but also cognitively make sense of those experiences. There is too much 
for them to cope with, in a sort of, emm, reality based way. And sometimes that meaning becomes more apparent for someone with 
psychosis. 
 
R9: Ok. And what about the sense of identity you have mentioned? What happens there? How do you see that?  
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P9: Emm, I guess there is a very disrupted sense of self. Sense of identity really that people are lacking, a coherent story about themselves, 
who they are, apart from those experiences.  And often is very hard to get to that in working with people. Often is something that, you know 
its genuinely really working when the client it’s on their first interview and you are thinking about what, well when I start to see somebody 
who are recognizing who they are as a person it probably means that we’ve gone quite a long way when that really happens.  
 
R10: In what way? 
 
P10: [p] I suppose is about them being present with themselves and their own potential for growth, to take care of themselves, to be 
responsible for themselves, and not to sort of being stuck [p] in a sort of psychotic process whether that’s about fantasy or denial about 
experiences however way that psychosis might function for someone. You know, it can function in different ways for people. Perhaps in 
terms of how it has come about and I don’t know if I can always work that out. I am not sure if that answers your question?   
 
R11: So you see from what I’m hearing from your own clinical experience psychosis manifesting in different ways in different clients.  Is 
that what you said?  
 
P11: Yeah. Yeah very much so.  I guess I am trying to think through different cases in terms of how I can understand how someone’s 
psychosis has developed like. For some people substance misuse it’s a huge element, some people it seems clear that there is a more 
biological connection, other people there is much clearer link to child trauma and neglect, but it’s easy from my perspective often easier 
than it is for me than for them to understand how it has been difficult for them to sort of developing a cognitive map of the world really and 
how to make sense of it. [P].  
 
R12: And are there any other prominent clinical manifestations or symptoms that you have in mind in reference to the clients that you have 
in mind that are common?  
 
P12: Certainly the way that I see that are not being able to construct meaning out of the psychosis experiences, so explicitly on psychosis 
but also of their sense of self or past experiences that they may had and not sort of linking back together again. And perhaps in some cases 
that being quite functional perhaps about not being able to face past trauma and to cope with this sort of affective experience of confronting 
that, but in other cases it perhaps be more about just a simple break down of the ability to make sense of things that might be more 
biologically drives rather than psychologically. But I guess there is an inability to construct a coherent story that they stick to that, make 
sense of and hold on to and move forward in life.  
 
R13: Hmm. As you have mentioned you have a more relational way of working with these clients. What does it mean for you to work 
relationally with this client group?  
 
P13: I guess is about attachment experiences, I guess I’m always very mindful that for the most part the clients I work with had difficult 
childhood experiences, breaking attachments that maybe played out in the relationship that they have with me in some way and that’s, 
emm, also not always able to emm for instance work with someone in a cognitive behavioural therapy way might find my approach 
threatening, they might be not able to challenge their experiences. I am able to offer them a different type of relationship and I see that as 
having some value really. It’s often not about recovery or change in the same way as I see it with other client groups. Sometime is about 
being there for the client being able to offer a different sort of relationship that they can learn from. I think sometimes there might be an 
unrealistic expectation that this might be internalized in that they can sort of move forward from their past difficulties and to develop you 
know, self-care and compassion towards themselves but I see that it helps in a kind of a supportive way which enables them to deal with 
things in the here and now and to help them deal with some aspects of psychosis rather than to battle with it.  
 
R14: So how, what does it mean for you to work relationally from the experiential standpoint? Regarding your clinical interventions?  
 
P14: OK. I guess it’s about, I suppose relationship. Emm it’s probably about me sort of [P]. I think I am very aware about judgment from 
other people and the level of that effect that they have to cope with and sort of manage that in the room with them.  
 
R15: Manage it how, in what ways?  
 
P15: Actually coming back to think about attachments. Sometimes the client has too much and sometimes once we start making some 
insights and the attachment gets too strong the clients would tend to back off more, avoiding me and me noticing that. With another client 
group I might be more challenging in terms of working with that, with this client group I might be more aware of it and allow it to happen 
to some degree by trying to hold something about, about them and what that tells me about  
formulation and understanding something about their difficulties, their past that often with some people we might be doing some guess 
work together whether there was some past trauma there or that it might not be disclosed.   
 
R16: You have mentioned a couple of times attachment. It seems like it echoes the relational thing for you. The relational way you work. I 
am wondering whether you can recall any particular examples working with a client that attachment, as you understand it became so much 
that it didn’t allow you to work relationally.  
 
P16: Yeah. There are a lot of examples there is it? [p] 
 
R17: Well if you try to focus on one so that we can explore that. 
 
P17: Yes, I can think of a male client that I work with in his thirties. Very long history of psychosis and a lot of risk issues as well being in 
secure services. Loads of self-harm, command hallucinations that would command him to harm himself and spend most of his life in secure 
settings. And his engagement with…I work within an assertive outreach team, his engagement with that team it’s extremely guarded and 
they have no, I had very limited information about his experience of command hallucinations so he was very resistant to engage with 
psychology. But I actually very quickly formed a relationship with him in terms of thinking about...he was actually experiencing 
relationship problems at the time, in relation to erm cause of anger difficulties, so I was acknowledging kind of forced control and anger 
problems so he became guarded about psychotic experiences that might have been quite a fact so he was sort of saying that this is also 
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connected to some problems that I had from long ago that I don’t want to talk about. So then actually a huge history of neglect in childhood 
but he was able to form an attachment and to start to trust me and start working on all of those things. But it felt that it was a huge thing for 
him to start to open up all of those details so he would...he back off and then he would engage and my team allows the possibility for that, 
than I am there available. I mean in the team we hold a caseload of 100 clients that would disengage and engage again. So he disengaged 
and said he didn’t want to work anymore but then he wanted to come back in and wanted to reengage with psychology. And it was I guess 
this was something that we talked not only with me but with the team as well and how he related to the team generally, that he would 
engage and form relationships and to open up about his experiences and then he pulled back. So it’s about sort of noticing that with him but 
also allow it in a way rather that pushing him and challenging to the degree that he needs to engage, that he has to think of that and that 
enables him to continue to work with me really. And I suppose I sometimes see working in that context, within that team I am constantly 
involved in some way, I am still present for some of the clients within my team where I am not necessarily seeing them for weekly therapy 
sessions or I am still holding them in mind. Enabling them to able to make use of their own defences and to help them reflect on them when 
the time is right to do that.  
 
R18: What kind of defences do you mean? If you are thinking of that particular client?   
 
P18: Yeah, emm for that example denial, projection, rationalization, yeah splitting. For others there are all sorts like fantasy, not so much 
for that client but. Yeah.  
 
R19: So let’s see all of these because they sound important. So denial, in what way? Denying what?  
 
P19: [P] Denial of…probably reality. Erm and I guess denial in relation to past experiences where they have been significant really.  
 
R20: What about the fantasy part? What kinds of fantasies emerge?  
 
P20: So I wouldn’t say so relevant about that particular case. Certainly for others. Fantasy I see it as providing another way to be, to have a 
sense of being in the world, to have relationships, and often the fantasy is about relationships really. Or. Identity. And particularly with a 
very complex client I am involved in working with now who I see her as having, and with a lot of other clients, having some personality 
difficulties as well as psychosis and she often, there were times when she was destabilized by environmental stimulus and stress triggers 
and things and she often behaves as she is a child. She is very dissociative and the rest of the team would see her as playing games, as being 
a child. So, playing with imaginary friends.  
 
R21: During sessions you mean?  
 
P21: I am talking about the team generally but she is better able to engage with me. She forms all this formulas, she has the idea that she 
can create formulas and that God passes these formulas to her for medicines and that will enable her to cure diseases for people and often 
gets frustrated because it’s not possible for her to make this formula for herself to cure her disorder. So that sort of fantasy gives her a 
purpose, something quite meaningful and important and actually her life has been empty in many ways. She has suffered severe neglect and 
some degree of abuse although that’s not clear, so it’s not so clear to work with but loads of attachments difficulties in relationships, family 
relationships that had broken down, she hasn’t been able to maintain a job, so this fantasy is extremely valuable really.  
 
R22: OK. This sounds important. I am wondering how do you work relationally with her with regards to the fantasy.  
 
P22: Sure. So at times I acknowledge it in sort of noticing, I guess reflecting when is there and when is not there. Sometimes is not there at 
all and so we are able to have very grounded discussions about problems in her life. Other times is really difficult, but sometimes is easy to 
reflect upon why it would come about at certain times. Or the fact that is real for her.  
 
R23: So when is real for her, because you mentioned earlier about having a grounded conversation when talking about present 
relationships, so when for example this particular client goes on to talk about relationships that happen in her fantasy how does the 
relational way you work with her plays out?  
 
P23: [P] She will often call people silly names. There are times when she would say, oh I have seen you earlier today, and I have already 
had a conversation with you. I spoke with the invisible you. Or there was a time when she called me the pixie lady for about a year. I guess, 
I think this is a very difficult case and sometimes it’s almost impossible to reflect upon these things. I think there is a fine line for this 
particular lady between personality difficulties and psychosis. And, there are times when there is clear psychosis and other times a 
borderline personality disorder element in terms of her seeking care. But certainly there is [P] I think there are different ways in which she 
will be using this fantasy in that relationship and how she understands my role and my own involvement with that. So she might be 
defending not to get close and also [P] how she sees and makes sense of me.  
 
R24: So how are you finding yourself relating to her fantasies? For example you’ve mentioned earlier that she would tell you she had a 
conversation with the invisible you, or I can’t remember how you actually said it. How are you finding yourself relating to that?  
 
P24: Erm I think it’s been very difficult actually. It’s being quite a long time now. Initially I would feel quite uncomfortable with that I 
think. And I’d find it much more difficult to be present and I would be probably more keen to reflect on my need to pull back from the work 
and [p] I would be questioning whether there is any value of me being there. I mean whether my presence increases distress rather than help 
and I’ll be struggling with my confidence regarding the interventions. At times I think I’ve been more able to stick with it and acknowledge 
actually that this person sort of needs this fantasy and it’s not necessarily my job to have to deny it. 
 
R25: So you are saying that at times when she talks about the fantasy you’re questioning your presence, you are questioning your 
interventions and you wonder whether you’re helpful towards her. 
 
P25: Yes. So I’ll be wondering whether I should be working with this person. Or would it be a better place somewhere else. I’ll be 
frustrated with her perhaps.  
 
R26: Frustrated with her? Tell me more.  
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P26: [P]  
 
R27: What is frustrating?  
 
P27: Not being able to relate [p]. And not being able to make sense of her really.  I mean, I have a formulation, but there is too much there 
to make sense of. There is too much discontinuity and it’s impossible to put the links back again and that she has a coherent sense of self or 
how I would like her to have.   
 
R28: Ok. So when you are finding yourself getting frustrated, how does your frustration or any other difficult feelings you have, affect the 
therapeutic relationship if at all?  
 
P28: Erm [P]. I think it makes me back off a bit. Probably, erm even to a degree, it might sound extreme but sort of dissociate a little bit. I 
guess I see myself from as her. Finding it very difficult to make sense of what I am sort of seeing. I guess I feel something’s thrown at me.   
 
R29: And you say you’re dissociating.  
 
P29: Well that’s an extreme term isn’t it? I’m not that present with her. Because that’s too much. And that’s what exactly is for her. But I 
think it’s very difficult to find the space to make sense of that.  
 
R30: OK. So in that situation, in that process of trying to make sense and becoming frustrated what else happens in the process to reach the 
narrative, to reach the client?  
 
P30: In terms of the relationship process on its own or in terms of my interventions?  
 
R31: I think both sounds important.  
 
P31: Well sometimes there is a natural disengagement. At times there’s been an admission to the hospital. [p]. I think I’ve been aware for 
this person that I have been discussing in supervision recently that erm we have constructed a plan together that we will reduce the 
frequency of our sessions and I found myself reflecting back if it was the right thing to do really or if I was getting pulled in sort of 
abandoning her in some way, or rejecting her or avoiding her. Because you see, what was difficult for me was needing to have an 
intervention really needing to do something in our meeting so that it would be valuable for the NHS. So working with evidence in a way, 
and having confidence about that. So there is a need to force something, to do, do to her, to feel that therapy is more constructive. And 
doing the sense making when she is allowing the sense making really.  
 
R32: You have mentioned a couple of times the disengagement from your side. And I’m wondering how you handle the emotions of 
disengagement when you are with the client.  
 
P32: Are you talking about the disengagement in the room? 
 
R33: Yes, in the room with the client.  
 
P33: Well it’s difficult really. I mean for the most part, I tend to think of my role in the NHS really and it can just be totally confusing. 
Exhausting. I recently receive more of psychodynamic supervision because I have been supervised for a long time from a CBT perspective 
and not from long-term psychotherapy approach supervision but that’s their main approach and I’ve realised that this didn’t allow me to 
reflect on this and other things [P].  
 
R34: So what other kind of emotions emerge for you when you are disengaged from the client?  
 
P34: Boredom sometimes, frustration, confusion, anxiety. I think that’s the main menu really.  
 
R35: What is the anxiety about?  
 
P35: So, where is this going? And to control it in some way to keep this person safe and whether that’s possible. Whether we can sort of, I 
guess something about things being manageable and not putting things in the way that might be unhelpful. I am feeling quite responsible for 
that really.  
  
R36: Unhelpful for whom? 
 
P36: Unhelpful for the client.  
 
R37: Can you think of an example? That sounds very interesting. What can be unhelpful for the client?  
 
P37: I guess it’s coming back to the fantasy stuff for me actually. Look at it from a more reality based way trying to think about how it 
functions facing it, the reality of this is a person that hasn’t been able to sustain a relationship, and desperate to have children, and substance 
misuse, and seems unlikely to achieve those things.  And there is a huge you know, erm human beings, the majority take this for granted 
really. Not easy to accept. And by actually being the person that finds the smallest thing difficult to cope with and I guess there is a very 
fine balance to be able to sort of see these kinds of things and be able to see some meaning and make sense of it, but that too much leading 
to all sorts of disintegration really.  
 
R38: And talking about meaning how are you finding yourself making meaning or not of their inability to engage pragmatically and on 
realistic grounds?  
 
P38: It would come up in the process. Noticing patterns, the here and now statements, and what happens between us. So for example I’ve 
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noticed that we get pulled in a fantasy, the formulas again. You are sharing with me all those formulas but I’m wondering whether we can 
reflect on them instead of how they have come about and sometimes we are moving towards me been drown into being in this fantasy, 
being given a formula and being asked if I can take it on and being able to say ‘what just happened there, the dynamics have changed’ and 
then we are talking about something that happened yesterday.  
 
R39: So you are mentioning some challenging issues that are brought up in the sessions. I’m wondering and thinking towards the other 
spectrum in thinking about the particular client or other clients that you’ve talked about, moments where you’ve felt connectivity and 
proximity with them. If you can describe these moment, how they happen, when they happen, if the happen?   
 
P39: You mean moments where I felt more connected with them? Erm [P]. You know thinking about it I have a great influence over, but 
often is also erm [p] sometimes with humour, or sometimes it can actually come out of the discussions with them, it comes out of the more 
human relationship, rather than me trying to employ a diary for them if I am using a CBT intervention. And I guess that brings me back to 
the difference between being and doing and being aware of that. And being-with allows forming the relationship but with this client group 
that comes with its challenges because often many difficulties arise in the relationship.  
 
R40: And how would you describe yourself in a being-with mode with a client?   
 
P40: [p] I guess I am more present emotionally in terms of acknowledging the whole person, not just the psychosis so we might not be 
talking about that. With that I am more present within myself, I bring more of myself to that.  
 
R41: So you are more in touch with yourself. 
 
P41: Yeah. Yeah. Much more.  
 
R42: And how would you describe the relationship between you and the client when you are in that state of being-with with them? How 
would you describe it?   
 
P42: Much more real. Less of a battle. I guess there is less of a battle for meaning really. I suppose is the difference there between trying to 
sort of either dissect or change meaning from a sort of CBT perspective. Working with beliefs or questioning delusions or whatever might 
be. To just being-with, hearing how they make sense, how the client makes sense of things. But often I think if someone’s not ready to 
question or to change meaning they would have got it out in the first place. But again if they might be questioning meaning then this brings 
us more back to the relationship. So being present there and observing it. And this allows them to be present, I see that they feel not judged 
and more accepted and feel warmth in the relationship. Humanistic staff.    
 
R43: How are you experiencing the warmth you are talking about? What is it like for you?  
 
P43: [P] I guess it comes up with just the acceptance of things. Much more existential level really. You know really difficult things happen 
in life and I suppose with that probably my awareness that difficult things happen in my life as well and how do I deal with that. And about 
being more grounded in that and I think the warmth is also from the position of the awareness of myself and from my own experiences of 
[P] if that makes sense really.  
 
R44: And how do you feel talking about it now? 
 
P44: It’s interesting. Emm, but I guess it feels risky in the work.   
 
R45: Risky in what way?  
 
P45: [P] I guess those things cannot necessarily be fixed, acknowledging that. Erm... that actually you’re to meet somebody’s life in a very 
significant way that it’s quite a big responsibility really. Especially when you might not be able to do much about it. Erm, other than to be 
there in some cases I think. Not all. I guess it’s an entering into a certain amount of madness really. And that’s often a challenge depending 
on all sorts of settings that you’re working in, but you often go back to an environment that it hasn’t got much of a capacity to see life on a 
continuum and acknowledge our own madness. I think being with someone often means acceptance of some of those beliefs you 
know…people have beliefs that are unusual and unproven and superstitions and myths that they hold on to and they are not pulled in these. 
And in the rest of my working life I am not religious as a person necessarily, or these huge amounts of customs and actually as a person I 
sort of resist to that but in my client work I accept it and see that it has value for people but it forces me really to question my own beliefs. 
If I’m truly present with someone it challenges me.  
 
R46: So, when you are in the mode of being-with the client and you feel the warmth you were describing earlier it seems that you are not 
only engaged with the other, with the client, but you are also engaged with yourself.  
 
P46: Yeah. 
 
R47: You also mentioned earlier about the settings, how the setting affects the way you work. I am wondering how you think the settings 
affect your work with this client group.  
 
P47: I mean there are loads and loads of ways. But I guess the main thing that came to my mind really was being in a team where I am the 
only psychologist. And, they are quickly not valuing the difference in beliefs and form a certain attitude about a client. So I’ll be quickly 
faced with a lot of judgements and appraisals about…someone being controlling, playing games, a lot, and a huge level of anxiety and 
chaos around whether this person has a psychosis or not. There are times when it is clear that there is psychosis but other times there 
appears to me that something else is happening. And a certain expectation about what a team should be able to achieve. And how things are 
making sense. I think I take this as part of my job really. How they are making sense of that and sort of being able to make sense about the 
team dynamics as well. But sometimes coming to a busy day to see a client that is that complex you are already not really present to 
yourself. And that has a direct influence on the work really. You can find yourself being pulled into other people’s attitudes and ideas about 
what’s happening. The third person being in the room in a way, the psychiatrist, the nurse, the social worker etc.  
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R48: And that has the potential to affect the therapeutic relationship. Are there any other ways that the therapeutic relationship can be 
affected by these external influences?  
 
P48: I mean the boundaries issues are big, especially in my team as compared to a CMHT setting or an individual therapy setting where 
you can manage that. You know to a degree. For example if a client of mine contacts the service, the person that answers the phone might 
respond in a different way that I would. Recently for example I had a client who contacted the team and mentioned that they had a physical 
health problem on their grown and the admin staff said why don’t you show _______ when you see her. And that’s how the session started. 
So different contacts with different people introduce very different boundaries. There is a constant renegotiation about all of that.  
 
R49: And you also mentioned earlier something about the NHS expectations which is more to the side of doing things and be productive. 
And you described earlier how that affects your own expectations and how you relate to the client. And that sounded important for you. Can 
you say more about that?  
 
P49: Oh yeah. Yeah. Well I am at a setting where is primarily nurse laid; psychiatric nurses and they have a certain attitude, which is very 
pragmatic. Focused upon you know, skills, solutions, fixing things, and that’s very strong. Often there is a sort of gaze on you, what are you 
doing, what are you contributing to working with this client or there is a perception that If I was to talk about being with somebody I get 
laughed at the team at times. And it’s quite hard to fight for that. I think alongside pressures, lack of recourses and pushing towards certain 
pathways and the pressure when there is no improvement from these clients that we might get paid less if we continue to work with them. 
You know, that is our job to move their mind and if not they will start not paying us or having less resources for these people that are really 
complex and in some cases you can’t expect to get huge results.  
 
R50: So it seems that the gaze of the settings is limiting your work and it’s pressurizing you.  
 
P50: Yeah. Yeah.  
 
R51: I was thinking of asking you, given the relational emphasis of the therapeutic work that you talked about, how you use, if at all, the 
space-in-between you and the client?  
 
P51: In the room [P] I suppose different levels of silence. I guess it makes me think about that kind of attaching and moving away to a 
degree. I think there is a way in which I support that in terms of how I ground people and at the end of sessions and focusing on something 
that is reality based and more real. But I am detaching a bit in that, in sort of ending the encounter.  
 
R52: Sorry, so you feel that you are detaching yourself by trying to ground in the here and now?  
 
P52: I suppose my thought was about ending the session and that person is not necessarily going to have that sort of relational depth with 
me. There is something about ending it and moving into some more superficial topics really and that thing about having that person sort of 
getting some of their defences back and to be grounded but not exposed.  
 
R53: Exposed?  
 
P53: I suppose what I mean by that is being in touch with some of the difficult feelings that might been felt in one session and about trying 
to contain that.  
 
R54: You mean difficult feelings for you or the client? Or both? 
 
P54: Both. Yeah.  
 
R55: And where do you think, if at all, difficult feelings of yours and the client’s meet? Do they meet?  
 
P55: Yes, occasionally.  
 
R56: Describe me this meeting.  
 
P56: I guess there are moments of reflection and challenge and quite recently I had a quite significant reflection with somebody about them 
acknowledging how they had a fantasy that I could look after him. And that was sort of a replacement for someone they worked in the past 
with whom they had a good relationship with and then he experienced the loss, and then that I am not always going to be here and I can’t 
actually do that. That as much as other people have let you down and rejected you I will too. And to be able to sort of sit with that.  
 
R57: And thinking about how you are impacted on any kind of level while working with this clients, I’m wondering how during sessions 
and if you are impacted on a physical level, on an embodied level.  
 
P57: I guess to a certain degree you know, in thinking about feeling anxious at times or feeling that embodied aspect to that, or feeling 
lethargic and exhausted, tired.  
 
R58: And how does it feel in your body if you can recall, on moments like the previous ones you described earlier when you disengage and 
you feel quite frustrated. How does it feel in your body?  
 
P58: Tensed. A feeling of something knocking on my head, restlessness, agitated. 
 
R59: And what happens after a session finishes? Is there anything particular that you feel or is there any particular way you are impacted? 
How does it feel? 
 
P59: [P] I guess it all feels like leaving one world and going back to another one. Another one which is actually the setting in which not 
					 267 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
everybody can understand. Sort of having to re-orientate yourself. And often to make some space for yourself. Particularly with clients that 
appear disrupted in terms of their thoughts, sometimes it’s quite difficult to just go from the one to the next. You need a little bit of time to 
make sense of all that.  
 
R60: So you are describing a transition from one world to the other, from the session that ended towards the setting, which sounds like a 
challenging transition.  
 
P60: I guess it’s about moving from being to doing.  
 
R61: OK. We are approaching the end. Is there anything you would like to add which is of personal importance to you when you are 
working with this client group? Any insights?  
 
P61: I think what was interesting as I was reflecting on, was probably the different modalities that I might use. And making sense of that 
from the relational or the psychodynamic approach and I think sometimes when I start looking for tools and they might inevitably be CBT 
related tools, because CBT has a lot of tools, more of the doing interventions I wonder if that relates to a, I guess it’s another way for me to 
sort of structure myself and make sense of what’s happening but also possibly sometimes another detachment from the being-with. And I 
guess that’s quite interesting if we are reflecting on it in that way. Often it seems very natural and perhaps it’s a useful thing to do and bring 
some of that to my work. But I think it’s also helpful to reflect on it really.  
 
R62: So while you were describing it, I had a picture in my mind, you the client and the tools. So you mentioned before that your 
engagement with the tools might be expressing your disengagement with the client. Is that what you said?  
 
P62: Yeah. [P]  
 
R63: OK. What purposes do the tools serve for you?    
 
P63: They also help me to keep being there. And I was thinking it in with regards to their own defences. They need their defences and I 
need mine. And sometimes this enable me to, helps me to understand something to make sense of what my role is, in being in the room with 
them. And it allows me to think of formulation when it comes to this client group because I don’t think I could confidently say that my 
clients that present with a sort of residual psychosis that I have a formulation about and understanding that I am 100% right. I think 
sometimes these tools, these formulations help me to be able to make sense of the case and to take some meaning from it all. And to sort of 
be there and have some kind of relationship.   
 
R64: So it’s a matter of professional confidence and at the same time managing your own anxiety in dealing with the disengagement from 
the client as well.   
 
P64: Yes.  
 
R65: Anything else that comes up? Anything prominent in you at the moment?   
 
P65: No, I don’t think so.  
 
R66: Thank you very much Paula for taking part in this. Well let me switch off the recorder so that we can debrief.  
 
P66: OK. Thank you 
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Appendix IX: IPA full transcript analysis for Paula   
 
Emergent 
Themes 
 
 
Exploratory  
Comments 
 
 
Original Transcript 
 
 
 
Descriptive 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The suitability of 
counselling 
psychology in working 
with psychosis  
 
Certain skills are 
important in  working 
with psychosis  
 
The complex 
conceptualization of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counselling psychology enables 
therapeutic work with psychosis: 
1) focusing on being present, 2) 
sustaining the relationship, 3) 
engaging clients well.  
A sense of feeling lonely in doing 
this work? Or a sense of being 
special?  
 
Specialize / specialty. Again – 
identify herself / skills as special? 
 
R1: Hi ___________ nice to see you here. Thank 
you very much for taking the time to participate 
in my research.  
 
 
P1: Thank you. It’s my pleasure. Hold on fixing 
the camera. Small complications but I should be 
fixing that in seconds.  
 
R2: Take your time.  
 
P2: Right all set now.  
 
R3: Well obviously because English is not my 
mother tongue, if you find difficulties in 
understanding what I’m saying or if I’m not 
clear, just ask me back.  
 
P3: That’s fine  
 
R4: Right, I’ve received your background 
information sheet. Sorry for sending it last 
minute, I forgot it.  So…one of the things you 
didn’t complete was your orientation.  
 
 
P4: Oh. I must have missed that. Well I guess 
primarily I see myself as an integrative therapist.  
I use some CBT; I particularly like some 
narrative therapy ideas, certainly with the sort of 
client group that I work with its mostly 
integrative really.  
 
R5: OK 
 
P5: Yeah  
 
R6: Well. As you’ve read in the information 
sheet I am interested in exploring how therapists 
or counselling psychologists work with psychosis 
from a relational and intersubjective vantage 
point. Just to start, what has actually interested 
you in my research topic?  
 
P6: Emm, I guess that I don’t know many 
counselling psychologists that specialize in 
working with psychosis or trained to take that as 
a speciality so I think that some of the skills that 
we have are a strength really in working with the 
group of people I work with because we are able 
to engage people well. We have a lot of skills of 
just being present for clients that I think enable 
you to sustain a relationship when it’s very 
difficult. So I’ve always felt like that, and yeah 
but I don’t see many counselling psychologists 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Identifying herself as an 
integrative therapist with 
specific reference to CBT 
and narrative therapy. 
Specifying that with the 
particular client group to be 
investigated, she employs an 
integrative approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not many counselling 
psychologists from her own 
experience work with 
psychosis or get trained or 
specialize in this field. She 
perceives counselling 
psychologists having certain 
skills, which are considered 
a strength in working with 
this group of clients 
(engaging people well, being 
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psychosis  
 
Psychosis and 
alterations in 
someone’s identity 
and being  
 
Psychosis and 
disintegration of 
meaning  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Affective and 
cognitive flow of 
experience disrupted  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key component? 
 
Recognition of the phenomenon 
of ‘skill’ and ‘strength’ – these 
seem to be important concept for 
her at this point. These skills 
identified here are some form of 
strength? 
 
Focus on relationships and 
engagement. Key skills? Key 
strengths? Interesting to see what 
others in sample say (if they 
identify same). Good precursor / 
orientation to intersubjectivity 
(relationship and engagement 
being a component of 
intersubjectivity) 
 
Always felt like this. BUT not 
many people do what she does. 
Identification of her skills as 
different? Special? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is emphasis on a person’s 
being and identity by focusing 
both the affective and the 
cognitive elements  
 
Ontological insecurity? 
 
Breaking down of stories 
(narrative)? Implication that 
stories hold experience together 
in coherence? Thoughts and 
identity are also linked through to 
stories.  
 
The ‘but’ suggests that losing 
touch with reality is viewed as a 
separate dimension of psychosis 
to the storied nature of identity, 
thoughts and experience 
(previously mentioned)? On the 
one hand very relative / social-
constructionist (narrative) but the 
other, contrasted this with the 
sense that there is a reality to lose 
touch with (positivism)? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The language here seems 
confusing and lacks coherence. 
Wondering whether the invitation 
to unpack the concept of 
‘disintegration’ might have 
welcomed a ‘demonstration’ of 
what it feels like to work with 
disintegration.  
 
Meaning from past experience. 
Theory that trauma is important 
in understanding why this 
do what I do. So I suppose I wanted to support, 
more of the interest of that in terms of the 
research as well really.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R7: OK. So from your own clinical experience 
what is your understanding of psychosis, I mean 
both conceptually and in terms of the clinical 
presentation of the clients?  
 
P7: I guess I describe it as a sort of breaking 
down of stories of experiences in some ways, 
disintegration of somebody’s thoughts, sense of 
identity but also the being, as someone having 
lost touch with reality in that process as well. 
Yes, if that’s a simple explanation for such a 
complex thing. Yeah, I think that’s how I see it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R8: You said disintegration.  What do you mean 
by that?  
 
 
P8: Emm, an inability to make meaning. From, 
possibly from, through past experiences, or 
through, perhaps there has been trauma. Emm, in 
that a person is unable to sort of confront on an 
emotional level but also cognitively make sense 
of those experiences. There is too much for them 
to cope with, in a sort of, emm, reality based 
way. And sometimes that meaning becomes more 
apparent for someone with psychosis.  
 
 
 
present for the client and 
therefore sustaining the 
therapeutic relationship 
when it is difficult). She 
does not know many 
counselling psychologists 
working with this client 
group and therefore felt that 
she wanted to support this 
particular research interest.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The participant describes the 
main manifestations of 
psychosis from her own 
clinical experiences as 
disintegration of clients’ 
thoughts and sense of 
identity, losing touch with 
reality but also that the 
stories of clients’ 
experiences are presented by 
them in a broken down 
fashion. The participant 
considers this matter as a 
complicated one.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
She defines disintegration as 
the inability of the client to 
make meaning of 
experiences or thoughts 
possibly because of 
traumatic experiences. She 
understands this inability to 
make meaning as a 
distinctive feature of this 
client group. She also 
understands disintegration as 
the inability of the client to 
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Psychosis and 
disrupted sense of self 
/Ontological 
insecurity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Psychosis manifests 
differently in different 
people and its 
functionality varies  
 
Uncertainty about the 
origins of psychosis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The relativistic 
approach to the 
conceptualization of 
psychosis  
 
Cognitive map of the 
world affected and 
disruption of meaning   
 
 
 
 
 
meaning-making goes away. 
 
Confront. Experiences? The 
emotion of the experience seems 
important to her. Emotions from 
trauma experiences as linking to 
cause of psychosis? Emotion 
affects sense-making? Invoking a 
stress-vulnerability model? 
 
The participant interprets 
psychosis from the perspective of 
a person’s lived experiences: 
People with psychosis manifest a 
difficulty to make sense of their 
experiences (past (e.g. trauma) 
and present) 
 
 
Again there is emphasis on the 
alterations of the sense of self and 
lack of coherence, which makes 
the work hard. Ontological 
insecurity?  
 
Good prognosis when there is 
some sense of self from the start 
of therapy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Noticing that instead of using the 
word ‘hallucination’ or ‘delusion’ 
she uses the word ‘fantasy’, 
which seems to me carrying les 
stigma (She is not 
psychoanalytically trained or 
oriented). 
 
The functionality of psychosis 
varies across people and less 
emphasis on aetiology  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relativistic and subjective 
approach to the conceptualization 
of psychosis  
 
The participant assumes that she 
is in a better position to 
understand the difficulties her 
clients have been through and 
how they have affected the way 
they view the world. Power issues 
here? She assumes her cognitive 
map of the world intact!  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R9: Ok. And what about the sense of identity you 
have mentioned? What happens there? How do 
you see that?  
 
 
 
 
P9: Emm, I guess there is a very disrupted sense 
of self. Sense of identity really that people are 
lacking, a coherent story about themselves, who 
they are, apart from those experiences.  And 
often is very hard to get to that in working with 
people. Often is something that, you know its 
genuinely really working when the client it’s on 
their first interview and you are thinking about 
what, well when I start to see somebody who are 
recognizing who they are as a person it probably 
means that we’ve gone quite a long way when 
that really happens.  
 
 
 
R10: In what way? 
 
 
P10: [p] I suppose is about them being present 
with themselves and their own potential for 
growth, to take care of themselves, to be 
responsible for themselves, and not to sort of 
being stuck [p] in a sort of psychotic process 
whether that’s about fantasy or denial about 
experiences however way that psychosis might 
function for someone. You know, it can function 
in different ways for people. Perhaps in terms of 
how it has come about and I don’t know if I can 
always work that out. I am not sure if that 
answers your question?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
R11: So you see from what I’m hearing from 
your own clinical experience psychosis 
manifesting in different ways in different clients.  
Is that what you said?  
 
 
P11: Yeah. Yeah very much so.  I guess I am 
trying to think through different cases in terms of 
how I can understand how someone’s psychosis 
has developed like. For some people substance 
misuse it’s a huge element, some people it seems 
clear that there is a more biological connection, 
other people there is much clearer link to child 
trauma and neglect, but it’s easy from my 
perspective often easier than it is for me than for 
them to understand how it has been difficult for 
them to sort of developing a cognitive map of the 
world really and how to make sense of it. [P].  
 
confront these experiences 
and thoughts on an 
emotional and cognitive 
level. Clients are engaged in 
a process of coping with 
loads of difficulties and are 
unable to do so in a reality 
based way.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a disrupted sense of 
self and these clients are 
lacking a sense of identity 
and a coherent story about 
themselves and they are 
finding it difficult to 
differentiate themselves 
from their experiences. She 
finds it difficult to engage 
this client group with their 
sense of identity and sense 
of self. When clients are 
able to engage with their 
sense of self from the very 
first session she considers it 
as a good prognosis for the 
therapeutic work.   
 
Engaging with their sense of 
self is understood as being 
present with themselves, 
their potential for growth 
and taking responsibility for 
themselves. It is also 
explained as not being stuck 
in a psychotic process. 
Psychotic process is defined 
here as being engaged in a 
fantasy or the denial of 
experiences. She is 
commenting that psychosis 
takes different forms 
depending on the individual. 
She expresses that there is a 
difficulty in always 
understanding what has 
actually caused the 
psychosis for her clients. 
 
 
 
 
She is taking the direction to 
think through different cases 
and how she understands 
what has caused certain 
clients to experience 
psychosis. She mentions 
substance misuse, biological 
reasons, childhood trauma 
and neglect. She specifies 
that often is easier for her as 
a clinician to make sense of 
how psychosis has come 
about for the client and the 
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Disruption of meaning 
in psychotic 
experiences  
 
Meaning making and 
coherence lacking  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Psychosis related to 
lived experiences and 
particularly to 
breaking of 
attachments  
 
Acknowledging 
otherness in psychosis 
and interventions  
 
The therapeutic 
relationship as 
fundamental and 
derived learning for 
clients 
 
Relational approach 
enabling clients to sit 
with and their 
experiences  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is an emphasis on meaning 
making of clients’ lived 
experiences and the function 
behind psychosis. There is a 
reason why psychosis has 
developed for each person  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therapy is tailored-made for 
psychosis and therefore 
acknowledging OTHERNESS  
 
The ‘a different sort of 
relationship’ seems to connote 
that she compares her own 
offerings to someone else’s which 
remains unclear. A sense of 
specialness again? Loneliness in 
the field/team informing this?  
 
The relational approach assists 
clients to deal with the here and 
now of the therapeutic process 
and invites them to deal with their 
circumstances  
 
The value of relatedness in 
therapeutic work for psychosis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R12: And are there any other prominent clinical 
manifestations or symptoms that you have in 
mind in reference to the clients that you have in 
mind that are common?  
 
 
P12: Certainly the way that I see that are not 
being able to construct meaning out of the 
psychosis experiences, so explicitly on psychosis 
but also of their sense of self or past experiences 
that they may had and not sort of linking back 
together again. And perhaps in some cases that 
being quite functional perhaps about not being 
able to face past trauma and to cope with this sort 
of affective experience of confronting that, but in 
other cases it perhaps be more about just a simple 
break down of the ability to make sense of things 
that might be more biologically drives rather than 
psychologically. But I guess there is an inability 
to construct a coherent story that they stick to 
that, make sense of and hold on to and move 
forward  
in life.  
 
 
 
R13: Hmm. As you have mentioned you have a 
more relational way of working with these 
clients. What does it mean for you to work 
relationally with this client group?  
 
 
P13: I guess is about attachment experiences, I 
guess I’m always very mindful that for the most 
part the clients I work with had difficult 
childhood experiences, breaking attachments that 
maybe played out in the relationship that they 
have with me in some way and that’s, emm, also 
not always able to emm for instance work with 
someone in a cognitive behavioural therapy way 
might find my approach threatening, they might 
be not able to challenge their experiences. I am 
able to offer them a different type of relationship 
and I see that as having some value really. Its 
often not about recovery or change in the same 
way as I see it with other client groups. 
Sometime is about being there for the client 
being able to offer a different sort of relationship 
that they can learn from. I think sometimes there 
might be an unrealistic expectation that this 
might be internalized in that they can sort of 
move forward from their past difficulties and to 
develop you know, self care and compassion 
towards themselves but I see that it helps in a 
kind of a supportive way which enables them to 
deal with things in the here and now and to help 
them deal with some aspects of psychosis rather 
than to battle  
with it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
client are finding it difficult 
to understand what has been 
difficult for them that might 
have actually caused the 
psychosis. They are finding 
it difficult to make sense of 
the world since they are 
lacking the capacity to 
develop a cognitive map of 
the world.    
 
 
She differentiates it between 
the inability to construct 
meaning out of the 
experiences of psychosis ad 
hoc, but also their inability 
to construct meaning about 
themselves and their past 
experiences. In some cases 
there is a difficulty to sit 
with past trauma and what 
that has caused for the client 
on an affective level, but 
also to make sense of the 
biological side of things. 
The participant finds her 
clients unable to construct a 
coherent story about 
themselves and their life 
experiences and move 
forward.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
The participant initially 
introduces the concept of 
attachment. She expresses 
that most of the clients she 
works with had difficult 
childhood experiences and a 
breaking of their 
attachments with significant 
others and that these 
dynamics get manifested in 
their therapeutic 
relationships. She mentions 
that it is not always possible 
to introduce CBT to certain 
clients as they might find it 
threatening as this requires 
them to challenge their past 
experiences and they resist a 
lot to that. The participant is 
able to offer a different 
approach and relationship 
for these clients who she 
sees as valuable and it is not 
concentrated upon change or 
recovery as compared with 
other client groups she 
works with. It is about 
being-with the client in a 
way that they can learn 
from. She also expresses that 
often she has the unrealistic 
expectation that clients 
might be able to internalize 
their relationship in a way 
that it will allow them to 
move forward in life and 
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Psychotherapy as the 
space for containing 
the judgement clients’ 
receive from others  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When attachment 
becomes strong the 
client is detaching 
 
Acknowledging and 
allowing closeness 
and separateness and 
looking for the 
meaning behind 
 
Sitting together with 
uncertainty in a 
collaborative manner  
 
Need for formulation 
and uncertainty  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The team’s otherness 
 
 
Separating from the 
team allows the 
formation of 
relationship with 
client 
 
Conceptualization of 
psychosis and 
negligence in 
childhood  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even though she is invited to talk 
about her own experience she 
shifts to the ‘they’ of the clients 
after a very long pause. 
Wondering whether she is 
avoiding here or if she is 
confused or actually relating to 
the judgement clients seems to 
receive from others? 
 
 
Interpersonal difficulties  
 
Too much closeness seems 
threatening for clients  
 
 
Acknowledging the clients’ 
otherness and tend to work 
differently with other client 
groups  
 
 The need for formulation seems 
to be informed by the difficulties 
uncertainty brings to the fore  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Detaching from the team and not 
identifying with it.  
(confusion with they/I) 
 
She has very quickly formed a 
relationship with this difficult 
client as compared to the rest of 
the team: Feeling special? 
Identifying with clients? 
 
The structure of the team and the 
way it functions seems to 
facilitate engagement and 
 
R14: So how, what does it mean for you to work 
relationally from the experiential standpoint? 
Regarding your clinical interventions?  
 
 
P14: OK. I guess it’s about, I suppose 
relationship. Emm it’s probably about me sort of 
[P]. I think I am very aware about judgment from 
other people and the level of that effect that they 
have to cope with and sort of manage that in the 
room with them.  
 
 
R15: Manage it how, in what ways?  
 
 
P15: Actually coming back to think about 
attachments. Sometimes the client has too much 
and sometimes once we start making some 
insights and the attachment gets too strong the 
clients would tend to back off more, avoiding me 
and me noticing that. With another client group I 
might be more challenging in terms of working 
with that, with this client group I might be more 
aware of it and allow it to happen to some degree 
by trying to hold something about, about them 
and what that tells me about  
formulation and understanding something about 
their difficulties, their past that often with some 
people we might be doing some guess work 
together whether there was some past trauma 
there or that it might not be disclosed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R16: You have mentioned a couple of times 
attachment. It seems like it echoes the relational 
thing for you. The relational way you work. I am 
wondering whether you can recall any particular 
examples working with a client that attachment, 
as you understand it became so much that it 
didn’t allow you to work relationally.  
 
 
P16: Yeah. There are a lot of examples there is 
it? [p] 
 
R17: Well if you try to focus on one so that we 
can explore that. 
 
 
P17: Yes, I can think of a male client that I work 
with in his thirties. Very long history of 
psychosis and a lot of risk issues as well being in 
secure services. Loads of self-harm, command 
hallucinations that would command him to harm 
himself and spend most of his life in secure 
settings. And his engagement with…I work 
within an assertive outreach team, his 
engagement with that team it’s extremely 
guarded and they have no, I had very limited 
information about his experience of command 
hallucinations so he was very resistant to engage 
with psychology. But I actually very quickly 
develop the capacity for 
self-care and compassion 
towards themselves. Instead 
she experiences the 
relationship as supportive 
and as a medium to deal 
with features of psychosis in 
the here and now of their 
encounters instead of 
battling with these features.   
 
 She helps the clients to cope 
with judgments they receive 
from people around them 
and to manage the effect of 
that in the room with them. 
 
The participant mentions the 
significance of the 
attachment developed 
between herself and her 
clients. She associates a 
strong attachment with 
working alliance and 
insights made together with 
clients. However, clients at 
times when the attachment 
becomes very strong and the 
get closer they tend to 
withdraw and she 
acknowledges that with 
them. She avoids being very 
challenging with this client 
group as compared with 
other client groups and she 
allows the withdrawal to a 
certain degree by trying to 
make sense of it and in way 
allowing the withdrawal to 
inform her understanding of 
their difficulties but also her 
clinical formulation about 
the client. When it comes to 
work together with the client 
in trying to make sense and 
understand their difficulties 
they are often engaged in 
guessing together what kind 
of significant trauma might 
have been experienced in the 
past or the client might not 
want to disclose.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
She goes on to describe a 
particular client with whom 
she works within the 
assertive outreach team, who 
has a long history of 
psychosis, self-harming 
through command 
hallucinations and has spent 
most of his life in secure 
psychiatric settings. She 
describes how guarded this 
client is towards the whole 
team but that she very 
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Deep engagement 
brings disengagement 
for the client 
 
Structure of the team 
enabling the work due 
to flexibility/ allowing 
engagement and 
disengagement  
 
Confirmation of 
clients’ difficulties  
 
 
The meaningfulness of 
resistance  
 
Non-pathological 
conceptualization of 
clients’ experiences  
 
 
Being-with the clients 
in their absence  
 
The space for 
disengagement allows 
the client to re-engage  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The intersubjective 
and ontological status 
of fantasy  
 
The meaningfulness of 
fantasy as a way of 
being-in-the-world 
disengagement in a good way.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To conceptualize the totality of 
the client’s experience she is 
taking into consideration the 
wider intersubjective context 
within the team in terms of how 
the client is engaging and 
disengaging. 
 
Buberian confirmation: she 
‘confirms’ the client’s difficulty 
in relating and separating without 
challenging it and allowing it to 
manifest. Again acknowledging 
their Otherness.   
 
She is concerned about clients 
even in their absence, a deep level 
of care.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
She uses the word fantasy again 
instead of delusions and 
hallucination. Wondering where 
this will lead.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fantasy (or delusions?) are 
understood as meaningful  and 
are usually involving 
relationships with other people or 
their own sense of self.  
 
She seems to be talking again 
formed a relationship with him in terms of 
thinking about...he was actually experiencing 
relationship problems at the time, in relation to 
erm cause of anger difficulties, so I was 
acknowledging kind of forced control and anger 
problems so he became guarded about psychotic 
experiences that might have been quite a fact so 
he was sort of saying that this is also connected 
to some problems that I had from long ago that I 
don’t want to talk about. So then actually a huge 
history of neglect in childhood but he was able to 
form an attachment and to start to trust me and 
start working on all of those things. But it felt 
that it was a huge thing for him to start to open 
up all of those details so he would...he back off 
and then he would engage and my team allows 
the possibility for that, than I am there available. 
I mean in the team we hold a caseload of 100 
clients that would disengage and engage again. 
So he disengaged and said he didn’t want to 
work anymore but then he wanted to come back 
in and wanted to reengage with psychology. And 
it was I guess this was something that we talked 
not only with me but with the team as well and 
how he related to the team generally, that he 
would engage and form relationships and to open 
up about his experiences and then he pulled back. 
So it’s about sort of noticing that with him but 
also allow it in a way rather that pushing him and 
challenging to the degree that he needs to engage, 
that he has to think of that and that enables him 
to continue to work with me really. And I 
suppose I sometimes see working in that context, 
within that team I am constantly involved in 
some way, I am still present for some of the 
clients within my team where I am not 
necessarily seeing them for weekly therapy 
sessions or I am still holding them in mind. 
Enabling them to able to make use of their own 
defences and to help them reflect on them when 
the time is right to do that.  
 
 
 
R18: What kind of defences do you mean? If you 
are thinking of that particular client?   
 
 
P18:  Yeah, emm for that example denial, 
projection, rationalization, yeah splitting. For 
others there are all sorts like fantasy, not so much 
for that client but. Yeah.  
 
R19: So let’s see all of these because they sound 
important. So denial, in what way? Denying 
what?  
 
 
P19: [P] Denial of…probably reality. Erm and I 
guess denial in relation to past experiences where 
they have been significant really.  
 
R20: What about the fantasy part? What kinds of 
fantasies emerge?  
 
 
 
P20: So I wouldn’t say so relevant about that 
particular case. Certainly for others. Fantasy I see 
it as providing another way to be, to have a sense 
of being in the world, to have relationships, and 
often the fantasy is about relationships really. Or. 
Identity. And particularly with a very complex 
client I am involved in working with now who I 
quickly formed a 
relationship with him. When 
they initially formed their 
therapeutic relationship he 
was experiencing some 
relationship difficulties due 
to anger management issues 
within his relationship. The 
participant could engage him 
with regards to the anger 
difficulties but he was 
initially guarded regarding 
his experiences of psychosis 
but also past traumatic 
experiences for which he 
could link with current 
difficulties, however refused 
to disclose. He gradually 
started opening up which 
appeared very challenging 
for him and talked about 
childhood neglect but trusted 
her and formed an 
attachment. But he would 
engage and disengage which 
is a common phenomenon 
with her clients in her team, 
which was discussed with 
her team as well. She 
opened this with the client as 
well and she describes how 
allowing him to engage and 
disengage allowed him to 
work with her. Even though 
the participant might not be 
seeing clients on a weekly 
session way she expresses 
that she is available for them 
and hold them in mind. She 
allows them to use their own 
defences and reflecting on 
them with clients when she 
thinks that they are ready 
enough to do so.        
 
 
 
 
 
The clients are denying 
reality and past experiences 
that have been significant.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
She understands fantasy as 
providing a sense of being in 
the world for clients.  It is 
often about fantasizing 
having relationships and 
certain identities. She can 
see that many of her clients 
					 274 
 
 
Dissociation as a 
form of 
disengagement  
 
Differentiation from 
the team  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Differentiation from 
the team and sense of 
specialness  
 
The negotiation of 
separateness and 
relatedness within the 
team  
 
The meaningfulness of 
lived experience 
/fantasy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Validation of 
subjective experience 
 
Assisting the client to 
reflect on their 
subjective experiences 
and looking for 
meaning 
 
Confirmation of 
client’s experiences  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the absence of 
meaning therapist 
engages with 
diagnostic labels  
 
Emotional 
disconnection brings 
incomprehensibility of 
client’s experiences  
about how she is offering 
something more special for the 
clients as compared to the team.  
 
Looking for meaning appears 
again as significant here.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working explicitly with delusions 
and the function behind the 
absence or presence. 
 
Meaning again is fundamental  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Validation of client’s experiences 
develops an acknowledgement of 
her Otherness  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
She earlier said that in the 
absence of her clients she is still 
involved and holds them in mind. 
It is interesting that here the client 
seems to be engaged in a similar 
way through her fantasy and she 
finds it difficult to comprehend. 
Wondering whether she is 
negotiating her own separateness 
see her as having, and with a lot of other clients, 
having some personality difficulties as well as 
psychosis and she often, there were times when 
she was destabilized by environmental stimulus 
and stress triggers and things and she often 
behaves as she is a child. She is very dissociative 
and the rest of the team would see her as playing 
games, as being a child. So, playing with 
imaginary friends.  
 
 
 
R21: During sessions you mean?  
 
 
P21: I am talking about the team generally but 
she is better able to engage with me. She forms 
all this formulas, she has the idea that she can 
create formulas and that God passes these 
formulas to her for medicines and that will 
enable her to cure diseases for people and often 
gets frustrated because it’s not possible for her to 
make this formula for herself to cure her 
disorder. So that sort of fantasy gives her a 
purpose, something quite meaningful and 
important and actually her life has been empty in 
many ways. She has suffered severe neglect and 
some degree of abuse although that’s not clear, 
so it’s not so clear to work with but loads of 
attachments difficulties in relationships, family 
relationships that had broken down, she hasn’t 
been able to maintain a job, so this fantasy is 
extremely valuable really.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
R22: OK. This sounds important. I am 
wondering how do you work relationally with 
her with regards to the fantasy.  
 
 
P22: Sure. So at times I acknowledge it in sort of 
noticing, I guess reflecting when is there and 
when is not there. Sometimes is not there at all 
and so we are able to have very grounded 
discussions about problems in her life. Other 
times is really difficult, but sometimes is easy to 
reflect upon why it would come about at certain 
times. Or the fact that is real for her.  
 
 
 
 
 
R23: So when is real for her, because you 
mentioned earlier about having a grounded 
conversation when talking about present 
relationships, so when for example this particular 
client goes on to talk about relationships that 
happen in her fantasy how does the relational 
way you work with her plays out?  
 
P23: [P] She will often call people silly names. 
There are times when she would say, oh I have 
seen you earlier today, and I have already had a 
conversation with you. I spoke with the invisible 
you. Or there was a time when she called me the 
pixie lady for about a year. I guess, I think this is 
a very difficult case and sometimes it’s almost 
impossible to reflect upon these things. I think 
there is a fine line for this particular lady between 
are experiencing personality 
difficulties together 
psychosis. She thinks of a 
particular female client she 
currently works with who 
she describes as being very 
dissociative as a result of 
trying to cope with anxiety 
provoking environmental 
factors and as a result she 
turns to behave as a child 
and playing with imaginary 
friends. The rest of the team 
perceives her as playing 
games and being controlling.   
 
The client generally exhibits 
this kind of behaviour with 
other professionals from the 
treatment team working with 
her. The participant 
expresses that she feels that 
the particular client engages 
well with her as compared to 
others. The client believes 
that God passes on to her 
certain pharmaceutical 
formulas to help her create 
certain medication to cure 
people from diseases but she 
gets frustrated as she is 
unable to cure her own 
disease. The participant 
explains how extremely 
valuable this fantasy is for 
the client as it provides her 
with meaning and purpose. 
The client has suffered 
possible abuse and neglect 
and attachment difficulties 
in her relationships with 
others and especially with 
family members. She hasn’t 
been able to maintain a job 
as well.  
 
She acknowledges and 
notices the fantasy together 
with the client but also 
noticing when the client is 
not fantasizing. When the 
client is not fantasizing they 
are able to have grounded 
discussions together about 
difficulties in her life. They 
are at times able to reflect 
upon the fantasy and how is 
it real for her. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
The participant talks about 
how the particular client 
relates to her through her 
fantasy; that she still 
fantasizing relating to her in 
her absence, or giving her 
new names. The participant 
expresses this is a very 
difficult case and that she 
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Therapist’ cognitive 
abilities affected when 
emotionally 
disconnected  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The difficulties of 
working with 
delusions that include 
the therapist  
 
Therapist’s 
detachment brings to 
the fore doubts about 
interventions  
 
Therapist feeling not 
good enough for the 
client  
 
The difficulty of 
confirming the client’s 
delusions  
 
Client’s delusion 
including the therapist  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doubting the 
therapeutic work 
when she is frustrated 
and detached 
 
 
 
 
 
from the client.  
 
 
‘In that relationship’ seems to 
demonstrate that the participant is 
negotiating a distance from the 
relationship with this particular 
client? 
 
When conceptualization becomes 
difficult and lacks meaning for 
her, diagnoses and labels are 
introduced  
 
Meaning appears significant 
again.  
 
Even though she seems to be 
describing a case where a clients 
negotiates closeness (i.e. 
pseudonym given, relating in her 
absence) the participant 
understands this as the client’s 
difficulty to connect emotionally. 
Can we assume her own difficulty 
here?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The language used and the tone 
seems to express that she hasn’t 
been ‘heard’ for a long time now.  
 
She finds it difficult to work with 
client’s delusions when she is 
involved in them when she is 
detached. What comes first 
though? Does she find it difficult 
that the client is coming to close 
to her through her delusions and 
therefore detaches and she 
experiences loss of meaning?  
(Searles, symbiosis) 
  
Therapist wants to detach and 
client is engaged with her in her 
absence  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A need to avoid the client? What 
is this frustration really about? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
personality difficulties and psychosis. And, there 
are times when there is clear psychosis and other 
times a borderline personality disorder element in 
terms of her seeking care. But certainly there is 
[P] I think there are different ways in which she 
will be using this fantasy in that relationship and 
how she understands my role and my own 
involvement with that. So she might be 
defending not to get close and also [P] how she 
sees and makes sense of me.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R24: So how are you finding yourself relating to 
her fantasies? For example you’ve mentioned 
earlier that she would tell you she had a 
conversation with the invisible you, or I can’t 
remember how you actually said it. How are you 
finding yourself relating to that?  
 
 
 
P24: Erm I think it’s been very difficult actually. 
It’s being quite a long time now. Initially I would 
feel quite uncomfortable with that I think. And 
I’d find it much more difficult to be present and I 
would be probably more keen to reflect on my 
need to pull back from the work and [p] I would 
be questioning whether there is any value of me 
being there. I mean whether my presence 
increases distress rather than help and I’ll be 
struggling with my confidence regarding the 
interventions. At times I think I’ve been more 
able to stick with it and acknowledge actually 
that this person sort of needs this fantasy and it’s 
not necessarily my job to have to deny it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R25: So you are saying that at times when she 
talks about the fantasy you’re questioning your 
presence, you are questioning your interventions 
and you wonder whether you’re helpful towards 
her. 
 
P25: Yes. So I’ll be wondering whether I should 
be working with this person. Or would it be a 
better place somewhere else. I’ll be frustrated 
with her perhaps.  
 
 
 
 
R26: Frustrated with her? Tell me more.  
finds it difficult to reflect 
upon such manifestations. 
She perceives her difficulties 
as being informed by 
psychosis and personality 
difficulties. Borderline 
personality disorder features 
for this client manifest in the 
ways she’s seeking care.  
She uses the fantasy with her 
in different ways in which 
she is trying to make sense 
of her and her role but also 
her involvement in their 
relationship. The fantasy 
helps her defending in not 
getting closer to her.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The participant recognizes 
that she is finding it difficult 
to relate for quite a while 
now. When the client is 
talking about relating with 
her in her absence (i.e. the 
fantasy) she initially finds it 
comfortable. She then finds 
it difficult to be present with 
the client and she’s pulling 
back from the relationship to 
question her need to back off 
and questions the value of 
her presence. She doubts her 
own interventions and 
lucking confidence while 
she wonders whether her 
presence increases anxiety in 
the client and being 
unhelpful. At other times she 
will acknowledge the 
client’s need to hold on to 
the fantasy and realizes that 
she doesn’t have to deny the 
client’s fantasy.  
 
 
 
The participant is wondering 
whether she should be 
working with this client at 
all and if it would be a better 
idea if the client was seeing 
someone else. She feels 
frustrated towards her.  
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Separateness brings 
frustration and 
incomprehensibility  
Technical language 
used when therapist is 
detached  
 
Formulation is not 
enough to make sense 
of client’s experiences  
 
Client’s incoherent 
sense of self frustrates 
therapist 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Separateness from the 
client causes 
dissociation and 
collapse of meaning  
 
Therapist’s autonomy 
threatened  
 
Cognitive and 
affective alterations  
 
Collapse of meaning 
appears threatening 
for the therapist 
 
Separateness is 
related to dissociation 
and lack of meaning  
 
Embodied attunement 
with client 
/disembodiment  
 
Therapist’s 
ambiguous pre-
reflective structure 
manifested through 
dissociation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a very long silence here 
and she seems getting in touch 
with her feelings  
 
 
 
 
The difficulty of the therapist to 
relate is not informed by the 
client’s difficulties here but is 
understood as the therapist own 
difficulty.  
 
The technical word ‘formulation’ 
is used in presence of detachment  
 
She talks about wanting the client 
to have a coherent sense of self 
and later on she will talk about 
her own dissociative processes. 
Does she talk about her own 
ontological insecurities?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
She understands dissociation as 
an outcome of not being able to 
make sense. Is detachment 
preceding the absence of 
meaning? The space between 
collapses and therapist’s 
autonomy might be threatened. 
The inability to make sense is 
experience as caused by 
something external, outside of the 
therapist? Can we say that it’s an 
experience of self-alterity? In 
other words that the therapist is 
experiencing self as Other?  
 
Therapist dissociates and the 
client seems to embody that with 
her fantasy of talking to the 
invisible her  
 
Buberian ‘leaping into’: The 
unpredictability of a genuine 
dialogue with one’s whole being 
as well as one’s vulnerability: 
Therapist feels transformed  
 
Laing’s concept of ‘engulfment’ 
comes to mind: 
Therapist autonomy is threatened  
 
The dynamics of separateness and 
relatedness in the space between 
brings to the fore therapist’s 
ambiguous pre-reflective 
structuring of meaning (i.e. 
dissociation) 
 
Moments of disembodiment for 
the therapist in the disruption of 
the fluidity of affective 
experience and her directedness 
towards the client.   
 
 
P26: [P]  
 
 
 
R27: What is frustrating?  
 
 
P27: Not being able to relate [p]. And not being 
able to make sense of her really.  I mean, I have a 
formulation, but there is too much there to make 
sense of. There is too much discontinuity and it’s 
impossible to put the links back again and that 
she has a coherent sense of self or how I would 
like her to have.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R28: Ok. So when you are finding yourself 
getting frustrated, how does your frustration or 
any other difficult feelings you have, affect the 
therapeutic relationship if at all?  
 
 
P28: Erm [P]. I think it makes me back off a bit. 
Probably, erm even to a degree, it might sound 
extreme but sort of dissociate a little bit. I guess I 
see myself from as her. Finding it very difficult 
to make sense of what I am sort of seeing. I guess 
I feel something’s thrown at me.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A very long silence.  
 
 
 
 
 
She is not able to relate and 
make sense of her client and 
she gets frustrated. She has a 
clinical formulation about 
the client which doesn’t 
seem enough for her to make 
sense of the client. She talks 
about the discontinuity in 
their work and she finds it 
difficult to connect all the 
links together. She also talks 
about the lack of a coherent 
self and her own need to 
experience her as coherent.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The participant backs off in 
these cases and dissociates 
to a degree. She identifies 
with the client and she is 
finding it difficult to make 
sense of what she sees in the 
client and feels that 
something’s thrown at her.  
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Therapist attuned to 
client’s detachment 
and loss of meaning  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The significance of 
supervision  
 
Interventions 
informed by the 
dynamics within the 
relationship  
 
Careful consideration 
of closeness and 
distance  
 
Therapist’s difficulty 
in sitting with the 
client in uncertainty 
magnified by settings’ 
over-engagement with 
results 
 
Therapist and client 
need some space from 
the therapeutic 
relationship  
 
Setting as disabling 
and discouraging  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emotional 
disengagement 
difficult and on 
embodied level 
exhausting for the 
therapist  
 
Setting makes 
 
 
 
Therapist is losing connection 
with the client. There is a sense of 
attunement to client’s affective 
state  
 
Disruption in the flow of 
cognitive and affective 
experience   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The therapist suggests that both 
client and herself need to reduce 
the quantity of sessions. But is 
this more of the therapist 
difficulty to stay in the space 
between?  
The way the therapist describes 
that the setting/team seems to be 
implicitly ‘intrude’ her way of 
practicing appears similar with 
the way she experiences the client 
intruding her by feeling that 
something is thrown at her.  
 
The way the NHS’s agenda is 
internalized and its outcome-
focused strategies seem 
incompatible with therapist’s 
approach and mode of relating to 
clients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
She is invited to talk about how 
she personally deals with her own 
emotions of disengagement from 
the client and she talks about how 
she perceives her role within her 
team/NHS which confuses her.  
 
The psychotic processes of the 
R29: And you say you’re dissociating.  
 
 
P29: Well that’s an extreme term isn’t it? I’m not 
that present with her. Because that’s too much. 
And that’s what exactly is for her. But I think it’s 
very difficult to find the space to make sense of 
that.  
 
 
 
 
R30: OK. So in that situation, in that process of 
trying to make sense and becoming frustrated 
what else happens in the process to reach the 
narrative, to reach the client?  
 
 
P30: In terms of the relationship process on its 
own or in terms of my interventions?  
 
 
R31: I think both sounds important.  
 
 
P31: Well sometimes there is a natural 
disengagement. At times there’s been an 
admission to the hospital. [p]. I think I’ve been 
aware for this person that I have been discussing 
in supervision recently that erm we have 
constructed a plan together that we will reduce 
the frequency of our sessions and I found myself 
reflecting back if it was the right thing to do 
really or if I was getting pulled in sort of 
abandoning her in some way, or rejecting her or 
avoiding her. Because you see, what was difficult 
for me was needing to have an intervention really 
needing to do something in our meeting so that it 
would be valuable for the NHS. So working with 
evidence in a way, and having confidence about 
that. So there is a need to force something, to do, 
do to her, to feel that therapy is more 
constructive. And doing the sense making when 
she is allowing the sense making really.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R32: You have mentioned a couple of times the 
disengagement from your side. And I’m 
wondering how you handle the emotions of 
disengagement when you are with the client.  
 
 
P32: Are you talking about the disengagement in 
the room? 
 
R33: Yes, in the room with the client.  
 
 
 
P33: Well it’s difficult really. I mean for the most 
part, I tend to think of my role in the NHS really 
and it can just be totally confusing. Exhausting. I 
recently receive more of psychodynamic 
supervision because I have been supervised for a 
long time from a CBT perspective and not from 
long-term psychotherapy approach supervision 
but that’s their main approach and I’ve realised 
 
 
 
She understands it as not 
being present with the client 
because she is finding it too 
much and that’s how it is for 
the client. She is finding it 
difficult to make sense of 
that though.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relationship process or both 
she wonders.  
 
 
 
 
 
There is a natural 
disengagement from the 
client’s part, which might 
lead to a hospital admission. 
In thinking about the 
particular client she talks 
about how they have 
decided together to reduce 
the frequency of their 
sessions and she wonders 
whether the disengagement 
might has been mutual as 
she considers the possibility 
that she got pulled into 
abandoning, rejecting and 
avoiding her. She talks about 
her need to employ 
measurable and evidence 
based interventions so that 
they can be valuable for the 
NHS and allowing her to 
feel confident in a way.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
She is finding it difficult to 
handle the disengagement 
feelings. When she 
disengages she tends to 
think of her role within the 
NHS and she can get very 
confused and exhausted in 
that process. She recognizes 
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relational and 
reflexive work difficult 
 
Therapist disengaging 
from the team 
 
Setting as disabling  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disengagement is 
experienced on an 
embodied level as 
boredom, frustration, 
confusion and anxiety 
 
 
 
 
 
Disengagement brings 
uncertainty  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The meaning and 
function behind 
fantasy/delusions 
 
 
Therapist 
acknowledging 
clients’ difficult 
circumstances   
 
 
The importance of 
meaning and its 
disintegration due to 
difficult experiences  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adopting a second-
person perspective  
 
team? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The language she uses here 
(manageable, unhelpful, 
responsible) seems to echo what 
the settings has ‘thrown’ at her 
which seems to intrude into the 
work with the client and 
sabotaging the therapeutic work  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The therapist seems to be 
engaging a second person 
perspective in her approach with 
that this didn’t allow me to reflect on this and 
other things [P].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R34: So what other kind of emotions emerge for 
you when you are disengaged from the client?  
 
 
P34: Boredom sometimes, frustration, confusion, 
anxiety. I think that’s the main menu really.  
 
 
 
 
 
R35: What is the anxiety about?  
 
 
P35: So, where is this going? And to control it in 
some way to keep this person safe and whether 
that’s possible. Whether we can sort of, I guess 
something about things being manageable and 
not putting things in the way that might be 
unhelpful. I am feeling quite responsible for that 
really.  
  
 
R36: Unhelpful for whom? 
 
P36: Unhelpful for the client.  
 
R37: Can you think of an example? That sounds 
very interesting. What can be unhelpful for the 
client?  
 
P37: I guess it’s coming back to the fantasy stuff 
for me actually. Look at it from a more reality 
based way trying to think about how it functions 
facing it, the reality of this is a person that hasn’t 
been able to sustain a relationship, and desperate 
to have children, and substance misuse, and 
seems unlikely to achieve those things.  And 
there is a huge you know, erm human beings, the 
majority take this for granted really. Not easy to 
accept. And by actually being the person that 
finds the smallest thing difficult to cope with and 
I guess there is a very fine balance to be able to 
sort of see these kinds of things and be able to 
see some meaning and make sense of it, but that 
too much leading to all sorts of disintegration 
really.  
 
 
 
 
 
R38: And talking about meaning how are you 
finding yourself making meaning or not of their 
inability to engage pragmatically and on realistic 
grounds?  
 
 
 
P38: It would come up in the process. Noticing 
patterns, the here and now statements and what 
happens between us. So for example I’ve noticed 
the benefit of receiving 
psychodynamic supervision 
lately as compared to CBT 
which didn’t allow her to 
reflect on this matter and 
other material.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Boredom, frustration, 
confusion, anxiety.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Uncertain about the future of 
therapy and the safety of the 
client. Feeling responsible 
for the client and having the 
need to create the 
appropriate settings to make 
things manageable and not 
being unhelpful for the 
client.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
She finds herself being 
unhelpful when she is trying 
to make sense of clients’ 
fantasy from a reality based 
way.  However the reality of 
many of her clients is that 
they have difficulties in 
sustaining a relationship, 
they are desperate to have 
children and it becomes 
difficult for them while they 
find it difficult to accept the 
difficulty.  She 
acknowledges that the 
average person takes the 
above for granted while for 
her clients who are 
vulnerable in coping with 
minor difficulties it becomes 
difficult to make meaning 
out of their difficulties and 
make sense of them which 
leads to different kinds of 
disintegration.   
 
 
 
 
She notices herself trying to 
make meaning through the 
therapeutic process by 
					 279 
Therapeutic process 
involving the moment 
to moment affective 
changes  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Feeling being special 
for clients  
 
Technical 
interventions not 
allowing connectivity 
to form/I-Thou vs I-It 
 
Being-with 
challenging 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Being-with allows 
connection with 
therapist’s sense of 
self  
 
Being-with allows the 
use of self in the 
process  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the clients.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Offering a human relationship 
which is focused on being-with 
rather than technical interventions 
 
Therapist is present in the 
betweenness as a fellow human 
being in the service of the Other 
(Buber) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Being-with the client allows a 
more holistic conceptualization 
and helps avoiding 
compartmentalizing the person. 
 
Acknowledging and experiencing  
the other’s wholeness allows the 
use of self in the process while 
the therapist remains connected 
with her own self 
 
 
 
 
Being-with allows the therapist to 
connect with herself  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
that we get pulled in a fantasy, the formulas 
again. You are sharing with me all those 
formulas but I’m wondering whether we can 
reflect on them instead of how they have come 
about and sometimes we are moving towards me 
been drown into being in this fantasy, being 
given a formula and being asked if I can take it 
on and being able to say ‘what just happened 
there, the dynamics have changed’ and then we 
are talking about something that happened 
yesterday.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R39: So you are mentioning some challenging 
issues that are brought up in the sessions. I’m 
wondering and thinking towards the other 
spectrum in thinking about the particular client or 
other clients that you’ve talked about, moments 
where you’ve felt connectivity and proximity 
with them. If you can describe these moment, 
how they happen, when they happen, if the 
happen?   
 
P39: You mean moments where I felt more 
connected with them? Erm [P]. You know 
thinking about it I have a great influence over, 
but often is also erm [p] sometimes with humour, 
or sometimes it can actually come out of the 
discussions with them, it comes out of the more 
human relationship, rather than me trying to 
employ a diary for them if I am using a CBT 
intervention. And I guess that brings me back to 
the difference between being and doing and 
being aware of that. And being-with allows 
forming the relationship but with this client 
group that comes with its challenges because 
often many difficulties arise in the relationship.  
 
 
 
R40: And how would you describe yourself in a 
being-with mode with a client?   
 
P40: [p] I guess I am more present emotionally in 
terms of acknowledging the whole person, not 
just the psychosis so we might not be talking 
about that. With that I am more present within 
myself, I bring more of myself to that.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
R41: So you are more in touch with yourself. 
 
 
P41: Yeah. Yeah. Much more.  
 
 
R42: And how would you describe the 
relationship between you and the client when you 
are in that state of being-with with them? How 
would you describe it?   
 
 
 
noticing the clients’ 
statements in the here and 
now of the session. The 
participant provides an 
example with a particular 
client discussed above who 
engages in a fantasy of 
formulas with whom she 
acknowledges when they are 
both getting pulled in her 
fantasy. She encourages the 
client to reflect on the 
content of the fantasy 
instead of how it has come 
about. The client invites her 
to get involved in her 
fantasy and the participant 
responds by acknowledging 
how the dynamics are 
shifting by asking her to get 
involved and they end up 
talking about something 
irrelevant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
She feels that she has a great 
influence over her clients. 
Connection manifest itself 
through humour, through 
their discussions in a more 
human relationship way 
when she is not engaged in 
her need to employ certain 
CBT interventions like diary 
keeping. She introduces the 
being versus doing and 
when she’s in a mode of 
being-with the client this 
allows the formation of their 
relationship which also 
comes with its challenges.  
 
 
 
 
She is emotionally present 
for herself and the client and 
she brings more of herself 
into the relationship. She 
finds herself acknowledging 
the whole person in the 
client and not just the 
psychosis.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
					 280 
The importance of 
meaning 
 
The meaningfulness of 
the relationship 
 
Relationships as the 
source of meaning   
 
Meaning co-
constructed and 
inherent in being-with 
 
 
Being-with and the 
confirmation of the 
client and therapist  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Existential acceptance 
of client’s and 
therapist’s facticity  
 
 
Self-affection and 
hetero-affection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sitting with facticity 
and limitations  
 
A great sense of 
responsibility for the 
client  
 
Being-with rather 
than doing  
 
Therapist belief 
system challenged  
 
Being-with and 
attuned to one’s own 
madness 
 
Relational work 
confronting 
therapist’s ontology  
 
In the state of being-with the 
therapeutic relationship is 
experienced more real and there 
is less battle for meaning as the 
relationship itself is the source of 
meaning  
 
Being-with allows the therapist to 
acknowledge clients’ otherness 
and provides the space for them 
to attach the meaning they want 
to their experiences and fantasies.  
 
Being-with allows the therapist to 
be fully present  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An existential acceptance of 
client’s and therapist’s difficult 
life circumstances.  
 
Being-with and being attuned to 
clients allows the therapist to 
come to grips with her own 
difficulties in life.   
 
Therapist is affected by herself 
and affects herself through being 
affected by the client who is 
affected by herself.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It reminds me Buber who 
suggests that the space between is 
a risky one because it involves 
change for both participants  
 
 
 
 
Therapist involvement in the 
space between generates the 
sense of risk.  (therefore the 
possibility for change). She feels 
decentred. Both client and 
therapist are being affected 
through a dynamic process which 
is not encapsulated within them 
but between them.  
 
The therapist is more interested in 
providing a relational basis and 
being available to the client 
instead of focusing on particular 
interventions.  
 
Closely attuned to the client the 
therapist is in touch with her own 
madness 
 
Relational work with psychosis 
 
P42: Much more real. Less of a battle. I guess 
there is less of a battle for meaning really. I 
suppose is the difference there between trying to 
sort of either dissect or change meaning from a 
sort of CBT perspective. Working with beliefs or 
questioning delusions or whatever might be. To 
just being-with, hearing how they make sense, 
how the client makes sense of things. But often I 
think if someone’s not ready to question or to 
change meaning they would have got it out in the 
first place. But again if they might be questioning 
meaning then this brings us more back to the 
relationship. So being present there and 
observing it. And this allows them to be present, 
I see that they feel not judged and more accepted 
and feel warmth in the relationship. Humanistic 
staff.    
 
 
 
 
 
R43: How are you experiencing the warmth you 
are talking about? What is it like for you?  
 
P43: [P] I guess it comes up with just the 
acceptance of things. Much more existential level 
really. You know really difficult things happen in 
life and I suppose with that probably my 
awareness that difficult things happen in my life 
as well and how do I deal with that. And about 
being more grounded in that and I think the 
warmth is also from the position of the awareness 
of myself and from my own experiences of [P] if 
that makes sense really.  
 
 
 
 
 
R44: And how do you feel talking about it now? 
 
 
 
 
P44: It’s interesting. Emm, but I guess it feels 
risky in the work.   
 
 
 
 
R45: Risky in what way?  
 
P45: [P] I guess those things cannot necessarily 
be fixed, acknowledging that. Erm... that actually 
you’re to meet somebody’s life in a very 
significant way that it’s quite a big responsibility 
really. Especially when you might not be able to 
do much about it. Erm, other than to be there in 
some cases I think. Not all. I guess it’s an 
entering into a certain amount of madness really. 
And that’s often a challenge depending on all 
sorts of settings that you’re working in, but you 
often go back to an environment that it hasn’t got 
much of a capacity to see life on a continuum and 
acknowledge our own madness. I think being 
with someone often means acceptance of some of 
those beliefs you know…people have beliefs that 
are unusual and unproven and superstitions and 
myths that they hold on to and they are not pulled 
in these. And in the rest of my working life I am 
not religious as a person necessarily, or these 
huge amounts of customs and actually as a 
 
She is experiencing the 
relationship as more real and 
she doesn’t battle with the 
client for meaning making. 
She is not trying to employ 
CBT interventions to 
question beliefs or delusions 
or anything else that might 
manifest and sticking to how 
the client makes sense of 
them. She’s being present 
with the client in a being-
with mode and allows them 
to be, and she observes 
everything that happens 
rather than challenging it. 
This allows the client to feel 
the warmth in their 
relationship without feeling 
being judged. However, if 
the client takes the initiative 
to question meaning this 
brings things back to the 
relationship.  
 
It is about accepting things 
as they are in an existential 
level. She acknowledges that 
it is a fact that difficult 
things happen in life and she 
becomes aware of the 
difficult things that 
happened in her life and how 
she deals with it and she 
becomes more grounded. 
The warmth also comes 
from the awareness of 
herself in sessions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
She finds her own 
reflections interesting but 
she finds it as a risky 
process in her work.   
 
 
 
 
She talks about the 
responsibility she feels 
towards her clients. That for 
her is about meeting a 
client’s life in a very 
significant way, even in the 
cases when she cannot do 
much about their difficulties. 
There is a challenge of 
entering a certain amount of 
madness when working with 
this client group which also 
depends on the settings of 
the work. Her experience of 
the settings she works for is 
that they haven’t got the 
capacity to see life on a 
continuum and acknowledge 
the madness of human 
beings in general.  When 
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Relational work 
allows confirmation of 
otherness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meaning making for 
team dynamics and 
therapy process  
 
Setting as disabling 
by judging the clients  
 
Mismatch between 
therapist’s and team’s 
expectations of 
therapeutic work 
 
Setting as disabling 
my sabotaging the 
space between  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
allows the therapist the 
opportunity to acknowledge 
Otherness meaningfully but it 
confronts therapist’s ontology  
 
The therapist ‘confirms’ the 
clients’ phenomenological world 
without judgment while she still 
acknowledges her own being 
(reflexive awareness of her own 
worldviews)  
 
Buber’s concept of ‘inclusion’ 
comes to mind: the therapist visits 
the standpoints of her clients and 
therefore acknowledges their 
otherness without giving up her 
own beliefs and points of view.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The complexity of meaning-
making process on the micro-
level of the therapy process and 
the macro-level of team dynamics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
person I sort of resist to that but in my client 
work I accept it and see that it has value for 
people but it forces me really to question my own 
beliefs. If I’m truly present with someone it 
challenges me.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R46: So, when you are in the mode of being-with 
the client and you feel the warmth you were 
describing earlier it seems that you are not only 
engaged with the other, with the client, but you 
are also engaged with yourself.  
 
P46: Yeah. 
 
R47: You also mentioned earlier about the 
settings, how the setting affects the way you 
work. I am wondering how you think the settings 
affect your work with this client group.  
 
P47: I mean there are loads and loads of ways. 
But I guess the main thing that came to my mind 
really was being in a team where I am the only 
psychologist. And, they are quickly not valuing 
the difference in beliefs and form a certain 
attitude about a client. So I’ll be quickly faced 
with a lot of judgements and appraisals 
about…someone being controlling, playing 
games, a lot, and a huge level of anxiety and 
chaos around whether this person has a psychosis 
or not. There are times when it is clear that there 
is psychosis but other times there appears to me 
that something else is happening. And a certain 
expectation about what a team should be able to 
achieve. And how things are making sense. I 
think I take this as part of my job really. How 
they are making sense of that and sort of being 
able to make sense about the team dynamics as 
well. But sometimes coming to a busy day to see 
a client that is that complex you are already not 
really present to yourself. And that has a direct 
influence on the work really. You can find 
yourself being pulled into other people’s attitudes 
and ideas about what’s happening. The third 
person being in the room in a way, the 
psychiatrist, the nurse,  
the social worker etc.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R48: And that has the potential to affect the 
therapeutic relationship. Are there any other 
ways that the therapeutic relationship can be 
being-with someone it 
means accepting their beliefs 
to a degree; beliefs that 
might be unusual and 
unproven, or superstitions 
they might hold. She 
acknowledges that as a 
person she is not very 
religious and she finds 
herself resisting to many 
cultural customs and 
superstitions but she 
recognizes that she accepts 
them in her clients. She can 
make sense of them and 
recognizes their value. If she 
is truly present with clients 
she feels challenges by their 
belief systems as they 
challenge her own ones.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The participant is the only 
psychologist working in her 
team and there is a different 
way in which she and the 
rest of the team values 
difference in belief systems 
in clients but also they hold 
certain attitudes about this 
client group, which differs 
from her own. Other 
colleagues become 
judgemental about these 
clients, perceiving them as 
controlling or playing games 
with staff. There is also a 
great anxiety manifesting 
within the team with regards 
to a valid diagnosis of 
psychosis and quite often 
she it is not very clear about 
the diagnosis while she 
perceives clients manifesting 
comorbidity. Even though 
there is a certain expectation 
about what a team should be 
able to achieve and how the 
team is making sense of 
clients’ issues she finds 
herself making sense of 
them in a different way. She 
considers that part of her job 
is to make sense of how the 
rest of the team is making 
sense but also the team 
dynamics. Part of the 
difficulty is that she feels 
getting pulled in the team’s 
attitudes and ideas about 
clients, which has a direct 
influence on her work. 
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Setting as disabling 
by not being sensitive 
to therapeutic 
boundaries  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Team disabling 
relational work by 
over-emphasizing 
doing than being 
 
The gaze of the team 
penetrates the space 
between 
 
Team reticulates  the 
relational approach  
 
Setting as disabling 
with financial 
pressures and 
outcome-focused 
agenda  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therapist engaging 
and disengaging in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The gaze of the team seems to 
penetrate the space between client 
and therapist. (wider 
intersubjective considerations) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
affected by these  
external influences?  
 
 
P48: I mean the boundaries issues are big, 
especially in my team as compared to a CMHT 
setting or an individual therapy setting where you 
can manage that. You know to a degree. For 
example if a client of mine contacts the service, 
the person that answers the phone might respond 
in a different way that I would. Recently for 
example I had a client who contacted the team 
and mentioned that they had a physical health 
problem on their grown and the admin staff said 
why don’t you show _______ when you see her. 
And that’s how the session started. So different 
contacts with different people introduce very 
different boundaries. There is a constant 
renegotiation  
about all of that.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R49: And you also mentioned earlier something 
about the NHS expectations which is more to the 
side of doing things and be productive. And you 
described earlier how that affects your own 
expectations and how you relate to the client. 
And that sounded important for you. Can you say 
more about that?  
 
P49: Oh yeah. Yeah. Well I am at a setting where 
is primarily nurse laid; psychiatric nurses and 
they have a certain attitude, which is very 
pragmatic. Focused upon you know, skills, 
solutions, fixing things, and that’s very strong. 
Often there is a sort of gaze on you, what are you 
doing, what are you contributing to working with 
this client or there is a perception that If I was to 
talk about being with somebody I get laughed at 
the team at times. And it’s quite hard to fight for 
that. I think alongside pressures, lack of 
recourses and pushing towards certain pathways 
and the pressure when there is no improvement 
from these clients that we might get paid less if 
we continue to work with them. You know, that 
is our job to move their mind and if not they will 
start not paying us or having less resources for 
these people that are really complex and in some 
cases you can’t expect to get huge results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
R50: So it seems that the gaze of the settings is 
limiting your work and it’s pressurizing you.  
 
 
P50: Yeah. Yeah.  
 
R51: I was thinking of asking you, given the 
relational emphasis of the therapeutic work that 
you talked about, how you use, if at all, the 
space-in-between you and the client?  
 
 
 
P51: In the room [P] I suppose different levels of 
These ideas and attitudes are 
present in the room with her 
clients and they are 
represented as a ‘third 
person’ in the room, being 
the psychiatric, the nurse, 
the social worker etc.  
She introduces the 
importance of boundaries 
and from her description it 
seems that they are often 
lacking. She compares her 
team with a CMHT team or 
a private practise setting 
where boundaries are more 
manageable. She provides 
an example of clients 
contacting the service to 
arrange a session instead of 
contacting her directly and 
that the person answering 
the phone might respond 
differently than she would 
have responded. She also 
gives an example of a client 
showing her their grown 
because of a physical 
condition they had who was 
encouraged by the admin 
staff.  She finds herself 
constantly renegotiation 
boundaries with the rest of 
the team.  
 
 
Psychiatric nurses who have 
a strong and pragmatic 
attitude by focusing on 
skills, solutions and fixing 
things surround her. She 
experiences their gaze as 
having an assessment and 
critical role with regards to 
her contribution in working 
with this client group. She 
doesn’t feel comfortable 
talking to the team about 
being-with clients as she 
expects that they will laugh 
at her. Within these 
pressures, with the lack of 
resources and with clients 
not showing improvements 
there is a pressure that she 
might get paid less when she 
is not working in a specific 
way with them. It is 
expected that clients must 
show improvement and she 
doesn’t like working in that 
way especially with this 
client group which is 
complex and you cant 
expect huge results.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
She mentions the use of 
					 283 
the space between  
 
Detaching from client 
generates reality 
based interventions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emotional 
disengagement 
generates superficial 
engagement  
 
Superficial 
engagement serves as 
a containing agency 
 
 
 
 
 
Being-with makes the 
therapist feeling 
emotionally 
transparent and 
exposed  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intersubjective nature 
of client’s delusions 
with reference to the 
therapist  
 
 
 
Acknowledging the 
limitations of the 
therapeutic work and 
finiteness   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Idle talk, Heidegger 
I-It, Buber  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Being connected to personal 
difficult feelings, feels likes she is 
exposed to the client. 
Therapist affective state is not 
hidden  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
silence. I guess it makes me think about that kind 
of attaching and moving away to a degree. I think 
there is a way in which I support that in terms of 
how I ground people and at the end of sessions 
and focusing on something that is reality based 
and more real. But I am detaching a bit in that, in 
sort of ending the encounter.  
 
 
R52: Sorry, so you feel that you are detaching 
yourself by trying to ground in the here and now?  
 
 
P52: I suppose my thought was about ending the 
session and that person is not necessarily going 
to have that sort of relational depth with me. 
There is something about ending it and moving 
into some more superficial topics really and that 
thing about having that person sort of getting 
some of their defences back and to be grounded  
but not exposed.  
 
 
 
R53: Exposed?  
 
P53: I suppose what I mean by that is being in 
touch with some of the difficult feelings that 
might been felt in one session and about trying to 
contain that.  
 
 
 
 
R54: You mean difficult feelings for you or the 
client? Or both? 
 
P54: Both. Yeah.  
 
 
R55: And where do you think, if at all, difficult 
feelings of yours and the client’s meet? Do they 
meet?  
 
 
P55: Yes, occasionally.  
 
 
R56: Describe me this meeting.  
 
 
P56: I guess there are moments of reflection and 
challenge and quite recently I had a quite 
significant reflection with somebody about them 
acknowledging how they had a fantasy that I 
could look after him. And that was sort of a 
replacement for someone they worked in the past 
with whom they had a good relationship with and 
then he experienced the loss, and then that I am 
not always going to be here and I can’t actually 
do that. That as much as other people have let 
you down and rejected you I will too. And to be 
able to sort of sit with that.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R57: And thinking about how you are impacted 
on any kind of level while working with this 
clients, I’m wondering how during sessions and 
if you are impacted on a physical level, on an 
different levels of silence. 
Silence allows her to reflect 
upon attaching and 
detaching from the client. 
She finds herself detaching 
in the way she ends the 
encounter by focusing on 
reality-based matters.  
 
 
 
 
 
Ending a session with a 
client that is not able to 
come to a relational depth 
with its done by her opening 
up more superficial issues to 
the encounter which allows 
them to get their defences 
back in a kind of a grounded 
but not exposed way.   
 
 
 
 
The participant by detaching 
at the end of the session 
allows the client to contain 
difficult feelings that have 
been felt during the session 
and this allows a kind of 
containment of these 
feelings.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
She talks about moments of 
mutual reflection, which can 
be quite challenging and she 
provides a particular 
example. This client had a 
fantasy that she could look 
after him, which she 
understood as an outcome of 
a traumatic past experience 
with a previous therapist 
with who the client had a 
good relationship with 
which ended with 
disappointment. The client 
according to her tried to 
replace the previous 
therapist with her but she 
had to work with that in help 
him to deal with the fact that 
she can’t always be there for 
him and she will let him 
down and reject him as other 
people have done in the past.   
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Embodied 
disengagement  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Setting as disabling  
 
 
Meaning is 
paramount after the 
session 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Being vs. Doing 
More connected with 
clients rather than the 
rest of the team 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therapeutic pluralism 
 
Using specific 
interventions to 
facilitate detachment  
 
Detachment comes 
naturally and allows 
the client some space 
to reflect  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Issues on embodiment when the 
therapist is disengaged from the 
client 
 
Again something external seems 
to be related  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The setting is again experienced 
as not providing any kind of 
containment especially after 
difficult sessions and not being a 
space which supports a reflexive 
stance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pluralistic work  
 
Is she saying in other words that 
she is disengaging to protect 
herself? To protect herself from 
what? From the space between? 
Is it becoming too much? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
embodied level.  
 
P57: I guess to a certain degree you know, in 
thinking about feeling anxious at times or feeling 
that embodied aspect to that, or feeling lethargic 
and exhausted, tired.  
 
 
R58: And how does it feel in your body if you 
can recall, on moments like the previous ones 
you described earlier when you disengage and 
you feel quite frustrated. How does it feel in your 
body?  
 
P58: Tensed. A feeling of something knocking 
on my head, restlessness, agitated. 
 
 
 
 
 
R59: And what happens after a session finishes? 
Is there anything particular that you feel or is 
there any particular way you are impacted? How 
does it feel? 
 
 
P59: [P] I guess it all feels like leaving one world 
and going back to another one. Another one 
which is actually the setting in which not 
everybody can understand. Sort of having to re-
orientate yourself. And often to make some space 
for yourself. Particularly with clients that appear 
disrupted in terms of their thoughts, sometimes 
it’s quite difficult to just go from the one to the 
next. You need a little bit of time to make sense 
of all that.  
 
 
 
 
R60: So you are describing a transition from one 
world to the other, from the session that ended 
towards the setting, which sounds like a 
challenging transition.  
 
P60: I guess it’s about moving from being to 
doing.  
 
 
 
 
R61: OK. We are approaching the end. Is there 
anything you would like to add which is of 
personal importance to you when you are 
working with this client group? Any insights?  
 
 
P61: I think what was interesting as I was 
reflecting on, was probably the different 
modalities that I might use. And making sense of 
that from the relational or the psychodynamic 
approach and I think sometimes when I start 
looking for tools and they might inevitably be 
CBT related tools, because CBT has a lot of 
tools, more of the doing interventions I wonder if 
that relates to a, I guess it’s another way for me 
to sort of structure myself and make sense of 
what’s happening but also possibly sometimes 
another detachment from the being-with. And I 
guess that’s quite interesting if we are reflecting 
on it in that way. Often it seems very natural and 
perhaps it’s a useful thing to do and bring some 
of that to my work. But I think it’s also helpful to 
 
 
There is a physical element 
when getting anxious or 
feeling lethargic, exhausted 
or tired.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
She feels tensed a pressure 
on her forehead, 
restlessness, agitated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
She describes a transition 
from one world to another in 
which there is not always 
much understanding and a 
kind of reorientation is 
required while making some 
space for herself. In cases 
where she works with 
challenging clients with 
disrupted thoughts she needs 
some time before moving to 
the next client to allow 
herself to make sense of the 
session, the client.  
 
 
 
 
 
Moving from a being-with 
mode to a doing mode.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
She finds it interesting that 
she was reflecting 
throughout the interview 
about the different 
modalities she applies to her 
work.  
She shares an insight 
(informed by a relational 
and psychodynamic 
perspective) about her need 
to employ CBT 
interventions. Her need to 
employ these tools and 
being in a doing mode is 
understood as a way of 
making sense of what’s 
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‘Technical’ 
interventions 
introduced by 
therapist vulnerability  
 
Therapist’s defences 
allow her to be 
present  
 
Technical language 
employed when 
reflecting on 
disengagement  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The tools serve as a mean through 
which she manages her own 
anxieties related to the 
therapeutic work  
 
Technical language is introduced 
again when she is reflecting about 
disengagement  
 
Formulation against the 
uncertainly of client’s 
circumstances  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reflect on it really.  
 
 
 
R62: So while you were describing it, I had a 
picture in my mind, you the client and the tools. 
So you mentioned before that your engagement 
with the tools might be expressing your 
disengagement with the client. Is that  
what you said?  
 
P62: Yeah. [P]  
 
R63: OK. What purposes do the tools serve for 
you?    
 
 
P63: They also help me to keep being there. And 
I was thinking it in with regards to their own 
defences. They need their defences and I need 
mine. And sometimes this enable me to, helps me 
to understand something to make sense of what 
my role is, in being in the room with them. And 
it allows me to think of formulation when it 
comes to this client group because I don’t think I 
could confidently say that my clients that present 
with a sort of residual psychosis that I have a 
formulation about and understanding that I am 
100% right. I think sometimes  
these tools, these formulations help me to be able 
to make sense of the case and to take some 
meaning from it all. And to sort of be there and 
have some kind of relationship.   
 
 
 
R64: So it’s a matter of professional confidence 
and at the same time managing your own anxiety 
in dealing with the disengagement from the client 
as well.   
 
 
P64: Yes.  
 
R65: Anything else that comes up? Anything 
prominent in you at the moment?   
 
P65: No, I don’t think so.  
 
R66: Thank you very much Paula for taking part 
in this. Well let me switch off the recorder so that 
we can debrief.  
 
 
P66: OK. Thank you 
happening for the client but 
also avoiding the being-
with. It often feels very 
natural for her to engage in 
that way and she can see the 
benefits of it, however she 
considers it important to 
reflect upon.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CBT tools help her to 
ground herself in the room 
with the client; they keep her 
there. It is also viewed as a 
way of defending. She 
expresses that clients have 
their own defences and she 
needs to have her own ones.  
CBT allows her to construct 
a formulation about the 
client, which is of great 
importance for this client 
group as 
she cannot be fully confident 
about formulation. She adds 
that formulation allows her 
to make sense of the client 
in a meaningful way and it 
allows her an opportunity to 
form a relationship.  
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Appendix X: Themes and subthemes with excerpts for entire sample 		
 
 
MAJOR THEME 1: THE PRIMACY OF SENSE-MAKING 
 
 		
SUBTHEME 1.1: FOCUSING ON MEANINGFULNESS AND 
COMPREHENSIBILITY 
 
 
 
1. PAULA 
 
“Emm, an inability to make meaning. From, possibly from, through past experiences, or through, 
perhaps there has been trauma. Emm, in that a person is unable to sort of confront on an emotional 
level but also cognitively make sense of those experiences. There is too much for them to cope with, in 
a sort of, emm, reality based way. And sometimes that meaning becomes more apparent for someone 
with psychosis” (P8/L26-28) 
 
“…in a sort of psychotic process whether that’s about fantasy or denial about experiences however 
way that psychosis might function for someone. You know, it can function in different ways for people” 
(P10, L36-37) 
 
“…but it’s easy from my perspective often easier than it is for me than for them to understand how it 
has been difficult for them to sort of developing a cognitive map of the world really and how to make 
sense of it” (P11/L43-44) 
 
“Certainly the way that I see that are not being able to construct meaning out of the psychosis 
experiences, so explicitly on psychosis but also of their sense of self or past experiences that they may 
had and not sort of linking back together again” (P12/L47-48) 
 
“Other times is really difficult, but sometimes is easy to reflect upon why it would come about at 
certain times. Or the fact that is real for her” (P13/L114-115) 
 
“Fantasy I see it as providing another way to be, to have a sense of being in the world, to have 
relationships, and often the fantasy is about relationships really” (P20/L100-101) 
 
“So that sort of fantasy gives her a purpose, something quite meaningful and important and actually 
her life has been empty in many ways. She has suffered severe neglect and some degree of abuse 
although that’s not clear, so it’s not so clear to work with but loads of attachments difficulties in 
relationships, family relationships that had broken down, she hasn’t been able to maintain a job, so 
this fantasy is extremely valuable really” (P21/L108-111) 
 
“At times I think I’ve been more able to stick with it and acknowledge actually that this person sort of 
needs this fantasy and it’s not necessarily my job to have to deny it” (P24/L129-130) 
 
“I guess it’s coming back to the fantasy stuff for me actually. Look at it from a more reality based way 
trying to think about how it functions facing it, the reality of this is a person that hasn’t been able to 
sustain a relationship, and desperate to have children, and substance misuse, and seems unlikely to 
achieve those things” (P37/L172-174)  
 
“Much more real. Less of a battle. I guess there is less of a battle for meaning really. I suppose is the 
difference there between trying to sort of either dissect or change meaning from a sort of CBT 
perspective. Working with beliefs or questioning delusions or whatever might be. To just being-with, 
hearing how they make sense, how the client makes sense of things” (P42/L197-199) 
 
 
2. BARBARA 
 
“So it’s like too much pressure and then something erupted and that the psychosis is meaningful. It’s 
quite of come to a...emm...you can see once you get to know them and you can see the meaning of 
psychosis, it’s not separate of who they are. Not in terms of separate of who they are that they are 
paranoid or...but in terms of saying a lot about some aspects of their internal world and emm...deficits 
that they have and what part of this has caused the break” (P16/L55-57) 
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“Yeah. Also it has a function for them but it also has a story. It tells their story. Emm...we had like one 
of my clients would say that one that during his first psychotic episode he thought that there was a big 
secret he knew and can’t tell anyone now. He knows it and the family knows it but he can’t tell because 
there is always someone listening. So everybody knows about it and nobody speaks about it. Now, at 
the moment we have family therapy with them and this is almost an accurate description of what’s 
happening in the family. There is something that everybody knows about, nobody speaks about it. So it 
tells a story. Also there is a function because he needs to organize his world” (P17/L61-65) 
 
 
3. BETH 
 
“So very much with, Ok, people who come up with, who have a diagnosis of psychosis, often manifest 
difficulties at particular time, and that time most likely is dramatic, but I can’t know for sure because 
the history was very blurred, missed their histories…emm…we did have some people with very, very, 
very, active psychosis and it was very interesting to see that actually some of the stuff they were saying, 
I mean I can’t know if they were true, but I believe that they are, but although it was very, very difficult 
to understand and it was, emm…it seems like the…basically there was meaning behind the voices and 
the delusions and that sort of thing” (P9/L53-57) 
 
 
4. CARLA 
 
“But when you are thinking in another way, psychodynamically, psychosis might be a situation, where 
yes you do have some of these symptoms, but not necessarily have the whole picture but more 
importantly these symptoms are meaningful. So I would say that somebody it’s quite psychotic when 
his relationship with the world has changed, you know, also the internal and external. So, ok, there are 
delusions and hallucinations but they are not organic, well, usually, if there are no drugs etc, but they 
have a deep and meaningful psychological value” (P2/L9-L13) 
 
“And then, he, he started feeling that I was, telling me that I was a witch that was doing spells on him. 
But see everything was meaningful. You know, even though his story sounded crazy, the feelings behind 
his psychosis were so real. Very real actually. Yes, the feelings were authentic, and I could relate to 
that” (P14/L90-92) 
 
“So as I said earlier, there was, often you act when working with psychosis you act immediately and 
it’s only afterwards that you get to understand more fully what has happened and it’s always, well 
almost always meaningful. I mean the patients’ behaviour; paranoia, delusions etc are always 
meaningful. So in this case, when this patient took the pen container, and he was really, he was ready 
to through it, he was, at least it felt to me that he wanted to receive something from me by force” 
(P31/L238-241) 
 
“All the paranoia, the hallucinations in the room, was he, he was creating another persona in the 
room, one that he preferred compared to the actual person, me, I mean” (P33/L258-259) 
 
 
5. GEORGE 
 
“So my experience is that I can completely make sense of the patient's experience, which is usually in 
psychosis characterized by threat of some kind. So is an experience of stress or being subject to 
something, there is something that's invading them or they want to get rid off, they are constantly 
subject to something, that is something that I can easily relate to, understand and hold to be true” 
(P5/L56-58) 
 
“So if you truly allow yourself to immerse yourself into the narrative of someone with an inner 
psychotic episode, what you come out with is the experience of how they are relating to the world, or 
how they are situated in the world, how free or not free they feel there, and it's always internally 
coherent. I never actually worked with someone with a diagnosis of psychosis whose experience didn't 
have internal coherence” (P5/L64-66) 
 
“I do think that the construction of psychosis, the way it works in the society, indeed on a systemic 
level has used these people to differentiate themselves from madness. The role of the psychotics is 
actually to make the other person feel sane. That's what I'm trying to say here” (P6/L84-85) 
 
“At a more complex level, again my experience of working with psychotic people, they are putting 
together a story of why they are feeling tormented, haunted by life. Of why they are feeling that they 
have no clear boundaries about themselves, or why they are feeling that they can be invaded, or feeling 
that they have a hole in their skull which cannot close and things are coming in. Which essentially is a 
delusion of invasion or any of that kind; you can’t shut off something in your head. Like someone left 
the window open that cannot be closed. Now if you take this as a metaphor, as an embodied experience 
of something that may have happened in their life that often rings true when you work with psychotic 
people meaning they often had boundaries violations or they had no boundaries at all. And they have 
merely formed a narrative about that” (P10/L141-146) 
 
“…so for most of the people I work with they live in a council flat and under very bad circumstances 
with no social contact, no meaningful occupation nothing to do in the day and to actually fantasize that 
there are people walking around the house who are interested in them is highly valuable” (P11/L165-
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167) 
 
“So again my conceptualization of psychosis is a way of making sense of an internal emotional 
experience usually that is all it is, as anything as with other patients for that matter. It's not different. 
And it's a subjective way of going about it and usually there is some truth, which overlaps with life 
experiences. It is not all that mad” (P11/L173-175) 
 
“But the whole point I’m trying to make here it is about something, it’s something about finding 
meaning in these things and understanding them intersubjectively. So for him the fantasy of a bottle 
that explodes was something that he brought in to test how far or close he can get to me, whether I 
could manage his madness, his anxiety and so on” (P15/L249-251) 
 
 
6. JOHN 
 
“…I think the fact that he (p) rather than other approaches which were trying to sort of get rid off the 
voices and things like that and so on and supress them and so on, my approach was trying to in a way 
give the voices a voice, to speak so that they could be heard, and thought about…emm…understood 
and how they connected with his outer world and so on, outer world experiences…” (P21/L148-150) 
 
“So it’s a question of just gradually making a psychological story that is useful to…rather than these 
strange bits of biology, and, totally explain it in biological terms. It’s actually a psychological one. 
This makes sense in terms of his life and very…not just intellectually, way of understanding, but that 
the understanding was highly relevant to his real life issues” (P22/L187-189) 
 
 
 
SUBTHEME 1.2: THE IMPACT OF LIVED EXPERIENCES ON 
DISTRESS AND PSYCHOSIS 
 
 
 
1. PAULA 
 
 
 
 
“…there is much clearer link to child trauma and neglect” (P11/L43) 
 
“I guess is about attachment experiences, I guess I’m always very mindful that for the most part the 
clients I work with had difficult childhood experiences, breaking attachments…” (P13/L55-56) 
 
“So then actually a huge history of neglect in childhood but he was able to form an attachment and to 
start to trust me and start working on all of those things” (P17/L83-L84) 
 
“…and she often, there were times when she was destabilized by environmental stimulus and stress 
triggers and things and she often behaves as she is a child” (P20/L102-103) 
 
“…but loads of attachments difficulties in relationships, family relationships that had broken down…” 
(P21/L110) 
 
“She has suffered severe neglect and some degree of abuse although that’s not clear, so it’s not so 
clear to work with but loads of attachments difficulties in relationships, family relationships that had 
broken down, she hasn’t been able to maintain a job, so this fantasy is extremely valuable really” 
(P21/L106-111) 
 
 
 
2. BARBARA 
 
 
 
“Even if they are smart, interesting, so it doesn’t come to the expense of intelligence so it’s not that. It 
is something interpersonal. Relationships break easily. And this might happen with other clients, 
neurotic clients, I don’t know. See my main work is with psychotic people (laughs). So I don’t know” 
(P24/L94-95) 
 
 
3. BETH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“…the main issue, that most of them had emm…was being very much isolated, so very in themselves, a 
lot of difficulty in emm actually talking and communicating and making relationship” (P3/L24-25) 
 
“I do believe that there’s trauma. Most people who have psychosis had some sort of trauma, that is 
what I believe, I could be wrong. Emm…of course but, I check it out and ask, and often, and I’ve heard 
this somewhere” (P9/L58-59) 
 
“Emm…but that was what the diagnosis was. She was very, very isolated and most of the people there, 
those with the diagnosis of psychosis, who seem to be a bit more correct with their diagnosis, 
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 emm…they were very isolated…” (P11/L76-78) 
 
“And he became unwell, this is quite usual for most of the people I’ve worked with emm...became more 
unwell when his mother died. And he was living alone. And had then became very unwell. He didn’t 
have other people around, his father had died and no family, emm...and he pretty much, emm...he 
fought with a lot of people. So shouted a lot, and throw things” (P16/L129-131) 
 
“…she was pretty much brought up in .............., in the psychiatric hospital, her mother, this is what we 
were told, because the history, you know there was nothing in her notes, we had no family to talk to, 
emm...so her mother had psychiatric problems. She was born in  .............., then went to some sort of 
orphanage for kids, and anyway, in and out of .............., pretty much it was her home. And she came 
for pretty much three and half years. She was very, very aggressive when she first came, because she 
had learned to live, she lived with a man at that time, and subversive prostitution, and very severe, well 
I imagine very severe voices…” (P19/L159-163) 
 
“…Emm…he was somebody who had a diagnosis of psychosis, from about the age of twenty, 
emm…had very difficult background emm…and so I mentioned the trauma bit, he had been, he said he 
had abused kids, and had been in the prison for it, there’s a question mark, as in whether this has 
happened and his family couldn’t explain, you know, they oh yes, it has, or, very desperate family, so 
we couldn’t actually get a proper, what had actually happened but he’d very like, to had been sexually 
abused by what he said. And he had been quite aggressive to his brother, he nearly killed him and he 
went to hospital for that, he hit him on the head with a sharp knife, emm…” (P23/L238-242) 
 
“…my feeling was that a lot of them had relational problems, so the common thing for me, they came 
from families who were either too much, most of them were you know there, but emotionally not at all” 
(P36/L371-372) 
 
“…and he was severely abused, my understanding was that it was more emotional deprivation, he 
described inappropriate sexual behaviour so parents having sex in front of him, and touching him…” 
(P39/L390-391) 
 
“...and was able to throughout our relationship, and the relationships he had with other people, in the 
apartment, he was able to, I think to be more open with himself, and learn to defuse situations and 
when he did have problems with people or people had problems with him, he was able to take some 
time and then discuss it with them, through the therapy...” (P40/L416-418) 
 
 
4. CARLA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“…if he’s very close he’s threatened with someone, if he’s very far away again he feels that he is left 
alone. It’s very, it’s an antiphasis…” (P4/L20) 
 
“But I would certainly say that something, which is very common, is, well is the difficulties, the great 
difficulties in relating and distancing from others…” (P6/L27-28) 
 
“So, this person had a very difficult childhood, many traumas, his dad was abusing him sexually, his 
uncle also, his mum committed suicide, his brother tried to kill him when he was a soldier, so yes, very 
traumatic so far” (P8/L49-50) 
 
“I mean, again the difficulties, I mean he had difficulties in relating to all significant others in his life, 
he was very, very alone, and it was very sad for me. He went through so many different traumas in life, 
horrendous experiences and his psychosis exactly, this exactly was, his psychosis was developed in 
order to deal with all that” (P32/L247-249) 
 
 
 
 
 
5. GEORGE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“…fact they have indeed grew up in a situation where they were constantly subject to an experience of 
powerlessness and the absence of choice okay…” (P5/L60-61) 
 
“…the fact that people get sectioned and forced the medication often, if they are not consenting to 
treatment, but first of all the experience of being locked away by force, and force the medication, 
replicates the very metaphorical essence of paranoia. So we can say from a psychoanalytic framework, 
the services are spot on colluding with the defence, and acting out against it. So already if we think for 
example that there is a link between trauma, subjective trauma history for someone who develops 
psychosis, they are traumatizing a person, making them worse by having no freedom and choice. That 
experience, materializes by the moment you are sectioned, it becomes a reality” (P9/L111-115) 
 
“Which essentially is a delusion of invasion or any of that kind; you can’t shut off something in your 
head. Like someone left the window open that cannot be closed. Now if you take this as a metaphor, as 
an embodied experience of something that may have happened in their life that often rings true when 
you work with psychotic people meaning they often had boundaries violations or they had no 
boundaries at all” (P10/L144-146) 
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“I did a one-day contract with the __________ for the victims of torture in__________, and I got my 
second patient, which was a woman, who came in and I could barely see her face. Literally what had 
happened, she repeatedly had her face distorted by acid by a group of men” (P20/L358-360) 
 
 
 
6. JOHN 
 
 
 
 
 
“Nearly always people with psychosis have some disturbance in their relationships, interpersonal 
relationships, consequent of what’s happening in their world which of course in itself might be 
consequent on problems of, in the outer world impinging on their inner world so it’s a circular issue” 
(P7/L22-23) 
 
“In summary I see everybody having varying degrees of vulnerability and facing life, facing life issues 
and we all have ways of circumventing, we all get tripped up when too much are happening and in the 
person with psychosis, they’ve usually had, a person who is having more acute psychosis, person has 
had either a or a series of things that have happened in their life, or not have happened, it could be 
disappointments, or failures that have overwhelmed their mind’s capacity to cope and emm…in my 
way of thinking this are much more affective experiences than cognitive experiences or the cognitions 
get disturbed as part of the process. But I see psychosis primarily as an affective disorder (p) although 
the way they’ve seen the world preceded psychosis will obviously have cognitive aspects. I do see 
nurture as having a very big role to play in the vulnerability of psychosis” (P8/L35-40) 
 
“Yeah, and suspiciousness of course, I mean I suppose that’s got an affective component, being 
suspicious and not trusting people. That’s obviously a feeling aspect to it. So the paranoia obviously, 
suspiciousness and lack of trust, emm…is a very common feature” (P10/L55-56) 
 
“People with psychosis have the difficulty in sustaining a relationship. That relationships readily break 
off, so this, so that’s (p) emm…” (P11/L60) 
 
“…and he was always on some kind of guard that he was going to be subject to something shameful 
humiliation, picked on him in some way, repeating a lot of his history, so he couldn’t sustain these kind 
of relationships with people, with peer groups” (P19/L137-138) 
 
“Affect was in the voices. And of course as well as having being on the receiving end of a lot of cruelty 
and humiliation, it meant he…quite detached from many things, in which he could own his own 
capacities to humiliate or be…actually be violent to others in the face of humiliation” (P22/L177-179) 
 
“…what comes to mind is that these patients are often very much on their own, which is both a source 
of safety and a great pain to them, existentially alone” (P28/L235-236) 
 
 
 
 
SUBTHEME 1.3: LOOKING AT SELF PROCESSES  
 
 
 
1. PAULA 
 
 
 
 
 
“…disintegration of somebody’s thoughts, sense of identity but also the being” (P7/L22-23) 
 
“Emm, I guess there is a very disrupted sense of self. Sense of identity really that people are lacking, a 
coherent story about themselves, who they are, apart from those experiences” (P9/L30-31) 
 
“Certainly the way that I see that are not being able to construct meaning out of the psychosis 
experiences, so explicitly on psychosis but also of their sense of self or past experiences that they may 
had and not sort of linking back together again” (P12/L47-48) 
 
“There is too much discontinuity and it’s impossible to put the links back again and that she has a 
coherent sense of self or how I would like her to have” (P12, L47-48) 
 
 
 
2. BARBARA 
 
 
 
 
 
“I would consider that the build-up towards it will be that some sort of gap started in terms of who 
they are and the direction of their going and then it was too much so they got psychotic” (P16/L53-55) 
 
“…and he was saying I’m, I don’t know...stories that his personality was taken from him. So there is 
something about not having...emm...I have now a client not being able to hold on to something” 
(P23/L86-87) 
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3. BETH 
 
 
 
 
“…especially with people with psychosis, I find it very difficult for them to understand that the other 
person has a different view from them, or you know, the theory of mind was a little difficult. The point 
that someone else is thinking something else or you know, they are not trying to hurt them, yeah. 
Separate from them and that sort of thing” (P5/L39-41) 
 
“Basically yes I do believe that most of them probably did have, do have problems with their sense of 
self. Some of them anyway, and they had difficulty separating their self from others, I imagine they 
have difficulty separating themselves from others but they seem very separate from others. So it was 
perhaps part of them trying to separate themselves from others, they have relational problems” 
(P36/L368-370)  
 
“…that some people with a diagnosis of psychosis would sit in front of a mirror, and look at 
themselves a lot. And I was told, oh people with psychosis have difficulty with mirrors and they 
shouldn’t have mirrors and they sit and look at themselves in the mirror. And I thought, I'm wondering 
why are they doing that. My hypothesis is that they don't know what they look like. Not really, but what 
I mean is that they have no sense of themselves, or a little sense of themselves…” (P37/L378-381) 
 
“And he was someone who had to me a very underdeveloped sense of self…” (P39/L394) 
 
“And yes, to me it was working, getting him to develop slowly his sense of self, by me reflecting what I 
see…” (P40/L408) 
 
“He was brought up pretty much, this was how I understood this, and him and his mother was the 
same thing. So we worked together how to develop his separate sense of self” (P40/L417-418) 
 
 
4. CARLA 
 
 
 
 
 
“The person is also fragmented, his internal world is fragmented and into several pieces which he…its 
difficult for him to put together. Yes, this disorganization and fragmentation is of vital importance” 
(P2/L13-14) 
 
“And this is because of the difficulty, often, in differentiating themselves from others, some basic 
boundaries, yes are not there. So they have a fragmented sense of self, yes, their identity is not whole, 
constantly disrupted. And it is threatening for them to come too close but threatening if you stay too far 
away from them as well” (P6/L28-30) 
 
“Careful to allow them the opportunity to develop a more stable sense of self. A sense of self, which is 
not solid but stable enough in time. And you know, when you come too close to them in many ways, 
even physically is, yes, it is difficult for them emm because they merge with you and they take the 
relationship as one.  The purpose is to help them to develop their autonomy and obviously before 
autonomy precedes dependence” (P12/L72-74) 
 
“I often find myself having to be more flexible but careful at the same time, because as I said before, or 
I didn’t, did I say about the boundary between self and other? I did yes, so often for the psychotic this 
is not there” (P11/L69-70) 
 
 
“And from there on we were able, and I must say that also with this patient, the issues with self and 
me, the other if you prefer, and making the difference were and still are there because we are still 
working together” (P33/L262) 
 
 
 
5. GEORGE 
 
 
 
 
 
“…to challenge their thinking and to realize what I am experiencing may not be what somebody else is 
experiencing” (P12/L184-185) 
 
“And I know that someone might say is dangerous, is without boundaries, but there again in the 
context of our interview, what people don’t often seem to realize is that by definition, a psychotic has 
no boundaries. There are not there. There is no separation between them and the world” (P21/L407-
409) 
 
“As I said, what you get with psychotics is that they don’t differentiate between that. Again because 
their experience is that of having a hole in their skull, there is not separation between them and the 
world anyway. It’s like, it’s a constant flux” (P29/L540-542) 
 
 
6. JOHN 
 
 
“Because well as you know, well sometimes there can be great confusion or loss of boundaries as one 
of the common features in the more severe psychosis a lot of being unable to differentiate between self 
and other, (p)…” (P14/L90-91) 
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“…try to blur the boundary between us, or locate something outside of our self which really belongs 
inside and so on…” (P26/L225) 
 
 
 
SUBTHEME 1.4: UNDERSTANDING INFORMED BY HOW 
THERAPIST IS AFFECTED 
 
 
 
1. PAULA 
 
 
 
“Sometimes the client has too much and sometimes once we start making some insights and the 
attachment gets too strong the clients would tend to back off more, avoiding me and me noticing that. 
With another client group I might be more challenging in terms of working with that, with this client 
group I might be more aware of it and allow it to happen to some degree by trying to hold something 
about, about them and what that tells me about formulation and understanding something about their 
difficulties…” (P15/L67-70) 
 
 
2. BARBARA 
 
 
 
“…emm…she went from foster house to foster house and she is very…very…spoilt. Emm she is very 
hurt…and she is sweet…very very sweet. And she creates like people want to adopt her. No, I don’t 
want to adopt her, I have my children and I don’t want to adopt her. I wouldn’t take her home. And I 
brought that to supervision. Now this was me talking...with my issue, in front of her, and see the way I 
felt, rejecting her in a way helped to understand about her own difficulties…” (P46/L204-207) 
 
 
3. BETH 
 
 
 
“We had very few histories, from people. So it is very difficult from me to know exactly, my feeling was 
that a lot of them had relational problems, so the common thing for me, they came from families who 
were either too much, most of them were you know there, but emotionally not at all. They basically had 
no one to, so no one reflected them, no proper communication no proper reflection, there was someone 
there giving them food, giving them money, but that was that, no sense of, you look nice you look 
beautiful today, you know no reflection. So to me the sense of self that some people didn't have was to 
do with that. That someone was there but it wasn't there. So a parent brought them up but it wasn't 
present. But that was the feeling because of how I felt in the relationship” (P36/L370-375) 
 
 
4. CARLA 
 
 
“So, when he is paranoid that I can read his mind, or I know what and how he is thinking about me or 
anything else, I understand it as, I try to (p) yes, I try to find my position in there, I mean my own 
responsibility let’s say. So yes, when I’m keeping my distance for this and that reason, to protect myself 
I understand the why and how for him. I have noticed that when I keep an emotional distance from 
him, he gradually becomes paranoid” (P20/L151-153) 
 
“And how the patients affect me, says a lot about how I understand what they are going through, and, 
yes, also what their psychosis is all about. And how I am affected, you see, says as well a lot about my, 
(p), yes my own difficulties” (P21/L161-162) 
 
“I have to make sure often, that he knows what I am thinking and how his stories impact me, and tell 
him, that, yes, that emm…that this is me and this is you. And I would say things like “you look like 
that’’, or “it seems to me that’’ you get what I mean, yes, as I said earlier, how his stories impact me 
allows me to understand him” (P33/L263-264) 
 
“But yes, with this patient the connection is strong, and it is important because, this is exactly why, I 
mean it is why we are able to understand his delusions, that why they are meaningful” (P34/L276-277) 
 
 
5. GEORGE 
 
 
 
 
“That is the essence of working intersubjectivity. Take his experiential world, bring it into the 
intersubjective space, and in fact we may have different approaches to it, but using that space to 
connect me to the person, and how it impacts me tells me what might be going on with them, to then 
allow them to open their mind further” (P21/L394-396) 
 
6. JOHN 
“Emm…my spontaneous response is that it can come in two ways. It can be, it can come across as a, 
as a lack of affect, a sort of split from affect, so the relationship is very dead, emm…(p) and I will 
experience this to my bone” (P21/L394-396) 
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“…but he couldn’t be able to make any playful gestures with his child and we got quite frustrated and 
thought we couldn’t understand what was actually happening and found ourselves getting down on the 
floor and playing with the child, with the toys that were there and so on, making noises with the fire 
engines and airplanes and this and that and it was great to get laughter from him. And afterwards we, 
me and my colleague, we were reflecting on this and thought my God I’m going back to the clinic and 
say that a I had been playing on the floor with children and so on, I’ll be very ashamed and humiliated 
and you know, what the hell are you doing and that was the important clue. We got to what was his 
problem. That, and that really helped. A really good understanding of him…” (P21/L394-396) 
 
“The degree of anxiety or feelings informed me, was very helpful and informed me about the patient’s 
subjectivity” (P21/L394-396) 
 
“The case when one’s responses parallel patient’s but in this case was such a powerful feeling and 
that’s why I put it together and it told me something about the patient. Suddenly it made me feel much 
more close to the patient” (P21/L394-396) 
 
 
 
MAJOR THEME 2: A RELATIONAL APPROACH TO THERAPY  
 
 
 
 
SUBTHEME 2.1: PRIORITISING AND MAPPING 
RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
 
1. PAULA 
 
 
 
“I am able to offer them a different type of relationship and I see that as having some value really. Its 
often not about recovery or change in the same way as I see it with other client groups. Sometime is 
about being there for the client being able to offer a different sort of relationship that they can learn 
from” (P13/L58-60) 
 
“Actually coming back to think about attachments. Sometimes the client has too much and sometimes 
once we start making some insights and the attachment gets too strong the clients would tend to back 
off more, avoiding me and me noticing that” (P15/L67-68) 
 
“But certainly there is [P] I think there are different ways in which she will be using this fantasy in 
that relationship and how she understands my role and my own involvement with that. So she might be 
defending not to get close and also [P] how she sees and makes sense of me” (P23/L121-123) 
 
“And it was I guess this was something that we talked not only with me but with the team as well and 
how he related to the team generally, that he would engage and form relationships and to open up 
about his experiences and then he pulled back. So it’s about sort of noticing that with him but also 
allow it in a way rather that pushing him and challenging to the degree that he needs to engage, that 
he has to think of that and that enables him to continue to work with me really” (P17/L87-90) 
 
“It would come up in the process. Noticing patterns, the here and now statements and what happens 
between us. So for example I’ve noticed that we get pulled in a fantasy, the formulas again” 
(P38/L178-179) 
 
 
2. BARBARA 
 
 
 
“…it’s better to talk about the there and now, so it doesn’t have to be about the there and then, so it’s 
like what’s happening within the unit, with the other people, before we speak about our relationship, or 
go on, on self disclosure…” (P14/L41-42) 
 
“…I am going back to the one I know for a long time, and there was a whole…that he would say, you 
know, every now and then would say “no, we are talking about what you want, not what I want”. And 
it kind of, and you need the connection in order to respect that, and follow that, and work with it, and 
not see it just as resistance…” (P66/L318-320) 
 
“…only like two weeks ago she said “I feel like I want to talk but I don’t manage to do it”. Ok, she 
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said that a few times, few times lately, quite a lot of times before, but only two weeks ago I understood 
that she means that she failed me, she disappointed me. So I feel like I need to talk, but I don’t manage 
to do it, I feel like I should talk, I should be a good client, I should talk and I don’t manage to do it. So 
that after nine months (laughing). I think I understand what she says. It’s more…yeah” (P70/L344-
347) 
 
“We have another six months, so we have started talking about it now. On the last session, the last, last 
session, it was really, almost kind of talking about that, you know, talking about us, what’s missing, 
what’s not there” (P81/L410-411) 
 
“But for me, the main work, and she did, and she is in a very different place now, and the main work 
was, with her peers. So she had very very intense relationships with other girls, and there is another 
girl, a close friend, and we were looking at that connection. We were sort of observing what happens 
for her there and looking at it” (P81/L415-417) 
 
 
3. BETH 
 
 
	
“…but the relationship is so important, and especially for these people, not so much with people in 
disabilities, but with people with psychosis. It’s so important to be able to make a relationship to, make 
relationship with themselves, in order to be able to relate to somebody else. Yeah” (P3/L26-27) 
 
“So I work very much with how I feel, you know with the other person, countertransference emm…and 
how they behave with other people…” (P5/L33-34) 
 
“What I, what I consider very interrelational, emm...is, I, use myself a lot. And, and the work. So, my 
relationship with them, you know, how they view me, or how I view them, emm…or you know, when 
they shout, how I’d feel, or you know…” (P15/L111-113) 
 
“So, emm...trying to be as present as possible with them when they were there. So I would, you know, 
bring up you know, on occasions when I thought was helpful, a feeling, you know I was whatever, how 
they made me feel, and always explain why I did it, so they can understand that by, by, by bonding with 
me, or you know, emm...creating a relationship with me, that way would also create a relationship with 
themselves and be able to create relationships with people outside. So that kind of, I, yeah, consider 
interrelational, and let’s say intersubjective” (P15/L115-119) 
 
“…emm...and very much on sort of management of relationships. So if he had difficulties with people 
out, you know, outside of the room let’s say, outside you know, in the residential home, which he did 
have a lot of difficulties, we would you know, talk about that, but also I would any, any opportunity I 
could, you know grasp, I would used to, how do you feel with me, what do you think I’m thinking, 
emm...this is what I feel, emm…” (P19/L149-151) 
 
“…that basically there is a reason people are doing whatever they are doing and he was you know, a 
responsibility for the relationship, for what had happened between me and him. I had responsibility 
and I don’t often become angry but when I did, I did express it a bit because I thought it was very 
important for him to understand how someone else feels…” (P23/L231-233) 
 
“…but you know, this, I really also took into account how he related to everybody else in the 
residential home…” (P23/L258-259) 
 
“...and was able to throughout our relationship, and the relationships he had with other people, in the 
apartment, he was able to, I think to be more open with himself, and learn to defuse situations and 
when he did have problems with people or people had problems with him, he was able to take some 
time and then discuss it with them, through the therapy...” (P24/L290-292) 
 
 
 
4. CARLA 
 
 
“The therapist tests his abilities a number of times and this is something that puts the relationship, 
transference and countertransference on the spot” (P1/L3-4) 
 
“And I was losing him, and he was losing me. But we both tried hard you see. We were both part of 
this, and it was difficult for both of us. I actually think that it was more difficult for myself for a while. 
But when I said, because I did, I said to him how it was difficult for me, obviously I was, yes very, very 
careful how I said what I said but yes…” (P17/L115-117) 
 
“…we take his disconnection together and slowly, slowly explore it. And what often happens, which is 
in the context, I mean in working and considering intersubjectivity, the disconnection is found and, yes, 
found in the between us, so it is explored within the context of therapy, not only, because of course you, 
we explore, yes, other significant relationships, but our relationship is vital, and it happens right there, 
there, so yes, we take considerable time to see what happens between us” (P19/L142-145) 
 
“I mean, we were exploring, his relationships with other people, his father and the dead mother, of 
course, yes, but I was finding it difficult to invite him to explore what was happening between the two 
of us. It often felt to me, very often that if I go closer something terrible would have happened…” 
(P32/L249-251) 
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5. GEORGE 
 
 
 
 
“I asked him why it was important to have explosives in the session. And then he said I just wanted to 
simply see how you would react to this. And then I said I am mostly intrigued. And then I said 
something around, I wonder whether it’s important to know you can blow the situation up if it became 
too much. He said yes, that would actually be quite helpful, but it is actually just water. So I said I get 
that. But the whole point I’m trying to make here it is about something, it’s something about finding 
meaning in these things and understanding them intersubjectively. So for him the fantasy of a bottle 
that explodes was something that he brought in to test how far or close he can get to me, whether I 
could manage his madness, his anxiety and so on” (P15/L247-251) 
 
“We went from there and in the end we managed to get to what was really at hand, which is putting 
boundaries in relationships. There have been none with his relationship with parents. They were still in 
contact irregularly, and when unwell they would call him, every three weeks, and getting so annoyed 
that he would throw his phone and broke it and step on it, and then he had to buy a new disposable 
phone, which is quite expensive for him because he's on benefits but it was his only way of 
disconnecting. So rather than being worried about that, we thought about different ways of 
disconnecting” (P15/L270-273) 
 
“And I would comment on people’s capacity for proximity. I would say things like “It feels like you 
can’t let me in there” or “it feels like I came too close” or “it feels like you want to come closer to 
me”” (P29/L534-535) 
 
 
6. JOHN 
 
 
 
 
“So to some extent the most important thing is, I think building up a sense that you care, actually that 
you care about them and you recognize that they’ve got long term vulnerabilities even though that 
might be painful for them to acknowledge that, and that as far as possible you are there for the long 
term” (P11/L64-66) 
 
“…with more time, the voices could be more integrated as a meaningful part, not just of his inner 
world but also in his intersubjective world as well. Relationships are real, important issues. Vital to his 
future. To be able to be managed, and work with them” (P22/L191-192) 
 
“…so I asked him, what was the worst thing that can happen today? So starting from…so what’s the 
worst thing that I could do to you? So he was able to say that he was terrified that I was going to put 
him into the hospital.  So I allowed him for me to be the worse person or that person that could do the 
worse thing he could imagine. And working the between” (P24/L204-206) 
 
“Or what’s the consequence of me having not done this, or said this, on, on, the relationship between 
us. So, I mean I suppose, a simple answer is in a way being prepared to voice out what’s happening in 
the interface between us. If there is something which needs thought” (P26/L219-221) 
 		
SUBTHEME 2.2: THE USE OF FIRST AND SECOND PERSON 
PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
 
1. PAULA 
 
 
“…he would engage and form relationships and to open up about his experiences and then he pulled 
back. So it’s about sort of noticing that with him…” (P17/L88-89) 
 
2. BARBARA 
 
 
 
 
“…and today you know when we were going towards the end of therapy he knows exactly how I feel 
towards him. He knows the difficult times; he knows things that now we can talk about it freely and 
about the connection between us and that’s because it was there all along. You know it didn’t just 
happen. I made a few times a conscious decision...” (P32/L128-130) 
 
“These are things that I still grapple with. I think I bring more and more of myself into the therapy 
room” (P43/L189-190) 
 
“So I would bring my opinion, I would bring the way I perceive sometimes the way I...feel about them, 
later stages, I can also laugh sometimes when it's not appropriate, I blush, I can emm...become sad, 
show it, and talk about a mistake I did last session. But this is all...this is all, with the idea...even if it's 
not deliberate, it's towards them. Trying to be...sometimes I would also take a conscious decision not to 
bring some things. Or what's difficult for me in the relationship with them, sometimes is not the right 
time for them to know. Maybe later on, but that would be delaying it” (P48/L225-228) 
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“…but for me was also connected towards the relational approach. I really see the connection there. 
And for him to really know what I feel towards him, to be aware of what I think about him and how I 
am with him” (P53/L247-248) 
 
“That’s the place that I can possibly connect with…or I can talk about myself and see how it translates 
to her, and I can’t speak from her end obviously, but I can say how it echoes, but I can speak about 
myself and then see if this, something I said about it works” (P84/L432-434) 
 
3. BETH 
 
 
 
 
“…I suppose it’s a person-centred word, congruence. Emm...or let’s say presence. So, emm...trying to 
be as present as possible with them when they were there. So I would, you know, bring up you know, on 
occasions when I thought was helpful, a feeling, you know I was whatever, how they made me feel, and 
always explain why I did it…” (P15/L115-117) 
 
“I had responsibility and I don’t often become angry but when I did, I did express it a bit because I 
thought it was very important for him to understand how someone else feels…” (P23/L232-233) 
 
“…and expressing all, I’m sad, I feel sad that you are hearing these voices. Must be very difficult” 
(P19/L177-178) 
 
“And, the main work I did was reflecting and bringing myself fully into what was happening. He would 
be like “oh so you're thinking this, and you must be thinking that” so very paranoid, a lot of paranoid 
thoughts” (P39/L395-397) 
 
“I will start with the reflection bit. He was someone who, I will basically say, you know reflect 
something, or talking about his positive bits, and really he wouldn’t believe me, and I would sort of, 
you know when you say this you look like this, and you know when you look anxious you are doing this, 
or whatever” (P40/L401-403) 
 
“…and I kept on saying well you know, I can see someone who is feeling anxious and you know I can 
see that from your brows, or from your sweat or you know because I was trained in that way. Or your 
eyes are doing this and your face looks a little bit more red, looks you've got more blood in your head, 
you got emotional or whatever, or you’re anxious. And yes, to me it was working, getting him to 
develop slowly his sense of self, by me reflecting what I see and slowly, slowly believing what I was 
seeing…” (P40/L406-409) 
 
“…so with this last example is that I used myself more than I would with someone else who hasn't got 
so many paranoid thoughts. I brought more of what I was thinking into the play. So yes maybe I use 
myself a bit more with people that are more paranoid” (P44/L454-456) 
 
4. CARLA 
 
 
 
	
“I would let him know how I am affected by his stories, his feelings, their, yes (p). Because it is very 
important to let him know how he affects me, and us, the dyad, he hasn’t learned that so far in life. If 
he knows how I am affected he is more able to understand his own position between the two of us, I’m 
not sure if you follow?” (P18/L132-134) 
 
“But when I said, because I did, I said to him how it was difficult for me, obviously I was, yes very, 
very careful how I said what I said but yes, he was very cooperative…” (P17/L117) 
 
“So in this cases, I need to find all the possible, yes possible ways to let him know that I have my own 
mind and, and I am processing things differently than him. So, yes, I would talk to him deliberately, I 
mean I would do a lot of mirroring and describe to him what I see, and how I see him, and what I 
reckon he is experiencing etc.” (P19/L140-142) 
 
“…so for example he will say something about his mother who killed herself or something about 
mothers generally, or anything and it might sound very psychotic and paranoid, so I will tell him how I 
honestly feel and think about it. Which often, yes, there is trouble with this but I have to, yes” 
(P22/L174-176) 
 
“Everything was different, I was more transparent, more available, and you see, I was open about this, 
I felt that I had to let him know that I felt different and told him about my way, of, of (p) my 
understanding anyway of the relationship changed” (P33/L260-261) 
 
“I have to make sure often, that he knows what I am thinking and how his stories impact me, and tell 
him, that, yes, that emm…that this is me and this is you. And I would say things like “you look like 
that’’, or “it seems to me that’’ you get what I mean, yes, as I said earlier, how his stories impact me 
allows me to understand him” (P33/L263-264) 
 
 
5. GEORGE 
 
“…and I have worked at an interpersonal level with them that other people would have been mortified 
by, including things like self-disclosure, not traumatic things about myself, not anything about my life 
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background, and so on, but be able to say that of course life it's maddening at times, that feeling is 
reality…” (P9/L127-129) 	
“I use my own response to the person, the patient, to inform what I think is going on with them, I 
sometimes use my own reaction to them to help them to make sense of experiences, which with some 
psychotic people can be helpful because they often have no awareness of the impact they have on 
others” (P14/L216-218) 
 
“That is something I do, and I would sometimes share that experience. I would say, it is, my felt sense 
of you is like that. This is what I feel you are experiencing. I do, do that immediately with patients to 
build up a connection…” (P19/L340-341) 
 
“…be really transparent and explain why I do what I do. So I would say I’m putting this out here, and 
this is how I feel and we can look at it. It doesn’t mean that I want you to feel this, or this and this” 
(P22/L421-422) 
 
“In a very basic nutshell is me turning out what I believe they are experiencing. And offering this on 
the plate. As in, I'm sorry I am offering plate you probably cannot see it. So this is what I think you're 
experiencing here, look at it, if you can relate with it, let's go there together, I would go with you. Let's 
go into his feelings, let's go into the experiences. That is the essence of working intersubjectivity” 
(P21/L392-394) 
 
“…something I think that works very, very well with people is mirroring, it's just reflecting back to 
them what is going on so that they can see that you can see it. Which is hugely rewarding for them. So 
that’s an intervention I would say I do intersubjectively and it helps a lot” (P21/L403-404) 
 
“And I would comment on people’s capacity for proximity. I would say things like “It feels like you 
can’t let me in there” or “it feels like I came too close” or “it feels like you want to come closer to 
me” (P29/L534-535) 
 
 
 
 
SUBTHEME 2.3: THE FLEXIBILITY OF BOUNDARIES  
 
 
 
1. PAULA 
 
 
“But it felt that it was a huge thing for him to start to open up all of those details so he would...he back 
off and then he would engage and my team allows the possibility for that, than I am there available. I 
mean in the team we hold a caseload of 100 clients that would disengage and engage again. So he 
disengaged and said he didn’t want to work anymore but then he wanted to come back in and wanted 
to reengage with psychology” (P17/L84-87)  
 
 
 
2. BARBARA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“So they have somebody who is in charge, like an occupational counsellor, in the unit there are social 
guides or social counsellors I don’t know what to call them, they have therapy twice a week with their 
personal therapist, groups and all kind of other things. So we see them twice a week for 45 minutes. 
And then in the kitchen, and in the field trips and in parties etc etc etc. But that’s our time with them” 
(P40/L173-176) 
 
“…I tried to contact her and she wouldn't talk to me and then she cancelled and the day before 
meeting she harmed herself very severely and she said I was really...emm..and I took her to the 
hospital, and they wouldn't hospitalize her and we had to spent together 8-9 hours so we had a long 
time (laughs) to talk about things emm get (P) emm but that was, that was leaving my role…” 
(P46/L209-212) 
 
“...and I think that loving them as clients is the caring part, it’s to enhance what I believe it is good to 
enhance, to change, and yes I...(P). I...you know, I am looking to change people. I am thinking that 
possibly to love somebody as a person you don’t really...you need not to be focused on changing them 
but as for clients then yes...” (P37/L157-158) 
 
“And then there are times that I start to get jealous of the guys who spent more time with them. And 
they can just talk to them, you know be with them and get something that…emm…(P). Of a different, 
like more like person-to-person rather than therapist to a client. Obviously for the guides are still a 
client, it’s still not friendship. It’s different” (P41/L179-182) 
 
“...you know to, to get to know them outside…well not just. To get to know them outside the therapy 
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room and I imagine to get them to know me in different set. Kind of like. And they are very young 
(laughs) but I can see how my younger self could be their friend emm sort of like how I could (p) have 
them…well my kids are very very young so they are too young but how I could have them as friends of 
my kids. Something that is not just sort of clients” (P42/L184-186) 
 
“As a person or as a therapist? Because it’s not the same thing. Because I think (P). As a person is like 
uncovering your vulnerability to any other person, so you make yourself more vulnerable and it kind of 
creates you know…lowering defences and it’s the same as gaining and loosing from relationships in 
general. As a therapist (p) I think that I’m sort of exploring now, occupied, preoccupied by…is…I think 
you can do…you can show all kind of aspects of yourself as long as is in the service of the client. As a 
therapist to create something that is outside, to abandon this position of the therapist I think it would 
be misconduct” (P44/L195-198) 
 
“A professional love towards them. So no need to love them as persons but that I need to love them as 
clients. So, I know, I don’t think it’s interfering with my countertransference because I can still...they 
can still annoy me and I can still hate them at the same time but I feel, for me the first stage of therapy 
is to find this and if I can’t find it then things get very difficult. It becomes difficult when they don’t 
enter your heart, sort of becoming a significant other for the treatment, becoming something that I 
can...that I want to work with, feel connected with” (P36/L149-152) 
 
“My role in our unit it’s not just the psychologist. I am also a case manager. So, I’m also, should be, 
not always but I should be in contact with the occupational counselor, and the guides, the 
psychiatrists, and the dietitian, and…when it’s time to move a stage, you know, every 3-4 months, I do 
case presentations, so we are very involved in their life. With their parents, and there are parents’ 
meetings at times. So we are very involved in their lives” (P81/L418-420) 
 
 
3. BETH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“…for most of the time we worked with, I saw him about 3-4 times a week, which is very unusual, it’s 
not something I do. Emm...I don’t work psychoanalytically, but because he was, he would come up with 
thoughts and suicidal thoughts and it was probably more to keep my attention going, but it was a way 
of relating…” (P16/L132-134) 
 
“…so he, we organized that he, you know spent half a day working in the kitchen, with the cook. It was 
very unusual, it wasn’t something, you know, they did there because they were scared, he had actually 
done four suicidal attempts, and one of them was with a knife. So we were extremely worried about 
him. But he has, that was quite a long time ago, we were, we were ok about him doing it. Emm…about 
him going into the kitchen, that’s what I mean, and using a knife. Anyway, so we organized this, and I 
was part of organizing it…” (P23/L216-220) 
 
“...you know how very helpful it is to be more present, and bring yourself more to the relationship and 
because we didn't just do therapy together, we, I also go for coffee with the other residents, which is 
part of them getting out in the community, and we also go to meetings for them, to find a job, or going 
to a group, or to the theatre, so my role isn't just to do the therapy and go. They see me in other 
realms, so we sit in the kitchen and have a coffee, and then we do therapy” (P24/L275-277) 
 
“…and I had this thought of bringing a mirror so that he would look at himself. Anyway, I didn't go 
ahead with doing that but I actually took him out of the room and had him in front of the bathroom 
mirror, so we did quite a lot of work with reflection. It isn't something that I have done before, in the 
bathroom in front of the mirror, but I do think it was helpful. He didn't believe what I was saying. He 
was very stuck with the thoughts he had, that he was very ill and he was very psychotic, and there was 
something wrong with him and I kept on saying well you know, I can see someone who is feeling 
anxious and you know I can see that from your brows, or from your sweat…” (P40/L403-407) 
 
“...he developed a bit of an attachment to me, and although I explained that I was married, and you 
know, the sort of, roles that I have, the different role, how he can form a relationship with, how he can 
do that, and that sort of thing. He had, you know, he had considered that we can have a relationship, 
so I have explained very clearly, so this thing was very present, that I wasn't interested in a 
relationship with him, and why, and yes, this was too much for me, boundaries were shaken, and so, 
and this was, intruding” (P23/L262-265) 
 
“So yes, although I was anxious about, about us having a rupture in the relationship, I wanted to be 
clear and I didn't worry that I was probably, not quite unbounded, because I come from a, my training 
is quite psychoanalytic, the doctorate had very much boundaries, and how much you use yourself, I 
mean I have done other trainings, a lot of work with myself, you know how very helpful it is to be more 
present, and bring yourself more to the relationship and because we didn't just do therapy together, 
we, I also go for coffee with the other residents, which is part of them getting out in the community, 
and we also go to meetings for them, to find a job, or going to a group, or to the theatre, so my role 
isn't just to do the therapy and go. They see me in other realms, so we sit in the kitchen and have a 
coffee, and then we do therapy. So, there I was worried about, always worried about, the boundary 
thing, I was trying to be as clear as I can, and be open, listen to, if he was angry, I don't know, I was, 
because I will be in therapy but also, other than that going out for coffee...” (P24/273-278) 
 
					 299 
 
4. CARLA 
 
 
	
“See, even though I am psychoanalytically trained, and I am very careful with boundaries and all that, 
and yes, I do know how important are, with a psychotic the story is different. I mean, yes, what I mean 
is that the process is different and the therapist creates the boundaries in different ways compared to 
other clients. I often find myself having to be more flexible but careful at the same time...” (P11/L67-
69) 
 
“So, he came and asked for an earlier session and at the beginning I said, “no, no, we have in two 
hours time I would see you then”. And he banged the door again and again, the third time I gave up. I 
said “Ok, I’ll see you an hour earlier than the session” that, the, and I could smell trouble. Ok, so I did 
that consciously, thinking that Ok, this is an in-between solution…” (P23/L180-182) 
 
“…and I remember that I did take it from his hands and put it here, I sat down and I said “Now this is 
well protected. And I think that we can do something about you as well”. That was all I said. But I did 
things, Ok. I was, I even touched his fingers maybe, I can’t remember to be honest. But again, with 
psychosis you need to, I mean there must be flexibility” (P24/L192-194) 
 
“Yes, responding, but also moving inside this room maybe either frightened him a lot that I was losing 
it, because I was out of my usual way of working or was a response that also was responded not only in 
the real respect, you know, putting it here and in the symbolic respect as well…” (P25/L196-197) 
 
“You see, the settings someone works in are very powerful. I mean, yes, so I see the patient outside of 
the therapy room, because I can’t and they can’t avoid it. And sometimes it’s helpful but other times 
no. So the boundaries are different, change, and on the other hand you can’t do something differently. 
Working with psychosis needs to, someone needs to be prepared to challenge their boundaries, yes, I 
mean you can see from this very example” (P31/L230-233) 
 
5. GEORGE 
 
 
 
 
“I have in the community in the NHS broken about every rule in terms of therapy that you are not 
supposed to break so often worked in people's homes, because I found it gave me a concrete insight 
into their lives, into their life world, and I have worked at an interpersonal level with them that other 
people would have been mortified by, including things like self-disclosure, not traumatic things about 
myself, not anything about my life background, and so on…” (P9/L126-129) 
 
“And because he had such a sense of disempowerment, I agreed with the care coordinator and the 
psychiatrist that I was going to get him dentures…we had already spent hours getting there because 
underground was not an option, we took the bus and I had to sit next to him on the bus and there was a 
promise, and while on the bus we had an agreement, we had to talk about horror movies because for 
whatever reason this made him feel safe. So we were on the bus, talking very loudly about horror 
movies…” (P15/L253-259) 
 
“One thing I just realized is that I need a cigarette. Something I have done a lot with psychotic 
patients, we smoked together. And many colleagues of mine would go “you cannot do that”. I find it 
tremendously helpful” (P31/L570-571) 
 
“As a controversial statement I quite happily live in a world with psychotic people on the street and 
would find it much more enjoyable, and indeed often have asked me, are you not afraid in going in 
such a person’s house and work with them? No I’m not” (P34/L591-593) 
 
“I was working with someone on the same unit and we had put what we called the sensory room, so 
that was about very primitive stimulation, so through light, through music, anything that was for 
embodiment soothing, and I had a very disturbed patient who could not at all manage the 
interpersonal proximity because there was too much confrontation. So with him I would work in the 
dark, he’ll be laying on a bin bag in one corner of the room, and I would lay on another bin bag in 
another corner and I would switch off the lights so that he wouldn’t see me. We would talk and it was 
going perfectly well” (P34/L595-599) 
 
6. JOHN  
 
 
 
 
“That you (p) it means, to, not to a masochistic degree, but organize your life in an appropriate 
professional way that patients don’t suffer too much from your own other issues in your own life, being 
reliable and so on. So (p) and I think being prepared for times when things are very difficult for 
patients. You know, you can’t control everything with a psychotic patient, you can’t control, and limits 
over the therapeutic process. Things happen in patients’ life so a degree of flexibility is important, 
that’s more so than you would with a non-psychotic patient, in being flexible in ones arrangements, 
ones responsiveness and so on…” (P11/L67-70) 
 
“…sometimes a spontaneous gesture in which one does something outside of the norm that can be 
helpful. I don’t do this in a planned way, but I can remember working with an asylum seeker patient 
with psychosis who had, who was very on the edge…emm…and I think she was pregnant at the time 
and suddenly there was a crisis and she had to move at the weekend, and having got any sort of 
facilities and no money and things like that and I found myself with the care coordinator actually 
physically helping her move some heavy, you know washing machine you know things like that from 
one thing to another, and that meant a lot to her that I was prepared to do that” (P12/L77-81) 
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“…one day I went for a walk with him for a session, and I can’t remember the circumstances that 
provoked that but just seemed the right thing to do, talk to him in a less formal setting and that meant 
an enormous amount to him. It had reduced…that he can do something normal with me and that I was 
prepared to come alongside him. So there are sort of practical times when, when obviously you have to 
be quite thoughtful about this and reflect about it and so on because you can end up feeling pressured 
and being something that you can sustain and it’s perhaps not helpful to sustain but this gesture I think 
means a lot to patients, who have lacked that experience of having a genuine, people being out there 
for them” (P13/L83-87) 
 
“…but he couldn’t be able to make any playful gestures with his child and we got quite frustrated and 
thought we couldn’t understand what was actually happening and found ourselves getting down on the 
floor and playing with the child, with the toys that were there and so on, making noises with the fire 
engines and airplanes and this and that and it was great to get laughter from him” (P14/L100-102) 
 
 
 
MAJOR THEME 3: THERAPIST’S PROCESSES IN THE 
RUPTURE OF RELATEDNESS 
 
 
 
SUBTHEME 3.1: SENSE OF AUTONOMY THREATENED 
 
 
 
 
 
1. PAULA 
 
 
 
 
“I think it makes me back off a bit. Probably, erm even to a degree, it might sound extreme but sort of 
dissociate a little bit. I guess I see myself from as her. Finding it very difficult to make sense of what I 
am sort of seeing. I guess I feel something’s thrown at me” (P28/L141-143) 
 
“I guess there are moments of reflection and challenge and quite recently I had a quite significant 
reflection with somebody about them acknowledging how they had a fantasy that I could look after 
him. And that was sort of a replacement for someone they worked in the past with whom they had a 
good relationship with and then he experienced the loss, and then that I am not always going to be 
here and I can’t actually do that. That as much as other people have let you down and rejected you I 
will too. And to be able to sort of sit with that” (P56/L264-267) 
 
 
2. BARBARA 
 
 
 
 
“Emm she is very hurt…and she is sweet…very very sweet. And she creates like people want to adopt 
her. No, I don’t want to adopt her, I have my children and I don’t want to adopt her. I wouldn’t take 
her home” (P46/L205-206) 
 
“No. No. All I said is that I am not a hugging person etc. When we talked for the 8 hours no. I kind of 
understood that this is not what I can bring to her, at least not at this stage. This was too much for me, 
it was already an intrusion” (P47/L214-215) 
 
“If what was going on is the lack of connectivity and I feel threatened possibly by it, then I’m tensed” 
(P94/L486-487) 
 
 
3. BETH 
 
“...he developed a bit of an attachment to me, and although I explained that I was married, and you 
know, the sort of, roles that I have, the different role, how he can form a relationship with, how he can 
do that, and that sort of thing. He had, you know, he had considered that we can have a relationship, 
so I have explained very clearly, so this thing was very present, that I wasn't interested in a 
relationship with him, and why, and yes, this was too much for me, boundaries were shaken, and so, 
and this was, intruding” (P23/L262-265) 
 
4. CARLA 
 
 
“Which as you can see, emm it is…yes very difficult for the therapist to find the right distance from 
these persons, not only for them but also for ourselves as therapists. It becomes, emm yes often 
becomes very difficult for me as the therapist to find the ways to come close, it’s frightening, especially 
at the beginning” (P6/L30-32)  
 
“But I’m thinking of a patient now who, he is very young, 24 years, and yes, he is very attached to me, 
and he was like this from the beginning. In our relationship it is me who finds it difficult to contain, 
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hmm (P)…to contain his dependence on me. Sometimes is unbearable, I find myself wanting to stop the 
session. I don’t obviously. But, yes, his needs to come closer to me, physically, symbolically, 
emotionally are too much” (P7/L36-38) 
 
“With _________ g I have to be very careful, with my responses. I have to, yes, be careful how much I 
give to him. Yesterday for example we had our session and, yeah, this is difficult for me talking about it 
now. No, not difficult because I don’t want to tell you, for, you know any reason, but it feels difficult 
now thinking about him” (P7/L40-42) 
 
“To come close to me. I felt threatened. Yes, it was like that” (P14/L89) 
 
“But, see the patient was full on with his psychotic stories and I felt lost. I didn’t know from where I 
could start. And then I shared my experience as openly and clearly as possible, and yes, I was 
transparent. But it was clear to me afterwards that something happened with my autonomy. See, my, 
my autonomy was shaken to say the least.  Gosh, it was difficult. Very difficult” (P16/L109-111) 
 
“I mean, in this particular case, the patient was frightened to come closer to me emotionally but I was 
scared as well. And I am thinking, I mean I can think of many moments were I would approach him, 
and he would allow me access to his emotional world and it would become too much for me. And 
that’s, I mean coming closer to him, meant that I was becoming closer to parts of myself that I didn’t 
know existed to a certain, yes, to a certain extent” (P18/L123-125) 
 
“...yes, space to realise, sit with his autonomy. And mine of course (p) (laughing). See although, yes, I 
mean I find myself often thinking where is the patient, where is me, us in the room, yes it happens often, 
this in and out it’s vital. Very vital, I mean if I don’t pull back from the work, it feels like I am creating 
obstacles between us because I need my space” (P22/L167-169) 
 
“Sometimes he, he would come and say things like, “I wonder how would it be like if I saw you naked, 
and we had sex together” and then, yes, so, he wants to come closer, and then you see, this often the 
case. It’s the boundaries again, and of course you have to be careful, but I don’t want him closer, no I 
don’t. And I would go into internal monologues, saying things emm…like “go away from me”, my 
independence is shaken, and it becomes difficult to follow but, yes, with patience we go there, I mean, I 
deal with it. It is also a matter of autonomy, which is often sabotaged you know, I mean it’s a common 
thing when working with psychosis, for me at least” (P34/L273-275) 
 
 
5. GEORGE 
 
“When it becomes overwhelming for me, so I’m on a physical level a very freaky person. I’m very up-
close with people, I’m very touchy. That doesn’t bother me. It starts to bother me when I sense that 
there is a complete disillusion of boundaries, and when I actually start feeling that this is going a bit 
mad and when I actually start to experience a full sense of madness which I’m not comfortable with. 
And that usually feels, happens when I feel I have lost all differentiation and I no longer know where is 
me, where is them”(P30/LP22-23) 
 
 
6. JOHN 
 
 
“So it’s inevitable that (p) almost inevitable that the distortions will appear and manifest themselves in 
the intersubjective relationship with the therapist. As well as of course with family members and those 
distortions can be, can cause problems in their own right for myself as a therapist.  It can be 
distressing, disturbing, confusing, painful, shameful, humiliating, intruding, so an essential capacity of 
the therapist is to do what they can to contain the impact of the distortions within themselves, manage 
them...” (P7/L25-28) 
 
“Because well as you know, well sometimes there can be great confusion or loss of boundaries as one 
of the common features in the more severe psychosis a lot of being unable to differentiate between self 
and other, (p) and to some extent one might sometimes find oneself doing things and only afterwards 
realize what was getting caught up into...” (P14/L90-92) 
 
“It was demanding work because at times it was very confusing, the voices were not quite easy to 
understand at times, and his change, his state, the voices would come and go a lot, sometimes they 
could be almost magically disappearing and then they came back again, like a chorus.  So it was hard 
work, to my relationship with him” (P21/L154-165) 
 
“I mean I suppose a common thing is that we like to feel ourselves as helpful but you can get stuck and 
actually there is something you are overlooking, completely left out, in which the opposite is actually 
something hoping to be held in some way but it can be speakable about, and not think about it either. 
It’s…it’s too narcissistically wounding or something like that. And there, there is responsibility. 
Responsibility falls on me (P27/L230-232) 
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SUBTHEME 3.2: DISRUPTION OF REFLECTIVE CAPACITIES 
AND CONTRADICTIONS  
 
 
 
1. PAULA 
 
“She will often call people silly names. There are times when she would say, oh I have seen you earlier 
today, and I have already had a conversation with you. I spoke with the invisible you. Or there was a 
time when she called me the pixie lady for about a year. I guess, I think this is a very difficult case and 
sometimes it’s almost impossible to reflect upon these things” (P23/L118-120) 
 
“I mean, I have a formulation, but there is too much there to make sense of. There is too much 
discontinuity and it’s impossible to put the links back again and that she has a coherent sense of self or 
how I would like her to have” (P27/L138-139) 
 
“Well it’s difficult really. I mean for the most part, I tend to think of my role in the NHS really and it 
can just be totally confusing. Exhausting. I recently receive more of psychodynamic supervision 
because I have been supervised for a long time from a CBT perspective and not from long-term 
psychotherapy approach supervision but that’s their main approach and I’ve realised that this didn’t 
allow me to reflect on this and other things [P]”(P33/L161-163)  
 
 
2. BARBARA 
 
“I don’t know what’s the other one, I know, I can imagine there is emm…a more connected 
explanation, because this is again something, from, nothing connected so I don’t, I, I, don’t have an 
image for (p) you to form an understanding or to feel what’s going on, except from the fact that there is 
nothing to hold on to” (P67/L329-331) 
 
“I think its unease. It’s restless. It’s irritating. Not in the sense of being angry at them, because 
sometimes I can’t find the words for feelings, so it’s not that, it’s like an internal irritation, you know 
this is not right, it’s something that it’s not working” (P76/L382-383) 
 
“Emm…to do that, my part, I need to make connections. It’s kind of, it’s the beginning and not 
sometimes thinking that that’s the work itself, it’s just to make the connection and if that doesn’t 
happen in three years and that’s fine. It’s not. I mean it is, also because sometimes it’s just the way it 
is. And that’s a struggle. Struggle to bring it, to talk about it. Not let it slight away. I don’t know. There 
must be a feeling, which describes it.  Do you know what that is” (P78/L391-394)    
 
“But I don’t have a sense of…so, if I don’t have a sense, I don’t know, I also don’t know myself in it. 
Because I don’t have a sense, because I can’t put it on her, I can’t put it on me. I don’t know. So I can’t 
just describe openly what’s happening” (P81/L404-406) 
 
3. BETH 
 
“...and although I explained that I was married, and you know, the sort of, roles that I have, the 
different role, how he can form a relationship with, how he can do that, and that sort of thing. He had, 
you know, he had considered that we can have a relationship, so I have explained very clearly, so this 
thing was very present, that I wasn't interested in a relationship with him, and why, and yes, this was 
too much for me, boundaries were shaken...” (P23/L262-265)  
 
 “This person needed something very specific, you know this is what you can do and this is what you 
can't do, so building boundaries so that he, he will know what's, right and what wasn't. Because it was 
very confusing as he had said” (P24/L269-270) 
 
 
4. CARLA 
 
“We work together for almost two years now, no, that is wrong; I think a little bit more. Actually 
almost three years? You see what is happening here already, thinking about this patient makes me 
block, not thinking as I normally do” (P8/L44-45) 
 
“Well, spot on (laughing). I also said earlier on, you know, when I was thinking about how many years 
we are working together with this patient, and I gave a wrong answer, I mean, confusion, do you see 
what I mean? (p) So I guess it’s also a matter of omnipotence and after so many years of experience I 
still, often, yes get caught up in it, and there is confusion, when coming closer to him I feel attacked 
symbolically, my thoughts, and it is very strong. I mean, it is many things together. So I kind of, find it 
difficult to think properly...” (P21/L157-160) 
 
“This is the beauty of working relationally. I mean it comes naturally to me, yes, and I don’t find it 
difficult. I can think of difficult moments, yes, but generally speaking it is easy. I mean, I don’t know, 
particularly, yes (P)” (P20/L149-150)  
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“I have noticed that when I keep an emotional distance from him, he gradually becomes paranoid. I 
mean, it is very implicit, but it happened a lot of times. So it is the whole thing, yes, around I want you 
to come closer. Which is not difficult to me, but yes” (P20/L153-154) 
 
 “...you know sometimes it was very difficult to understand what he was saying, I couldn’t follow his 
stories, and I couldn’t connect with his emotions...” (P33/L257-258)  
 
 “I mean, in this particular case, the patient was frightened to come closer to me emotionally but I was 
scared as well. And I am thinking, I mean I can think of many moments were I would approach him, 
and he would allow me access to his emotional world and it would become too much for me” 
(P18/L123-124) 
 
 
5. GEORGE 
 
“For me, this might sound weird, personally it is not challenging but to get the team to join that world 
and engage with, it is very challenging due to the very fact that, from a phenomenological or 
intersubjective point of view one may conceive of as a subjective reality of any given patient...” 
(P3/L35-36) 
 
“But I personally don't find that difficult at all and it depends how concrete or metaphorical you take a 
narrative” (P3/L44) 
 
“So my experience is that I can completely make sense of the patient's experience, which is usually in 
psychosis characterized by threat of some kind” (P5/L56-57) 
 
“So if you truly allow yourself to immerse yourself into the narrative of someone with an inner 
psychotic episode, what you come out with is the experience of how they are relating to the world, or 
how they are situated in the world, how free or not free they feel there, and it's always internally 
coherent. I never actually worked with someone with a diagnosis of psychosis whose experience didn't 
have internal coherence. If that makes sense to you” (P5/L64-66) 
 
“But as a clinician and as a human being I find life maddening, it is manageable, but I can relate to 
the experience” (P9/L130-131) 
 
“Yes. Absolutely. If one I think is (p) I don't want this to come too self-indulgent, but if we are daring 
to be honest enough with ourselves, we can relate to most of these experiences if we allow ourselves to 
feel them” (P16/L279-280) 
 
“So yes, coming back to your question, I’ve never found anything really, not in psychosis anyway 
(laughing) that I can’t relate to a patient” (P16/L290) 
 
“But with most psychotic people I can actually, I feel actually emotionally related. I can relate to the 
world being mad, I can relate...” (P16/L298-299) 
 
“And that is particularly easy with psychotic people because they can easily talk, talk, talk, talk and 
then you think where on earth is this going. Particularly if they are slightly thought disordered so they 
might be saying something like “so I was rushing and I saw a red bus and then oh my God, and then I 
thought it was Tuesday”. This is a slightly thought disordered sentence which you can’t quite make 
sense of...” (P18, L318-320) 
 
“It's a level of despair that I have never had that I can’t, in some way it's not something that I can go 
in and say we can do something with it and it will be okay because I couldn’t feel it in that moment that 
it would be okay. Does it make sense? So there is an example where I got the feeling where this is too 
horrific. Either I can sit with that or I can’t actually say that I can relate to it because I couldn't. I 
think because it was too horrific or because I had no template within myself that allowed me to go 
there” (P20/L362-365) 
 
“When it becomes overwhelming for me, so I’m on a physical level a very freaky person. I’m very up-
close with people, I’m very touchy. That doesn’t bother me. It starts to bother me when I sense that 
there is a complete disillusion of boundaries, and when I actually start feeling that this is going a bit 
mad and when I actually start to experience a full sense of madness which I’m not comfortable with” 
(P30/L551-553) 
 
“Because you’ve dragged them out of this isolation, you showed them I can relate, and they might have 
confused this with a primary bond that they never had. And to then clawing it back and almost make 
the point that this is what happens with all patients, it’s not unique to you...” (P23/L432-433) 
 
“So I can come here, enter this space and can relate for a moment, I open some experiences up, you 
listen, and we probably never talk after this again. And that’s okay. And for me that is okay because I 
live life where I can get closer to people and I can have moments of connection and because I can have 
them I can let go of them, that is okay” (P25/L449-451) 
 
“Whilst again, with the patient with the tooth problems, if he was a private patient and if I was to get 
paid for it, I’d happily see him twice a week for the rest of my life. He fascinates me. He’s funny when 
					 304 
he’s okay, tremendously funny. Because he sees so many things in the world that other people don’t 
see, more nuances that I find funny” (P25/L463-464) 
 
 
6. JOHN 
 
“Because well as you know, well sometimes there can be great confusion or loss of boundaries as one 
of the common features in the more severe psychosis a lot of being unable to differentiate between self 
and other, (p) and to some extent one might sometimes find oneself doing things and only afterwards 
realize what was getting caught up into...” (P14/L90-92) 
 
 
 
SUBTHEME 3.3: ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY  
 
 
 
1. PAULA 
 
 
“Erm I think it’s been very difficult actually. It’s being quite a long time now. Initially I would feel 
quite uncomfortable with that I think. And I’d find it much more difficult to be present and I would be 
probably more keen to reflect on my need to pull back from the work and [p] I would be questioning 
whether there is any value of me being there. I mean whether my presence increases distress rather 
than help and I’ll be struggling with my confidence regarding the interventions” (P24/L126-129) 
 
“Yes. So I’ll be wondering whether I should be working with this person. Or would it be a better place 
somewhere else” (P25/L133) 
 
“So, where is this going? And to control it in some way to keep this person safe and whether that’s 
possible. Whether we can sort of, I guess something about things being manageable and not putting 
things in the way that might be unhelpful. I am feeling quite responsible for that really” (P35/167-168) 
 
“I guess those things cannot necessarily be fixed, acknowledging that. Erm... that actually you’re to 
meet somebody’s life in a very significant way that it’s quite a big responsibility really. Especially 
when you might not be able to do much about it” (P45/L209-210) 
 
2. BARBARA 
 
 
“A fault of mine. Sometimes I (p) don’t see the other parts. Ok, so the client that I feel very connected 
with, there was a time when he was making another guy’s life like hell, and he was very sadistic and 
very abusive, and I didn’t meet that part. I can hear about it, so I also, for, when he would say 
something abusive to me, I would say ok, it comes because it’s him, it’s because he is paranoid now, 
angry because he is…whatever, and I…didn’t stay with the front. Which is sometimes very very thick. 
So I think not staying with the front it’s not just good.  It’s also a fault; it’s also something, which is 
problematic. And I don’t know exactly how to sit with that, but something that I have been thinking 
about, throughout my work with him” (P64/L299-303) 
 
“…the treatment because it doesn’t give her anything, it has nothing to offer. Same time that I was 
thinking maybe I should talk to another therapist to do some work with her. I don’t know” (P71/L349-
350) 
 
“Well, it a frustrating, tiring, emm…hmm…(P). I guess it depends when…but failure; guilt also comes 
up…again some come or less. I don’t know if there is a word for about…to feel unethical, like I am not 
doing my job. With the other client, the male client, we were working at six months and I think I slowly 
manage to close the gap, but to feel that gap, that I don’t like him and he likes me. It’s kind 
of…of…like I don’t know; it’s a feeling by itself. To fill that gap” (P75/L378-380) 
 
“Well, when talking specifically about the gap, or not just the gap, maybe, but it’s like I am deceiving 
somebody. It’s a very, it can be a very intimate space. Like if I don’t, can’t, to be there, if I want to be 
there it’s I guess possibly something that I could handle better than if I just don’t…want to be there” 
(P78/L387-388) 
 
“Yeah, yeah. Alone, lost, unclear. It’s not even, it’s not even, I was kind of thinking failure. But it’s not 
even that. It’s before that. It’s not even failing to do something. Hmm…Yeah and then (p) in a sense it’s 
difficult ethically, because we are suppose to do something. This is the occupation of change. 
Profession of something…of substance” (P72/L359-361) 
 
“And I felt that I might be doing something really really wrong, like I am caught in some sort 
of...something I cannot see” (P34/L143-144) 
 
 
3. BETH 
 
 
“...so I kind of totally disconnected from him and I, I think it was quite obvious actually, but I don't 
think I lost him, as such, I think it was, it was totally my issue” (P26/L302-303) 
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“So I had supervision and I spoke to colleagues, so it took about a week for me to kind of calm down 
and return to him and I think it was completely my issue to carry on pretty much from where we were 
and see whether he wanted to do therapy, what he wanted to work on end, yes” (P27/L310-312) 
 
“I thought it was my fault, but it wasn't, but I kind of thought that I could do this and that, it was part 
of my, I can save him, I'm afraid I did have a bit of that, even though I tried to leave it aside. Most of 
his weight fell on me and I, well I probably, better I took his weight, because I wanted to. It came; I 
also took it, because nobody told me that I have to see him four times a week. I thought I would be able 
to help him, but on occasion I would feel angry, oh for goodness sake, we did work four times a week, 
or sometimes even twice a day and we talked about this several times” (P34/L352-356) 
 
 
4. CARLA 
 
 
 
“Yes, wondering about the boundaries and about me being a bad therapist for him” (P10/62-63) 
 
“So yes, it was so strong, and then when he, when he (P) when he came for the next session I was very 
passive, I didn’t allow him to...well…it was strange, I felt guarded. And it felt like it was totally my own 
fault of what happened, I mean this whole disruption between us” (P13/L86-87) 
 
“Oh, it was horrible. I felt very upset, and angry with myself, guilty. That it was my entire fault. And 
then I tried to invite him to explore what has happened between the two of us. And the difficult part for 
me, very difficult part was to sit down with my vulnerability in the room, I felt naked in a way. And you 
know, it was a mistake of mine, I shouldn’t have touched him that day” (P15/L98-100) 
 
“You know it is very easy for the therapist to say that, you know, you know, the patient is not 
responding enough, or the therapy isn’t going well because it is the patient’s issues. I mean, in this 
particular case, the patient was frightened to come closer to me emotionally but I was scared as well. 
And I am thinking, I mean I can think of many moments were I would approach him, and he would 
allow me access to his emotional world and it would become too much for me” (P18/L122-124) 
 
“I have noticed that when I keep an emotional distance from him, he gradually becomes paranoid. I 
mean, it is very implicit, but it happened a lot of times. So it is the whole thing, yes, around I want you 
to come closer” (P20/L153-154) 
 
“And you know, all these obstacles I was putting between us, because, I, I, you know sometimes it was 
very difficult to understand what he was saying, I couldn’t follow his stories, and I couldn’t connect 
with his emotions, but it was also my issues there. All the paranoia, the hallucinations in the room, was 
he, he was creating another persona in the room, one that he preferred compared to the actual person, 
me, I mean” (P33/L257-259) 
 
 
5. JOHN 
 
 
“I am always asking myself, where has it gone wrong? Or have I missed something, is it me or is it the 
patient, where is it, where is it, is it possible to locate some issues more in me, more in the patient, or 
somewhere between us. Or what’s the consequence of me having not done this, or said this, on, on, the 
relationship between us” (P26/L218-220) 
 
“...a common thing is that we like to feel ourselves as helpful but you can get stuck and actually there 
is something you are overlooking, completely left out, in which the opposite is actually something 
hoping to be held in some way but it can be speakable about, and not think about it either. It’s…it’s too 
narcissistically wounding or something like that. And there, there is responsibility. Responsibility falls 
on me (P27/230-232) 
 
 
 
 
SUBTHEME 3.4: COMPENSATORY MECHANISMS 
 
 
 
 
 
1. PAULA 
 
 
 
“I guess it makes me think about that kind of attaching and moving away to a degree. I think there is a 
way in which I support that in terms of how I ground people and at the end of sessions and focusing on 
something that is reality based and more real. But I am detaching a bit in that, in sort of ending the 
encounter” (P51/L250-252) 
 
“...sometimes when I start looking for tools and they might inevitably be CBT related tools, because 
CBT has a lot of tools, more of the doing interventions I wonder if that relates to a, I guess it’s another 
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way for me to sort of structure myself and make sense of what’s happening but also possibly sometimes 
another detachment from the being-with” (P61/286-288) 
 
“I guess, I think this is a very difficult case and sometimes it’s almost impossible to reflect upon these 
things. I think there is a fine line for this particular lady between personality difficulties and psychosis. 
And, there are times when there is clear psychosis and other times a borderline personality disorder 
element in terms of her seeking care” (P23/L119-121) 
 
“Because you see, what was difficult for me was needing to have an intervention really needing to do 
something in our meeting so that it would be valuable for the NHS. So working with evidence in a way, 
and having confidence about that. So there is a need to force something, to do, do to her, to feel that 
therapy is more constructive. And doing the sense making when she is allowing the sense making 
really” (P31/L154-156) 
 
“We have a lot of skills of just being present for clients that I think enable you to sustain a relationship 
when it’s very difficult. So I’ve always felt like that, and yeah but I don’t see many counselling 
psychologists do what I do” (P6/L17-18) 
 
“I am able to offer them a different type of relationship and I see that as having some value really. Its 
often not about recovery or change in the same way as I see it with other client groups. Sometime is 
about being there for the client being able to offer a different sort of relationship that they can learn 
from” (P13/L58-60) 
 
“I am talking about the team generally but she is better able to engage with me” (P21/L106) 
 
“She is very dissociative and the rest of the team would see her as playing games, as being a child” 
(P20/L103-104) 
 
“...but you often go back to an environment that it hasn’t got much of a capacity to see life on a 
continuum and acknowledge our own madness” (P45/L212) 
 
“So I’ll be quickly faced with a lot of judgements and appraisals about…someone being controlling, 
playing games, a lot, and a huge level of anxiety and chaos around whether this person has a psychosis 
or not. There are times when it is clear that there is psychosis but other times there appears to me that 
something else is happening. And a certain expectation about what a team should be able to achieve. 
And how things are making sense. I think I take this as part of my job really. How they are making 
sense of that and sort of being able to make sense about the team dynamics as well. But sometimes 
coming to a busy day to see a client that is that complex you are already not really present to yourself. 
And that has a direct influence on the work really. You can find yourself being pulled into other 
people’s attitudes and ideas about what’s happening. The third person being in the room in a way, the 
psychiatrist, the nurse, the social worker etc” (P47/L223-229) 
 
“Well I am at a setting where is primarily nurse laid; psychiatric nurses and they have a certain 
attitude, which is very pragmatic. Focused upon you know, skills, solutions, fixing things, and that’s 
very strong. Often there is a sort of gaze on you, what are you doing, what are you contributing to 
working with this client or there is a perception that If I was to talk about being with somebody I get 
laughed at the team at times. And it’s quite hard to fight for that. I think alongside pressures, lack of 
recourses and pushing towards certain pathways and the pressure when there is no improvement from 
these clients...” (P49/L240-244) 
 
 
2. BARBARA 
 
 
 
 
 
“We have group supervision, and I brought somebody that I don’t feel connected with…emm..I’m not 
sure…when I talk to him or when I talk about him I feel closer to him but when I see him at the unit I 
don’t feel like going and say hello. I don’t have much connection. And he says, he says that sessions 
are helpful and meaningful and so we kind of breached this gap that I am not comfortable with. And I 
was emm…I brought him to group supervision…and I think… I’m not sure if he was fully behind what 
he was saying…and my…why why do you, this thing that you are supposed to love your clients. Why? 
Who said it? Could it be someone that you just like, that you are close to” (P58/L275-279) 
 
“And I have another one that I am only working for…it’s more on the ADHD, borderline area, but we 
are only working for a month and a half, he is going to be leaving now he will not stay, anyway, very 
difficult to connect with…” (P66/L314-315) 
 
“And she was diagnosed at our unit with paranoid schizophrenia and the other girl is like hardcore 
borderline and something in that mixture, kind of went through…a layer and it wasn’t working. Too 
many issues yes, borderline and psychosis made the relationship difficult” (P81/L418-420) 
 
 
“But sometimes, when the connectivity is not as strong, like I had a client, I worked with for 7 months 
and then left and emm…and I just started…it wasn’t…and they were talking about being 
borderline…false self. Everybody failed her false self. And at the beginning I didn’t, and I was 
thinking, ok, maybe I don’t see it because they are here for a long time and they are all talking about it, 
as being part of, specific borderline, that she is and everyone was talking about how she’s bringing up 
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her false self and I started to see it in sessions and I think that was wrong. I was influenced by that and 
I wasn’t aware yet…that I could have been very different, a very different space. So sometimes, 
something different happens and I think it’s contaminated our space” (P97/L505-510) 
 
“So, I have these two schizophrenics that I find difficult to work with, their schizophrenia is very 
strong and it makes it difficult”(P97/L512-513) 
 
“Ok, how come that I feel something else? Something nobody else feels. And what do I do with it? How 
do I mediate it to the staff? Do I need to mediate it to the staff? So I kind of fill the gap” (P97/L504-
505) 
 
“This was very challenging. And then the other one was that I’ve heard from the outside a lot of 
criticism, talking about how poisonous he is, and destructive, and sadistic, and I couldn’t feel it” 
(P34/L140-141) 
 
“I think I abandoned…emm…when not connected, emm...I had a session with a client, she’s 
borderline…emm…either borderline with psychotic…emm…(p)” (P45/201-202) 
 
 
3. BETH 
 
 
 
“Working with people with psychosis interrelationally which I don’t think is something that happens 
that often. In my experience anyway” (P2/L5) 
 
“So, the role of the psychologist there is very, very big” (P12/L96) 
 
“Emm...and one of the things that came up, I think it came out of our work and not the work of 
anybody else, was that he was able to form bonds with people, and emm...” (P16/L135-136) 
 
“...who I had problems connecting with has a diagnosis of bipolar disorder, slash psychosis. Emm…so 
this particular person, he was also in the group, I worked a lot with him. We started, I’ll just explain 
that initially, the point was to get him to understand the psychiatrist thought would be helpful, to help 
him to understand what his symptoms were, why he had this diagnosis he had, so he’ll be able to 
manage it. Because he is actually a quite functional person. Emm…very, very functional. So, emm…he 
had a lot of difficulties with people he lived with, the less functional. He had issues with superiority 
and inferiority, that sort of thing. Narcissistic type difficulties” (P23/L210-214) 
 
 
4. CARLA 
 
 
	
“So yes, it is difficult work, but, yes very difficult at times but very rewarding. And very few of us do 
this work” (P36/L294-295) 
 
“But the other co-workers, are not always ready, I mean I don’t blame them. They are not always 
ready to understand what’s going on with, emm…they sometimes raise obstacles, their thinking it’s not 
sensitive to the therapeutic process. And yes, sometimes it is a real problem, it becomes a real problem 
because nurses, and other psychologists even or psychiatrist are not trusting the work and they force 
me to show results” (P35/L285-287) 
 
“But one has, this is a rule for me, yes, emm find people who can trust and speak about clients, 
supervision is very important, yes. But again it’s very difficult, very few of us work intersubjectively” 
(P35/L289-290) 
 
 
5. GEORGE 
 
 
 
 
“For me, this might sound weird, personally it is not challenging but to get the team to join that world 
and engage with, it is very challenging due to the very fact that, from a phenomenological or 
intersubjective point of view one may conceive of as a subjective reality of any given patient, that 
subjective reality is usually defined by what the psychiatrist or the nurse may think and constitutes the 
person as been mad, so to ask someone to join the subjective world you are literally asking people to 
confront something that they consider as madness” (P3/L35-38) 
 
“Most people I do think have neurotic defences, which protect them from truly engaging with the 
reality that nothing is quite real and that life is quite mad if we truly, truly look at it. And few people 
have the capacity for that” (P6/L82-84) 
 
“...and I have worked at an interpersonal level with them that other people would have been mortified 
by...” (P9/L128-129) 
 
“Now if I was a classic NHS person, I will think alarm, alarm, alarm you need to get into the hospital. 
Danger, danger, danger. But because I am not...” (P9/L128-129) 
 
“Because I have taken tremendous effort, if I can use the terminology, break into their world, and 
most, a lot of people would not make this effort to break into their world because either they don’t care 
or they are terrified” (P25/L455-457) 
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6. JOHN 
 
 
 
 
“So you can think of a bipolar, a person, what’s called a bipolar psychosis, they can switch from being 
wonderful, euphoric affect emm…and idealizing you and all kinds of things and issues” (P10/L51-53) 
 
“I think he realized that what we, me and my colleague were offering him was something different from 
what he’d experienced before” (P21/L145-146) 
 
“…so I think the fact that he (p) rather than other approaches which were trying to sort of get rid off 
the voices and things like that and so on and suppress them and so on...” (P21/L147-148) 
 
 
 
 
MAJOR THEME 4: THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF BEING-WITH  
 
 
 
 
 
SUBTHEME 4.1: RELATEDNESS AND CONNECTIVITY 
 
 
 
1. PAULA 
 
 
 
	
“You know thinking about it I have a great influence over, but often is also erm [p] sometimes with 
humour, or sometimes it can actually come out of the discussions with them, it comes out of the more 
human relationship, rather than me trying to employ a diary for them if I am using a CBT intervention. 
And I guess that brings me back to the difference between being and doing and being aware of that. 
And being-with allows forming the relationship but with this client group that comes with its 
challenges because often many difficulties arise in the relationship” (P39/L185-189) 
 
“R40: And how would you describe yourself in a being-with mode with a client? P40: I guess I am 
more present emotionally in terms of acknowledging the whole person, not just the psychosis so we 
might not be talking about that. With that I am more present within myself, I bring more of myself to 
that” (P40/L191-192) 
 
“But I actually very quickly formed a relationship with him...” (P17/L80-81) 
 
“...but he was able to form an attachment and to start to trust me and start working on all of those 
things” (P17/L84) 
 
“And I suppose I sometimes see working in that context, within that team I am constantly involved in 
some way, I am still present for some of the clients within my team where I am not necessarily seeing 
them for weekly therapy sessions or I am still holding them in mind” (P17/L90-92) 
 
“I guess there are moments of reflection and challenge and quite recently I had a quite significant 
reflection with somebody about them acknowledging how they had a fantasy that I could look after 
him” (P56/L264-265) 
 
 
2. BARBARA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“It happens naturally and today you know when we were going towards the end of therapy he knows 
exactly how I feel towards him. He knows the difficult times; he knows things that now we can talk 
about it freely and about the connection between us and that’s because it was there all along. You 
know it didn’t just happen” (P32/L128-130) 
 
“It becomes difficult when they don’t enter your heart, sort of becoming a significant other for the 
treatment, becoming something that I can...that I want to work with, feel connected with” (P36/L151-
152) 
 
“You know, to see the potential I think that’s what connects me to clients, some kind of potential that 
you can connect with them, have a bigger space in them. Emm...to want to work with them also...to 
want to explore them, to be interested and really curious about them. Emm...it doesn’t always happen. 
Emm...no that’s not true. You can find it if you look good, that’s the thing, but sometimes you need to 
look hard. Like, there will be some clients that I connect with them really quickly” (P37/L159-161) 
 
“I think when I know that is that, is when I become jealous of the guys that spent with them 24 hours” 
(P39/L167) 
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“Well, I think I get something from it also. They become meaningful, for this connectivity they become 
significant. So it’s a good place” (P55/L269) 
 
“...when I feel some sort of connection, these are the places where there is the…will…and where there 
is will there is a way. And hopefully, if the will exists from both sides then we start working” 
(P60/L288-289) 
 
“I think there is connectivity; we have a very strong relationship. I am not underestimating that 
relationship. Emm…or we can look at and…but there is this lacuna, this area that we don’t enter. And 
that possibly is you know, a deeper level of connectivity. It’s not that it doesn’t exist. It’s not that there 
is nothing to hold on to” (P82/L424-426) 
 
“...and I think if I would think hard I can find the places where he was there for me. But I think that's 
very important” (P54/L259-260) 
 
“And with her is for both of us, we both kind of, there’s this area that we both don’t enter. So it’s not 
just her that doesn’t enter. I don’t enter there, and it kinds of stays…emm (p) We have another six 
months, so we have started talking about it now. On the last session, the last last session, it was really, 
almost kind of talking about that, you know, talking about us, what’s missing, what’s not there. It’s 
always, always spoken of…not…kind of rushed upon it and I think that’s something that (p) and I think 
that on her part emm…it has to do with her breakdown that causes, you know, a deeper fear of 
attachment etc etc etc. And with me it’s more neurotic. But it’s there. And I am not sure, I think what 
we can do it together, is possibly highlighted…we…I think we’ll be able to pass through it because, 
because it’s somewhere that we need, so that we can get connected with this lack” (P81/L409-414) 
 
“To…you know to, to get to know them outside…well not just. To get to know them outside the therapy 
room and I imagine to get them to know me in different set” (P42/L184-185) 
 
“...I do think that there is something about becoming a solid object for him but for me was also 
connected towards the relational approach. I really see the connection there. And for him to really 
know what I feel towards him, to be aware of what I think about him and how I am with him. The fact 
that...emm...be embarrassed at times, make mistakes and listen to him, take him seriously, was a lot of 
the work. That there is somebody that I see and that he sees himself through me. So this openness it 
needs to be there in order for them to have it” (P53/L246-249) 
 
“I mean, it is the connection, it is the…and the…the…I think is the right word to describe the 
relationship. So I think it’s good. And then, once is there, then (p) so I am thinking…so I have this 
client that I am very connected to, 2.5 years we are working together, a long time, he knows me, I know 
him, we can work in a way that is suitable for him…” (P66/L312-314) 
 
3. BETH 
 
 
 
 
“Therapeutically I connected with him, straightaway especially when he first started... So he was 
someone who opened up straight away which I liked, extremely honest about what he thought” 
(P26/300-304) 
 
“But we had a lot of moments where I felt that we were connecting if you want to call an I-Thou 
relationship. The, I don't know if I can describe it completely. I know that I feel very close to someone 
else connected when I feel emotional I got tears in my eyes and (p) when time flies and I don't 
realise...” (P30/L322-324) 
 
“...when he was connected with the sadness and he had tears in his eyes, I found that, I would be able 
to be connected with him, there. I knew physically, more physically I will go with that, whether it was 
true, true emotion, or whether he was trying to bring an emotion in me, as in to use me, which he very 
rarely did. When he, when .............. was connected to his emotion, for me it was totally real. Actually, 
talking about him I have a physical reaction, my stomach is hurting. And I'm imagining that probably 
at the time of, having that physical reaction, I certainly would have tears in my eyes, and yes, and 
normally when I feel emotional I also have pain in my stomach” (P33/L339-343) 
 
“A lot of sadness it was very overwhelming, he was somebody I got very attached with, and it was very 
sad when he left” (P34/L352) 
 
“Sorry perhaps I'm going too much into it. But I was extremely connected to him and by using myself I 
think slightly too much I became I sort of followed the vulnerable child a bit too much, and he was 
actually very helpful, he kind of realised that not in these exact words we were able to sort of organise 
that together. So he would, yes. Anyway I don't want to go too much into it. He helped me and I helped 
him. That's what I want to say and that’s what I think it's very helpful when you're more present, you 
need to be very careful when you are present, because you can get a bit confused and that's where the 
intersubjective bit comes in...” (P40/L428-432) 
 
“...so because I am doing a lot of art therapy, they talk a lot about the space between, between you and 
your artwork, with is the space between you and yourself or you and the other person, and the energy 
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that is created between you and, so if I were to think about it in those words, yes if someone was more 
vulnerable I would feel that I will need to be closer to them, be more intact...” (P46/L472-474) 
 
“I just find it extremely interesting, and I'm more in love with it than scared by it. I feed my anxiety, I 
use anxiety quite a lot, so I am someone who gets quite stressed, I feel I can connect with people with 
psychosis by no means have their experiences, so I don't hear voices or have unusual experiences, but I 
have on occasions and I think most of us have, quite paranoid and extremely anxious, but much more 
than I need to” (P49/L487-490) 
 
“I felt very alive, I, I was happy that it seemed helpful for him, I was sad that I didn't catch my 
countertransference in time and I went into too much, I was too connected to him...” (P41/L435-436) 
 
 
4. CARLA 
 
 
 
 
“But, see, there was another part of me that, that felt so strong, see I had the need to go and care for 
him, and tell him something. And I did. My human side was activated; let’s say I deliberately decided 
to come out of my therapist role. And, yes, there, I, I said something comforting, and I put my hand on 
his shoulder and I will never forget how he looked at me. It was, I actually feel it in my stomach now, it 
was, it’s like (P). So, I felt that we were one at that moment. But you see, it wasn’t, I didn’t feel that 
there was no boundary there, there was, but we were one and two at the same time” (P13/L81-84) 
 
“He is such a wonderful man, so clever, and, and, yes, so interesting. I often look forward for our 
session, it is so easy now to follow him, emm and also, he knows that, he feels that, yes, he tells me that 
sometimes. I get so many things as well, from him (p) he seems to, he holds for me, and not only him, 
he holds parts of me, if you prefer, contains some of the craziness that you don’t get with other 
patients, I mean the more neurotic, so it is a very rewarding relationship. When, emm…you asked 
about the connection, and, emm…yes, it is a very strong connection, I feel for him, emm…I mean I care 
for him a lot, we have a space, we created a space, which is very safe for both of us, I hope (laughing)” 
(P34/L266-270) 
 
“See, this patient was able from the very beginning to stir, yes to mix very different emotions in me. I 
would become very, very emotional in the sessions, or very angry, or very anxious, and I’m not sure 
how this sounds, but our relationship is able to contain me. Not only me, both of us, but I am talking 
about me here so, yes” (P9/L53-55) 
 
“Do you know any person that comes to our services to provide containing? They come, all people 
come to me, to us, because they need to be helped, contained, nurtured, and million other things but 
this is my role and yes, surely not their role. So I did find myself wondering (P). Yes, wondering about 
the boundaries and about me being a bad therapist for him. How can a disturbed person, and sorry, I 
am saying disturbed only because I can also speak of my own disturbances, yes…I mean it is not label 
or, you know, we all are to different degrees. So how can disturbed people hold me emotionally? There 
is something real and symbolic in this of course, as you understand” (P10/L61-65) 
 
5. GEORGE 
 
 
 
 
“It has an affect on me. As I said with this patient he’s someone that on a relational level I don’t mind 
spending time with, he fascinates me. We had a connection, well, (P). Hold on, I don’t want to be in 
assumptions. So there is people I meet in my life, friends, colleagues, something or other, whereby 
when you are together with them they see something and you can see it at the same time and it’s a very 
beautiful experience because you share some overlap in your mind. And I am someone who loves that. 
I value these things in my life. Often working with psychotic patients, they can open up a world for me, 
which I often find fascinating and I can see it with them, and yes, I lose that. And I do find that very, 
very sad. So it is not just them, there is certainly a part of me that does find that sad but unfortunately 
is part of the profession” (P26/L489-494) 
 
“So that leaves me deeply sad as much as, you know often when you discover the world that these 
people have grown in, they are so lonely, so desolate, that it is actually truly upsetting; if you truly 
connect. If you manage to get into their world. If you manage to have a transpersonal moment with 
them and you can see what life looks like from where they are sitting, that can be quite sad and it’s of 
course, well of course for me, a therapist, whilst we know that we cannot truly change another person, 
we nonetheless, I think we retain, some omnipotent fantasy that we can do something in terms of 
helping them. Because otherwise there wouldn’t be any point of doing what we are doing” (P25/L458-
462) 
 
“Whilst again, with the patient with the tooth problems, if he was a private patient and if I was to get 
paid for it, I’d happily see him twice a week for the rest of my life. He fascinates me. He’s funny when 
he’s okay, tremendously funny. Because he sees so many things in the world that other people don’t 
see, more nuances that I find funny” (P25/L463-465) 
 
“And I feel the same with psychotic people. That I have access to an experiential world, which doesn’t 
feature in my day-to-day reality and is a world I actually take pleasure in. Because I can find joy in 
madness. I can find it quite enjoyable. But that gets lost. And then there is a human element, whereby I 
know that, I often wonder how these people are and part of that wondering is much about me it’s not 
just about them. So yes, it does affect me personally. But then, I assume that, this is a risk factor in 
working intersubjectively. If you allow yourself to relate to human rather than to pathology this, it’s a 
relationship at the end of the day. A relationship, an encounter. Just because we call it therapy it 
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doesn’t make it less human in that sense” (P26/L499-504) 
 
“…as much as I contain sanity for that patient that they can’t hold, they could hold my madness 
because that’s their base position. It’s almost like, it’s a projective identification in that sense. It’s 
something that I lose, and afterwards I have to hold it by myself again in a less productive way. And 
that’s what gets lost in a very simple way for me” (P27/L506-508) 
 
“I find these people much more real and they contain a part of me that these people cannot contain. 
And there is the sadness. I feel left afterwards, I feel lost with that. Because I certainly think as I said 
earlier on, the world is mad. The experience of life is mad” (P28/L512-514) 
 
“…but be able to say that of course life it's maddening at times, that feeling is reality, where if I was to 
tell this to my colleagues in a peer supervision group in the NHS, they would have said, hold on you 
are making this worse. But as a clinician and as a human being I find life maddening, it is manageable, 
but I can relate to the experience” (P9/L129-131) 
 
 
6. JOHN 
 
 
 
 
“A Greek patient actually who actually meant a lot, one day I went for a walk with him for a session, 
and I can’t remember the circumstances that provoked that but just seemed the right thing to do...” 
(P13/L83-84) 
 
“It was demanding work because at times it was very confusing, the voices were not quite easy to 
understand at times, and his change, his state, the voices would come and go a lot, sometimes they 
could be almost magically disappearing and then they came back again, like a chorus.  So it was hard 
work, to my relationship with him. I mean, I think I carried with me, into my work, a sort of quite 
confidence that I can be of help to people which doesn’t mean to say that at times I have to be, feel, 
manage feelings…quite helpless at the same time, I mean there are setbacks and so on. Emm…(p). I 
was…I don’t know if that’s part of the questioning but its’…anyway let me say it. I was sad when we 
came to an end. I was (p) it was circumstances beyond my control or the services’, so its boundaries 
and things like that but it meant that we had to draw an end, and I knew we had a lot more we could 
do, so I had to manage my own sadness and disappointment about the limits of what we had achieved, 
but the same time help him manage the ending too, and his family, because we were working with his 
wife as well, and I remember him saying at the end, “the voice will miss you” he said (laughing). That 
was quite touching in a way” (P21/L154-162) 
“...sometimes a spontaneous gesture in which one does something outside of the norm that can be 
helpful. I don’t do this in a planned way, but I can remember working with an asylum seeker patient 
with psychosis who had, who was very on the edge…emm…and I think she was pregnant at the time 
and suddenly there was a crisis and she had to move at the weekend, and having got any sort of 
facilities and no money and things like that and I found myself with the care coordinator actually 
physically helping her move some heavy, you know washing machine you know things like that from 
one thing to another, and that meant a lot to her that I was prepared to do that” (P12/L76-81) 
 
 
 
 
SUBTHEME 4.2: THERAPIST’S SELF-EXPERIENCE 
 
 
 
1. PAULA 
 
 
 
 
“I guess it comes up with just the acceptance of things. Much more existential level really. You know 
really difficult things happen in life and I suppose with that probably my awareness that difficult things 
happen in my life as well and how do I deal with that. And about being more grounded in that and I 
think the warmth is also from the position of the awareness of myself and from my own experiences of 
[P] if that makes sense really” (P43/L203-205) 
 
“I guess I am more present emotionally in terms of acknowledging the whole person, not just the 
psychosis so we might not be talking about that. With that I am more present within myself, I bring 
more of myself to that” (P40/L191-192)  
 
“And in the rest of my working life I am not religious as a person necessarily, or these huge amounts 
of customs and actually as a person I sort of resist to that but in my client work I accept it and see that 
it has value for people but it forces me really to question my own beliefs. If I’m truly present with 
someone it challenges me” (P45/L214-216) 
 
 
2. BARBARA 
 
 
 
“I think I bring more and more of myself into the therapy room. I think that sort of wish was sort of 
stronger when I started working at the unit so the gap is kind of emm…but I’ll say that emm…(p) I 
guess the more vulnerable parts. It’s about getting in touch with your deeper self” (P43/L189-191) 
 
“Like a simpler aspect would be my issues. So why I went to become a psychologist, that my, my 
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struggles in psychology, my struggle is to make the connection. So this is…but I think it’s also a 
meeting between us. Because there are other times which it doesn’t happen. It’s a space between each 
other on that aspect. (P) And I guess it is, it’s like an echo of being rejected, or hurt, and being tempted 
to do something that doesn’t fulfill itself. It’s that, that area. That’s the place that I can possibly 
connect with” (P84/L430-433) 
 
“Sometimes when the connection is strong, like with the guy that I work for long term, then I kind of 
find myself within this gap. Like, being also aware of my own stuff.” (P97/L504) 
 
 
3. BETH 
 
 
 
	
“...what I remember for sure was that I had physical reactions, as in my stomach would hurt, or my 
eyes will be burning or teary, when I felt that he had understood something or had become closer or he 
had come to an understanding for something about himself, and that had mainly to do with his 
relationship with others. And the way he saw others in the way he saw himself so I am sorry I don't 
actually remember particular examples. But yes, very connected with, realities, parts of myself as 
well” (P30/L326-329) 
 
“So I actually liked that, I liked that Ι was connected, for them and also for me, for me, as a person, I 
had difficulty my life, I wasn't connected with my emotions and I didn’t learn to do it, I avoided them 
for a long time so it is something that I learned and I liked, you know I did a lot of gestalt work, and 
person centred work and that sort of thing and I, so I would find it, yeah, I’ll be pleased let's say. Not 
pleased with myself that I was doing good work but that it was something that it was a real 
relationship let's say” (P33/L343-346) 
 
“...but when I did feel something the emotion was too, and I would feel overwhelmed because what he 
was mentioning was real, like he would say I have no future, and I can't make any plans, and you know 
I…” (P33/L349-350) 
 
“The reason I mention this it's because I think it's quite important, I feel I can relate to these people. 
To some extent. And I feel very, so I connect with myself, with what I am and also I find it intellectually 
quite interesting. But more on an experiential level” (P49/L494-496) 
 
 
4. CARLA 
 
 
 
 
	
“I really felt his pain, and mine. I was going through a very stressful period on a personal level at the 
time” (P13/L84-85) 
 
“You know, I felt that I suddenly became something I wasn’t aware of before, like I, I, but that I also 
wasn’t aware of. Something that terrified me. Yes, I did feel terrified. Also, because, you know, because 
of the experience of not knowing who I was in that moment, but also because of coming closer to a part 
of myself which was scary. And it belonged to me; it wasn’t the patient’s stuff. So at the same time I felt 
like a detached observer of myself and, and what was interesting was that what brought me back to 
reality let’s say was the patient himself. I remember at one point looking at him and his gaze woke me 
up. I suddenly, very suddenly, yes, felt that experience of when I touched him that day that we were one 
and two at the same time” (P16/L105-109) 
 
“Well, protect me from having to face the reality that this patient was not very different, yes different 
from me in some way. In many ways actually. I identified with some of his difficulties. And I became 
detached in some way for some sessions. And I was losing him, and he was losing me. But we both 
tried hard you see. We were both part of this, and it was difficult for both of us. I actually think that it 
was more difficult for myself for a while” (P17/L114-116) 	
“And I am thinking, I mean I can think of many moments were I would approach him, and he would 
allow me access to his emotional world and it would become too much for me. And that’s, I mean 
coming closer to him, meant that I was becoming closer to parts of myself that I didn’t know existed to 
a certain, yes, to a certain extent. What comes to mind now is issues around identity and sense of self. 
This patient’s unstable sense of self threatened me but not only, I mean (p), it also enlightened 
something, to a certain extent, very existential about my sense of self in many ways. I mean my 
identities or roles let’s say, as a therapist, as a mother, as a daughter etc and how they are connected 
or not” (P18/L123-128) 
 
“I can remember many times with this patient that when I have the need to pull back from the work, I, 
kind of, yes, sort of finding in me spaces that are mine, completely mine and I detach from the client 
because I detach from something horrific I encountered within myself. In and out, in and out all the 
time (laughing)” (P21/L162-164) 
 
 
5. GEORGE 
 
 
 
“…things got under my skin where I couldn’t step out of because I encountered a level of terror, that I 
had, or despair, that I had previously not found in myself. So either I took on the person’s despair or 
because I allowed myself to connect, I found a level of despair in myself that I previously not been 
aware of. And it was scary. That sometimes happens. But that I can only call it the very depths of 
despair. Where everything is lost for example and one has a snapshot moment whereby you realize you 
can’t hang on to anything in life truly” (P20/L353-356) 
					 313 
 
6. JOHN 
 
 
	
“In summary I see everybody having varying degrees of vulnerability and facing life, facing life issues 
and we all have ways of circumventing, we all get tripped up when too much are happening...” 
(P8/L35-36) 
 
“...we all have borderline moments and we try to blur the boundary between us, or locate something 
outside of our self which really belongs inside and so on, and try to stir people up to take it on board 
when we don’t want to do it ourselves” (P26/L224-226) 
 
“...something overlapping from the patient that is touching something in me. So, that we’ve got some 
issue in common here. Oh…yes…oh…yes, yes. I mean I suppose a common thing is that we like to feel 
ourselves as helpful but you can get stuck and actually there is something you are overlooking, 
completely left out, in which the opposite is actually something hoping to be held in some way but it 
can be speakable about, and not think about it either. It’s…it’s too narcissistically wounding or 
something like that. And there, there is responsibility. Responsibility falls on me” (P27/L229-232) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUBTHEME 4.3:  OSCILLATIONS BETWEEN DISTANCE 
                                AND PROXIMITY  
 
 
 
1. PAULA 
 
 
 
 
“...and I think sometimes when I start looking for tools and they might inevitably be CBT related tools, 
because CBT has a lot of tools, more of the doing interventions I wonder if that relates to a, I guess it’s 
another way for me to sort of structure myself and make sense of what’s happening but also possibly 
sometimes another detachment from the being-with. And I guess that’s quite interesting if we are 
reflecting on it in that way. Often it seems very natural and perhaps it’s a useful thing to do and bring 
some of that to my work. But I think it’s also helpful to reflect on it really” (P61/L286-290) 
 
“They also help me to keep being there. And I was thinking it in with regards to their own defences. 
They need their defences and I need mine. And sometimes this enable me to, helps me to understand 
something to make sense of what my role is, in being in the room with them. And it allows me to think 
of formulation when it comes to this client group because I don’t think I could confidently say that my 
clients that present with a sort of residual psychosis that I have a formulation about and understanding 
that I am 100% right. I think sometimes these tools, these formulations help me to be able to make 
sense of the case and to take some meaning from it all. And to sort of be there and have some kind of 
relationship” (P63/L295-299) 
 
 
2. BARBARA 
 
 
 
 
“The client I am working with now and his family which is about to end where he announced it and 
have found an apartment and go on and live his life and he for a long...emm...there was no, we could 
have, emm...we started with a lot of mistrust and then he settled well into my world, you know I liked 
him, he has good aspects but he can throw me out at any time. But the same can happen with me. In 
and out, but see it’s part of the process, the relationship” (P27/L106-109) 
 
3. BETH 
 
 
 
“And, the main work I did was reflecting and bringing myself fully into what was happening. He would 
be like “oh so you're thinking this, and you must be thinking that” so very paranoid, a lot of paranoid 
thoughts. And I would go back, and sit with myself, and I need my space to think and understand” 
(P39/L395-397) 
 
4. CARLA 
 
 
 
 
“I really felt his pain, and mine. I was going through a very stressful period on a personal level at the 
time. So he didn’t say anything, and I didn’t, I just left and when I entered my office I felt so ashamed I 
did that. My superego forces we activated, so extremely I couldn’t breathe for a while. So yes, it was so 
strong, and then when he, when he (P) when he came for the next session I was very passive, I didn’t 
allow him to..well…it was strange, I felt guarded. And it felt like it was totally my own fault of what 
happened, I mean this whole disruption between us” (P13/L84-87) 
 
“So, but also because before I was talking about how important it is to find the good balance between 
distance and proximity, generally with all kind of, you know clients but in psychosis it becomes very 
important, more important. Yes, so part of this distance, which is very important as well because the 
client also needs help to understand that is separated from you But no, not just the client, me as well. If 
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I don’t move back it feels like I’ll get swallowed” (P19/L136-138) 
 
“I can remember many times with this patient that when I have the need to pull back from the work, I, 
kind of, yes, sort of finding in me spaces that are mine, completely mine and I detach from the client 
because I detach from something horrific I encountered within myself. In and out, in and out all the 
time (laughing)” (P21/L162-164) 
 
 
5. GEORGE 
 
 
 
 
“And to then clawing it back and almost make the point that this is what happens with all patients, it’s 
not unique to you, this is just the work” (P23/L433-434) 
 
“So I can come here, enter this space and can relate for a moment, I open some experiences up, you 
listen, and we probably never talk after this again. And that’s okay. And for me that is okay because I 
live life where I can get closer to people and I can have moments of connection and because I can have 
them I can let go of them, that is okay” (P25/L449-451) 
 
“So how close I can come, or how far away I need to be is exactly what I need to work with. Because 
again there again, in an existential sense all I’m trying to do with a psychotic patient is to drag them 
out of isolation. And in order to drag them out of isolation I need to find the right distance. Not too 
close, not too far, to allow them to safely make a connection with me. If I’m too far away, they will not 
reach me, I will not reach them. If I go too close, they’ll get overwhelmed or I’ll get overwhelmed or 
we get messed up and it collapses. So the whole, and this is generally for me in therapy, the whole 
game or dance is about the negotiation of the perfect proximity” (P29/L527-531) 
 
“I’m very up-close with people, I’m very touchy. That doesn’t bother me. It starts to bother me when I 
sense that there is a complete disillusion of boundaries, and when I actually start feeling that this is 
going a bit mad and when I actually start to experience a full sense of madness which I’m not 
comfortable with. And that usually feels, happens when I feel I have lost all differentiation and I no 
longer know where is me, where is them” (P30/L551-554) 
 
 
6. JOHN 
 
 
 
 
“...which gives you that certain amount of freedom to move, and once you got to that edge you stop 
yourself and you might be moved towards that edge and then to have just enough space before you go 
too far to rethink what’s going on” (P14/L93-95) 
 
“Well, I realized that if I were to describe what was going on to certain members of the team, so that l 
would be down on the floor so to speak, that…I might be subject to some ridicule or embarrassment, or 
humiliation and being made to think that I shouldn’t do that kind of thing” (P18/L122-123) 
 
 
 
SUBTHEME 4.4: BESTOWING MEANING 
 
 
 
1. PAULA 
 
 
 
 
 
	
“Much more real. Less of a battle. I guess there is less of a battle for meaning really. I suppose is the 
difference there between trying to sort of either dissect or change meaning from a sort of CBT 
perspective. Working with beliefs or questioning delusions or whatever might be. To just being-with, 
hearing how they make sense, how the client makes sense of things. But often I think if someone’s not 
ready to question or to change meaning they would have got it out in the first place. But again if they 
might be questioning meaning then this brings us more back to the relationship. So being present there 
and observing it. And this allows them to be present, I see that they feel not judged and more accepted 
and feel warmth in the relationship. Humanistic staff” (P42/L197-201) 
 
“...which enables them to deal with things in the here and now and to help them deal with some aspects 
of psychosis rather than to battle with it” (P13/L61-62) 
 
“And in the rest of my working life I am not religious as a person necessarily, or these huge amounts 
of customs and actually as a person I sort of resist to that but in my client work I accept it and see that 
it has value for people but it forces me really to question my own beliefs” (P45/L214-216) 
 
 
2. BETH 
 
 
“And other things which did not make any sense to me, but if the relationship wasn’t strong, I mean, I 
wouldn’t be able to return, and make sense, and the same applied for him as well. All I’m trying to say 
is that I was very anxious but our strong relationship allowed meaning and survived the rupture” 
(P26/L303-305) 
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3. CARLA 
 
 
 
 
 
	
“But yes, with this patient the connection is strong, and it is important because, this is exactly why, I 
mean it is why we are able to understand his delusions, that why they are meaningful. It is exhausting 
though...” (P34/L276-278) 	
“And one of the things that I kept reflecting about while I was talking to you, is how powerful it is for 
me as the therapist to be able to construct meaning with the client. And for me the only authentic way 
to do that is when the relationship is put on the spot, in, yes in the sense that we are connecting and 
disconnecting yes, but that it’s part of the relationship. That safe space which is co-created is the cave 
where meaning is located”(P36/L295-298) 
 
 
4. GEORGE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I cannot see how someone can’t work with the person intersubjectively. It doesn't make sense to me 
but that's probably my experience of life, and the person that I am. It's not logical to me to any shape 
or form. That’s where meaning is found, in that space” (P14/L234-235) 
 
“I asked him why it was important to have explosives in the session. And then he said I just wanted to 
simply see how you would react to this. And then I said I am mostly intrigued. And then I said 
something around, I wonder whether it’s important to know you can blow the situation up if it became 
too much. He said yes, that would actually be quite helpful, but it is actually just water. So I said I get 
that. But the whole point I’m trying to make here it is about something, it’s something about finding 
meaning in these things and understanding them intersubjectively. So for him the fantasy of a bottle 
that explodes was something that he brought in to test how far or close he can get to me, whether I 
could manage his madness, his anxiety and so on. And from there on he did that for 3 to 4 sessions and 
it was not an issue after, it stopped” (P15/L247-252) 
 
“So if you truly allow yourself to immerse yourself into the narrative of someone with an inner 
psychotic episode, what you come out with is the experience of how they are relating to the world, or 
how they are situated in the world, how free or not free they feel there, and it's always internally 
coherent” (P5/L64-66) 
 
“So every meaning that develops, every emotion that develops, develops from relationality or 
relatedness in that matter. Thereby we can only understand it and work with it in that domain” 
(P14/211-212) 
 
 
5. JOHN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The case when one’s responses parallel patient’s but in this case was such a powerful feeling and 
that’s why I put it together and it told me something about the patient. Suddenly it made me feel much 
more close to the patient. And sometimes you think you understand something about the patient and 
you are wrong. But here, this was something that lasted for weeks and months and opened the door to 
many other… (p). A much richer understanding of psychosis actually. Because the issue of shame and 
humiliation could explain the loss of other phenomena with this person” (P19/L131-134) 
 
“So it’s a question of just gradually making a psychological story that is useful to…rather than these 
strange bits of biology, and, totally explain it in biological terms. It’s actually a psychological one. This 
makes sense in terms of his life and very…not just intellectually, way of understanding, but that the 
understanding was highly relevant to his real life issues. But also it makes sense through our 
relationship” (P22/L187-189) 
 						
 
 
